The Jyllandsposten Controversy

I haven't said much about the Danish cartoon controversy. In one sense it doesn't strike me as an interesting issue: I would have thought that anyone who actually took the trouble to look up the cartoons, as I did, would see at once that there is nothing particularly anti-religious about them. Several of them are clearly racist, feeding on stereotypes about Islamic civilization, and I find it puzzling that so many people are defending what is, in fact, nothing other than a hostile European xenophobia. I find it sickening that so many people are using the label 'freedom of speech' as a way of proudly supporting racist attacks on an entire civilization. I don't think setting fire to embassies is quite constructive; but I don't think violent civil-rights uprisings or peasant riots are generally constructive, either. I think, as well, that such things are failures to attain to the level of moral action to which we are all called. I still can understand them, and I'm not convinced that those who engage in such acts are really more culpable than those who occasioned them, or even than those who condoned those who occasioned them. Wrongs are not righted by wrongs; but we must not let the more noticeable case distract us from recognizing that it is occasioned by something that is also wrong.

The most powerful commentary on this whole chain of events, I think, has been from Muslims; and I wish that people wouldn't talk about this sort of thing without making a serious attempt to see this matter from the Muslim point of view. My recommendations for blog-reading on the subject:

Sunni Sister has a very good post about a very common form of bigotry (I had noted briefly an example of this in discussing Daniel Dennett's odd essay in CHE recently):

My feeling is that by now, people who are really interested in knowing what the regular Mozzies of the mainstream think about terror have figured it out, and only those who are interested in stoking the flames of hate still say, "Why don’t they condemn terrorism?" every time a Muslim dares to raise his or her head. Because anyone with access to a television, newspaper, or the internet can take a moment or two to find out that Muslim community leaders, including those of our big organizations, spend a great deal of time telling the press that we’re against violence, terror, etc. everytime some Muslim somewhere does something wrong. It’s getting to the point where some guy named Abdullah mugs an old lady, and someone’s going to call the masjid and ask for the imam’s response, and some right wing nutter’s going to blog a post asking, "Why haven’t all the Muslims condemned this mugging?"

(HT: Dervish)

Abu Sinan has a few very brief posts on the issue that are worth reading: here, here, and here.

Qadeeb al-Ban at Mere Islam has a set of links to try to help others see why some Muslims are so angry over this matter. See also the post, An Idiot's Guide to Offensive Cartoons.

Sister Aishah's Islamic Journey discusses the lessons of the story behind the Prayer of Taif in light of current events.

In addition, see Bookish on the subject (HT: Akram's Razor). (Unfortunately there's a pop-up from something on the page.)

[UPDATE: This defense of the cartoons at the Washington Post seems to me to miss the point entirely; it would be irrational, for instance, to commission cartoons using Shylock stereotypes and blood libel to test how afraid the media is of Jews; it doesn't become more rational when similar stereotypes and calumnies are applied to Muslims. It also, like a number of others in this controversy, fails to remember what 'freedom of press' and 'free speech' actually mean, namely, freedom from government coercion. They are not what is primarily at stake here; what is primarily at stake here is bigotry that casts aspersions with a broad brush.]

Malebranche against Spontaneous Generation

THÉOTIME. It is necessary, Theodore, that I tell you about an experiment I made [une expérience que j'ai faite]. One day in summer I took a large piece of meat that I enclosed in a bottle, and I covered it with a bit of gauze. I noted that various flies came to lay their eggs or larvae on this gauze, and that when they hatched they ate the gauze and fell onto the meat, which they devoured in a short time. But as that smelled too bad, I threw it all out.

THÉODORE. That is how flies come from putrefaction. They put their larvae on the meat and hurriedly fly away. These larvae eat and the flesh putrefies. After those larvae have eaten well, they enclose themselves in their cocoons and leave them as flies; and because of this common men believe insects come from putrefaction.

THÉOTIME. What you say is certain. For many times I have enclosed flesh in a hermetically sealed bottle where no flies have been, and I have never found larvae there.

ARISTE. But how then can it be that one finds very large ones in all sorts of fruits?

THÉODORE. One finds them large, but they entered the fruits small. Search well, you will discover on the skin either a small hole or its scar. But let us not dwell, I pray you, on the proofs that people give that there are animals that come from putrefaction. For these are proofs so weak that they do not merit any reply. One finds mice in a newly constructed vessel, or in a place where there were none. Therefore, it must be that this animal has been engendered from some putrefaction. As if these animals were prevented from seeking out their needs at night, from moving on planks and and on the ropes onto small boats and from there onto the large ships, or as if one could construct vessels elsewhere than on the shore. I am unable to comprehend how such a great number of people of good sense have been able to enter into such a blatant and palpable error on similar reasons. For what is there that is more incomprehensible than an animal being formed naturally out of a little putrified meat? It is infinitely easier to conceive of a bit of rusty iron being changed into a perfectly good watch; for there are infinitely more parts of greater delicacy in a mouse than in the most complex clock.

Nicolas Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (1688), XI.viii. This is about 20 years after Redi's experiment against spontaneous generation, of which Theotimus describes a simple version; this convinced most people who were aware of it that larger animals like flies and mice did not arise spontaneously. Due to the discovery of microbes (by way of the microscope) it was still common for people to hold that microbes spontaneously generated; but, given Malebranche's view of all life as extremely complex machinery, he would hold that the same reasoning applies to microbes that applies to flies and mice. It took Pasteur, however, to provide (or finish providing, since he built on previous work) solid experimental evidence that microbes were not spontaneously generated in things like spoiled broth.

[As a side note, in case I have any readers who are interested in this sort of thing, Tara Smith of the weblog Aetiology is starting a new blog carnival, Animalcules, devoted to microbes. (HT: Science and Politics)]

Examples of Per Impossibile Reasoning

Looking for good examples of per impossibile reasoning that don't involve God, I found this one at Bill Vallicella's old Maverick Philosopher blog site:

A perpetual motion machine is nomologically impossible. Yet if, per impossibile, one were to exist, it would have to be a physical object.

This is a useful example for looking at how reasoning per impossibile works, since it is clear and not controversial. The conjunction of 'A perpetual motion machine exists' and 'A perpetual motion machine is nomologically impossible' is a contradiction. Despite this we can (one might say) overlook the contradiction and say, without supposing any difference in the laws of the universe (which would be a messy and complicated thing to do, given how much reasoning would be required in order to be consistent about it), that if a perpetual motion machine were to exist, it would have to be a physical object. It follows simply from its being a motion machine of any sort that it would have to be a physical object.

Another example, from Vomit the Lukewarm:

If, per impossibile, I existed by essence or definition, then I could never cease existing, for definitions are always true.

The point here, of course, is that to exist by essence or definition is to exist, simply speaking; even if we assume an impossible case of existing by essence or definition, to make sense of it qua case of existing by essence or definition, we have to treat it as a case in which the thing supposed to exist simply exists, end of story.

I think that my suggestions for an account of reasoning per impossibile apply to examples like these quite well.

Lincoln on the Preservation of Liberty

What constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence? It is not our frowning battlements, our bristling sea coasts, the guns of our war steamers, or the strength of our gallant and disciplined army. These are not the reliance against the resumption of tyranny in our fair land. All of them may be turned against our liberties, without making us stronger or weaker for the struggle. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in our bosoms. Our defense is the preservation of the spirit which prizes liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands, every where.

Quoted here as a selection from a speech at Edwardsville, Illinois, 11 September 1858.

Links and Notes

* The early modern Carnivalesque is up. The posts on astronomy in Calvin and Aquinas, self-portraiture, and leeks and onions in early modern philosophy were especially interesting. As can be seen from the passage in Malebranche, it's an important example for him; he is very clear that he is getting it from the story in Numbers. However, unlike the others, Malebranche never suggests that the Egyptians worshipped leeks and onions; his focus is on the Israelites, whose sin was not that they literally worshipped leeks and onions but that they gave leeks and onions priority over God.

* The second Biblical Studies Carnival is also up.

* Loren Rosson III has finished up his series on Lewis's Perelandra: Prologue, Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Epilogue.

* Lee at verbum ipsum points to this review of Nagel's The Last Word.

* I keep forgetting to link to Clayton's interesting discussion of Steward's analysis of 'could have done otherwise'.

* Bono's homily at the National Prayer Breakfast,(HT: GetReligion). It was interesting to note that he has a Thomistic understanding of almsgiving:

And finally, it’s not about charity after all, is it? It’s about justice.

Let me repeat that: It’s not about charity, it’s about justice.

And that’s too bad.

Because you’re good at charity. Americans, like the Irish, are good at it. We like to give, and we give a lot, even those who can’t afford it.

But justice is a higher standard. Africa makes a fool of our idea of justice; it makes a farce of our idea of equality. It mocks our pieties, it doubts our concern, it questions our commitment.

* Father Jim has a homily on Job.

[UPDATE: Jimmy Akin has a series discussing various interpretive approaches to Genesis 1, which he has put into a single post. I think I'll be putting up a post soon on evening and morning knowledge, which is a curious Augustinian variant of the Revelatory Day interpretation, one that has had a long and distinguished theological history.]

[UPDATE 2: An interesting discussion of the notion of 'existential import' (HT: Beyond Necessity).]

As you might have noticed, I'm making some minor changes to the template -- reorganizing a bit, sorting out the blogroll and adding a few people I haven't gotten around to adding yet, etc. This will probably be occurring over the next several weeks, bit by bit.

Betty Friedan

As you may know, Betty Friedan died Saturday. Some of the blogosphere's notable posts on her are found at the following weblogs:

Feministing
Hugo Schwyzer
Random Ravings (good set of links)
Tennessee Guerilla Women
Echidne of the Snakes
Feministe
UPDATE: nomadicfusion
UPDATE 2: Another good one at Echidne of the Snakes

If you know of any others that were particularly interesting, let me know and I'll put them up.

My suspicion is that at some point within the next few decades Friedan, who at present is still regarded as something of an out-of-date dinosaur, even by feminists who appreciate the work she did with The Feminist Mystique, will be seen, even by those who disagree with her overall view, as what she really was: namely, the most politically savvy feminist of her generation, who saw that the real key to lasting feminist change in the United States was in transforming for the better the lives of the large number of women who are too often dismissed by feminists (as Friedan herself often was, due to her focus on them) as "bourgeois." On its own such a focus was no doubt incomplete; but I think it was more savvy than it is usually conceded to be, and a more complete focus needs to be precisely that -- more, not less. But time is what will really tell. As Hugo Schwyzer notes, it's interesting to compare and contrast her with another great feminist who recently died, Andrea Dworkin. Between the two of them they have a lot to tell us about the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary feminism.

Reasoning per Impossibile

Reasoning per impossibile is initially a puzzling phenomenon. The reason is logical: from a contradiction anything follows. So the question is, how do we make use of an impossibility in reasoning per impossibile? Clearly we don't allow such reasoning to include to anything. There must be something to stop the spread of implication.

I think the solution to the puzzle is this. When we reason per impossibile we posit some impossible thing. However, we never reason from the impossibility. The reason we posit the impossibility is that it's useful for abstracting from particular details. Suppose that God necessarily exists and that, necessarily, every other thing that exists is sustained in existence by God. It's still possible to say, "If, per impossibile, God did not exist, what would the features of such-and-such created thing be?" In other words, the purpose of such reasoning is not to use an impossibility but to abstract from a necessity.

In this sense we can see reasoning per impossibile as a form of idealization -- indeed, idealization taken to an extreme. We are not committing ourselves to the impossible idealization's being the way things are; rather, we are idealizing in order simply to clarify some particular point or other about the non-idealized (and therefore possible) case.

There is another possible, and perhaps more important,use of reasoning per impossibile, one which is more epistemic or doxic in nature. We can use reasoning per impossibile in order to help us get more clear about the implications of someone's position, if that position includes a claim we consider to be impossible. For instance, the above theist can reason per impossibile, not in an attempt to determine anything about the subject of reasoning, but to determine something about the perspective; what the world would look like if we falsely assumed something impossible. In some abstract logical sense, of course, when we assume something impossible we are committed to everything; but as a matter of fact we limit the spread of implication, and need to do so if we are to reason at all. To that extent we are paraconsistent reasoners and need a way of seeing how to be rational even when paraconsistent, as certain contemporary logicians have seen. Reasoning per impossibile is one way we can handle failure of consistency in a rational way.

Candlemas

And when the days of her purifying are fulfilled, for a son, or for a daughter, she shall bring a lamb of the first year for a burnt offering, and a young pigeon, or a turtledove, for a sin offering, unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, unto the priest: Who shall offer it before the LORD, and make an atonement for her; and she shall be cleansed from the issue of her blood. This is the law for her that hath born a male or a female. And if she be not able to bring a lamb, then she shall bring two turtles, or two young pigeons; the one for the burnt offering, and the other for a sin offering: and the priest shall make an atonement for her, and she shall be clean.
[Leviticus 12:6-7]

Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word:
For mine eyes have seen thy salvation,
Which thou hast prepared before the face of all people;
A light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory of thy people Israel.
[Luke 2:29-32]

It is called 'Candlemas' because of the blessing of the candles. Candlemas is the Feast of the Presentation of the Lord in the Temple and the Purification of Mary, and is the liturgical of the ending of the Christmas season -- from now until Advent, Easter dominates the calendar. There's a famous poem by Robert Herrick that conveys this sense of the holiday:

The Ceremonies for Candlemas Day

Kindle the Christmas brand, and then
Till sunset let it burn ;
Which quench'd, then lay it up again
Till Christmas next return.
Part must be kept wherewith to teend
The Christmas log next year,
And where 'tis safely kept, the fiend
Can do no mischief there.

The best known association with Candlemas in North America is Groundhog Day. Traditionally, the weather on Candlemas was held to provide clues about the future of winter:

If Candlemas be fair and bright,
Come, winter, have another flight.
If Candlemas brings clouds and rain,
Go, winter, and come not again.

This is the source of the popular tradition that if the groundhog sees his shadow, we have six more weeks of winter. The semi-official groundhog of the United States, Punxsatawney Phil, saw his shadow today. None of Canada's groundhog grand marshals (Manitoba Merv, Shubenecadie Sam, and Wiarton Willie) did. Of course, in both cases the people involved just make something up beforehand.

Eric Gill

Here are (roughly copied) samples of typefaces by Eric Gill (1882-1940):





Gill Sans is a registered trademark of Monotype Imaging. Gill's famous work An Essay on Typography was set in Joanna. The book is more than a discussion of typography; it muses on the conflicts between industrialism and craftsmanship, and argues that the difference between a commercial article and a work of art is that the former is "simply physically serviceable and, per accidens, beautiful in its efficiency" whereas the latter is beautiful in its very substance and, per accidens, as serviceable as an article of commerce." Gill designed the grave monument for his fellow Distributist, G. K. Chesterton.

The Tate Gallery has a number of Gill's other works, in drawing, engraving, and sculpture.

End of an Era

Western Union no longer provides telegram services. (HT: JimmyAkin.org)

It was bound to happen sooner or later.

Hume on Women's Men

'Tis a general remark, that those we call good women's men, who have either signaliz'd themselves by their amorous exploits, or whose make of body promises any extraordinary vigour of that kind, are well receiv'd by the fair sex, and naturally engage the affections even of those, whose virtue prevents any design of ever giving employment to those talents. Here 'tis evident, that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment, is the real source of that love and esteem he meets with among the females; at the same time that the women, who love and esteem him, have no prospect of receiving that enjoyment themselves, and can only be affected by means of their sympathy with one, that has a commerce of love with him.

[Treatise 3.3.5.2]

Commerce Clause

Two interesting articles by Randy Barnett on the original meaning of the commerce clause (HT: Positive Liberty):

The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause

New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause

History Carnival XXIV

The new History Carnival is up at The Elfin Ethicist. Wilson did a great job with this edition. Go and browse!

The Gallows and the Rack

When Hume builds his account of the passions, he makes extensive use of examples. Some of them are rather interesting little insights into the culture of the day, at least as it was seen by Hume. (The Treatise was first published in 1739.) An interesting instance:

Thus we find, that tho' every one, but especially women, are apt to contract a kindness for criminals who go to the scaffold, and readily imagine them to be uncommonly handsome and well-shap'd; yet one, who is present at the cruel execution of the rack, feels no such tender emotions; but is in a manner overcome with horror, and has no leisure to temper this uneasy sensation by any opposite sympathy.

[Treatise 2.2.9.18]