Edward Feser at "Right Reason" (here and here) has been arguing that the war in Iraq was a just war, but I'm not buying it. Part of it, of course, is that strictly speaking, just war theory doesn't actually talk about 'just wars'; a war, as such, is neither just or not. Rather, just war theory talks about just warring, or, to be even more accurate, about leaders being just even in acts of war. The basic foundation for such a position is expressed well in Aquinas's three requirements: as prince of a city you can be just if you act from legitimate authority, with the proper disposition, toward the right end. All the maxims and criteria are intended as guidelines for what constitutes being just in matters of war. Feser goes through some of these maxims in order to argue that Bush's going to war in Iraq fits the criteria. I will comment on some of these.
(1) Legitimate authority. The only persons who can go to war are those who lead states in such a way that they are responsible for the security of those states. Feser attempts to dismiss the "quibble" that the war was not declared by Congress, on the basis that just war theory is not concerned with the specific mechanisms of authority; but this seems to me to be a very bad argument. Just war theory does not, it is true, dictate how legitimate authority is to be determined; but that's because it respects the facts of authority in each case. The U.S. Constitution splits the authority between Congress (the power to declare war) and the President (who is Commander-in-Chief). As Feser notes, there was a Congressional resolution in favor of the war; it can reasonably be argued that this counts. But this is a long way from saying that the objection is a quibble; on the contrary, it raises a very important point, even though it is not the strongest ground on which to object to the Iraq war.
(2) Just Cause. War can only be fought in defense of a violated right. As Feser notes, this is usually not understood in such a way as to constrain to a merely defensive war. Rather, it extends to any protection of rights under natural law or the law of nations (which is not international law, but that aspect of international law that international law must presuppose). The oppression of the innocent would certainly count. If it isn't a mere excuse. For what matters in just cause is not what cause may be appealed to; what matters is the actual purpose of the action of war. Just cause is a matter of ends (a just cause is that end to which a just action is directed), and what is more, it is a matter of actual ends, not possible ends. Therefore Feser moves far too quickly when he says that it's clear that the war in Iraq meets the criteria of just cause; because all he indicates are things that would certainly be considered just if unadulterated. It is possible to ruin any just end by mixing it with unjust ends. It is not enough for there to be something just to which one appeals in going to war; that something just has to define one's purpose for going to war, without admixture from anything unjust. Thus many opponents of the war are quite willing to say that there were potential just causes for military action to remove Saddam Hussein; what they deny is that we actually went to war with just cause.
(3) Last resort. The other major avenues of resolution (negotiation, mediation, arbitration, sanction, moral suasion, and the like) must be of no avail. Feser is right that a simplistic notion of last resort is clearly unsustainable. But last resort is still a tricky issue; for it isn't clear that the war was a last resort. The last resort, remember, would have to be the last resort with regard to the just cause. But most of the debate prior to the war wasn't about any plausible just causes but about "weapons of mass destruction." The real debates -- about what would be the best way to go about protecting Kuwait from Iraq, or protecting the Kurds from Saddam Hussein, or any other such case, never really happened.
(4) The knowability of the just cause as just. Feser is right that Ryba's argument on this point is simply bizarre. All that's needed for this is good character and a recognition of the principles of justice.
(5) Right intention. This one always bothers me, because in medieval jsut war theory 'right intention' means (more or less) 'right disposition'. What we usually mean is 'intended in the right way'; which is legitimately a concern, but only one of many. Understood in this way it is not a matter of disposing oneself properly to the fulfillment of the end but instead is merely just cause restated.
(6) Right means. In fact, it is questionable whether anyone today uses right means; to engage in right means you cannot (for instance) lie, and you cannot accept, even indirectly, the deaths of innocents as a means to your end. We, on the other hand, institutionalize lying in government agencies and military operations that are in part supposed to do exactly that.
The key issue, and the one that seems missing entirely from Feser's analysis, is that justice with regard to war is very difficult. You can be just in war, but you cannot merely assume that you are just on the basis of a few procedures; it requires continual soul-searching and a serious, complete devotion to moral good. The above is not an argument that Bush was unjust in war; rather, it's that the defense of the just even in just war is not so easy: it is an arduous examination only the just can endure.
Saturday, March 18, 2006
Cartesian Assent
A proto-Pascalian passage from Descartes (Second Replies):
Later Descartes notes that his position that we should only assent to what we clearly and distinctly perceive to be true, is a position about what is justifiable in seeking the contemplation of truth, not about what is justifiable in everyday life.
As far as the conduct of life is concerned, I am very far from thinking that we should assent only to what is clearly perceived. On the contrary, I do not think that we should always wait even for probable truths; from time to time we will have to choose one of many alternatives about which we have no knowledge, and once we have made our choice, so long as no reasons against it can be produced, we must stick to it as firmly as if it had been chosen for transparently clear reasons.
Later Descartes notes that his position that we should only assent to what we clearly and distinctly perceive to be true, is a position about what is justifiable in seeking the contemplation of truth, not about what is justifiable in everyday life.
Friday, March 17, 2006
Works by and Attributed to St. Patrick
Confession:
Letter to the Soldiers of Coroticus: A fierce denunciation of Christians killing Christians:
Lorica ('The Deer's Cry'): The famous prayer (of which I quoted a section in the previous post). The alternative name cames from the tradition that in response to the prayer Patrick and his companions were turned into deer so they could escape their enemies.
Likewise, the following farewell blessing on the people of Munster is traditionally attributed to Patrick, although I'm not sure what its claim to authenticity is:
A blessing on the Munster people --
Men, youths, and women;
A blessing on the land
That yields them fruit.
A blessing on every treasure
That shall be produced on their plains,
Without any one being in want of help,
God's blessing be on Munster.
A blessing on their peaks,
On their bare flagstones,
A blessing on their glens,
A blessing on their ridges.
Like the sand of the sea under ships,
Be the number in their hearths;
On slopes, on plains,
On mountains, on hills, a blessing.
There are other works that have been attributed to Patrick. The Synodus secunda Patritii, for instance, is a set of Irish ecclesiastical canons; it is almost certainly not by Patrick himself. There are also two Latin tracts, De abusionibus saeculi and De Tribus habitaculis, also probably not by Patrick, that were attributed to him; as was a synodical decree, Si quae quaestiones in hac insula oriantur, ad Sedem Apostolicam referantur. With any great and influential hero like Patrick, there are bound to be misattributed works.
And on a second occasion I saw Him praying within me, and I was as it were, inside my own body , and I heard Him above me—that is, above my inner self. He was praying powerfully with sighs. And in the course of this I was astonished and wondering, and I pondered who it could be who was praying within me. But at the end of the prayer it was revealed to me that it was the Spirit. And so I awoke and remembered the Apostle’s words: ‘Likewise the Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we know not how to pray as we ought. But the Spirit Himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for utterance.’ And again: ’The Lord our advocate intercedes for us.’
Letter to the Soldiers of Coroticus: A fierce denunciation of Christians killing Christians:
You prefer to kill and sell them to a foreign nation that has no knowledge of God. You betray the members of Christ as it were into a brothel. What hope have you in God, or anyone who thinks as you do, or converses with you in words of flattery? God will judge. For Scripture says: Not only they that do evil are worthy to be condemned, but they also that consent to them.
Lorica ('The Deer's Cry'): The famous prayer (of which I quoted a section in the previous post). The alternative name cames from the tradition that in response to the prayer Patrick and his companions were turned into deer so they could escape their enemies.
Likewise, the following farewell blessing on the people of Munster is traditionally attributed to Patrick, although I'm not sure what its claim to authenticity is:
A blessing on the Munster people --
Men, youths, and women;
A blessing on the land
That yields them fruit.
A blessing on every treasure
That shall be produced on their plains,
Without any one being in want of help,
God's blessing be on Munster.
A blessing on their peaks,
On their bare flagstones,
A blessing on their glens,
A blessing on their ridges.
Like the sand of the sea under ships,
Be the number in their hearths;
On slopes, on plains,
On mountains, on hills, a blessing.
There are other works that have been attributed to Patrick. The Synodus secunda Patritii, for instance, is a set of Irish ecclesiastical canons; it is almost certainly not by Patrick himself. There are also two Latin tracts, De abusionibus saeculi and De Tribus habitaculis, also probably not by Patrick, that were attributed to him; as was a synodical decree, Si quae quaestiones in hac insula oriantur, ad Sedem Apostolicam referantur. With any great and influential hero like Patrick, there are bound to be misattributed works.
The Deer's Cry
I bind to myself today
The strong virtue of the Invocation of the Trinity:
I believe the Trinity in the Unity
The Creator of the Universe.
I bind to myself today
The virtue of the Incarnation of Christ with His Baptism,
The virtue of His crucifixion with His burial,
The virtue of His Resurrection with His Ascension,
The virtue of His coming on the Judgement Day.
I bind to myself today
The virtue of the love of seraphim,
In the obedience of angels,
In the hope of resurrection unto reward,
In prayers of Patriarchs,
In predictions of Prophets,
In preaching of Apostles,
In faith of Confessors,
In purity of holy Virgins,
In deeds of righteous men.
I bind to myself today
The power of Heaven,
The light of the sun,
The brightness of the moon,
The splendour of fire,
The flashing of lightning,
The swiftness of wind,
The depth of sea,
The stability of earth,
The compactness of rocks.
I bind to myself today
God's Power to guide me,
God's Might to uphold me,
God's Wisdom to teach me,
God's Eye to watch over me,
God's Ear to hear me,
God's Word to give me speech,
God's Hand to guide me,
God's Way to lie before me,
God's Shield to shelter me,
God's Host to secure me,
Against the snares of demons,
Against the seductions of vices,
Against the lusts of nature,
Against everyone who meditates injury to me,
Whether far or near,
Whether few or with many.
Happy St. Patrick's Day!
The strong virtue of the Invocation of the Trinity:
I believe the Trinity in the Unity
The Creator of the Universe.
I bind to myself today
The virtue of the Incarnation of Christ with His Baptism,
The virtue of His crucifixion with His burial,
The virtue of His Resurrection with His Ascension,
The virtue of His coming on the Judgement Day.
I bind to myself today
The virtue of the love of seraphim,
In the obedience of angels,
In the hope of resurrection unto reward,
In prayers of Patriarchs,
In predictions of Prophets,
In preaching of Apostles,
In faith of Confessors,
In purity of holy Virgins,
In deeds of righteous men.
I bind to myself today
The power of Heaven,
The light of the sun,
The brightness of the moon,
The splendour of fire,
The flashing of lightning,
The swiftness of wind,
The depth of sea,
The stability of earth,
The compactness of rocks.
I bind to myself today
God's Power to guide me,
God's Might to uphold me,
God's Wisdom to teach me,
God's Eye to watch over me,
God's Ear to hear me,
God's Word to give me speech,
God's Hand to guide me,
God's Way to lie before me,
God's Shield to shelter me,
God's Host to secure me,
Against the snares of demons,
Against the seductions of vices,
Against the lusts of nature,
Against everyone who meditates injury to me,
Whether far or near,
Whether few or with many.
Happy St. Patrick's Day!
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Intuitive Essentialism (IV)
So, I've looked around a bit at essentialism, in a very rough and crude way, in the following posts:
I. Essentialisms
II. Essentialisms in Biology
III. Essentialism in Darwin
Now, one might think from my having to go into all this background that I'm gearing up for some major criticism of the Shtulman paper (for the basic argument of the paper, see Chris's post again). But I'm not. The basic points of the paper seem to me to be very plausible. The background is primarily (1) for me to be more clear about essentialism; and (2) to emphasize just how careful we need to be when talking about essentialism. (See below for a few sources I've found since that do a better job than I at making one or two of my points.)
And we do need to be careful. For instance, what sort of essentialism does Shtulman have in mind when he talks about essentialism? It seems clear that he must be talking about type essentialism, since he thinks of it as being the positing of an ideal member of the family. He thinks of this as a sort of average (following Gould), and although type essentialists haven't generally seen the type as an average, this can be taken as correct for at least crude purposes. But the mechanisms he associates with essentialists in evolution -- transformationists, as he calls them -- are more like shared nature essentialism. This was why my first reaction on looking at one of Shtulman's diagrams (which Chris exhibits in his post) was, "Does that even make sense?" Remember, things are constrained by natures but constrained to types. Because of this, if a population is continuously changing it is quite reasonable to regard the type as being in more or less smooth transition throughout the change of the population: it depends on precisely how you think the type is determined (which has always been the trickiest issue in type essentialism), but it's a plausible first conclusion. However, types are not related to generations of a population by any sort of inheritance; you don't inherit a type, you resemble it. You do, however, inherit shared natures (that's precisely the point of inheritance, that you share something in common with the previous generation). So in the diagram Shtulman gives we find an implausible amalgam of type and shared nature essentialisms.
I haven't decided whether this is a lack of clarity in Shtulman, or a common confusion that he is faithfully reporting, or both. A confusion between shared nature and type is exactly the sort of confusion that one might expect of the general public; and, I suspect, it wouldn't be difficult to set up fairly basic situations in which people fail to distinguish properly between classifying by paradigm or type and classifying by features. So it is entirely possible that Shtulman is right that his transformationalists are committed to the sort of position his diagram suggests, in which essential types are given the job of natural essences. The result is a weird view in which things are caused to be what they are by their (independently changing) type. Perhaps this can be regarded as a form of vitalism. But, as Shtulman points out, his results suggest that transformationists actually haven't thought things through very carefully.
Shtulman doesn't use the term 'vitalism' but transformationism as he characterizes it involves the following characteristics:
1. Variation: Individual differences are nonadaptive or maladaptive deviations from type.
2. Inheritance: Organisms inherit any trait adaptive to the species as a whole.
3. Adaptation: Death of individuals prior to reproducitve maturity not important for adaptation.
4. Domestication: Domestication occurs not by selection but by manipulation of individuals over many generations.
5. Speciation: Morphologically distinct species do not share a common ancestor; morphologically similar species are linearly related.
6. Extinction: Background extinction (slow extinction over many generations) is not common.
Shtulman's results ended up dividing the evolutionary stance of the participants into three groups.
Transformationists tended to hold the above views.
Variationists tended to reject the above views and provide a view closer to standard scientific theory.
Pre-variationists tended to provide transformationist answers to the questions, but diverged from pure transformationists by tending somewhat variationist. The primary places where this variation tended to occur were inheritance and adaptation (p. 181):
However, is it really true, as Shtulman says, that what is misleading the non-variationist groups is the same thing that led earlier biologists, like Lamarck, Cope, and Haeckel, astray, namely, that species have essences and that the essences of species change over time? Well, if we are talking about a minimal essentialisms like the MCE I suggested in my first post, we certainly aren't wrong to say that species have essences and that the essences of species change over time; because species are kinds of things that change over time, and they become different kinds of things. It can only be a narrower sort of essentialism that is at stake here. What is more, it isn't clear whether we are really dealing with essential types or natural essences. And, more importantly, it seems very unlikely that some of the biologists who were not variationists were 'led astray' by assumptions possessed by the transformationalists in Shtulman's study. For one thing, what led Lamarckians astray (and even Darwin) was not any position about essences; rather they were led astray by the apparent plausiblity of the claim that the actual use or disuse of organs by individuals always causes heritable changes in them. Further, this mistake gives a general view of natural history that is very similar to Darwin's. It is true that Lamarck has no real place for extinction (instead of becoming extinct, species transform into other species) and he did hold that evolution had a direction (from the simple to the complex). Haeckel had (very roughly) similar views. But it doesn't seem, at least on first glance, to be any particular position about essences that leads to it. Perhaps there is some such position (I certainly haven't studied Lamarck and Haeckel very extensively), but it's certainly not obvious that there is. The reason for these positions were apparent facts, not assumptions about essences. (And Haeckel was certainly nothing even vaguely like a vitalist; nor does he seem a particularly likely candidate for a strong form of essentialism, although, again, it depends on exactly what you mean.)
The issue is complicated; my point here is primarily that it seems misleading to say that earlier thinkers about evolution were misled by assumptions about essences.
Incidentally, having taken the trouble to struggle through the previous posts on my own, I came across a few things that could have helped. These presentation notes by John Wilkins (PDF) make some points similar to ones I had made, and a few in clearer ways (and he also gives the sense in which a modern biologist would be inclined to deny that species have essences, i.e., shared natures, which I did not). Levit and Meister have an interesting paper called The history of essentialism vs. Ernst Mayr's "Essentialism Story": A case study of German idealistic morphology (PDF). Ron Amundson has a paper called Typology Reconsidered: Two Doctrines on the History of Evolutionary Biology (PDF); it makes the important point, which I was trying to make in discussing Mayr but only gestured at, that in Darwin's era the typical 'type essentialist' (to use my term) or typology was in direct opposition to any robust theory of biological teleology; our bizarre tendency to conflate the two (and to conflate them both with independent special creation) is a result of historical events since then. And it must be recognized as a genuinely bizarre tendency.
It occurs to me, in reflection on these sources, that I should say something briefly about an assumption I was making about 'essentialism' in biology; namely, that it is closely connected to classification. In fact, it's only really because of classification that types and natures (essences) have ever been talked about in biology at all. However, it occurs to me that many people may not make this assumption. If 'essentialism' is closely connected to classification, it follows that even a very skeptical biologist must admit a lot of essentialism, and it becomes weird why anyone would make such a fuss about essentialism -- it can only be done if you are thinking about a very, very particular form of essentialism. So, if people aren't beginning their thinking about 'essentialism' from classification, where are they beginning it? It would seem from modern creationists (in the usual sense of the term 'creationist'). This is not, however, a good template for examining either the history of biology or our cognitive tendencies with regard to biology.
I've gotten away somewhat from Shtulman's paper, in part because, as I said, there's very little I find to disagree with in it. I'm still left uneasy about it, for the reason I gave above: we need to be very sophisticated when we talk about 'essentialism', because failure to do so brings in a perpetual danger of distortion. Above I questioned whether it was quite so clear that 'species have essences that change over kind' was really quite so problematic in the history of biology as Shtulman suggests; and that leaves another question, namely, whether it is doing quite as much work in the transformationist errors as Shtulman suggests. It's much more plausible there, I think, and just by what can be told from a mere amateur's glance, something like Shtulman's conclusions are suggested by his data. Nonetheless, I would be happier if a study like this were done with a greater sophistication about essences. From Shtulman's own analysis it's very difficult to see what's going on. Is it the use of typological thinking? Is it the use of natural-kind thinking? Is it the bizarre mixture of the two, trying to get types to do what only natures could do? Or is there something more fundamental that makes people engage in apparently silly errors (like treating types as natures)? I don't know and I can't tell. It would be nice if further studies in this area would take a more sophisticated approach to this whole issue of intuitive essentialism.
UPDATE: John Wilkins has an excellent post in response called Essentialism Revisited. (Unlike me, Wilkins actually does work on this sort of subject). He also notes that you can listen to the talk (mp3) that goes with the presentation linked to above.
Were I to change a few things in the argument of these four posts, I would, besides incorporating the above sources more adequately, have been more careful about the issue of typology, since, as Wilkins notes, I muddle a few type-relevant issues together.
I. Essentialisms
II. Essentialisms in Biology
III. Essentialism in Darwin
Now, one might think from my having to go into all this background that I'm gearing up for some major criticism of the Shtulman paper (for the basic argument of the paper, see Chris's post again). But I'm not. The basic points of the paper seem to me to be very plausible. The background is primarily (1) for me to be more clear about essentialism; and (2) to emphasize just how careful we need to be when talking about essentialism. (See below for a few sources I've found since that do a better job than I at making one or two of my points.)
And we do need to be careful. For instance, what sort of essentialism does Shtulman have in mind when he talks about essentialism? It seems clear that he must be talking about type essentialism, since he thinks of it as being the positing of an ideal member of the family. He thinks of this as a sort of average (following Gould), and although type essentialists haven't generally seen the type as an average, this can be taken as correct for at least crude purposes. But the mechanisms he associates with essentialists in evolution -- transformationists, as he calls them -- are more like shared nature essentialism. This was why my first reaction on looking at one of Shtulman's diagrams (which Chris exhibits in his post) was, "Does that even make sense?" Remember, things are constrained by natures but constrained to types. Because of this, if a population is continuously changing it is quite reasonable to regard the type as being in more or less smooth transition throughout the change of the population: it depends on precisely how you think the type is determined (which has always been the trickiest issue in type essentialism), but it's a plausible first conclusion. However, types are not related to generations of a population by any sort of inheritance; you don't inherit a type, you resemble it. You do, however, inherit shared natures (that's precisely the point of inheritance, that you share something in common with the previous generation). So in the diagram Shtulman gives we find an implausible amalgam of type and shared nature essentialisms.
I haven't decided whether this is a lack of clarity in Shtulman, or a common confusion that he is faithfully reporting, or both. A confusion between shared nature and type is exactly the sort of confusion that one might expect of the general public; and, I suspect, it wouldn't be difficult to set up fairly basic situations in which people fail to distinguish properly between classifying by paradigm or type and classifying by features. So it is entirely possible that Shtulman is right that his transformationalists are committed to the sort of position his diagram suggests, in which essential types are given the job of natural essences. The result is a weird view in which things are caused to be what they are by their (independently changing) type. Perhaps this can be regarded as a form of vitalism. But, as Shtulman points out, his results suggest that transformationists actually haven't thought things through very carefully.
Shtulman doesn't use the term 'vitalism' but transformationism as he characterizes it involves the following characteristics:
1. Variation: Individual differences are nonadaptive or maladaptive deviations from type.
2. Inheritance: Organisms inherit any trait adaptive to the species as a whole.
3. Adaptation: Death of individuals prior to reproducitve maturity not important for adaptation.
4. Domestication: Domestication occurs not by selection but by manipulation of individuals over many generations.
5. Speciation: Morphologically distinct species do not share a common ancestor; morphologically similar species are linearly related.
6. Extinction: Background extinction (slow extinction over many generations) is not common.
Shtulman's results ended up dividing the evolutionary stance of the participants into three groups.
Transformationists tended to hold the above views.
Variationists tended to reject the above views and provide a view closer to standard scientific theory.
Pre-variationists tended to provide transformationist answers to the questions, but diverged from pure transformationists by tending somewhat variationist. The primary places where this variation tended to occur were inheritance and adaptation (p. 181):
Because the pre-variationists produced fewer ambiguous responses than the transformationists did...these diverences cannot be attributed to confusion or laziness on the part of the pre-variationists. Rather, they suggest that the pre-variationists held two variational beliefs that the transformationists did not: (1) that organisms inherit the traits of their parents regardless of their adaptive value and (2) that differential survival is relevant to species adaptation.
However, is it really true, as Shtulman says, that what is misleading the non-variationist groups is the same thing that led earlier biologists, like Lamarck, Cope, and Haeckel, astray, namely, that species have essences and that the essences of species change over time? Well, if we are talking about a minimal essentialisms like the MCE I suggested in my first post, we certainly aren't wrong to say that species have essences and that the essences of species change over time; because species are kinds of things that change over time, and they become different kinds of things. It can only be a narrower sort of essentialism that is at stake here. What is more, it isn't clear whether we are really dealing with essential types or natural essences. And, more importantly, it seems very unlikely that some of the biologists who were not variationists were 'led astray' by assumptions possessed by the transformationalists in Shtulman's study. For one thing, what led Lamarckians astray (and even Darwin) was not any position about essences; rather they were led astray by the apparent plausiblity of the claim that the actual use or disuse of organs by individuals always causes heritable changes in them. Further, this mistake gives a general view of natural history that is very similar to Darwin's. It is true that Lamarck has no real place for extinction (instead of becoming extinct, species transform into other species) and he did hold that evolution had a direction (from the simple to the complex). Haeckel had (very roughly) similar views. But it doesn't seem, at least on first glance, to be any particular position about essences that leads to it. Perhaps there is some such position (I certainly haven't studied Lamarck and Haeckel very extensively), but it's certainly not obvious that there is. The reason for these positions were apparent facts, not assumptions about essences. (And Haeckel was certainly nothing even vaguely like a vitalist; nor does he seem a particularly likely candidate for a strong form of essentialism, although, again, it depends on exactly what you mean.)
The issue is complicated; my point here is primarily that it seems misleading to say that earlier thinkers about evolution were misled by assumptions about essences.
Incidentally, having taken the trouble to struggle through the previous posts on my own, I came across a few things that could have helped. These presentation notes by John Wilkins (PDF) make some points similar to ones I had made, and a few in clearer ways (and he also gives the sense in which a modern biologist would be inclined to deny that species have essences, i.e., shared natures, which I did not). Levit and Meister have an interesting paper called The history of essentialism vs. Ernst Mayr's "Essentialism Story": A case study of German idealistic morphology (PDF). Ron Amundson has a paper called Typology Reconsidered: Two Doctrines on the History of Evolutionary Biology (PDF); it makes the important point, which I was trying to make in discussing Mayr but only gestured at, that in Darwin's era the typical 'type essentialist' (to use my term) or typology was in direct opposition to any robust theory of biological teleology; our bizarre tendency to conflate the two (and to conflate them both with independent special creation) is a result of historical events since then. And it must be recognized as a genuinely bizarre tendency.
It occurs to me, in reflection on these sources, that I should say something briefly about an assumption I was making about 'essentialism' in biology; namely, that it is closely connected to classification. In fact, it's only really because of classification that types and natures (essences) have ever been talked about in biology at all. However, it occurs to me that many people may not make this assumption. If 'essentialism' is closely connected to classification, it follows that even a very skeptical biologist must admit a lot of essentialism, and it becomes weird why anyone would make such a fuss about essentialism -- it can only be done if you are thinking about a very, very particular form of essentialism. So, if people aren't beginning their thinking about 'essentialism' from classification, where are they beginning it? It would seem from modern creationists (in the usual sense of the term 'creationist'). This is not, however, a good template for examining either the history of biology or our cognitive tendencies with regard to biology.
I've gotten away somewhat from Shtulman's paper, in part because, as I said, there's very little I find to disagree with in it. I'm still left uneasy about it, for the reason I gave above: we need to be very sophisticated when we talk about 'essentialism', because failure to do so brings in a perpetual danger of distortion. Above I questioned whether it was quite so clear that 'species have essences that change over kind' was really quite so problematic in the history of biology as Shtulman suggests; and that leaves another question, namely, whether it is doing quite as much work in the transformationist errors as Shtulman suggests. It's much more plausible there, I think, and just by what can be told from a mere amateur's glance, something like Shtulman's conclusions are suggested by his data. Nonetheless, I would be happier if a study like this were done with a greater sophistication about essences. From Shtulman's own analysis it's very difficult to see what's going on. Is it the use of typological thinking? Is it the use of natural-kind thinking? Is it the bizarre mixture of the two, trying to get types to do what only natures could do? Or is there something more fundamental that makes people engage in apparently silly errors (like treating types as natures)? I don't know and I can't tell. It would be nice if further studies in this area would take a more sophisticated approach to this whole issue of intuitive essentialism.
UPDATE: John Wilkins has an excellent post in response called Essentialism Revisited. (Unlike me, Wilkins actually does work on this sort of subject). He also notes that you can listen to the talk (mp3) that goes with the presentation linked to above.
Were I to change a few things in the argument of these four posts, I would, besides incorporating the above sources more adequately, have been more careful about the issue of typology, since, as Wilkins notes, I muddle a few type-relevant issues together.
Wednesday, March 15, 2006
Additional Links
I thought Laura Snyder's Confirmation for a Modest Realism was an interesting discussion of Whewell's notion of consilience.(The link is to Google's cache; you can get to the original Word document by following the link at the top of the page.) I'm all for scientific realists engaging in Whewellian projects, and the one suggested in this paper seems promising. In reading it I also realized that I had misstated a claim about Whewell in one of my recent essentialism posts; I'll have to fix it.
The Philosopher's Carnival is up at "Heaven Tree". I didn't see much that I thought was interesting, but I would recommend the discussion between Clayton and Lewis at "Hesperus/Phosphorus": Why I am an evidentialist.
The History Carnival is up at "History : Other." The Carnival of Bad History is up at "Ahistoricality." In both cases there are some great posts. I particularly recommend An Unexpected Analogy at "Orac Knows".
I think I may have noted it, but since I never got back to reading it, I'll note it again, to have a link handy: the 112th Christian Carnival is up at "Adam's Blog". The series on the relation between neural states and thought at "Thinking Christian" is interesting. The type of argument being discussed can be very tricky; but it's a very modest version, and so, I think, has something to be said for it, and the discussion is quite good. It's an argument for substance dualism, and I'm not a substance dualist but a hylomorphist, so I have my disagreements. But I recommend it.
Since I've been linking to so many carnivals, I keep intending to post a link to the second State of the Ummah, the Muslim Carnival; but it keeps not being there. Well, that's real life. In any case, it's supposed to show up at towards God is our journey any time now.
Dr. Wafa Sultan has recently become a popular (and unpopular) voice criticizing Islam; but is she hitting the right points? I thought Dr. Hesham Hessaballa's post on her at "God, Faith, and a Pen" provided a fair and balanced criticism of her approach. It's also a sharp rebuke to some of her less balanced critics, as much by example as by word.
Miriam Burnstein gives us the 'rules' for a neo-Victorian novel, a world in which the evil methodistical Evangelicals do battle with Truly Egalitarian Heroes and Heroines who are Instinctively Admired by Oppressed Populations. There are also Prostitutes with Unusual Talents and Wretched Slums. It's almost on the way to being nearly an approximation of Dickensian. Quite amusing; well worth reading. The rules, I mean.
I'm reading with interest Kevin Timpe's paper,"Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause."
The Philosopher's Carnival is up at "Heaven Tree". I didn't see much that I thought was interesting, but I would recommend the discussion between Clayton and Lewis at "Hesperus/Phosphorus": Why I am an evidentialist.
The History Carnival is up at "History : Other." The Carnival of Bad History is up at "Ahistoricality." In both cases there are some great posts. I particularly recommend An Unexpected Analogy at "Orac Knows".
I think I may have noted it, but since I never got back to reading it, I'll note it again, to have a link handy: the 112th Christian Carnival is up at "Adam's Blog". The series on the relation between neural states and thought at "Thinking Christian" is interesting. The type of argument being discussed can be very tricky; but it's a very modest version, and so, I think, has something to be said for it, and the discussion is quite good. It's an argument for substance dualism, and I'm not a substance dualist but a hylomorphist, so I have my disagreements. But I recommend it.
Since I've been linking to so many carnivals, I keep intending to post a link to the second State of the Ummah, the Muslim Carnival; but it keeps not being there. Well, that's real life. In any case, it's supposed to show up at towards God is our journey any time now.
Dr. Wafa Sultan has recently become a popular (and unpopular) voice criticizing Islam; but is she hitting the right points? I thought Dr. Hesham Hessaballa's post on her at "God, Faith, and a Pen" provided a fair and balanced criticism of her approach. It's also a sharp rebuke to some of her less balanced critics, as much by example as by word.
Miriam Burnstein gives us the 'rules' for a neo-Victorian novel, a world in which the evil methodistical Evangelicals do battle with Truly Egalitarian Heroes and Heroines who are Instinctively Admired by Oppressed Populations. There are also Prostitutes with Unusual Talents and Wretched Slums. It's almost on the way to being nearly an approximation of Dickensian. Quite amusing; well worth reading. The rules, I mean.
I'm reading with interest Kevin Timpe's paper,"Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause."
They are come, but they are not gone
[63] "The following story, too, is told by many. A certain seer warned Caesar to be on his guard against a great peril on the day of the month of March which the Romans call the Ides; and when the day had come and Caesar was on his way to the senate-house, he greeted the seer with a jest and said: 'Well, the Ides of March are come,' and the seer said to him softly: 'Ay, they are come, but they are not gone.' Moreover, on the day before, when Marcus Lepidus was entertaining him at supper, Caesar chanced to be signing letters, as his custom was, while reclining at table, and the discourse turned suddenly upon the question what sort of death was the best; before any one could answer Caesar cried out: 'That which is unexpected.'
"After this, while he was sleeping as usual by the side of his wife, all the windows and doors of the chamber flew open at once, and Caesar, confounded by the noise and the light of the moon shining down upon him, noticed that Calpurnia was in a deep slumber, but was uttering indistinct words and inarticulate groans in her sleep; for she dreamed, as it proved, that she was holding her murdered husband in her arms and bewailing him. Some, however, say that this was not the vision which the woman had; but that there was attached to Caesar's house to give it adornment and distinction, by vote of the senate, a gable-ornament, as Livy says, and it was this which Calpurnia in her dreams saw torn down, and therefore, as she thought, wailed and wept. At all events, when day came, she begged Caesar, if it was possible, not to go out, but to postpone the meeting of the senate; if, however, he had no concern at all for her dreams, she besought him to inquire by other modes of divination and by sacrifices concerning the future. And Caesar also, as it would appear, was in some suspicion and fear. For never before had he perceived in Calpurnia any womanish superstition, but now he saw that she was in great distress. And when the seers also, after many sacrifices, told him that the omens were unfavourable, he resolved to send Antony and dismiss the senate.
[64] "But at this juncture Decimus Brutus, surnamed Albinus, who was so trusted by Caesar that he was entered in his will as his second heir, but was partner in the conspiracy of the other Brutus and Cassius, fearing that if Caesar should elude that day, their undertaking would become known, ridiculed the seers and chided Caesar for laying himself open to malicious charges on the part of the senators, who would think themselves mocked at; for they had met at his bidding, and were ready and willing to vote as one man that he should be declared king of the provinces outside of Italy, and might wear a diadem when he went anywhere else by land or sea; but if some one should tell them at their session to be gone now, but to come back again when Calpurnia should have better dreams, what speeches would be made by his enemies, or who would listen to his friends when they tried to show that this was not slavery and tyranny? But if he was fully resolved (Albinus said) to regard the day as inauspicious, it was better that he should go in person and address the senate, and then postpone its business. While saying these things Brutus took Caesar by the hand and began to lead him along.
"And he had gone but a little way from his door when a slave belonging to some one else, eager to get at Caesar, but unable to do so for the press of numbers about him, forced his way into the house, gave himself into the hands of Calpurnia, and bade her keep him secure until Caesar came back, since he had important matters to report to him.
[65] "Furthermore, Artemidorus, a Cnidian by birth, a teacher of Greek philosophy, and on this account brought into intimacy with some of the followers of Brutus, so that he also knew most of what they were doing, came bringing to Caesar in a small roll the disclosures which he was going to make; but seeing that Caesar took all such rolls and handed them to his attendants, he came quite near, and said: 'ead this, Caesar, by thyself, and speedily; for it contains matters of importance and of concern to thee.'Accordingly, Caesar took the roll and would have read it, but was prevented by the multitude of people who engaged his attention, although he set out to do so many times, and holding in his hand and retaining that roll alone, he passed on into the senate. Some, however, say that another person gave him this roll, and that Artemidorus did not get to him at all, but was crowded away all along the route.
[66] "So far, perhaps, these things may have happened of their own accord; the place, however, which was the scene of that struggle and murder, and in which the senate was then assembled, since it contained a statue of Pompey and had been dedicated by Pompey as an additional ornament to his theatre, made it wholly clear that it was the work of some heavenly power which was calling and guiding the action thither. Indeed, it is also said that Cassius, turning his eyes toward the statue of Pompey before the attack began, invoked it silently, although he was much addicted to the doctrines of Epicurus; but the crisis, as it would seem, when the dreadful attempt was now close at hand, replaced his former cool calculations with divinely inspired emotion."
Plutarch, Life of Caesar
"After this, while he was sleeping as usual by the side of his wife, all the windows and doors of the chamber flew open at once, and Caesar, confounded by the noise and the light of the moon shining down upon him, noticed that Calpurnia was in a deep slumber, but was uttering indistinct words and inarticulate groans in her sleep; for she dreamed, as it proved, that she was holding her murdered husband in her arms and bewailing him. Some, however, say that this was not the vision which the woman had; but that there was attached to Caesar's house to give it adornment and distinction, by vote of the senate, a gable-ornament, as Livy says, and it was this which Calpurnia in her dreams saw torn down, and therefore, as she thought, wailed and wept. At all events, when day came, she begged Caesar, if it was possible, not to go out, but to postpone the meeting of the senate; if, however, he had no concern at all for her dreams, she besought him to inquire by other modes of divination and by sacrifices concerning the future. And Caesar also, as it would appear, was in some suspicion and fear. For never before had he perceived in Calpurnia any womanish superstition, but now he saw that she was in great distress. And when the seers also, after many sacrifices, told him that the omens were unfavourable, he resolved to send Antony and dismiss the senate.
[64] "But at this juncture Decimus Brutus, surnamed Albinus, who was so trusted by Caesar that he was entered in his will as his second heir, but was partner in the conspiracy of the other Brutus and Cassius, fearing that if Caesar should elude that day, their undertaking would become known, ridiculed the seers and chided Caesar for laying himself open to malicious charges on the part of the senators, who would think themselves mocked at; for they had met at his bidding, and were ready and willing to vote as one man that he should be declared king of the provinces outside of Italy, and might wear a diadem when he went anywhere else by land or sea; but if some one should tell them at their session to be gone now, but to come back again when Calpurnia should have better dreams, what speeches would be made by his enemies, or who would listen to his friends when they tried to show that this was not slavery and tyranny? But if he was fully resolved (Albinus said) to regard the day as inauspicious, it was better that he should go in person and address the senate, and then postpone its business. While saying these things Brutus took Caesar by the hand and began to lead him along.
"And he had gone but a little way from his door when a slave belonging to some one else, eager to get at Caesar, but unable to do so for the press of numbers about him, forced his way into the house, gave himself into the hands of Calpurnia, and bade her keep him secure until Caesar came back, since he had important matters to report to him.
[65] "Furthermore, Artemidorus, a Cnidian by birth, a teacher of Greek philosophy, and on this account brought into intimacy with some of the followers of Brutus, so that he also knew most of what they were doing, came bringing to Caesar in a small roll the disclosures which he was going to make; but seeing that Caesar took all such rolls and handed them to his attendants, he came quite near, and said: 'ead this, Caesar, by thyself, and speedily; for it contains matters of importance and of concern to thee.'Accordingly, Caesar took the roll and would have read it, but was prevented by the multitude of people who engaged his attention, although he set out to do so many times, and holding in his hand and retaining that roll alone, he passed on into the senate. Some, however, say that another person gave him this roll, and that Artemidorus did not get to him at all, but was crowded away all along the route.
[66] "So far, perhaps, these things may have happened of their own accord; the place, however, which was the scene of that struggle and murder, and in which the senate was then assembled, since it contained a statue of Pompey and had been dedicated by Pompey as an additional ornament to his theatre, made it wholly clear that it was the work of some heavenly power which was calling and guiding the action thither. Indeed, it is also said that Cassius, turning his eyes toward the statue of Pompey before the attack began, invoked it silently, although he was much addicted to the doctrines of Epicurus; but the crisis, as it would seem, when the dreadful attempt was now close at hand, replaced his former cool calculations with divinely inspired emotion."
Plutarch, Life of Caesar
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