This gets me toward the end of September 2014 in my notes. I have at least four more little fat notebooks to go to catch up.
Living reason involves both memorial and anticipation.
nonengagement; marginal engagement (containment); proxy engagement; limited engagement; major engagement; coalition campaign
tradition as integrating, sanctifying radicating, and evangelizing
antiquity: apostolicity; consensus of antinquity; (tending to) consensus with antiquity
refractions of ideas through practices
the uncanny as a font of inquiry
reciprocal action as a sign of composition
intentio, stability, coherence, and proportion in material substances
Torah as watering paradise (Sirach 24:23ff)
"One who admits his fault will be kept from failure." (Sirach 20:3)
projected sculptures & fictional characters
fictional characters to be acted (false identities, covers, cons, plays)
historical characters that, known only indirectly, may not be real
Reasonableness does not suffice for avoiding conflict.
Diamond: in one's power; Box; beyond one's power to avoid
We have a mastery of other things in the measure we have mastery of ourselves.
faith as making us instruments of divine teaching authority
timing/time as the matter of cinema (Tarkovsky)
All historical disciplines, including those of natural history, begin with direct attestation of some present evidence and work out from there by affinity and parsimony.
agents: proper authority
agents-means: public declaration
means-end: (1) feasibility (2) proportionality
end-highest end: (1) last resort (2) just cause
agents-means-end-highest end: right intention
last resort ; feasibility :: just cause : proportionality
(1) Caretaker for what is common: proper authority
(2) for common good: just cause
(3) ordering of reason: feasibility, necessity (last resort), proportionality, right intention
(4) promulgation: public declaration
That is not charity which does not boldly fight injustice and error; charity uses higher means to further good and impede bad, and thus does so more than even justice, albeit in new ways.
(1) distinction between sense and intellect -> antecedent possibility of angels
(2) existence of God -> antecedent possibility of angels
(3) perfection of cosmos -> antecedent possibility of angels
(1) + (2) + (3) -> antecedent probability of angels
Cant 4:7-8 Immaculate conception (note v. 12) + assumption + coronation (note v. 14 re intercession?)
Immaculate Conception as a sort of assumption of soul completed in Assumption of body and soul
Mary as the ephod of priesthood
Mary as Tabernacle (the Word tabernacled among us)
Virginity as understood by the Fathers is not a mere physical condition but a spiritual one; thus the perpetual virginity of Mary is more than a claim about sexual status.
consentient council of doctors (Vincent of Lerins)
immortality as a postulate of philosophical inquiry (cp Rep 611e-612a)
sages -> nobles -> merchants -> mobs/gangs -> warlords
All probabilities presuppose a prior division of a universe of discourse.
Trust creates social resilience.
The key question for any society is: What makes this society one? What does the real work of integration?
unexpected coherences as motives of credibility
approaches to personal identity // approaches to change
Relying on immigrants for one's work is not structurally different from relying on mercenaries for one's army.
Human beings are present to each other by signs; in some cases we can make ourselves the signs by which we are present to others -- but also in some cases this can be more difficult than it sounds.
The ordinary presence of God is not primarily by sign; rather, He is present in such a way that that to which He is present is a sign of Him.
"A prophet mediates between the angels and the people." Aquinas
Theological insight can be welcomed but cannot be forced.
Statesmanship must be guided by reason, but by a reason that takes sympathy into account.
Solomon's Temple is loftier than the temples of natural reason.
The Jews more than any other people have understood the powerful truth that nations are signs, and that nations must form themselves as signs of things that are not base.
the canonical Spirit,
exceeding all measure,
measuring all
Chance sometimes proves the wisest strategist.
philotimia, philomatheia, and philanthropia as propaedeutics to philosophia
Xenophon & the importance of making virtue visible
"Questioning is a kind of teaching." Xenophon
utilitarianism as reducing human beings to their productive value as a source of profit (that the human beings may share in the profit is not relevant -- actual sharing of profit only enters as producing)
the nonrational creation as a trust
the improvement of moral thought by metaphor and exhortation
the parable of the Good Samaritan and the sacraments of initiation (inn, oil, wine)
almsdeeds as sabbath rest
the wonderful, the uncanny, the fantastic
"Sameness consists of at least three elements: for there to be sameness a thing must needs be the same as another according to a particular condition." Marsilio Ficino
The reason for trusting rules is so that we can trust people more, not less.
the Passion as sacramental premotion
Tobit 12:15 // Rv 8:2-4
oil as a symbol of Mary (cf Gregory Thaumaturgos)
the natural respect of a man for his tools
No one but God is an expert on God.
reflections of angelic choir in the prayer of the Church
boredom-quit and frustration-quit in argument/inquiry
the importance of "unexpected flashes of instruction" through "fortuitous collision of happy incidents, or an involuntary concurrence of ideas" (Johnson Rambler 154)
Wealth does not spoil character, but it can accelerate the spoiling of it.
Protagoras' 3 stages of learning justice
(1) language
(2) poetry, music, athletics
(3) law
aphorism as an approach to multiplicity of proof
philosophical inquiry as a model of ethical life, ethical life as a model of philosophical inquiry
new indicators & ongoing indicators for presumptive reasoning
Matrimony reflects ordination in ordination's aspect of being the sacrament of tradition; it does so by being itself the sacrament of genealogy, which is a sign of tradition.
Trinitarian procession as giving the structure of sacred Tradition
natural marriage as our way of reaching toward eternity (permanence, fecundity, union)
"The heretics cling to one point -- that the sacrament is figurative -- and to that extent they are not heretics." Pascal
pleasure and pain as good qua remedial
pleasure as a coming-to-be
arguments against usury
(1) from protection of the poor
(2) from justice of exchange
(3) from sterility of usury
Live-and-let-live requires a presupposition of harmlessness.
three-eyed Plato is a swan
Reductionism usually consists entirely of a network of metaphors.
"mind belongs to that kind which is cause of everything" Philebus 30e
immediate vs memory-mediated pleasures
People are more likely to get angry at being accused of lacking knowledge than they are when accused of lacking pleasure.
Justice requires calling the noblest things by the noblest names.
Outrage may be a legitimate motivation, but even so it is not a plan.
patience as the marrow of piety (Catherine of Siena)
The possibility of supererogation follows from any position that allows a distinction between the first principles of practical reason and the principles of obligation.
Ecclesiastes as a book of repentance (Wesley)
consciousness as partial conscience
Bragging is not about inducing believes in others -- people brag to people they know will not believe them, and peopl brag in cases where the point is simply to make themselves feel better.
Each of the Ten Commandments indicates a way in which human beings violate divine prerogatives or act as gods over others.
Arguments from divine hiddenness boil down to the claim that if God's existence is not self-evident to us, God does not exist.
In coming to know God from creation, we come to see creation in a new light.
sacred languages as memory systems for the Church
"Unless we have a moral principle about such delicate matters as marriage and murder, the whole world will become a welter of exceptions with no rules. There will be so many hard cases that everything will go soft." Chesterton
wine "intended to be a medicine and to produce reverence in the soul and health and strength in the body' (Laws672d)
Lack of evidence only becomes significant in itself through complicated counterfactual reasoning.
"the way to heaven is like heaven itself" Sigrid Undset
True love of God and neighbor requires the prayer of faith.
Grace is the beginning of faith.
religious festivals as periods for restoration of character (Laws 653b)
'Induction approximates truth because of uniformity of nature' vs 'Induction approximates truth by ruling out causes of falsehood' (Peirce is esp. good on this)
"the poetic tribe, with the aid of Graces and Muses, often grasps the truth of history" (Laws 682a)
A very significant number of bad skeptical inferences consist of conflating immediate and particular grounds of particular inferences with remote and general grounds of knowledge in general.
Most arguments over burden of proof are signs of intellectual laziness; they involve arguing over who is supposed to do the work.
Desert is a social concept.
"the moderate man is God's friend, being like him" (Laws 716d)
"mankind is by nature a companion of eternity" (Laws 721c)
"Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike." (Laws 736)
Theos is the first word of Plato's Laws.
All human authority is implicit in human nature, which is given by God, and by human work it is specified and furthered.
modesty & treating oneself as a person
the preludial system of legislation is especially appropriate to natural law theory
constancy and coherence as intimations of the real
the First Way and the intrinsic conditions of empirical experience
St. Catherine of Siena and moral miracles of conversion
the episode of the moldy flour in St. Catherine's life as an emblem of salvation
personal identity // transworld identity // material constitution
vagueness states // possible states or temporal states
(i.e., vagueness as an unusual diamond modality)
a church as a memory palace
matrimony as the sacrament of hospitality
the fate-level and the free-will-level of a narrative
The water of natural marriage becomes the wine of sacramental matrimony.
Love enlivens virtue.
the primary thesis of Plato's Laws: Law is a sort of divine order because it expresses reason, which is the divine in us because it has kinship with the gods.
"What we call a bad civilization is a civilization not good enough for us." Chesterton
Labeling oneself a skeptic remarkably often leads into the intellectual laziness of not bothering to earn the label with serious thought.
"It is when the work has passed from mind to mind that it becomes a work of art." Chesterton
All states not explicitly recognizing institutions beyond their control tend toward the totalitarian.
Saturday, May 21, 2016
Friday, May 20, 2016
Linkable Links
* How to caramelize sugar without melting it
* Anglo-Saxon theology of Pentecost at "A Clerk of Oxford"
* D. G. D. Davidson discusses white tie and tuxedos by looking at the formalwear of Tuxedo Mask in the Sailor Moon manga and anime.
* Peter Kwasniewski on tradition and modernity.
* Friedrich Hayek on his second cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein.
* Postcards from Rome, circa 1890. They were made using the Photochrom lithographic process, making them among the earliest color postcards.
* Mapping the Martyrs looks at some of the places associated with early Christian martyrs.
* David Clayton discusses the Ghent Altarpiece.
* The beatification cause of Shahbaz Bhatti has been opened in Pakistan.
* Norman P. Ho, A Confucian Theory of Property (PDF)
* Rachel Cohon discusses Hume's account of promissory obligation.
* Which Shakespeare play should I see? An illustrated flowchart.
* Some apocryphal psalms in Syriac.
* It has been noted that there has been some sloppiness in recent papal documents with regard to use of quotations and references -- someone will be cited as saying something and when one goes to the original, one finds that someone was fooled by a misleading translation no one bothered to check, or important qualifications have been dropped. Some of the oddities of the use of Thomas Aquinas in the recent Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia.
* Hildegard von Bingen's Explanation of the Athanasian Creed, as translated by Nathaniel Campbell.
* Thony Christie on Boole, Shannon, and the Electronic Computer
* All the French Tintin comics.
* Robbie Duschinsky, Tabula Rasa and Human Nature discusses the history of the concept of tabula rasa.
* The Eucharist in space. Actually, there's been at least one other case of the Catholic Eucharist being taken up. And, of course, famously, one of the very first things ever done on the moon was Presbyterian communion.
* Elliott Sober on simplicity and scientific theory.
* The Syriac Catholic Patriarch has some sharp words for how Western politicians have handled the Syria crisis.
* William Whewell, John William Lubbock, and the development of peer review.
* The nuns who helped chart the stars of the sky.
* Larry Hurtado discusses the ways in which the book of Revelation differs significantly from other apocalyptic texts.
* Apparently, new evidence of the Union of Uzhhorod, which some skeptics had doubted even occurred formally, has been discovered.
* Anglo-Saxon theology of Pentecost at "A Clerk of Oxford"
* D. G. D. Davidson discusses white tie and tuxedos by looking at the formalwear of Tuxedo Mask in the Sailor Moon manga and anime.
* Peter Kwasniewski on tradition and modernity.
* Friedrich Hayek on his second cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein.
* Postcards from Rome, circa 1890. They were made using the Photochrom lithographic process, making them among the earliest color postcards.
* Mapping the Martyrs looks at some of the places associated with early Christian martyrs.
* David Clayton discusses the Ghent Altarpiece.
* The beatification cause of Shahbaz Bhatti has been opened in Pakistan.
* Norman P. Ho, A Confucian Theory of Property (PDF)
* Rachel Cohon discusses Hume's account of promissory obligation.
* Which Shakespeare play should I see? An illustrated flowchart.
* Some apocryphal psalms in Syriac.
* It has been noted that there has been some sloppiness in recent papal documents with regard to use of quotations and references -- someone will be cited as saying something and when one goes to the original, one finds that someone was fooled by a misleading translation no one bothered to check, or important qualifications have been dropped. Some of the oddities of the use of Thomas Aquinas in the recent Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia.
* Hildegard von Bingen's Explanation of the Athanasian Creed, as translated by Nathaniel Campbell.
* Thony Christie on Boole, Shannon, and the Electronic Computer
* All the French Tintin comics.
* Robbie Duschinsky, Tabula Rasa and Human Nature discusses the history of the concept of tabula rasa.
* The Eucharist in space. Actually, there's been at least one other case of the Catholic Eucharist being taken up. And, of course, famously, one of the very first things ever done on the moon was Presbyterian communion.
* Elliott Sober on simplicity and scientific theory.
* The Syriac Catholic Patriarch has some sharp words for how Western politicians have handled the Syria crisis.
* William Whewell, John William Lubbock, and the development of peer review.
* The nuns who helped chart the stars of the sky.
* Larry Hurtado discusses the ways in which the book of Revelation differs significantly from other apocalyptic texts.
* Apparently, new evidence of the Union of Uzhhorod, which some skeptics had doubted even occurred formally, has been discovered.
Thursday, May 19, 2016
A Reading of Earth, or of Life
We are justified in saying that philosophy partakes of the nature of art, provided that we are serious about art. The addition made to reality by a great artist is not wilful or disconnected;--it is an unfolding, or a cultivated growth from what was there. Shakespeare says, 'See what life can be; for a Cordelia, for Autolycus, and for Macbeth'. Pheidias says both, 'See what marble can do', and also 'This is what Dew-maidens would be if they existed'; bringing out something which is inchoate in a twilight amongst Greek hills. Holbein shows us a society and a history, and depths of experience sounded or evaded, through a few lines on a canvas. More simply, though on the smaller scale, we see the interpretative office in the secondary arts. The performance of a drama, the playing of an orchestral composition, the reading aloud of a poem, will add to existent reality an evanescent series of movements and of sounds, and through these will unfold what was given. Poets perhaps have bestowed a name which philosophy need not repudiate, when they have called it a reading of earth, or of life.
[Helen Wodehouse, "Language and Moral Philosophy," Mind, Vol. 47, No. 186 (Apr., 1938), p. 213.]
Helen Marion Wodehouse (1880-1964) is a philosopher who deserves a somewhat greater remembrance than she has. Her book, The Logic of Will, for instance, is an interesting exploration of the analogy between the cognitive and the conative, or, in other words, between speculative thought and practical action.
"Language and Moral Philosophy" itself is a very nicely worked-out argument that all language is both emotive and representational (or, as she prefers to put it, emotive and presentative); that is to say, that we cannot separate out 'emotive' uses of language and factual/scientific/assertive uses of language because all use of language is emotive -- it seeks to move, even if only to move people to pay attention to something -- and that it always fulfills its emotive function by presenting the world in a certain way, either directly asserting or suggesting assertions: "Every intentional communication is both presentative and emotive; and if a rule is given, an assertion is made" (p. 209).
Wednesday, May 18, 2016
A Quick Trip to Italy, Miscellanea IV
Florence: Uffizi Gallery
As I noted, I avoided taking many pictures in the Uffizi, despite the fact that they allow flashless photography, but I did grab a few very quick ones to prove I'd been. Here is the most famous painting in the Uffizi, taken from the doorway because of the crowd:
I never realized that Botticelli's The Birth of Venus was so popular, but there was a constant mass of people crowding straight for it.
Here is a picture of the tower of the Palazzo Vecchio, from the cafe balcony:
Hyacinthe Rigaud's portrait of Bossuet:
And Charles-Alphonse Dufresnoy's Death of Socrates:
Rome: Trevi Fountain
The plaque above the Fontana di Trevi:
And some more of the fountain itself:
Rome: Forum
On the way to Trajan's Forum, I snapped this picture of the front of the Basilica of the Twelve Apostles:
It's a very old church, going back to the sixth century, although, of course, it was heavily restored and developed beginning in the fifteenth century. Bessarion is buried there; I hadn't known that offhand, but it makes me glad I at least snapped a picture of the front, as I very much like Bessarion.
Here's the edge of the entire Forum area:
And another picture of the gaudy monstrosity:
Manalive, something about that monument irritates me. The front side is completely uninviting and dull. From the back side the winged statues at the top look like giant black bats feeding on a white glob of corpse. No one's life has been made better by it. It's like a supervillain's notion of monumental architecture.
to be continued
As I noted, I avoided taking many pictures in the Uffizi, despite the fact that they allow flashless photography, but I did grab a few very quick ones to prove I'd been. Here is the most famous painting in the Uffizi, taken from the doorway because of the crowd:
I never realized that Botticelli's The Birth of Venus was so popular, but there was a constant mass of people crowding straight for it.
Here is a picture of the tower of the Palazzo Vecchio, from the cafe balcony:
Hyacinthe Rigaud's portrait of Bossuet:
And Charles-Alphonse Dufresnoy's Death of Socrates:
Rome: Trevi Fountain
The plaque above the Fontana di Trevi:
And some more of the fountain itself:
Rome: Forum
On the way to Trajan's Forum, I snapped this picture of the front of the Basilica of the Twelve Apostles:
It's a very old church, going back to the sixth century, although, of course, it was heavily restored and developed beginning in the fifteenth century. Bessarion is buried there; I hadn't known that offhand, but it makes me glad I at least snapped a picture of the front, as I very much like Bessarion.
Here's the edge of the entire Forum area:
And another picture of the gaudy monstrosity:
Manalive, something about that monument irritates me. The front side is completely uninviting and dull. From the back side the winged statues at the top look like giant black bats feeding on a white glob of corpse. No one's life has been made better by it. It's like a supervillain's notion of monumental architecture.
to be continued
Tuesday, May 17, 2016
A Great and Zealous Eagerness
On seeing certain wealthy foreigners in Rome carrying puppies and young monkeys about in their bosoms and fondling them, Caesar asked, we are told, if the women in their country did not bear children, thus in right princely fashion rebuking those who squander on animals that proneness to love and loving affection which is ours by nature, and which is due only to our fellow-men. Since, then, our souls are by nature possessed of great fondness for learning and fondness for seeing, it is surely reasonable to chide those who abuse this fondness on objects all unworthy either of their eyes or ears, to the neglect of those which are good and serviceable. Our outward sense, since it apprehends the objects which encounter it by virtue of their mere impact upon it, must needs, perhaps, regard everything that presents itself, be it useful or useless; but in the exercise of his mind every man, if he pleases, has the natural power to turn himself away in every case, and to change, without the least difficulty, to that object upon which he himself determines. It is meet, therefore, that he pursue what is best, to the end that he may not merely regard it, but also be edified by regarding it. A colour is suited to the eye if its freshness, and its pleasantness as well, stimulates and nourishes the vision; and so our intellectual vision must be applied to such objects as, by their very charm, invite it onward to its own proper good.
Such objects are to be found in virtuous deeds; these implant in those who search them out a great and zealous eagerness which leads to imitation.
Plutarch, Life of Pericles
And Mar Not the Essence Divine
The School Teacher
by James Breckenridge
Toil, Teacher, toil,
How great is the work to be done!
Toil, Teacher, toil,
Thy labour is only begun.
Toil, Teacher, toil,
The twig is entrusted to thee;
Try, teacher, try,
To make it a beautiful tree.
Toil, teacher, toil,
The charge of young spirits is thine;
"Watch, teacher, watch,
And mar not the essence divine.
Toil, teacher, toil,.
We wish you a hearty God speed;
"Work, teacher, work,
For that is the way to succeed.
Toil, teacher, toil,
Thine is a noble employ;
Strive, teacher, strive,
To make it thy glory and joy.
Toil, teacher, toil,
Let thy soul and thy purpose be strong;
Bear, teacher, bear,
With slander, injustice, and wrong,
Toil, teacher, toil,
Mid clouds by the hurricane riven;
Bold, teacher, bold,
Fear only thy Master in heaven.
Toil, teacher, toil,
Though tempted, tormented, and cross'd ]
Stand, teacher, stand,
Like a patriot firm at thy post.
Toil, teacher, toil,
Encourage the generous youth;
Guide, teacher, guide,
The soul that is grasping for truth.
Toil, teacher, toil,
Let the soul of a hero be thine;
Have, only, have,
A lofty, a noble design.
Toil, teacher, toil,
A power thou possessest for good;
On, teacher, on,
And wield it aright for thy God!
Monday, May 16, 2016
Dashed Off IX
the relation between normativity and future passive constructions (gerundives)
the great ocean of intelligible beauty
exhibition of true good as a philosophical activity
- exhibition of true good itself and exhibition of true good in a field or discipline
virtue & the unwavering heart
mission as an expression of heart
the verbum of friendship
seeking out the li or principle of a text
Kant's transcendental ideas as actually intentions of internal sense
tradition & giving birth to that with which one is already pregnant
- the eros of tradition & giving birth in beauty
Every skill, craft, art, considers tendencies to ends: medicine, those of the body; music, those of patterns of sound; and so forth.
Loss, sorrow, etc., make things beautiful by putting them into stark relief.
marriage as a preservation of the past
romance as like divination
fiction as the loosely anchored version of what we strictly anchor in rigorous inquiry
fiction - speculation - determination
the heart as theological sign and corporeal signifier
the holy thymos of Christ
prayer as interpreter of intention
the Lord's Prayer as Messianic intention
argumentative prudence
using little disasters to undo great disasters (demolitions, surgery, etc.)
Standards are structures of means as determined by ends.
A requirement for choice is a qualified restriction on futures.
Our ideas of space, time, etc., are ideas of restriction or limitation of something.
Convergences of arguments are more than unitary arguments but less than systems of arguments
terms - convergences of terms (lists, term relevances) - propositions - convergences of propositions - arguments - convergences of arguments - systems of arguments - convergences of systems - movements - convergences of movements - schools - convergences of schools - civilizational schemes
Nothing is capable of friendship except to the extent it is angel-like.
Fully understanding consecrated virginity requires understanding how angels can be role models.
angels & subsidiarity
the practice of free crafts and cultivation of nonservile skills
"wine refreshes the heart and both allays worry like a sedative and feeds the flame of good cheer like oil" Xenophon
mereotopology as the connecting point between logic and mathematics
capability control and motivational selection in constitutional design
identity & individuation conditions for philosophical questions
quasi-implicational dependencies among impossibilities
Taking oneself too seriously is a quick way to spoil good taste.
In the experience of Christian charity, we experience the Holy Trinity.
Plato's argument for women's education is based on the idea of education being directed to common good -- which is one for all and must be taught to all.
cryptography as causal reasoning concerning the disparities in (potential) capability between those whom one wants to break the security and those whom one doesn't
precedent-based reasoning in engineering
testing philosophical positions in terms of capacity to identify the as-yet undiscovered, to solve difficulties swiftly, to handle many problems at once, to interlock with other philosophical positions, to overpower contrary positions
categorical syllogistic : mereological syllogistic :: x : mereotopological deduction
To become an expert one must uncover the little known.
Comparison of essences shows the need for actual being; comparison of actual beings shows the need for causes.
Anti-natalism is a form of tutiorism.
The structure of the sacrament of matrimony is that of human nature lifted up by grace.
material causes as instrument-constituting causes
The principles of classification are at root mereological.
buddha-lands as Kantian postulates in Buddhism (conditions of rational hope in escape from the cycle of suffering)
Perpetual Virginity as a symbol of Immaculate Conception
one purpose of wealth as being to offset the difficulties of aging
Common good is intrinsically and necessarily subsidiary in its structure.
consecrated virgins as signs of divine wisdom itself (Pr, Wis, etc. as the books of consecrated virginity)
People defend scientism almost entirely by poetic expressions.
To consider: The coming to be of a particle (an actual localizable measure) presupposes the actuality of a field (an actual measurable through space)?
(1) Tutiorism is false
(2) Persons themselves are intrinsic goods
(3) The lives of all persons are rich with goods
(4) To have and raise children is a natural human good
(5) Interests may matter morally even if not to the organism whose interest it is
(6) The human race itself is a good
(7) Moral intuitions of a certain kind are reasonably reliable if certain conditions are met, so that being counterintuitive in this way is a reason to disbelieve an ethical theory
(8) Benefits and harms do not exhaust goods and evils
(9) The Beatific vision is possible and infinite good
(10) Human society itself is a good
(11) Moral life creates new good and makes local bads contextual goods
Error, an evil for the pursuit of truth, is transformed into a contextual good by the pursuit of truth.
error // natural evil
Only understood as design does an experiment contribute to scientific inquiry.
It is necessary to the role experiment plays in scientific inquiry that in it the same effect be wholly attributable to both principal and instrumental causes, allowing, of course, for a certain element of chance.
the paradox of poetry: the excellence of good poets exceeds the capacity of poetry to describe
Those who complain that metaphysics has no practical utility still go about using causal reasoning for practical purposes and assume things about practical ends.
the Assumption sa Second Eve undoing the exile from the Garden
Epistemology is not what entitles one to believe; it is merely investigation of such entitlements.
Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross, and good taste in religious experiences
the gift of wisdom as God's good taste
music & poetry as athletics of the soul
"the best things are less liable to alteration or change" Republic 380e
Efficiency is only as valuable as the problems it solves less the problems it creates.
Christ as the principal agent of catechesis
Spirit in Providence // Spirit in Magisterium
the labels with which we vest ourselves in communication
Newman's illative sense as part of an account of motives of credibility.
Classification requires a middle way between Heraclitus and Parmenides.
scientism as a collage of minimal deterrence strategies
retorsion-testing of arguments
intrinsic vs conditional retorsion (this is in fact just the kind of necessity/impossibility involved)
intellectual responsibility as an anticipation of the infinite horizon of being (Lonergan)
Is 22;23 and papal infallibility
To seek humiliation and not reconciliation is a sign of corruption.
tracks or clues left behind in language by virtues
"a soul that is always reaching out to grasp everything both divine and human as a whole" Republic 6.486
"all great things are prone to fall" 497d
"nothing incomplete is the measure of anything" 504c
"Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake." 505e
the analogy between habitus and vestment (the former being internal/intrinsic and the latter external/extrinsic - but they are similar enough that they can often be discussed in the same terms)
the songs of ascent as marking out 15 degrees of virtue (Durandus)
vestment as a term of being acted upon
position (arrangement) as a term of acting upon
disposition as an ordering to
analogies regimented by other analogies
An accessibility relation is what you have to add to a modal operator to make it work like a different modal operator.
relics & narrative lines uniting the liturgical commonwealth
categorical vs transcendental parthood
alienating qualifications and modal shifts
act | potency
substance | quantity
quality | relatedness
action | passion
position | vestment
when | where
moral sense theory and causal sense theory (esp interesting to think about in the case of Hume -- i.e., what would a moral account // to his causal account and a causal account // to his moral count be like?)
Spinoza's weakness is his view of actual and potential
the value of destructible good as the basis for a refutation of tutiorism
kinds of argument in a tradition
(1) reconstructive: original intent
(2) lectoral: present reading
(3) structural: implicit principle in practice
(4) precedentive: previously formulated explicit principle
(5) pragmatic:constraints of practice
Persuasion is accomplished thread by thread.
To describe a term qua productive is to describe it in light of something other than itself.
Extrinsic denomination presupposes intrinsic denomination.
A principal agent and an instrumental cause differ in that the instrumental cause introduces the similitude of another into the effect; the principal agent introduces its own. Cp Sent 4d19q1a2q1
The character of the acting is proportioned to the agent.
Civil authority proceeds from god in a sense analogous to the way that what is natural proceeds from God.
divine being as beyond modality (premodal)
Divine action pre-exists all things by which we name it.
The water, the oil, the matter of any sacrament are, as sacramental, not the minister's but belong to the one in whose name they are administered.
The sacrament administered by the priest does not come from the faith of the priest.
Acts 5:34 and the Holy Spirit as God
Sunday, May 15, 2016
Fortnightly Book, May 15
In most languages there is a narrow circle of books that tend to be called great novels in that language, and a few candidates, sometimes one, that repeatedly are regarded as the greatest among those great novels -- as, for instance, Pride and Prejudice repeatedly comes up as an obvious candidate, perhaps the obvious candidate, if you ask, "What is the greatest novel ever written in the English language?" Tastes will vary, favorites will be picked for individual lists, but some books are more than favorites and not merely objects of good taste but definers of it. And if you ask almost anybody which novel is the greatest of all novels ever written in the Italian language, you will find one book mentioned over and over again: Alessandro Manzoni's I Promessi Sposi. For the Fortnightly Book, I will be reading the English translation in the Everyman Library, The Betrothed.
Manzoni (1785-1873) was born to a literary family in Milan. Because of his mother, something of a freethinker (she divorced his father, took up with another man, and ran in freethinking circles in England and France), he grew up in a largely anti-Catholic atmosphere and became a poet. He married a Calvinist girl, Henriette Blondel, in 1808, a very happy marriage. But Henriette in 1810 became Catholic, and this led Alessandro to re-examine his life entirely. The result was that he became Catholic, as well; he took it quite seriously, and lived a life full of penitential practices. His literary work became more experimental and innovative.
In the 1820s he conceived the idea that would eventually developed into The Betrothed and began to shape both the story and the language of it. You must remember that Italy was not yet unified; it was a large number of smaller states. Even today, Italians from northern Italy and Italians from southern Italy speak dialects sufficiently different as to make understanding a bit difficult, but the problem has always been there, and has historically been even more severe. When poets and writers like Dante or Petrarch wrote in Italian they were, to some degree, building their Italian out of a wide variety of conflicting materials. And this too was Manzoni's task. The work was originally written in his Milanese dialectic, but he would in later drafts Tuscanize it in order to build on the strengths of that dialect. He is widely regarded as having succeeded very well, and the result would itself contribute to the shaping of the Italian language as the book became a standard for other Italian works to emulate.
The Betrothed was published in 1827. It is a historical novel, with its events taking place during a time of turmoil and unrest in the 1600s. Renzo and Lucia are a young couple in northern Italy who plan to marry in November of 1628. The trouble and tumult of the society around them, however, will intervene to prevent it. And a great and terrible robber baron in the area, known only as The Unnamed, decides to seize Lucia . There will be famine. There will be war. There will be plague. But some loves do not die and are never conquered.
Manzoni (1785-1873) was born to a literary family in Milan. Because of his mother, something of a freethinker (she divorced his father, took up with another man, and ran in freethinking circles in England and France), he grew up in a largely anti-Catholic atmosphere and became a poet. He married a Calvinist girl, Henriette Blondel, in 1808, a very happy marriage. But Henriette in 1810 became Catholic, and this led Alessandro to re-examine his life entirely. The result was that he became Catholic, as well; he took it quite seriously, and lived a life full of penitential practices. His literary work became more experimental and innovative.
In the 1820s he conceived the idea that would eventually developed into The Betrothed and began to shape both the story and the language of it. You must remember that Italy was not yet unified; it was a large number of smaller states. Even today, Italians from northern Italy and Italians from southern Italy speak dialects sufficiently different as to make understanding a bit difficult, but the problem has always been there, and has historically been even more severe. When poets and writers like Dante or Petrarch wrote in Italian they were, to some degree, building their Italian out of a wide variety of conflicting materials. And this too was Manzoni's task. The work was originally written in his Milanese dialectic, but he would in later drafts Tuscanize it in order to build on the strengths of that dialect. He is widely regarded as having succeeded very well, and the result would itself contribute to the shaping of the Italian language as the book became a standard for other Italian works to emulate.
The Betrothed was published in 1827. It is a historical novel, with its events taking place during a time of turmoil and unrest in the 1600s. Renzo and Lucia are a young couple in northern Italy who plan to marry in November of 1628. The trouble and tumult of the society around them, however, will intervene to prevent it. And a great and terrible robber baron in the area, known only as The Unnamed, decides to seize Lucia . There will be famine. There will be war. There will be plague. But some loves do not die and are never conquered.
Sophocles, The Theban Plays of Sophocles
Introduction
Opening Passages: From Antigone:
From Oedipus Tyrannos:
From Oedipus at Colonus:
Summary: In Antigone, we find the aftermath of a terrible civil war, literally brother against brother as the sons of Oedipus fought for the throne of Thebes until they both died before its walls, leaving their uncle Creon fully in charge of the city. It is, I think, essential to the play that one understand that this puts Creon in a terrible and difficult position. But Creon is a ruler with a peculiar characteristic: he always, and in every way, puts the good of Thebes above any other good. For the good of Thebes, one brother must be recognized as hero, the other as traitor, and for the good of Thebes, the traitor must be punished by the full brunt of the law. Not for the Greeks was the notion that human capacity to punish ended at death; you may punish someone after they are dead by denying them proper funeral rites, thus refusing them even in death the regard of the city. Eteocles will be buried as a hero; Polyneices is to rot in the field as a traitor.
But Creon is meddling with something greater than he understands, and this begins to take shape in Antigone, who defies his orders and buries her brother. It is an act of piety to her brother and to the gods of the dead. It is also an act of treason. Again Creon finds himself put into an impossible situation by the House of Laius, and again he responds to the problem as he must, putting the affair of the state above all personal good. A ruler cannot show favoritism,but must uphold the law. He condemns his niece to death. It is worth, I think, taking a moment to appreciate how extraordinary this. Age after age, nepotism has been one of the great sources of evils in government; for a ruler to be so free of nepotism as Creon is a truly extraordinary thing.
Creon's son, Haemon, however, who was to be married to Antigone, argues that the people have a much greater sympathy with Antigone than Creon knows. The people of Thebes do not see what Antigone has done as a crime. The very idea baffles Creon to the point of frustration. Of course it was a crime; she broke the law and honored a traitor to the city. Moreover, it is he, not the people, who has the responsibility for the city. In the midst of his argument, Haemon threatens that if Antigone dies, she will not die alone. This infuriates Creon; it seems to him as if the whole city is going mad.
Creon has Antigone walled up in a cave as a living tomb, with a ritual minimum of food and water to prevent the city from any guilt of direct murder. Antigone enters, bewailing her virginity and stubbornly insisting against both the Chorus and Creon that she was in the right.
Then the blind seer Tiresias, Creon's most trusted advisor, comes to him with a warning: the sacrifices to the gods have been tainted by the sentence against Polyneices -- his rotting corpse is literally desecrating the sacred rites of the city, so that the gods no longer regard its prayers. He must relent in his penalty against Polyneices. For Creon, this is simply the last straw; here is yet one more person who has gone mad and is advocating respect and honor for those who have betrayed the city. They have a massive falling out, and Tiresias leaves, prophesying that Creon will be made to pay by the gods. Again, Creon is in a difficult situation: to relent is politically impossible, but he himself can see the danger if it turns out that Tiresias is right. But at the advice of the Chorus, he yields to what he finally sees as necessity, and goes to release Antigone and to put the body of Polyneices into the cave as a proper tomb. But of course, it is too late. Antigone is dead; Haemon is dead; Creon's wife, Eurydice, dies when she hears her son has died.
You might perhaps notice that I have told the story entirely as a story about Creon. Antigone is such a striking figure, and so sympathetic to us Christians, who really and truly believe that there is a knowable law greater and more fundamental than any human law, and who regard desecration of the dead as an immense sacrilege compared to which political treason is insignificant, that it is she who comes to the front of the story, despite being in only parts of it. Indeed, even for the Greeks she was sympathetic enough to be the most memorable part of the work. But the structure of the story makes Creon, not Antigone, the real tragic hero. Antigone's certainty far exceeds anything that pagan Greeks could possibly have granted her; the good of the city is one of the sacred pillars of life itself for them, and Antigone's lack of respect for it was problematic; to punish the enemies of the city was the charge of the ruler and there is no doubt or question that this is what Creon was doing; it is impossible to imagine that there weren't many Greeks who would have had the attitude we find explicitly expressed in the story by Ismene and by the Chorus, that there is something admirable about what Antigone was trying to do, but that what she was trying to do was beyond the power of mortals. It is Creon who finds himself in tragedy because he insists on doing what he clearly can see is right.
Creon and Antigone share their fatal flaw, and it is certainty in their own rightness. Part of the difficulty is that they are, indeed, right. Antigone is right that the punishment against Polyneices is a desecration and an insult to the gods of the dead. Creon is right that traitors must not be honored. But, as they are opposed, the rightness of each guarantees the wrongness of the other. Antigone owes an obligation of respect and deference to the ruler of the city, one she at no point acknowledges, and that the authority of the gods is not her authority; and Creon is failing to acknowledge that he, too, must defer to a higher authority.
The Greeks never saw the stories of their tragic plays except against a background of a larger tale. Each tragedy is one particular outgrowth of some more terrible curse that lies in the background, one afflicting entire houses, entire cities, and, in the case of the Trojan War, all of Greek civilization. The larger curse against which Antigone's tale would have been seen is that of the House of Laius, rooted in the tale of Oedipus. With this root Oedipus Tyrannos, since Aristotle often considered the most perfect of all Greek tragedies, is concerned.
Thebes is blighted in some mysterious way, which has led Oedipus to send Creon to the Oracle at Delphi. Oedipus is living high; he has become king of Thebes because of his cleverness in overcoming the terrorizing Sphinx shortly after the previous king, Laius, had been murdered. To have attained the heights by one's wits is a very splendid thing. But, of course, all things move forward in a doom that has already been laid down and therefore is not at all avoidable, as, piece by piece, the truth of Oedipus's history falls into place. The layering of this is quite masterful, as the certainties of everyone involved are stripped away.
In Oedipus at Colonus, which in some ways is my favorite of the three, we see the countervailing power of eunoia, or benevolence. Oedipus, who has gouged out his eyes, is wandering with his daughters Antigone and Ismene to guide and aid him. He comes to Colonus and stumbles into a sacred grove dedicated to the Furies. This distresses the local townsmen greatly, but he convinces them that he means no ill, and with their guidance undergoes the ritual to remove the piacular guilt of trespassing on a sacred place. I've always liked the balance of this, since it shows the beginning of a new turn in a nice, clean way. Oedipus has spent much of his adult life stumbling into sacred places, violating the strictures protecting the sacredness of fatherhood, of motherhood, and now of the gods; but the ritual means for removing the unintended guilt of violating the bounds of the grove shift the terms of the curse. They do not end it -- as we see merely by looking at Antigone by his side -- and his house will still suffer the consequences of it. But for Oedipus himself, it is the one thing that truly begins to make things go right, or, as right as they can go after all that has already happened, at least.
Through his noble willingness to uphold the honor of Colonus before the gods, he is put in good stead with Theseus, king of Athens, who is the protector of Colonus. It will turn out to be a crucial thing. For the god Apollo is not done intervening in the life of Oedipus through the instrumentality of his Oracle. The Oracle has informed Thebes that Oedipus is crucial to the safety of Thebes, and thus Oedipus, at whom all had looked in horror, is now courted by both his son Polyneices and his brother-in-law Creon.
Creon comes first. Oedipus cannot dwell in the land of Thebes, but if there is one constant in the portrayal of Creon in Sophocles, it is that he will do anything, absolutely anything, for the good of the city. Thus he intends to set Oedipus up under practical house arrest just outside of Thebes's legal jurisdiction, so that the exile of Oedipus will remain but Thebes still may enjoy the protection the gods have said now comes with Oedipus. Oedipus refuses vehemently, noting that Creon did absolutely nothing in support of him, and only wants Oedipus now to protect Thebes from Athens -- but the Athenians have treated Oedipus better than the Thebans did, even knowing his terrible history. Creon attempts to get what he wants by force; he has already seized Ismene, and seizes Antigone as well. Theseus, however, pursues and returns them.
When he does, he notes that a suppliant has come asking for Oedipus, and it turns out to be Polyneices. He has been thrown out of Thebes by Eteocles, and has come for Oedipus's help in reclaiming the city, claiming kinship both of blood and of fate. Oedipus refuses this plea, too, noting that it was Antigone and Ismene who have sacrificed everything for him, while Polyneices was one of those who threw Oedipus out from Thebes. Antigone urges Polyneices not to attack the city, and Oedipus prophesies that the two brothers will kill each other.
A terrible thunderstorm arises, and Oedipus takes this as an omen that his death is near, and he finishes life with sacrifices to the gods. Before he dies, however, Oedipus has Theseus promise to keep his tomb secret, so that the protection promised by the gods may belong to Athens and never be stolen from it. And Antigone, learning of this, asks for help in returning to Thebes, hoping to stop Polyneices from his attack on the city....
Slavitt's translation is very easy to read. The simplicity is capable of achieving the dignified. Here for instance, is Slavitt with Antigone's famous speech:
This is about as dignified as Slavitt gets, and it has a certain amount of force. And it contrasts favorably with Paul Roche's version of the same:
But in all the concision it is easy to lose track of the fact that this is a ritual -- admittedly, it is a ritual that admitted of considerable flexibility, but all tragedies were ritual components in larger religious and political events. Slavitt's breaking up of the Chorus may make it easier to treat the plays as drama, but it materially harms their ability to be ritual representations of the things of gods and heroes. This is especially notable at the ends of the plays, which all kind of peter out instead of coming to their stately choral conclusions.
Favorite Passage:
Recommendation: Highly Recommended.
Opening Passages: From Antigone:
Dear sister, Ismene, what evils that come
from Oedipus our father has Zeus not sent
to burden our lives? There is nothing, no shame, no pain,
no sorrow, no disgrace that you and I
have not endured. And now comes the general's new
proclamation. What have you heard? Or do you
take no notice of how our enemies move
against our friends.
From Oedipus Tyrannos:
My children, the latest to spring from Cadmus' stock,
why do you sit before my house with your votive
garlands? The whole city is filled with wailing,
lamentations, and prayers to Apollo. Incense
fills the air. I have not sent to inquire
but have come myself to hear from you directly,
I, Oedipus, whom all call famous.
From Oedipus at Colonus:
Antigone, child of a blind man, where are we?
What place is this? What city of men have we come to?
Who now shall welcome wandering Oedipus
who brings but scanty gifts? Expecting little,
I get even less, but that, for me, is enough,
for suffering and time that have been my companions
have instructed me in contentment. Nobility, too,
teaches me patience.
Summary: In Antigone, we find the aftermath of a terrible civil war, literally brother against brother as the sons of Oedipus fought for the throne of Thebes until they both died before its walls, leaving their uncle Creon fully in charge of the city. It is, I think, essential to the play that one understand that this puts Creon in a terrible and difficult position. But Creon is a ruler with a peculiar characteristic: he always, and in every way, puts the good of Thebes above any other good. For the good of Thebes, one brother must be recognized as hero, the other as traitor, and for the good of Thebes, the traitor must be punished by the full brunt of the law. Not for the Greeks was the notion that human capacity to punish ended at death; you may punish someone after they are dead by denying them proper funeral rites, thus refusing them even in death the regard of the city. Eteocles will be buried as a hero; Polyneices is to rot in the field as a traitor.
But Creon is meddling with something greater than he understands, and this begins to take shape in Antigone, who defies his orders and buries her brother. It is an act of piety to her brother and to the gods of the dead. It is also an act of treason. Again Creon finds himself put into an impossible situation by the House of Laius, and again he responds to the problem as he must, putting the affair of the state above all personal good. A ruler cannot show favoritism,but must uphold the law. He condemns his niece to death. It is worth, I think, taking a moment to appreciate how extraordinary this. Age after age, nepotism has been one of the great sources of evils in government; for a ruler to be so free of nepotism as Creon is a truly extraordinary thing.
Creon's son, Haemon, however, who was to be married to Antigone, argues that the people have a much greater sympathy with Antigone than Creon knows. The people of Thebes do not see what Antigone has done as a crime. The very idea baffles Creon to the point of frustration. Of course it was a crime; she broke the law and honored a traitor to the city. Moreover, it is he, not the people, who has the responsibility for the city. In the midst of his argument, Haemon threatens that if Antigone dies, she will not die alone. This infuriates Creon; it seems to him as if the whole city is going mad.
Creon has Antigone walled up in a cave as a living tomb, with a ritual minimum of food and water to prevent the city from any guilt of direct murder. Antigone enters, bewailing her virginity and stubbornly insisting against both the Chorus and Creon that she was in the right.
Then the blind seer Tiresias, Creon's most trusted advisor, comes to him with a warning: the sacrifices to the gods have been tainted by the sentence against Polyneices -- his rotting corpse is literally desecrating the sacred rites of the city, so that the gods no longer regard its prayers. He must relent in his penalty against Polyneices. For Creon, this is simply the last straw; here is yet one more person who has gone mad and is advocating respect and honor for those who have betrayed the city. They have a massive falling out, and Tiresias leaves, prophesying that Creon will be made to pay by the gods. Again, Creon is in a difficult situation: to relent is politically impossible, but he himself can see the danger if it turns out that Tiresias is right. But at the advice of the Chorus, he yields to what he finally sees as necessity, and goes to release Antigone and to put the body of Polyneices into the cave as a proper tomb. But of course, it is too late. Antigone is dead; Haemon is dead; Creon's wife, Eurydice, dies when she hears her son has died.
You might perhaps notice that I have told the story entirely as a story about Creon. Antigone is such a striking figure, and so sympathetic to us Christians, who really and truly believe that there is a knowable law greater and more fundamental than any human law, and who regard desecration of the dead as an immense sacrilege compared to which political treason is insignificant, that it is she who comes to the front of the story, despite being in only parts of it. Indeed, even for the Greeks she was sympathetic enough to be the most memorable part of the work. But the structure of the story makes Creon, not Antigone, the real tragic hero. Antigone's certainty far exceeds anything that pagan Greeks could possibly have granted her; the good of the city is one of the sacred pillars of life itself for them, and Antigone's lack of respect for it was problematic; to punish the enemies of the city was the charge of the ruler and there is no doubt or question that this is what Creon was doing; it is impossible to imagine that there weren't many Greeks who would have had the attitude we find explicitly expressed in the story by Ismene and by the Chorus, that there is something admirable about what Antigone was trying to do, but that what she was trying to do was beyond the power of mortals. It is Creon who finds himself in tragedy because he insists on doing what he clearly can see is right.
Creon and Antigone share their fatal flaw, and it is certainty in their own rightness. Part of the difficulty is that they are, indeed, right. Antigone is right that the punishment against Polyneices is a desecration and an insult to the gods of the dead. Creon is right that traitors must not be honored. But, as they are opposed, the rightness of each guarantees the wrongness of the other. Antigone owes an obligation of respect and deference to the ruler of the city, one she at no point acknowledges, and that the authority of the gods is not her authority; and Creon is failing to acknowledge that he, too, must defer to a higher authority.
The Greeks never saw the stories of their tragic plays except against a background of a larger tale. Each tragedy is one particular outgrowth of some more terrible curse that lies in the background, one afflicting entire houses, entire cities, and, in the case of the Trojan War, all of Greek civilization. The larger curse against which Antigone's tale would have been seen is that of the House of Laius, rooted in the tale of Oedipus. With this root Oedipus Tyrannos, since Aristotle often considered the most perfect of all Greek tragedies, is concerned.
Thebes is blighted in some mysterious way, which has led Oedipus to send Creon to the Oracle at Delphi. Oedipus is living high; he has become king of Thebes because of his cleverness in overcoming the terrorizing Sphinx shortly after the previous king, Laius, had been murdered. To have attained the heights by one's wits is a very splendid thing. But, of course, all things move forward in a doom that has already been laid down and therefore is not at all avoidable, as, piece by piece, the truth of Oedipus's history falls into place. The layering of this is quite masterful, as the certainties of everyone involved are stripped away.
In Oedipus at Colonus, which in some ways is my favorite of the three, we see the countervailing power of eunoia, or benevolence. Oedipus, who has gouged out his eyes, is wandering with his daughters Antigone and Ismene to guide and aid him. He comes to Colonus and stumbles into a sacred grove dedicated to the Furies. This distresses the local townsmen greatly, but he convinces them that he means no ill, and with their guidance undergoes the ritual to remove the piacular guilt of trespassing on a sacred place. I've always liked the balance of this, since it shows the beginning of a new turn in a nice, clean way. Oedipus has spent much of his adult life stumbling into sacred places, violating the strictures protecting the sacredness of fatherhood, of motherhood, and now of the gods; but the ritual means for removing the unintended guilt of violating the bounds of the grove shift the terms of the curse. They do not end it -- as we see merely by looking at Antigone by his side -- and his house will still suffer the consequences of it. But for Oedipus himself, it is the one thing that truly begins to make things go right, or, as right as they can go after all that has already happened, at least.
Through his noble willingness to uphold the honor of Colonus before the gods, he is put in good stead with Theseus, king of Athens, who is the protector of Colonus. It will turn out to be a crucial thing. For the god Apollo is not done intervening in the life of Oedipus through the instrumentality of his Oracle. The Oracle has informed Thebes that Oedipus is crucial to the safety of Thebes, and thus Oedipus, at whom all had looked in horror, is now courted by both his son Polyneices and his brother-in-law Creon.
Creon comes first. Oedipus cannot dwell in the land of Thebes, but if there is one constant in the portrayal of Creon in Sophocles, it is that he will do anything, absolutely anything, for the good of the city. Thus he intends to set Oedipus up under practical house arrest just outside of Thebes's legal jurisdiction, so that the exile of Oedipus will remain but Thebes still may enjoy the protection the gods have said now comes with Oedipus. Oedipus refuses vehemently, noting that Creon did absolutely nothing in support of him, and only wants Oedipus now to protect Thebes from Athens -- but the Athenians have treated Oedipus better than the Thebans did, even knowing his terrible history. Creon attempts to get what he wants by force; he has already seized Ismene, and seizes Antigone as well. Theseus, however, pursues and returns them.
When he does, he notes that a suppliant has come asking for Oedipus, and it turns out to be Polyneices. He has been thrown out of Thebes by Eteocles, and has come for Oedipus's help in reclaiming the city, claiming kinship both of blood and of fate. Oedipus refuses this plea, too, noting that it was Antigone and Ismene who have sacrificed everything for him, while Polyneices was one of those who threw Oedipus out from Thebes. Antigone urges Polyneices not to attack the city, and Oedipus prophesies that the two brothers will kill each other.
A terrible thunderstorm arises, and Oedipus takes this as an omen that his death is near, and he finishes life with sacrifices to the gods. Before he dies, however, Oedipus has Theseus promise to keep his tomb secret, so that the protection promised by the gods may belong to Athens and never be stolen from it. And Antigone, learning of this, asks for help in returning to Thebes, hoping to stop Polyneices from his attack on the city....
Slavitt's translation is very easy to read. The simplicity is capable of achieving the dignified. Here for instance, is Slavitt with Antigone's famous speech:
Yes, for it was not Zeus who made that law,
nor Justice who dwells with the gods below and rules
in the world of men and women. Your edict was clear
and strong, but not enough to suspend the unwritten,
unfailing laws of the gods who live forever
and whose rule, revealed to us so long ago,
is not for here and now but, like the gods,
forever.
This is about as dignified as Slavitt gets, and it has a certain amount of force. And it contrasts favorably with Paul Roche's version of the same:
Naturally! Since Zeus never promulgated such a law,
Nor will you find that Justice,
Mistress of the world below,
publishes such laws to humankind.
I never thought your mortal edicts had such force
they nullified the laws of heaven,
which unwritten, not proclaimed,
can boast a currency that everlastingly is valid,
an origin beyond the birth of man.
But in all the concision it is easy to lose track of the fact that this is a ritual -- admittedly, it is a ritual that admitted of considerable flexibility, but all tragedies were ritual components in larger religious and political events. Slavitt's breaking up of the Chorus may make it easier to treat the plays as drama, but it materially harms their ability to be ritual representations of the things of gods and heroes. This is especially notable at the ends of the plays, which all kind of peter out instead of coming to their stately choral conclusions.
Favorite Passage:
OEDIPUS: Daughters, you hear the words of the helpful stranger?
ISMENE: We have listened, Father, what shall we do?
OEDIPUS: I cannot go, myself. I have not the strength
and I cannot see. One of you must go
to perform the rite for the three of us as he
prescribed. Even one, who is sincere, may speak
for a larger number. One of you, go. The other
must stay with me to help me and be my guide.
Recommendation: Highly Recommended.
Maronite Year XLVII
Sunday of Pentecost
Acts 2:1-21; John 14:15-20
The Lord pours his Spirit out on all,
sons and daughters prophesy for Him,
elders dream true dreams, youths have visions.
On those who serve, both men and women,
the holy Virgin, the apostles,
He pours out His Spirit with glory.
Who calls on His great name will be saved,
salvation comes to Jerusalem,
for the Lord has spoken in His love.
Holy God, You give us true life;
Holy Mighty, You confirm our hearts;
Holy Immortal, You send us forth.
Upon the cross You saved us, O Christ;
today you send us the Consoler,
that we may announce your name to all.
At the time You ascended on high,
You raised Your hands and poured out blessings,
telling Your apostles they must wait.
Gathered together as the one Church,
they heard a noise; the Spirit filled them.
the simple spoke Your truth in all tongues.
With words of flame they spoke Your good news,
going into all the world to save souls,
bringing wonders and casting their nets.
They feared no rulers, dreaded no death,
in all places proclaiming the faith,
that God through love was made manifest.
Their zeal made them seem drunk, as with wine,
but their glory was in their Spirit,
their intoxication, love of You.
Confirm us, Lord, in Your holy faith,
adorn us with Your Holy Spirit;
we beg You for Your spiritual gifts.
Bind us to the apostolic Church,
whose pillar is the bishop of Rome,
which is tended by priests and deacons.
Defend Your Church against vainglory,
sanctify her shepherds with Your grace,
and purify her children from death.
You have clothed us in baptismal clothes;
make Your light shine in all hearts through us,
we who receive You at the altar.
Grant us to receive the Life-giver,
the consoling Spirit whom You send,
the Spirit who unites us to You.
Tongues of flame were on the apostles;
ardent love grant to us Your servants,
the love that speaks in every tongue.
Kindle in us apostolic zeal
that we may carry Your love to all
until all glorify Your Father.
Your love, O Lord, is consuming fire,
and You, O Lord, are consuming love;
through our love, Lord, set the world aflame.
To those who love Christ, He sends His truth,
the truth-giving Spirit as a friend,
through overshadowing bringing light.
The apostles witnessed to their Lord;
they came out announcing to the world:
'The Son has risen in His glory.'
The Spirit of life speaks through prophets;
He witnesses through the apostles;
Lord, may we be made splendid in Him.
And we beg You, O Holy Spirit,
Spirit of might, of knowledge, of fear,
that You be our love and our wisdom.
Spirit of wisdom and compassion,
give life to the Church of our Lord Christ,
and truth to the tongues of her people.
Saturday, May 14, 2016
Bright Flames from the Heavenly Portals
Ode for the Coming of the Holy Spirit
by Gregory of Narek
translated by Abraham Terian
A sudden blast, effluence from the Father,
Streaming like fire, a path marked by bright flames from the heavenly portals,
Separate flames (driven) by blasting wind, many flames of assorted languages.
Celestial silence amid the multiplicity of sounds
Bringing good news to the sad assembly,
Invitation to good things for the Petrine company.
To the One who cleanses with fire we raise
A balanced song (of praise) in nine lines,
For the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit:
Spirit of the Father, coming from his very presence,
Spirit of God, Spirit of might, Spirit of meekness,
Spirit of knowledge (and) wisdom, Spirit of counsel and understanding.
I beg you not to convict me, ever.
Abide within me, a temple built by you.
Your will is an accomplished act.
You, whose will is good, show your benevolent act within me, a manifold sinner,
That by your will I may sing songs of praise to you who are Existent,
And renew me unto glory.
[from The Festal Works of St. Gregory of Narek, Terian, tr., Liturgical Press (Collegeville, MN: 2016) pp. 89-91.]
Friday, May 13, 2016
Dashed Off VIII
Dashed off notes, to be taken with a grain of salt.
canons of advisability for precedent
to metrion, to prepon, to kairon, and to deon in dialectical reasoning
to metrion, to prepon, to kairon & to deon as aspects of prudential judgment, as aspects of illative sense
All political constitutions depend for their day-to-day legitimacy and effectiveness on the exercise of unenumerated rights.
extended mind // relics of saints
the sublimity of the starry sky as a principle of the history of science
the moral teaching of the Church
(1) preparation for communion
(2) consistency with sacraments
(3) consistency of witness for Christ
bhakti as likely a ripple in Hinduism resulting from Islam
the solidary and meritorious works of charity
(1) preparations for further grace
(2) satisfactions
(3) interpositions on behalf of others
As the Ark of the Covenant was an instrument of union between God and His people and a pledge of divine help, so too is Mary.
the importance of prolegomena and groundwork-laying to long-term philosophy
rhetorical use of pathos to poison or correct philosophical reasoning
philosophical encyclopedia (survey) as a training ground and resource bank for philosophical inquiry
The preservation of destructible good in accordance with its nature is itself a good.
immutable & mutable data in arguments
To ask well is the first step in receiving.
sealing an argument (related to cognition of truth of premises)
attention as the seed of planned action
argument forensics -- e.g., restoring an argument to its original context, considerations of authenticity relevant to interpretation, etc.
Plato's dialogues as memorials and as anticipations
The purpose of the office of the bishop is to preserve the integrity of the sacramental economy.
confirmation character & curation of Christian heritage
the sacrament of confirmation as the binding thread of the liturgical commonwealth
assessing the utility of actions when one considers not merely the consequences of one's actions but one's actions as consequences
maximizing good causes rather than good consequences
Intelligence and final goals are not, pace Bostrom, orthogonal; that would require a bizarrely wide separation of speculative and practical reason.
cognitive anticipations or presentiments
general beneficence, special beneficence, pietas, justice, honesty, mercy, magnanimity as preconditions for society without which it begins to break down
The difference between philosophical strategy and military strategy is the Socratic principle of the former that the truth and the just must win, even at the cost of one's own loss in the dispute. This is not necessarily foreign ot the latter, but it is certainly not integral and essential to it, either.
solidarity as dampening for bad consequences
marriage as foundation-work for society
Even prophets do not always listen to themselves.
Laws protecting marriage can guarantee neither friendship of virtue nor friendship of pleasure, only friendship of use.
two forms of violence/violation: against will and against nature
Politics in every age is often a system of curing symptoms so as to ignore the diseases; this is a problem both Plato and Xenophon tackle.
St. Isidore's etymologies are a kind of approach to phenomenology.
Eleazar in IV Macc. and the death of Socrates
Every vice can be analyzed into a formal aspect, which is to be understood as active disorder, usurpation, arrogation, or pride, and a material aspect, which can be regarded as passive disorder, craving, or concupiscence.
Utopias tend to be stronger as criticisms than dystopias because relative to utopias we are already the dystopia.
sacraments involving promises made to God: baptism, confirmation, matrimony, orders
Philosophy itself is a sort of death, or anticipation of death (Phaedo 67e), in which one separates body from soul through the cardinal virtues (69b-c).
recollection is semiotic (Phaedo 73c)
reason as universal test
reliability specs for reasoning
Some insoluble problems are made insoluble by the state of the problem-solver.
means as defined by circumstances and ends
the instruments of argument
probe arguments
symptom-tests & use-tests
Plato uses analogies, dramatic elements, and contextual juxtapositions to get arguments to perform more than one function at once.
superposition of guesses
intemperance as the chief corruptive of prudence
philosophies of science analogous to might-makes-right in ethics
deus scientiarum dominus est
problem, diagnosis, solution
- problems as always under an at least partial diagnosis
- problems occur within a structure; depending on how the diagnosis relates the problem to the structure, the appropriate kind of solution may be:
reform (consistency-improving)
transformation (reworking structure)
separation (structure-creating)
tolerance
the fundamental vein of philosophy of language: how one may teach by means of language
first principle of practical reason
for individual good: private taste and convenience
for weakly common good: good taste
for strongly common good: custom and law
for most common good: moral principle
clinamen, antinomy, and anomaly relative to a given model
clinamen & the empirical residue for a model
envy as the most orc-ish vice
abstract pattern vs. narrative pattern in dance
Error has no rights, but sometimes it must be tolerated for the sake of the rights of truth.
Poetic flow under immense pressure becomes rigorous rational structure.
Clitophon as establishing that even if philosophy begins in wonder (thaumaston) it is not enough to have wonder (407e)
the priest in confession as a defender of common good (Alphonsus Liguori)
The confessor must help the penitents dispose themselves to absolution, not just try to absolve them.
Nonfulfillment of preferences is not identical to frustration of preferences.
The Church as Mother, in union with Christ, brings forth souls unto salvation and light.
A symbol requires a frame within which its symbolism can be seen.
Decadence makes stagnation look like peaceful prosperity.
health, power, safety, usefulness, prosperity, refined by Socratic elenchus to reality of Good as such (cp. Republic, Gorgias, Eryxias)
general differences between indefinite quantities
(1) the corruption of the idea of triage
(2) the deterioration of the understanding of medicine as a humanitarian tradition
(3) the collapse of the moral economy of medicine as a moral economy
modal logic as following naturally from kinds of hypothetical reasoning
philosophical tasks requiring many contributors
objection-collecting
Ex 40:34 // Lk 1:35
the miracle of loaves & fishes as teaching about faith & the gospel
locative operators that work like epistemic and doxastic operators (e.g., localizability from a reference point0
Peirce & workable-in-a-tradition
to thaumaston & miracles
the poetics of miracles
development of ascetic practice -> generalization of ascetic practice in qualified form for larger audience -> new development of ascetic practice
(but this is complicated by the fact that ascetic practices, being difficult, are constantly deteriorating)
Catholicism is not a theory but a civilization: the universal civilization of the Word made flesh.
To say that there is an external world is to say that our minds are potential to an actual independent of us.
Stable trade requires stable ceremony.
Military disasters arise by convergence of many factors; rarely if ever through some single great mistake (but many small mistakes, or a great mistake as a contributing factor, are not uncommon).
"The pain that gnaws at the heart as a result of sinning against love is sharper than all other torments that exist." Isaac the Syrian
philosophy as attention to the soul (and its part in all else)
latreia to the god (Apol 23c, 30a)
principles of reasonable deference
- seem to require a notion of fields of (presumptive) authority and to be related to principles governing that authority
- note that one defers to judgment, qua exercise of authority / expertise / right of determination
Hume's account of property & exchange as an account of ceremonial interaction
causal, public trust as essential to the health of society
fear as sense of vulnerability
kami in Shinto as manifestations of natural affinity
Human beings themselves are the evidence of ethics.
sublimity as a ground of hope
remotion, causation, & eminence in understanding the external world
postulates of deliberation: free decision, universal concepts, ground of possibility
the sublimity of the first principles of speculative reason
Sensible affinities presuppose intelligible affinities.
God as first principle or ground of affinity
prose as indefinitameter
arguments formed from mists of aphorisms
Ruth : Gentile :: Naomi : Jew
The difference between suggestive and conclusive evidence is everything else.
Natural law as the general structure of human society: people surviving, reproducing, educating, living in society, seeking truth about the most important things, as human beings.
The miracles of Christ practically beg to be used to generate a vocabulary for rightly framing life.
Snark shades into spite with dangerous ease.
"Freedom can never yield its fullness of blessings so long as the law or its administration places the smallest obstacle in the pathway of any virtuous citizen." James Garfield
'is part of' vs 'is a part of'
time as the metric mereotopology of clocks
ordinary language philosophy as ordinary evidence philosophy
The concept of evidence is clearly separable from that of justification.
(there needs to be a proper analysis of 'respect for evidence')
breach of loyalty vs conflict of interest vs abuse of position
obligation // proof
tradition, personal experience, and chance circumstances as joint determinatives of what counts as a live option, a forced option, a momentous option
scientists guiding inquiry according to assessments of live, forced, and momentous paths
Mk 2:27-28 is a fairly daring interpretation of Gn 1.
resurrection and fiat lux Mt 28:1; Mk 16:2; Lk 24:1; Jn 20:1 (cf Justin Martyr 1 Apol 67)
the structure of Sunday
(1) natural law: distinct identifiable time for the community to recognize the universal beneficence of God
(2) customary law (apostolic tradition): memorial of Resurrection as surpassing Sabbath (Sabbath as type)
(3) positive law: precept of Church
Marriage is itself a specific manifestation and form of ecclesial communion.
piety and friendship as two grounds besides legal justice for corporate action (but all virtues associated with justice contribute something to corporate life and solidarity)
voodoo refutation using toy model arguments
We see people through our sentiments.
three grounds of healthy customary law (cp Laws VIII): reverence for divine things, love of honor, preference of noble attributes of soul over goods of body
Baptism : baptism :: Transfiguration : confirmation :: Passion : orders
(But note, of course, that our understanding of each already depends in some ways on each of the three parts of the Life of Christ)
the sacrament of confirmation strengthened by the witness of Moses (Law) and Elijah (prophets)
Baptism ; faith :: Transfiguration : hope :: Passion : charity
All of Bostrom's existential risks are only limit cases of things we deal with all the time in institutions.
Jus ad bellum criteria, properly understood, are also jus in bello criteria, and both, properly understood, are just post bellum criteria. This is because the criteria are specifications of issues arising from the very structure of large-scale policy actions.
equity, benevolence, and prudence as concerned especially directly with the good of persons considered as persons.
The more essential lawyers are to a society, the weaker the poor and the outcast are.
The cultivation of stable goods is a key element of good citizenship.
The witness of the Church is an act of the Holy Spirit.
Strategies are not mere conglomerations of tactics and operations, but higher standpoints.
Jacob's Ladder and Christ Ascended
li & the Urphenomenon
Just cause must directly pertain to common good.
HoP as guard against equivocation
The calendar of saints helps to guarantee that, in the long run, the philosophy that assists teaching is not merely theoretical but is rooted in the practice of Christian life.
the panoply of Jewish heritage: adoption (election), Shekinah, covenants (patriarchal and Davidic), Torah, Temple worship, Divine promises, patriarchal history, Messiah
All genuine criticism involves teleological analysis, some examination of means and their relations to ends.
aridity in light of the cross as a purification from pride and a study of humility
When suspension of judgment is required, the rational response is to develop all branches, not to stop. Suspension of judgment is not a stopping rule but a change of strategy.
The altar signifies (1) the human heart (2) the Church, including the Virgin Mary (3) the Incarnate Word (4) the table of the Last Supper (5) the throne of God
John the Baptist & icons as pedagogical
metonymic and metaphoric quasi-definitions
points of eminence (Durandus)
baptism - efficacy
eucharist - sanctity
matrimony - signification
confirmation & orders - ratione conferentis
peccatum
original, mortal, venial
of cognition, of locution, of perpetration
of fragility (weakness), of simplicity (ignorance), of malignity (malice)
sacramental guardians & curators of the sacraments
philosopher as witness
(1) We can experience a world outside us.
(2) To be able to experience a world outside us is to be potential to something actual that is not ourselves.
(3) We experience a world outside us.
(4) To experience a world outside us is to be actualized in some way because of something that is outside us.
There is nothing wrong with ad hoc reasoning as an exploratory strategy; but it cannot substitute for principled reasoning.
attestation -> affinity
The rule of law is founded on regard for virtue, for only virtue can find genuine common good.
rule of law as friendship-building
Catechesis is a practical endeavor whose ends are drawn from those of the whole Church.
Both the Election of Israel and the Incarnation imply that contributions will inevitably be extraordinarily diverse, in all the natural hues of human life.
The abstract structure of civilization is the same as that of prudence.
eucharistic communion as communion with martyrdom
Pragmatism always must presuppose a received context.
orders the sacrament of tradition
Our capacity to think of possible alternatives is of itself a reason for thinking determinism false.
'the madness, the Bacchic frenzy of philosophy' (Symp 218b)
the personation of philosophical ideas (Socrates, Confucius, etc.)
gifts of ideas laid at the altar
To understand the excellence of work of a genius artisan one must first understand the competence of a good artisan.
the intrinsic link between eros and fecundity: Symposium 206c and following.
canons of advisability for precedent
to metrion, to prepon, to kairon, and to deon in dialectical reasoning
to metrion, to prepon, to kairon & to deon as aspects of prudential judgment, as aspects of illative sense
All political constitutions depend for their day-to-day legitimacy and effectiveness on the exercise of unenumerated rights.
extended mind // relics of saints
the sublimity of the starry sky as a principle of the history of science
the moral teaching of the Church
(1) preparation for communion
(2) consistency with sacraments
(3) consistency of witness for Christ
bhakti as likely a ripple in Hinduism resulting from Islam
the solidary and meritorious works of charity
(1) preparations for further grace
(2) satisfactions
(3) interpositions on behalf of others
As the Ark of the Covenant was an instrument of union between God and His people and a pledge of divine help, so too is Mary.
the importance of prolegomena and groundwork-laying to long-term philosophy
rhetorical use of pathos to poison or correct philosophical reasoning
philosophical encyclopedia (survey) as a training ground and resource bank for philosophical inquiry
The preservation of destructible good in accordance with its nature is itself a good.
immutable & mutable data in arguments
To ask well is the first step in receiving.
sealing an argument (related to cognition of truth of premises)
attention as the seed of planned action
argument forensics -- e.g., restoring an argument to its original context, considerations of authenticity relevant to interpretation, etc.
Plato's dialogues as memorials and as anticipations
The purpose of the office of the bishop is to preserve the integrity of the sacramental economy.
confirmation character & curation of Christian heritage
the sacrament of confirmation as the binding thread of the liturgical commonwealth
assessing the utility of actions when one considers not merely the consequences of one's actions but one's actions as consequences
maximizing good causes rather than good consequences
Intelligence and final goals are not, pace Bostrom, orthogonal; that would require a bizarrely wide separation of speculative and practical reason.
cognitive anticipations or presentiments
general beneficence, special beneficence, pietas, justice, honesty, mercy, magnanimity as preconditions for society without which it begins to break down
The difference between philosophical strategy and military strategy is the Socratic principle of the former that the truth and the just must win, even at the cost of one's own loss in the dispute. This is not necessarily foreign ot the latter, but it is certainly not integral and essential to it, either.
solidarity as dampening for bad consequences
marriage as foundation-work for society
Even prophets do not always listen to themselves.
Laws protecting marriage can guarantee neither friendship of virtue nor friendship of pleasure, only friendship of use.
two forms of violence/violation: against will and against nature
Politics in every age is often a system of curing symptoms so as to ignore the diseases; this is a problem both Plato and Xenophon tackle.
St. Isidore's etymologies are a kind of approach to phenomenology.
Eleazar in IV Macc. and the death of Socrates
Every vice can be analyzed into a formal aspect, which is to be understood as active disorder, usurpation, arrogation, or pride, and a material aspect, which can be regarded as passive disorder, craving, or concupiscence.
Utopias tend to be stronger as criticisms than dystopias because relative to utopias we are already the dystopia.
sacraments involving promises made to God: baptism, confirmation, matrimony, orders
Philosophy itself is a sort of death, or anticipation of death (Phaedo 67e), in which one separates body from soul through the cardinal virtues (69b-c).
recollection is semiotic (Phaedo 73c)
reason as universal test
reliability specs for reasoning
Some insoluble problems are made insoluble by the state of the problem-solver.
means as defined by circumstances and ends
the instruments of argument
probe arguments
symptom-tests & use-tests
Plato uses analogies, dramatic elements, and contextual juxtapositions to get arguments to perform more than one function at once.
superposition of guesses
intemperance as the chief corruptive of prudence
philosophies of science analogous to might-makes-right in ethics
deus scientiarum dominus est
problem, diagnosis, solution
- problems as always under an at least partial diagnosis
- problems occur within a structure; depending on how the diagnosis relates the problem to the structure, the appropriate kind of solution may be:
reform (consistency-improving)
transformation (reworking structure)
separation (structure-creating)
tolerance
the fundamental vein of philosophy of language: how one may teach by means of language
first principle of practical reason
for individual good: private taste and convenience
for weakly common good: good taste
for strongly common good: custom and law
for most common good: moral principle
clinamen, antinomy, and anomaly relative to a given model
clinamen & the empirical residue for a model
envy as the most orc-ish vice
abstract pattern vs. narrative pattern in dance
Error has no rights, but sometimes it must be tolerated for the sake of the rights of truth.
Poetic flow under immense pressure becomes rigorous rational structure.
Clitophon as establishing that even if philosophy begins in wonder (thaumaston) it is not enough to have wonder (407e)
the priest in confession as a defender of common good (Alphonsus Liguori)
The confessor must help the penitents dispose themselves to absolution, not just try to absolve them.
Nonfulfillment of preferences is not identical to frustration of preferences.
The Church as Mother, in union with Christ, brings forth souls unto salvation and light.
A symbol requires a frame within which its symbolism can be seen.
Decadence makes stagnation look like peaceful prosperity.
health, power, safety, usefulness, prosperity, refined by Socratic elenchus to reality of Good as such (cp. Republic, Gorgias, Eryxias)
general differences between indefinite quantities
(1) the corruption of the idea of triage
(2) the deterioration of the understanding of medicine as a humanitarian tradition
(3) the collapse of the moral economy of medicine as a moral economy
modal logic as following naturally from kinds of hypothetical reasoning
philosophical tasks requiring many contributors
objection-collecting
Ex 40:34 // Lk 1:35
the miracle of loaves & fishes as teaching about faith & the gospel
locative operators that work like epistemic and doxastic operators (e.g., localizability from a reference point0
Peirce & workable-in-a-tradition
to thaumaston & miracles
the poetics of miracles
development of ascetic practice -> generalization of ascetic practice in qualified form for larger audience -> new development of ascetic practice
(but this is complicated by the fact that ascetic practices, being difficult, are constantly deteriorating)
Catholicism is not a theory but a civilization: the universal civilization of the Word made flesh.
To say that there is an external world is to say that our minds are potential to an actual independent of us.
Stable trade requires stable ceremony.
Military disasters arise by convergence of many factors; rarely if ever through some single great mistake (but many small mistakes, or a great mistake as a contributing factor, are not uncommon).
"The pain that gnaws at the heart as a result of sinning against love is sharper than all other torments that exist." Isaac the Syrian
philosophy as attention to the soul (and its part in all else)
latreia to the god (Apol 23c, 30a)
principles of reasonable deference
- seem to require a notion of fields of (presumptive) authority and to be related to principles governing that authority
- note that one defers to judgment, qua exercise of authority / expertise / right of determination
Hume's account of property & exchange as an account of ceremonial interaction
causal, public trust as essential to the health of society
fear as sense of vulnerability
kami in Shinto as manifestations of natural affinity
Human beings themselves are the evidence of ethics.
sublimity as a ground of hope
remotion, causation, & eminence in understanding the external world
postulates of deliberation: free decision, universal concepts, ground of possibility
the sublimity of the first principles of speculative reason
Sensible affinities presuppose intelligible affinities.
God as first principle or ground of affinity
prose as indefinitameter
arguments formed from mists of aphorisms
Ruth : Gentile :: Naomi : Jew
The difference between suggestive and conclusive evidence is everything else.
Natural law as the general structure of human society: people surviving, reproducing, educating, living in society, seeking truth about the most important things, as human beings.
The miracles of Christ practically beg to be used to generate a vocabulary for rightly framing life.
Snark shades into spite with dangerous ease.
"Freedom can never yield its fullness of blessings so long as the law or its administration places the smallest obstacle in the pathway of any virtuous citizen." James Garfield
'is part of' vs 'is a part of'
time as the metric mereotopology of clocks
ordinary language philosophy as ordinary evidence philosophy
The concept of evidence is clearly separable from that of justification.
(there needs to be a proper analysis of 'respect for evidence')
breach of loyalty vs conflict of interest vs abuse of position
obligation // proof
tradition, personal experience, and chance circumstances as joint determinatives of what counts as a live option, a forced option, a momentous option
scientists guiding inquiry according to assessments of live, forced, and momentous paths
Mk 2:27-28 is a fairly daring interpretation of Gn 1.
resurrection and fiat lux Mt 28:1; Mk 16:2; Lk 24:1; Jn 20:1 (cf Justin Martyr 1 Apol 67)
the structure of Sunday
(1) natural law: distinct identifiable time for the community to recognize the universal beneficence of God
(2) customary law (apostolic tradition): memorial of Resurrection as surpassing Sabbath (Sabbath as type)
(3) positive law: precept of Church
Marriage is itself a specific manifestation and form of ecclesial communion.
piety and friendship as two grounds besides legal justice for corporate action (but all virtues associated with justice contribute something to corporate life and solidarity)
voodoo refutation using toy model arguments
We see people through our sentiments.
three grounds of healthy customary law (cp Laws VIII): reverence for divine things, love of honor, preference of noble attributes of soul over goods of body
Baptism : baptism :: Transfiguration : confirmation :: Passion : orders
(But note, of course, that our understanding of each already depends in some ways on each of the three parts of the Life of Christ)
the sacrament of confirmation strengthened by the witness of Moses (Law) and Elijah (prophets)
Baptism ; faith :: Transfiguration : hope :: Passion : charity
All of Bostrom's existential risks are only limit cases of things we deal with all the time in institutions.
Jus ad bellum criteria, properly understood, are also jus in bello criteria, and both, properly understood, are just post bellum criteria. This is because the criteria are specifications of issues arising from the very structure of large-scale policy actions.
equity, benevolence, and prudence as concerned especially directly with the good of persons considered as persons.
The more essential lawyers are to a society, the weaker the poor and the outcast are.
The cultivation of stable goods is a key element of good citizenship.
The witness of the Church is an act of the Holy Spirit.
Strategies are not mere conglomerations of tactics and operations, but higher standpoints.
Jacob's Ladder and Christ Ascended
li & the Urphenomenon
Just cause must directly pertain to common good.
HoP as guard against equivocation
The calendar of saints helps to guarantee that, in the long run, the philosophy that assists teaching is not merely theoretical but is rooted in the practice of Christian life.
the panoply of Jewish heritage: adoption (election), Shekinah, covenants (patriarchal and Davidic), Torah, Temple worship, Divine promises, patriarchal history, Messiah
All genuine criticism involves teleological analysis, some examination of means and their relations to ends.
aridity in light of the cross as a purification from pride and a study of humility
When suspension of judgment is required, the rational response is to develop all branches, not to stop. Suspension of judgment is not a stopping rule but a change of strategy.
The altar signifies (1) the human heart (2) the Church, including the Virgin Mary (3) the Incarnate Word (4) the table of the Last Supper (5) the throne of God
John the Baptist & icons as pedagogical
metonymic and metaphoric quasi-definitions
points of eminence (Durandus)
baptism - efficacy
eucharist - sanctity
matrimony - signification
confirmation & orders - ratione conferentis
peccatum
original, mortal, venial
of cognition, of locution, of perpetration
of fragility (weakness), of simplicity (ignorance), of malignity (malice)
sacramental guardians & curators of the sacraments
philosopher as witness
(1) We can experience a world outside us.
(2) To be able to experience a world outside us is to be potential to something actual that is not ourselves.
(3) We experience a world outside us.
(4) To experience a world outside us is to be actualized in some way because of something that is outside us.
There is nothing wrong with ad hoc reasoning as an exploratory strategy; but it cannot substitute for principled reasoning.
attestation -> affinity
The rule of law is founded on regard for virtue, for only virtue can find genuine common good.
rule of law as friendship-building
Catechesis is a practical endeavor whose ends are drawn from those of the whole Church.
Both the Election of Israel and the Incarnation imply that contributions will inevitably be extraordinarily diverse, in all the natural hues of human life.
The abstract structure of civilization is the same as that of prudence.
eucharistic communion as communion with martyrdom
Pragmatism always must presuppose a received context.
orders the sacrament of tradition
Our capacity to think of possible alternatives is of itself a reason for thinking determinism false.
'the madness, the Bacchic frenzy of philosophy' (Symp 218b)
the personation of philosophical ideas (Socrates, Confucius, etc.)
gifts of ideas laid at the altar
To understand the excellence of work of a genius artisan one must first understand the competence of a good artisan.
the intrinsic link between eros and fecundity: Symposium 206c and following.
Reasons to Learn Philosophy
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We should learn philosophy to:
— Existential Comics (@existentialcoms) May 11, 2016
Aquinas: understand God
Sartre: understand freedom
Popper: understand science
Hegel: understand Hegel
Converting Kant into Natural Law
The categorical imperative, according to Kant, is:
Kant, of course, spends considerable time explaining how this should be understood. But let's suppose a scenario: you are a natural law theorist and don't think Kantianism is right, but you think there's a lot that is good in it. How do you 'translate' Kant into natural law with minimal distortion so as to establish that more rigorously in natural law terms?
Well, everything in natural law theory depends on two things: the theory of practical reason and the theory of law (or obligation). Because Kantianism also has the structure of a certain conception of practical and a theory of obligation, it will actually translate fairly easily.
So we start with law. Taking Aquinas's famous definition, law is an ordering of reason to common good as promulgated by one who is caretaker of the community. So suppose we understood "universal law" in a Thomistic rather than Kantian way? What's universal about it in Kant is that it applies to all rational beings. And a maxim is just the rule you make for yourself in a decision, so:
[1b] In your decisions, act only according to that rule that could be a rational ordering to good common to all who have reason.
But a more common way of saying this, rather than talking about maxims or rules in decision, would be simply:
[1c] Seek and do what is appropriate to what is common good for all rational beings.
But let's stop a moment and think about how we get precepts of natural law in the first place. According to Aquinas, the most general principle for reasoning about practical decisions of any kind is:
There's nothing inherently moral about this; it's the general principle which makes it possible to say that tying your shoes before running up and down stairs is rational. Whether the law of natural law comes enters into the question depends on the kind of good involved. Aquinas's definition of law requires common good -- note that this is literally what it says, good shared in common, and that it is any kind of good shared in common, not (as in utilitarianism) only good consequences. So the first principle of practical reason becomes the first precept of natural law when the good in question is the common good of human beings.
So if Kant's categorical imperative is understood according to the Thomistic account of what a law is, it is very like a close specification of the positive clause of the first precept of natural law. This actually makes sense. The first principle of practical reason is to practical matters what the principle of noncontradiction it is in theoretical matters: it distinguishes the rationally incoherent from the rationally coherent, and Kant's categorical imperative is entirely concerned with rationally coherent action. And the first principle of practical reason becomes a precept of natural law when it concerns the common good of rational animals, while the categorical imperative specifically concerns law appropriate for all rational beings, so if you add to the categorical imperative the Thomistic notion that law is an ordering to common good promulgated by its caretaker(s), you get something very similar to the first precept of natural law. They are functionally and structurally analogous to begin with.
You can do this, incidentally, with all the formulations of the categorical imperative. The Law of Nature formulation works the same way as the above. The End in Itself formulation converts when you add to the above the idea of human nature itself (our nature as rational animals) as being a necessary part of the common good of all human beings, and then you get a precept to seek what is appropriate to human nature. The Kingdom of Ends formulation can be converted by adding the idea that a kingdom or realm is constituted by friendship, and that human beings are caretakers for the common good of the human race, and then you more-or-less get a precept to act in a way consistent with friendship with all human beings.
Of course, Kant doesn't have a natural law theory. But by converting Kant in this way, it becomes more straightforward to sort out what a natural law theorist could regard as right and wrong, good or bad about Kantianism. And none of this is to claim that the converted precepts, as merely converted, are flawless or have the same role in natural law theory as the categorical imperative in Kant's account. But it is, in fact, of the very nature of natural law to seek what is appropriate to the common good of all human beings, and it is, in fact, a matter of natural law that we should seek the good appropriate to human nature, and it is, in fact, a matter of natural law that we should seek what is required in order to make possible friendship among all human beings. (The most interesting difference is that these are not all equivalent precepts in natural law theory, despite being all very general and exceptionless precepts. This is because Kant's formulations just use three vocabularies human beings use in moral matters to restate exactly the same categorical imperative, but the analogous vocabulary in natural law theory cannot cover exactly the same ground.)
You could do the same thing in the reverse, but this is less interesting, because from a natural law perspective, this is in a way what Kant did in the first place, and from Kant's perspective, all moral vocabulary can be conformed to the categorical imperative to show either its incoherence or its true form. Natural law theorists have tended not to be so bold.
Which is unfortunate, as it contributes to a common error in understanding natural law theory, that there are distinctive classes of 'natural law arguments'. If natural law theory is true, all good moral arguments are natural law arguments. You can no more have a distinctive category of 'natural law arguments' than you can have a distinctive category of 'arguments using the principle of noncontradiction', and for exactly the same reason. To be sure, you can have arguments that are more explicit about using it than others, but all good arguments are principle-of-noncontradiction arguments, and (if natural law theory is true) all good moral arguments are first-precept-of-natural-law arguments. Thus the natural law theorist should be able to say, of any moral argument, what in it is good in terms of natural law.
[1]Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.
Kant, of course, spends considerable time explaining how this should be understood. But let's suppose a scenario: you are a natural law theorist and don't think Kantianism is right, but you think there's a lot that is good in it. How do you 'translate' Kant into natural law with minimal distortion so as to establish that more rigorously in natural law terms?
Well, everything in natural law theory depends on two things: the theory of practical reason and the theory of law (or obligation). Because Kantianism also has the structure of a certain conception of practical and a theory of obligation, it will actually translate fairly easily.
So we start with law. Taking Aquinas's famous definition, law is an ordering of reason to common good as promulgated by one who is caretaker of the community. So suppose we understood "universal law" in a Thomistic rather than Kantian way? What's universal about it in Kant is that it applies to all rational beings. And a maxim is just the rule you make for yourself in a decision, so:
[1b] In your decisions, act only according to that rule that could be a rational ordering to good common to all who have reason.
But a more common way of saying this, rather than talking about maxims or rules in decision, would be simply:
[1c] Seek and do what is appropriate to what is common good for all rational beings.
But let's stop a moment and think about how we get precepts of natural law in the first place. According to Aquinas, the most general principle for reasoning about practical decisions of any kind is:
Good is to be sought and done, bad is to be avoided.
There's nothing inherently moral about this; it's the general principle which makes it possible to say that tying your shoes before running up and down stairs is rational. Whether the law of natural law comes enters into the question depends on the kind of good involved. Aquinas's definition of law requires common good -- note that this is literally what it says, good shared in common, and that it is any kind of good shared in common, not (as in utilitarianism) only good consequences. So the first principle of practical reason becomes the first precept of natural law when the good in question is the common good of human beings.
So if Kant's categorical imperative is understood according to the Thomistic account of what a law is, it is very like a close specification of the positive clause of the first precept of natural law. This actually makes sense. The first principle of practical reason is to practical matters what the principle of noncontradiction it is in theoretical matters: it distinguishes the rationally incoherent from the rationally coherent, and Kant's categorical imperative is entirely concerned with rationally coherent action. And the first principle of practical reason becomes a precept of natural law when it concerns the common good of rational animals, while the categorical imperative specifically concerns law appropriate for all rational beings, so if you add to the categorical imperative the Thomistic notion that law is an ordering to common good promulgated by its caretaker(s), you get something very similar to the first precept of natural law. They are functionally and structurally analogous to begin with.
You can do this, incidentally, with all the formulations of the categorical imperative. The Law of Nature formulation works the same way as the above. The End in Itself formulation converts when you add to the above the idea of human nature itself (our nature as rational animals) as being a necessary part of the common good of all human beings, and then you get a precept to seek what is appropriate to human nature. The Kingdom of Ends formulation can be converted by adding the idea that a kingdom or realm is constituted by friendship, and that human beings are caretakers for the common good of the human race, and then you more-or-less get a precept to act in a way consistent with friendship with all human beings.
Of course, Kant doesn't have a natural law theory. But by converting Kant in this way, it becomes more straightforward to sort out what a natural law theorist could regard as right and wrong, good or bad about Kantianism. And none of this is to claim that the converted precepts, as merely converted, are flawless or have the same role in natural law theory as the categorical imperative in Kant's account. But it is, in fact, of the very nature of natural law to seek what is appropriate to the common good of all human beings, and it is, in fact, a matter of natural law that we should seek the good appropriate to human nature, and it is, in fact, a matter of natural law that we should seek what is required in order to make possible friendship among all human beings. (The most interesting difference is that these are not all equivalent precepts in natural law theory, despite being all very general and exceptionless precepts. This is because Kant's formulations just use three vocabularies human beings use in moral matters to restate exactly the same categorical imperative, but the analogous vocabulary in natural law theory cannot cover exactly the same ground.)
You could do the same thing in the reverse, but this is less interesting, because from a natural law perspective, this is in a way what Kant did in the first place, and from Kant's perspective, all moral vocabulary can be conformed to the categorical imperative to show either its incoherence or its true form. Natural law theorists have tended not to be so bold.
Which is unfortunate, as it contributes to a common error in understanding natural law theory, that there are distinctive classes of 'natural law arguments'. If natural law theory is true, all good moral arguments are natural law arguments. You can no more have a distinctive category of 'natural law arguments' than you can have a distinctive category of 'arguments using the principle of noncontradiction', and for exactly the same reason. To be sure, you can have arguments that are more explicit about using it than others, but all good arguments are principle-of-noncontradiction arguments, and (if natural law theory is true) all good moral arguments are first-precept-of-natural-law arguments. Thus the natural law theorist should be able to say, of any moral argument, what in it is good in terms of natural law.
Thursday, May 12, 2016
Libanius and the Praise of Widowhood
An interesting passage in Chrysostom's Letter to a Young Widow:
The sophist who taught John Chrysostom was Libanius, who was friends with Julian the Apostate and perhaps the greatest teacher of rhetoric of his day (and in his day, rhetoric was king). Libanius's Funeral Oration for Julian is perhaps the last great expression of the political vision of pagan Imperial Rome.
For once when I was still a young man I know that the sophist who taught me (and he exceeded all men in his reverence for the gods) expressed admiration for my mother before a large company. For enquiring, as was his wont, of those who sat beside him who I was, and some one having said that I was the son of a woman who was a widow, he asked of me the age of my mother and the duration of her widowhood, and when I told him that she was forty years of age of which twenty had elapsed since she lost my father he was astonished and uttered a loud exclamation, and turning to those present "Heavens!" cried he "what women there are among the Christians." So great is the admiration and praise enjoyed by widowhood not only among ourselves, but also among those who are outside the Church.
The sophist who taught John Chrysostom was Libanius, who was friends with Julian the Apostate and perhaps the greatest teacher of rhetoric of his day (and in his day, rhetoric was king). Libanius's Funeral Oration for Julian is perhaps the last great expression of the political vision of pagan Imperial Rome.
Diversifying the Philosophical Curriculum
Jay Garfield and Bryan Van Norden have an article arguing that if American philosophy departments only offer courses on philosophy from Europe and America, they should be called "Department of European and American Philosophy" rather than "Department of Philosophy". Unfortunately they rather muddle things up at several points in ways that are rather worrisome.
(1) They repeatedly slide between talking about American philosophy departments and talking about the discipline. Thinking that the former is somehow constitutive of the latter is itself precisely a form of arrogance; the discipline already includes all actively working philosophers, even if Americans don't recognize it.
This is of some significance. One of the worries with curricular expansion is that if its logic is really taken to the limit, the result is that you end up doing far more than you can actually do well. You can't have a pantraditional philosophy department. This is distinct from the possibility of philosophers acting and setting up their departments in such a way that they recognize that there are multiple traditions, thus increasing the ways in which philosophers globally and cooperatively work together in their discipline regardless of background.
(2) They muddle together the teaching of non-European traditions, the teaching of non-European texts, and the teaching of non-European figures. As a historian of philosophy, I assure you that they are very, very different things. The rhetoric would be really overheated if all they are saying is that teaching a text from Augustine (who was, of course, from North Africa) would satisfy them. They want a diverse selection of something. How diverse? Should the diversity be measured by tradition (which is the most intensive thing to teach), or by text in the canon, or by figure (the easiest)? In my Intro course I say explicitly on the first day that we will be focusing on Western philosophy and they still briefly get Avicenna (always in talking about Aristotle on cause, and usually also in talking about Descartes on the cogito, and sometimes also in talking about Descartes on the existence of God). It's still obviously about Western philosophy, though. Averroes and Maimonides were from Cordoba; one might assume that they would count, but it has to be admitted that if you just added them, you are still only including Europeans.
I do not say this to quibble, but to point out that, for all of the vehemence with which they are engaging in their advocacy, they never actually give any definite thing for which they are advocating except diversity in the curriculum, and vaguely more of it. It seems obvious that there is a level that would, obviously, not really be changing anything (as if you could just solve the problem by mentioning Confucius in passing, or assigning a reading by Augustine, or looking at one argument from Avicenna in light of its relevance to the history of Western epistemology). And the mixing together of all sorts of different ways in which we could have curricular diversity leaves us with no sense of what it would be.
(3) And it is actually precise ways of doing it that are really needed. In general, large curricular expansion requires large expansion of resources. Anyone can add a snippet of Confucius to an ethics class; a Confucian philosophy section in a course requires preparation time and resources dedicated for the subject; a stable Chinese philosophy course requires a specialist or semi-specialist slot dedicated to it in the department. You can cut down on these costs by replacing rather than adding (and similar moves), but this will only get you so much. While you do get ignorant loudmouthed jackasses who go around dismissing Mencius as 'not really philosophy, not in the way that counts' (in general they are the same jackasses who would dismiss the study of, say, Plotinus), in general pushback on these things is really due to this: you are demanding a significant expansion of time, work, and money from departments. Merely demanding 'more' in an open-ended way is not to grasp the actual root of resistance, which is that academics are reluctant to commit to something that will increase competition for resources that are often already dwindling, and lay a claim to their own time, the thing almost every academic, by the nature of the profession, considers more valuable than gold.
In short, this is not a false-advertising problem, it is a resource problem. It's not that there are no resources that could not be diverted precisely this way; the problem is by what reasonable path you can get people actually to do it in a state of limited and often dwindling resources. Garfield and Van Norden don't have any plan; they seem to be under the impression that this is just something you can up and do, since it's the right thing to do, and nothing in the argument gives any sense that they grasp the expense -- mostly in time and effort, but also in increased competition for limited positions -- that the right path involves.
But, on the other side, I think it is at least good to consider the ways in which we are limited, and I think we must oppose, vehemently, any notion by parochial idiots that they somehow get to define 'philosophy' as whatever they happen to do, and the article does press the point well on both of those fronts.
(1) They repeatedly slide between talking about American philosophy departments and talking about the discipline. Thinking that the former is somehow constitutive of the latter is itself precisely a form of arrogance; the discipline already includes all actively working philosophers, even if Americans don't recognize it.
This is of some significance. One of the worries with curricular expansion is that if its logic is really taken to the limit, the result is that you end up doing far more than you can actually do well. You can't have a pantraditional philosophy department. This is distinct from the possibility of philosophers acting and setting up their departments in such a way that they recognize that there are multiple traditions, thus increasing the ways in which philosophers globally and cooperatively work together in their discipline regardless of background.
(2) They muddle together the teaching of non-European traditions, the teaching of non-European texts, and the teaching of non-European figures. As a historian of philosophy, I assure you that they are very, very different things. The rhetoric would be really overheated if all they are saying is that teaching a text from Augustine (who was, of course, from North Africa) would satisfy them. They want a diverse selection of something. How diverse? Should the diversity be measured by tradition (which is the most intensive thing to teach), or by text in the canon, or by figure (the easiest)? In my Intro course I say explicitly on the first day that we will be focusing on Western philosophy and they still briefly get Avicenna (always in talking about Aristotle on cause, and usually also in talking about Descartes on the cogito, and sometimes also in talking about Descartes on the existence of God). It's still obviously about Western philosophy, though. Averroes and Maimonides were from Cordoba; one might assume that they would count, but it has to be admitted that if you just added them, you are still only including Europeans.
I do not say this to quibble, but to point out that, for all of the vehemence with which they are engaging in their advocacy, they never actually give any definite thing for which they are advocating except diversity in the curriculum, and vaguely more of it. It seems obvious that there is a level that would, obviously, not really be changing anything (as if you could just solve the problem by mentioning Confucius in passing, or assigning a reading by Augustine, or looking at one argument from Avicenna in light of its relevance to the history of Western epistemology). And the mixing together of all sorts of different ways in which we could have curricular diversity leaves us with no sense of what it would be.
(3) And it is actually precise ways of doing it that are really needed. In general, large curricular expansion requires large expansion of resources. Anyone can add a snippet of Confucius to an ethics class; a Confucian philosophy section in a course requires preparation time and resources dedicated for the subject; a stable Chinese philosophy course requires a specialist or semi-specialist slot dedicated to it in the department. You can cut down on these costs by replacing rather than adding (and similar moves), but this will only get you so much. While you do get ignorant loudmouthed jackasses who go around dismissing Mencius as 'not really philosophy, not in the way that counts' (in general they are the same jackasses who would dismiss the study of, say, Plotinus), in general pushback on these things is really due to this: you are demanding a significant expansion of time, work, and money from departments. Merely demanding 'more' in an open-ended way is not to grasp the actual root of resistance, which is that academics are reluctant to commit to something that will increase competition for resources that are often already dwindling, and lay a claim to their own time, the thing almost every academic, by the nature of the profession, considers more valuable than gold.
In short, this is not a false-advertising problem, it is a resource problem. It's not that there are no resources that could not be diverted precisely this way; the problem is by what reasonable path you can get people actually to do it in a state of limited and often dwindling resources. Garfield and Van Norden don't have any plan; they seem to be under the impression that this is just something you can up and do, since it's the right thing to do, and nothing in the argument gives any sense that they grasp the expense -- mostly in time and effort, but also in increased competition for limited positions -- that the right path involves.
But, on the other side, I think it is at least good to consider the ways in which we are limited, and I think we must oppose, vehemently, any notion by parochial idiots that they somehow get to define 'philosophy' as whatever they happen to do, and the article does press the point well on both of those fronts.
Wednesday, May 11, 2016
New Poem Draft, New Poem Re-Draft
With a picture from Wikimedia commons, for any who have never seen a firewheel = Indian blanket = sundance = blanketflower = Gaillardia pulchella. They grow in legions here in Central Texas, and, of course, Texas spends quite a bit of money to seed its wildflowers along the highways, so you can see them turn a hill to fire.
Firewheel
You, O Empress of daisies, fire
spark on verdant hills,
blazing defiance, strength emblazoned,
upward in these high-domed halls;
and cool with dew, soft blanket,
you receive languid lovers
with gentlest hospitality.
Reddest ruby heart enhaloed gold,
you are the simplest queen, a maid
enthroned on grassy pillow,
rejoicing in the earth,
but sunlight crowned -- like ardent love.

Ataraxia
Not suspense but dwelling makes for peace;
to live at home upon a little plot
alone can quiet give that will not cease,
alone can bring to rest the restless thought.
Not doubt nor balanced judgment makes for calm
but cottage made of reason's little joys,
with splendid view and garden full of balm
to give shalom that nothing can annoy,
in Sabbath-rest and Sunday with the rose
that flowers by the house in vivid hue,
made music by a stream that softly flows
amid the grassy hills in morning dew,
when morning breeze blows scented, soft, and cool,
and you, in pleasant chair, drink tea and sigh
that all around is yours, though small it be,
and full of joy beneath an endless sky
that somewhere wraps around an endless sea.
Not suspense but dwelling makes for peace,
not judgment in suspense through skeptic's ploy,
but lovely truth to count your own small piece,
in which you spend your days in quiet joy.
Firewheel
You, O Empress of daisies, fire
spark on verdant hills,
blazing defiance, strength emblazoned,
upward in these high-domed halls;
and cool with dew, soft blanket,
you receive languid lovers
with gentlest hospitality.
Reddest ruby heart enhaloed gold,
you are the simplest queen, a maid
enthroned on grassy pillow,
rejoicing in the earth,
but sunlight crowned -- like ardent love.
Ataraxia
Not suspense but dwelling makes for peace;
to live at home upon a little plot
alone can quiet give that will not cease,
alone can bring to rest the restless thought.
Not doubt nor balanced judgment makes for calm
but cottage made of reason's little joys,
with splendid view and garden full of balm
to give shalom that nothing can annoy,
in Sabbath-rest and Sunday with the rose
that flowers by the house in vivid hue,
made music by a stream that softly flows
amid the grassy hills in morning dew,
when morning breeze blows scented, soft, and cool,
and you, in pleasant chair, drink tea and sigh
that all around is yours, though small it be,
and full of joy beneath an endless sky
that somewhere wraps around an endless sea.
Not suspense but dwelling makes for peace,
not judgment in suspense through skeptic's ploy,
but lovely truth to count your own small piece,
in which you spend your days in quiet joy.
Music on My Mind
Nick Lowe, "Cruel to Be Kind". It's the last week of term. Students are taking tests. I am grading an endless river of things....
This is one of the first music videos ever to play on MTV (number 66, to be exact). It consists entirely of footage from Nick Lowe's wedding to Carlene Carter; they used the wedding cinematography for the video cinematography and vice versa.
Monday, May 09, 2016
A Most Curious Council
Since I've been doing various things with the Maronite liturgical calendar this year, and I did the same for the Council of Trent, I thought I would note that today is the memorial for the Fathers of the Holy and Ecumenical Second Council of Constantinople in the Maronite calendar. II Constantinople (553) is the fifth of the councils recognized as ecumenical by both Catholics and Eastern Orthodox. Convoked by the Emperor Justinian and presided over by St. Eutychius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, it attempted to resolve the controversies over the previous council at Chalcedon, and failed completely to do so.
Justinian had tried to force an end to post-Chalcedon problems arising from the Oriental Orthodox (who accept the first three Councils but not Chalcedon) by condemning a body of works that seemed to fit the Oriental Orthodox view, which became known as the Three Chapters. (There are more than three works in the Three Chapters, but it gets its name from the fact that there were three authors involved -- Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyr, and Ibas of Edessa. All three were already dead.) He began to get the bishops to agree to it, by more than a little pressure and occasionally by a bit of roughing up. Many of the Latin bishops, even those who were in the East at the time, refused to do so -- some out of sympathy for the works, but most for the eminently reasonable reason that they didn't read Greek and so had no idea what the books actually said. What they did know was that all three authors were highly respected by other highly respected authors.
The Council did not start on a good footing at all, at all. Pope Vigilius was on his way to Constantinople, in part because Rome was not a particularly safe place at the moment; his journey went through precisely the territory that was most vehemently opposed to the condemnation, so he must have heard about it in negative terms from virtually every bishop on the way. At Constantinople, he started excommunicating people who had signed off on the condemnation. Then he issued a judgment condemning the Three Chapters himself. (It's usually thought that someone had given him actual translations.) Then he withdrew it. Then he met with Justinian and agreed that they would resolve it with a council. Justinian then went and issued another condemnation on his own authority, which led Vigilius to issue an encyclical complaining about Justinian's behavior. Another agreement to have the matter decided by a council was reached. Then Vigilius decided against it and issued a letter to everyone telling them that he would not recognize any council that proceeded without him.
The Council proceeded without him. The Three Chapters were officially condemned. And in the Third Session, the Council ordered Pope Vigilius's name struck from the diptychs -- effectively this means that it ordered the liturgy to proceed as if he were no longer bishop of Rome. (Sometimes it's treated as a 'deposition' or an 'excommunication'; these terms are both too strong, as is seen by the suspiciously common excuse in much later days that a pope's name was left off the diptychs entirely by mistake. If someone can get out of it by saying, "Oh, wow, how did that happen?" it's an exaggeration to treat it as being in itself an excommunication.) The emperor then had him imprisoned. After about six months in prison, Vigilius reversed himself again, claiming that he had been misled by his advisors, and condemned the Three Chapters again -- but very notably he did it on his own authority and without any mention of the Council. Unfortunately, a lot of Latin bishops were still in the same position they were. Very important Western sees like Milan (arguably the second most important see in the West) broke communion with him over it. News of the council did not travel very widely in the West, which is why for a very significant part of the early Middle Ages the Spanish numbering of the councils skips over Second Constantinople.
In the East, the Council failed utterly to do what it was supposed to do, namely, eliminate the schism that had developed over Chalcedon. Not only were the Oriental Orthodox not inclined to pay attention to it if they did not have to do so, the entire East was beginning to be inflamed with war, first from Persia and then from the sudden rise of Islam, and everyone in the far east of the Empire had more immediate things on their mind.
It was not a shining example of an ecumenical council; it was in many ways exactly what you don't want in a Church council. It was not a shining example of papal wisdom and fortitude; Vigilius was certainly no Leo. It was not a shining example of Imperial defense of the faith; Justinian managed to flop massively at this point. Emperors and popes, saints and bishops, managed to do almost everything in the most stupid way available. But the Council did become a major element of Byzantine theology. And acceptance of it as an ecumenical council slowly spread over the next several centuries, at least in the West. The Second Council of Constantinople has the distinction of being perhaps the least immediately effective ecumenical council ever. But when it became secure, it became very secure.
From the Sentences against the Three Chapters issued by the Council:
It's perhaps worth noting that Second Constantinople occasionally pops up in unusual places as people rediscover it. It has been argued for instance, that Thomas Aquinas shifted his account of prophecy in the Psalms (one of the things that comes up incidentally in the discussion of Theodore of Mopsuestia) after having come across a better translation of the condemnation. When Nikodemos the Hagiorite insists that Augustine of Hippo is a saint, it's on the basis of the fact that the Second Council of Constantinople treats him as such -- and indeed, among those Eastern Orthodox who have since come to recognize Augustine as a saint, it is a combination of the authority of Second Constantinople and the Hagiorite himself. And it occasionally shows up again in theological discussions of synodality and episcopal collegiality. A most curious council in both its manner of proceed and its effects.
Justinian had tried to force an end to post-Chalcedon problems arising from the Oriental Orthodox (who accept the first three Councils but not Chalcedon) by condemning a body of works that seemed to fit the Oriental Orthodox view, which became known as the Three Chapters. (There are more than three works in the Three Chapters, but it gets its name from the fact that there were three authors involved -- Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyr, and Ibas of Edessa. All three were already dead.) He began to get the bishops to agree to it, by more than a little pressure and occasionally by a bit of roughing up. Many of the Latin bishops, even those who were in the East at the time, refused to do so -- some out of sympathy for the works, but most for the eminently reasonable reason that they didn't read Greek and so had no idea what the books actually said. What they did know was that all three authors were highly respected by other highly respected authors.
The Council did not start on a good footing at all, at all. Pope Vigilius was on his way to Constantinople, in part because Rome was not a particularly safe place at the moment; his journey went through precisely the territory that was most vehemently opposed to the condemnation, so he must have heard about it in negative terms from virtually every bishop on the way. At Constantinople, he started excommunicating people who had signed off on the condemnation. Then he issued a judgment condemning the Three Chapters himself. (It's usually thought that someone had given him actual translations.) Then he withdrew it. Then he met with Justinian and agreed that they would resolve it with a council. Justinian then went and issued another condemnation on his own authority, which led Vigilius to issue an encyclical complaining about Justinian's behavior. Another agreement to have the matter decided by a council was reached. Then Vigilius decided against it and issued a letter to everyone telling them that he would not recognize any council that proceeded without him.
The Council proceeded without him. The Three Chapters were officially condemned. And in the Third Session, the Council ordered Pope Vigilius's name struck from the diptychs -- effectively this means that it ordered the liturgy to proceed as if he were no longer bishop of Rome. (Sometimes it's treated as a 'deposition' or an 'excommunication'; these terms are both too strong, as is seen by the suspiciously common excuse in much later days that a pope's name was left off the diptychs entirely by mistake. If someone can get out of it by saying, "Oh, wow, how did that happen?" it's an exaggeration to treat it as being in itself an excommunication.) The emperor then had him imprisoned. After about six months in prison, Vigilius reversed himself again, claiming that he had been misled by his advisors, and condemned the Three Chapters again -- but very notably he did it on his own authority and without any mention of the Council. Unfortunately, a lot of Latin bishops were still in the same position they were. Very important Western sees like Milan (arguably the second most important see in the West) broke communion with him over it. News of the council did not travel very widely in the West, which is why for a very significant part of the early Middle Ages the Spanish numbering of the councils skips over Second Constantinople.
In the East, the Council failed utterly to do what it was supposed to do, namely, eliminate the schism that had developed over Chalcedon. Not only were the Oriental Orthodox not inclined to pay attention to it if they did not have to do so, the entire East was beginning to be inflamed with war, first from Persia and then from the sudden rise of Islam, and everyone in the far east of the Empire had more immediate things on their mind.
It was not a shining example of an ecumenical council; it was in many ways exactly what you don't want in a Church council. It was not a shining example of papal wisdom and fortitude; Vigilius was certainly no Leo. It was not a shining example of Imperial defense of the faith; Justinian managed to flop massively at this point. Emperors and popes, saints and bishops, managed to do almost everything in the most stupid way available. But the Council did become a major element of Byzantine theology. And acceptance of it as an ecumenical council slowly spread over the next several centuries, at least in the West. The Second Council of Constantinople has the distinction of being perhaps the least immediately effective ecumenical council ever. But when it became secure, it became very secure.
From the Sentences against the Three Chapters issued by the Council:
Our great God and saviour Jesus Christ, as we are told in the parable in the gospel, gives talents to each one according to his ability, and at the proper time asks for an account of what has been done by each one. If the person to whom only one talent has been given is condemned because he has not worked and increased it, but has only preserved it without diminishment, how much more serious and more frightening must be the condemnation to which the person is subjected who not only fails to look after himself but scandalizes others and is a cause of offence to them? It is clear to all believers that when a problem about the faith comes up it is not only the heretical person who is condemned but also the person who is in a position to correct the heresy of others and fails to do so. To those of us to whom the task has been given of governing the church of the Lord, there comes a fear of the condemnation which threatens those who neglect to do the Lord's work. We hurry to take care of the good seed of faith protecting it from the weeds of heresy which have been planted by the enemy.
It's perhaps worth noting that Second Constantinople occasionally pops up in unusual places as people rediscover it. It has been argued for instance, that Thomas Aquinas shifted his account of prophecy in the Psalms (one of the things that comes up incidentally in the discussion of Theodore of Mopsuestia) after having come across a better translation of the condemnation. When Nikodemos the Hagiorite insists that Augustine of Hippo is a saint, it's on the basis of the fact that the Second Council of Constantinople treats him as such -- and indeed, among those Eastern Orthodox who have since come to recognize Augustine as a saint, it is a combination of the authority of Second Constantinople and the Hagiorite himself. And it occasionally shows up again in theological discussions of synodality and episcopal collegiality. A most curious council in both its manner of proceed and its effects.
Sunday, May 08, 2016
A Poem Draft and a Poem Re-Draft
For more about the ode of Horace I am non-translating, see here.
Non-Horace, Odes Book I, Carmen V
What stripling, blossomed in roses,
liquid and scenting, urges himself on you
in sweet grotto, Pyrrha golden-tressed,
your hair dressed in wreaths,
artfully simple? Cry he will
of changeful faith and gods, wondering,
astonished, by roughening seas,
by black wind of tempest,
who tastes of you in golden now, credulous,
ever-open and ever-friendly
hoping you, not knowing the gale
of treachery. Hapless are they
who heedless are blinded. And I? My votive,
my still-dripping clothes,
on temple wall hangs, pendant,
to the god who rules the sea.
Susan Pevensie
We once saw beyond the thing to the Thought
in the Mind of the Maker of all,
and visions of light in snow-laden wood
almost came at our bidding and call.
And the light of the gods was bright in all things
and their songs on the wind were still heard
while mer-people chanted the music that rang
in the echo of water and bird.
Doors we would find that, more than mere doors,
were the gates to the gardens of grace,
and paintings could lead to ships that were fair:
on the storm-laden waves they would race.
The horn of a train might call us to war,
where we valiantly took up our sword:
of Thoughts in the One we yet were aware,
and of power that fell from the Word.
(And that was the thing that made us mature,
giving freedom of thought to the child;
and that was the thing that God made to endure,
the thing that preserved us from guile.)
But children are free in their thought, not their will;
our paths by the world were then ruled,
and we all were then bound to wishers who wished
but the best; but some wishers are fools.
And now? We are grown; our wills are our own,
but our minds have no vision to see,
and dreams are all dreamed in the darkness alone
with a thought that is no longer free.
Now all of our graces are dollars and names,
all our worries are cold and mundane,
and words are just marks; no Pentecost flame
gives them power to brighten the brain.
(But once all the marks were emblems of truths,
like a language the world itself spoke,
and once we saw through the thing to the Thought
that the angels in morning invoked.)
And Susan was there! Her eyes were our own,
but more gentle, like soft summer sea.
She was crowned in bright gold, and on her fair throne
she was utterly, perfectly free.
And Susan saw through the thing to the Thought
in the Mind of the Maker of all.
She passed through the door, with the darkness she fought,
and her horn with salvation would call.
But now? No sign can capture of her
in the realms of the Upward and In;
of Susan the dryads still carry no word
of the paths where her footsteps have been.
But you and I went in days long ago
on this path of the burden of men,
and a Susan behind this face that I know
in the mirror reminds of my sin,
how I, who had seen past the thing to the Thought
in the Mind of the Maker of all
and felt the desire for goodness from God
(to which all this creation still calls),
now toil in the dust from which we all came,
with sweat and with thorns in my side,
and slave for a mark made of gold from which comes
the one freedom in which I have pride.
(But you, once when you with a suddenness wept --
in your face I saw Susan return.
Her sadness was there, and tears in the depths
that are liquid, but nonetheless burn.)
As Susan is lost, so we too are lost,
and her loss is the loss that we bear --
but Susan may find the pearl of great cost
and a chance beyond courage to dare
to see through the thing to the glorious Word
that is spoken by He who made all;
and the horn of salvation may someday be heard
as Susan sounds out the great call!
Non-Horace, Odes Book I, Carmen V
What stripling, blossomed in roses,
liquid and scenting, urges himself on you
in sweet grotto, Pyrrha golden-tressed,
your hair dressed in wreaths,
artfully simple? Cry he will
of changeful faith and gods, wondering,
astonished, by roughening seas,
by black wind of tempest,
who tastes of you in golden now, credulous,
ever-open and ever-friendly
hoping you, not knowing the gale
of treachery. Hapless are they
who heedless are blinded. And I? My votive,
my still-dripping clothes,
on temple wall hangs, pendant,
to the god who rules the sea.
Susan Pevensie
We once saw beyond the thing to the Thought
in the Mind of the Maker of all,
and visions of light in snow-laden wood
almost came at our bidding and call.
And the light of the gods was bright in all things
and their songs on the wind were still heard
while mer-people chanted the music that rang
in the echo of water and bird.
Doors we would find that, more than mere doors,
were the gates to the gardens of grace,
and paintings could lead to ships that were fair:
on the storm-laden waves they would race.
The horn of a train might call us to war,
where we valiantly took up our sword:
of Thoughts in the One we yet were aware,
and of power that fell from the Word.
(And that was the thing that made us mature,
giving freedom of thought to the child;
and that was the thing that God made to endure,
the thing that preserved us from guile.)
But children are free in their thought, not their will;
our paths by the world were then ruled,
and we all were then bound to wishers who wished
but the best; but some wishers are fools.
And now? We are grown; our wills are our own,
but our minds have no vision to see,
and dreams are all dreamed in the darkness alone
with a thought that is no longer free.
Now all of our graces are dollars and names,
all our worries are cold and mundane,
and words are just marks; no Pentecost flame
gives them power to brighten the brain.
(But once all the marks were emblems of truths,
like a language the world itself spoke,
and once we saw through the thing to the Thought
that the angels in morning invoked.)
And Susan was there! Her eyes were our own,
but more gentle, like soft summer sea.
She was crowned in bright gold, and on her fair throne
she was utterly, perfectly free.
And Susan saw through the thing to the Thought
in the Mind of the Maker of all.
She passed through the door, with the darkness she fought,
and her horn with salvation would call.
But now? No sign can capture of her
in the realms of the Upward and In;
of Susan the dryads still carry no word
of the paths where her footsteps have been.
But you and I went in days long ago
on this path of the burden of men,
and a Susan behind this face that I know
in the mirror reminds of my sin,
how I, who had seen past the thing to the Thought
in the Mind of the Maker of all
and felt the desire for goodness from God
(to which all this creation still calls),
now toil in the dust from which we all came,
with sweat and with thorns in my side,
and slave for a mark made of gold from which comes
the one freedom in which I have pride.
(But you, once when you with a suddenness wept --
in your face I saw Susan return.
Her sadness was there, and tears in the depths
that are liquid, but nonetheless burn.)
As Susan is lost, so we too are lost,
and her loss is the loss that we bear --
but Susan may find the pearl of great cost
and a chance beyond courage to dare
to see through the thing to the glorious Word
that is spoken by He who made all;
and the horn of salvation may someday be heard
as Susan sounds out the great call!
Learning by Addressing
Grasping the meaning of the terms “almighty” and “creator of heaven and earth” comes in degrees, as does grasping the meaning of most terms. One has a better grasp as an adult than as a child; one adult has a better grasp than another adult. The better one understands the meaning of the addressee-identification terms used when addressing God liturgically, the deeper one’s knowledge of God – assuming that the terms fit God. A liturgical neophyte learns to employ the term “creator of heaven and earth” in addressing God. At first the knowledge of God that he acquires thereby is very shallow. As he understands better what he is saying, his knowledge of God as creator of heaven and earth deepens.
Must one already know God in order to address God? Is addressing God the expression and application of knowledge of God acquired in some other way? No; one can come to know God by learning to engage God in the mode of addressing God and by learning to do so in certain ways.
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Knowing God Liturgically, Journal of Analytic Theology, Vol. 4, May 2016 [10.12978/jat.2016-4.130818221405b].
Maronite Year XLVI
Seventh Sunday of the Resurrection
Ephesians 1:15-23; John 13:31-35
May You, O God, Father of glory,
enlighten the hearts of Your people,
grant to them the Spirit of wisdom,
that they may hope with a sure hope.
Your Son is seated at Your right hand,
having truly risen from the dead;
all things have been put under His feet,
and we, His Body, share in His rule.
At Your name, O Christ, all things kneel down;
in heavenly heights, on firm earth,
in the realms of the dead all things kneel,
proclaiming You their Lord and ruler.
By Your humility, You obeyed,
even unto death on the cross,
reconciling even us, Your foes.
Your rising sealed Your atoning death,
a pledge of resurrection and life.
You made us heirs of life eternal
and were exalted above all else.
As our Head, You save us in water,
You raise us up in heavenly fire,
that we may sing Your praise with one voice.
The Son of man has been glorified,
and God has been glorified in Him,
glory upon glory glorified,
and He has given a new command,
to love each other as He has loved,
that in us He may be glorified!
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