Saturday, March 19, 2005
Fools, Fools, and More Fools
The post on the Ship of Fools at "Giornale Nuovo" reminds me of this delightful essay on the twenty or so different kinds of fools that Aquinas discusses in his works, from the insipiens to the stolidus to the stupidus to the fatuus. Alas, I am something of a vecors at times; fortunately, however, I am not incrassatus. One of the terms, inanis, empty-minded, is related to the word used in the Latin of Aquinas's citation from I Corinthians: "If Christ did not rise, our preaching is empty (inanis), and our faith is empty (inanis)". Helpfully, the essay ends with Aquinas's remedy for folly of every kind: mercy, and (in particular) prayer, instruction, and advice.
Wisdom from Swift
Some pearls from Jonathan Swift's Thoughts on Various Subjects:
No preacher is listened to but Time, which gives us the same train and turn of thought that older people have tried in vain to put into our heads before.
When a true genius appears in the world you may know him by this sign; that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.
The greatest inventions were produced in the times of ignorance, as the use of the compass, gunpowder, and printing, and by the dullest nation, as the Germans.
It is pleasant to observe how free the present age is in laying taxes on the next. FUTURE AGES SHALL TALK OF THIS; THIS SHALL BE FAMOUS TO ALL POSTERITY. Whereas their time and thoughts will be taken up about present things, as ours are now.
It is in disputes as in armies, where the weaker side sets up false lights, and makes a great noise, to make the enemy believe them more numerous and strong than they really are.
What they do in heaven we are ignorant of; what they do not we are told expressly: that they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.
Complaint is the largest tribute heaven receives, and the sincerest part of our devotion.
The common fluency of speech in many men, and most women, is owing to a scarcity of matter, and a scarcity of words; for whoever is a master of language, and hath a mind full of ideas, will be apt, in speaking, to hesitate upon the choice of both; whereas common speakers have only one set of ideas, and one set of words to clothe them in, and these are always ready at the mouth. So people come faster out of a church when it is almost empty, than when a crowd is at the door.
The preaching of divines helps to preserve well-inclined men in the course of virtue, but seldom or never reclaims the vicious.
If the men of wit and genius would resolve never to complain in their works of critics and detractors, the next age would not know that they ever had any.
No preacher is listened to but Time, which gives us the same train and turn of thought that older people have tried in vain to put into our heads before.
When a true genius appears in the world you may know him by this sign; that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.
The greatest inventions were produced in the times of ignorance, as the use of the compass, gunpowder, and printing, and by the dullest nation, as the Germans.
It is pleasant to observe how free the present age is in laying taxes on the next. FUTURE AGES SHALL TALK OF THIS; THIS SHALL BE FAMOUS TO ALL POSTERITY. Whereas their time and thoughts will be taken up about present things, as ours are now.
It is in disputes as in armies, where the weaker side sets up false lights, and makes a great noise, to make the enemy believe them more numerous and strong than they really are.
What they do in heaven we are ignorant of; what they do not we are told expressly: that they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.
Complaint is the largest tribute heaven receives, and the sincerest part of our devotion.
The common fluency of speech in many men, and most women, is owing to a scarcity of matter, and a scarcity of words; for whoever is a master of language, and hath a mind full of ideas, will be apt, in speaking, to hesitate upon the choice of both; whereas common speakers have only one set of ideas, and one set of words to clothe them in, and these are always ready at the mouth. So people come faster out of a church when it is almost empty, than when a crowd is at the door.
The preaching of divines helps to preserve well-inclined men in the course of virtue, but seldom or never reclaims the vicious.
If the men of wit and genius would resolve never to complain in their works of critics and detractors, the next age would not know that they ever had any.
Aquinas on the Necessity of the Resurrection
What follows is my rough translation from the Latin of ST 3.53.1. For another English translation, see the New Advent Summa; I borrowed a bit or two from that translation. I'll probably have several posts over this next week on this subject, and on other Holy Week subjects.
******
[1] So we proceed to the first [objection]. It seems that it was not necessary for Christ to rise again. Thus Damascene says (in book IV [of De Fid. Orth.]), "Resurrection is the rising again of what is disintegrated and fallen." But Christ did not fall through sin, nor was his body disintegrated, as is clear from what was said above (ST 3.51.3). Therefore it was not appropriate for him to rise.
[2] Further, whoever rises is promoted to something higher, because to rise (surgere) is to be uplifted (sursum moveri). But the body of Christ after death remained united to the divinity, and so could not be promoted to something higher. Therefore rising again was not due to it.
[3] Further, everything that happened to the humanity of Christ was ordered to our salvation. But the passion of Christ suffices for our salvation, for through it we are liberated from fault and penalty, as is clear from what was said above (ST 3.49.1,3). Therefore it was not necessary for Christ to rise from the dead.
But against this is what is said at the end of Luke, "It was needful that Christ suffer and rise from the dead."
I reply that it must be said that it was necessary for Christ to rise again, for five reasons.
First of all, for the commendation of divine justice, to which pertains exalting those who humble themselves for God's sake, according to Luke 1: "He deposes potentates from their seats and exalts the humble." Therefore because Christ, according to charity and obedience to God, humbled himself even to death on the cross, it was needful that he be exalted by God even to glorious resurrection, as it is said in His Person in the Psalm (138:2) as the Gloss expounds it, "You have known," that is, approved, "my sitting down," that is, humility and passion, "and my rising up," that is, glorification in resurrection."
Second, for our instruction in faith. Because through his resurrection our faith about Christ's divinity is confirmed, because, as is said at the end of II Corinthians, "Although he was crucified from our infirmity, he lives from God's power." And likewise, it is said in I Corinthians 15, If Christ did not rise, our preaching is empty, and our faith is empty." And in the Psalm (29:10), "What profit is in my blood," that is, in the shedding of my blood, "while I descend," as it were through various grades of evil, "into corruption?" As though He were to answer, "None, If therefore I do not rise again at once, an my body be decayed, I shall bring news to no one, I shall profit no one," as the Gloss expounds.
Third, for the uplifting of our hope. Because, while we see Christ, who is our Head, rise again, we also hope in our own resurrection. Wherefore it is said in I Corinthians 15, "If Christ is preached that He rises from the dead, how is it said among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?" And in Job 19 it is said, "I know," that is, through the certainty of faith, "that my redeemer," that is, Christ, "lives," having risen from the dead, and therefore "in the last day, I shall rise out of the earth; this my hope is stored in my bosom."
Fourth, for the formation (informationem) of the lives of the faithful, according to which [it is said in] Romans 6, "As Christ is risen from the dead throught the glory of the Father, even so may we walk in newness of life." And further down, "Christ, rising from the dead, therefore no longer dies; so also recognize that you are dead to sin, but living to God.
Fifth, for the completion of our salvation. Because just as for this reason he endured evil things in dying so that he might liberate us from evil, so he is glorified in rising again so that he might promote us to good, according to Romans 4, "He was delivered for our sins, and he rose for our justification."
To the first it must therefore be said that, although Christ did not fall through sin, He fell through death, because as sin is a fall from justice, so death is a fall from life. Wherefore we can understand as from the person of Christ what is said in Micah 7, "Do no rejoice over me, my enemy, because I have fallen; I will rise." Likewise, although Christ's body was not disintegrated through returning to dust, yet the separation of the soul from the body was a sort of disintegration.
To the second it must be said that divinity was united to the flesh of Christ after death by a personal union, not a union of nature, as the soul is united to the body as form so as to constitute human nature. And because of this, the body, united with the soul, was promoted to a higher state of nature, but not to a higher personal state.
To the third it must be said that the passion of Christ operated for our salvation, properly speaking, inasmuch as it removed evils; but resurrection inasmuch as it was the first beginning and exemplar of goods.
******
[1] So we proceed to the first [objection]. It seems that it was not necessary for Christ to rise again. Thus Damascene says (in book IV [of De Fid. Orth.]), "Resurrection is the rising again of what is disintegrated and fallen." But Christ did not fall through sin, nor was his body disintegrated, as is clear from what was said above (ST 3.51.3). Therefore it was not appropriate for him to rise.
[2] Further, whoever rises is promoted to something higher, because to rise (surgere) is to be uplifted (sursum moveri). But the body of Christ after death remained united to the divinity, and so could not be promoted to something higher. Therefore rising again was not due to it.
[3] Further, everything that happened to the humanity of Christ was ordered to our salvation. But the passion of Christ suffices for our salvation, for through it we are liberated from fault and penalty, as is clear from what was said above (ST 3.49.1,3). Therefore it was not necessary for Christ to rise from the dead.
But against this is what is said at the end of Luke, "It was needful that Christ suffer and rise from the dead."
I reply that it must be said that it was necessary for Christ to rise again, for five reasons.
First of all, for the commendation of divine justice, to which pertains exalting those who humble themselves for God's sake, according to Luke 1: "He deposes potentates from their seats and exalts the humble." Therefore because Christ, according to charity and obedience to God, humbled himself even to death on the cross, it was needful that he be exalted by God even to glorious resurrection, as it is said in His Person in the Psalm (138:2) as the Gloss expounds it, "You have known," that is, approved, "my sitting down," that is, humility and passion, "and my rising up," that is, glorification in resurrection."
Second, for our instruction in faith. Because through his resurrection our faith about Christ's divinity is confirmed, because, as is said at the end of II Corinthians, "Although he was crucified from our infirmity, he lives from God's power." And likewise, it is said in I Corinthians 15, If Christ did not rise, our preaching is empty, and our faith is empty." And in the Psalm (29:10), "What profit is in my blood," that is, in the shedding of my blood, "while I descend," as it were through various grades of evil, "into corruption?" As though He were to answer, "None, If therefore I do not rise again at once, an my body be decayed, I shall bring news to no one, I shall profit no one," as the Gloss expounds.
Third, for the uplifting of our hope. Because, while we see Christ, who is our Head, rise again, we also hope in our own resurrection. Wherefore it is said in I Corinthians 15, "If Christ is preached that He rises from the dead, how is it said among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?" And in Job 19 it is said, "I know," that is, through the certainty of faith, "that my redeemer," that is, Christ, "lives," having risen from the dead, and therefore "in the last day, I shall rise out of the earth; this my hope is stored in my bosom."
Fourth, for the formation (informationem) of the lives of the faithful, according to which [it is said in] Romans 6, "As Christ is risen from the dead throught the glory of the Father, even so may we walk in newness of life." And further down, "Christ, rising from the dead, therefore no longer dies; so also recognize that you are dead to sin, but living to God.
Fifth, for the completion of our salvation. Because just as for this reason he endured evil things in dying so that he might liberate us from evil, so he is glorified in rising again so that he might promote us to good, according to Romans 4, "He was delivered for our sins, and he rose for our justification."
To the first it must therefore be said that, although Christ did not fall through sin, He fell through death, because as sin is a fall from justice, so death is a fall from life. Wherefore we can understand as from the person of Christ what is said in Micah 7, "Do no rejoice over me, my enemy, because I have fallen; I will rise." Likewise, although Christ's body was not disintegrated through returning to dust, yet the separation of the soul from the body was a sort of disintegration.
To the second it must be said that divinity was united to the flesh of Christ after death by a personal union, not a union of nature, as the soul is united to the body as form so as to constitute human nature. And because of this, the body, united with the soul, was promoted to a higher state of nature, but not to a higher personal state.
To the third it must be said that the passion of Christ operated for our salvation, properly speaking, inasmuch as it removed evils; but resurrection inasmuch as it was the first beginning and exemplar of goods.
Sterne on Mind-Body Union
...in the present state we are in, we find such a strong sympathy and union between our souls and bodies, that the one cannot be touched or sensibly affected, without producing some correspondnig emotion in the other.--Nature has assigned a different look, tone of voice, and gesture, peculiar to every passion and affection we are subject to; and, therefore, to argue against this strict correspondence which is held between our souls and bodies,--is disputing against the frame and mechanism of human nature.--We are not angels, but men cloathed with bodies, and, in some measure, governed by our imagination, that we have need of all these external helps which nature has made the interpreters of our thoughts.
Laurence Sterne, Sermon 43 ('The Efficacy of Prayer') in The Sermons of Mr. Yorick (1760).
Sterne, of course, is best known for his work, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, a bizarre and beautiful work of bawdy satire and Christian skepticism, and the most experimental of all experimental novels that ever have been and probably ever will be. In Tristram Shandy, Sterne takes the novel to the very outer limits of what a novel can do, nearly breaking it in the process. Sterne was a village vicar in the Church of England for about twenty-two years; The Sermons of Mr. Yorick are his own (Mr. Yorick is a character in Tristram Shandy, distantly related to Hamlet's Yorick; Sterne applies the name jokingly to himself).
Laurence Sterne, Sermon 43 ('The Efficacy of Prayer') in The Sermons of Mr. Yorick (1760).
Sterne, of course, is best known for his work, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, a bizarre and beautiful work of bawdy satire and Christian skepticism, and the most experimental of all experimental novels that ever have been and probably ever will be. In Tristram Shandy, Sterne takes the novel to the very outer limits of what a novel can do, nearly breaking it in the process. Sterne was a village vicar in the Church of England for about twenty-two years; The Sermons of Mr. Yorick are his own (Mr. Yorick is a character in Tristram Shandy, distantly related to Hamlet's Yorick; Sterne applies the name jokingly to himself).
Declaration of Interventions
This is a very interesting post (hat-tip: Jonathan Dresner at Cliopatria). The question it brings to my mind is: Can it really be considered a self-evident principle "That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of its ends, it is the Right of the Intervener to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government"?
But, of course, the original statement of the Declaration of Independence brought up exactly similar questions. There was at the time an interesting sermon by George Campbell, one of Scotland's great early modern philosophers, that discussed the Declaration of Independence, and he actually mocks the document for accepting as self-evident so many things that few reasonable people had ever thought self-evident before. It's a bit jarring to read it; it's one thing to read someone who might quibble with some of the language -- it's something entirely different to read someone (and what is more, someone quite brilliant and rational) who thought that the argument of the Declaration of Independence was irrational and incoherent.
But to get back to the right of intervention issue; the real issue is what lies behind this right. In just war theory, for instance, as it has usually been conceived, there is no right of military intervention, properly speaking, whatsoever. The just war tradition sees war powers as an extension of the responsibility of the governing agent(s) to protect the people they govern. On this view, the only military intervention that can even conceivably be legitimate, therefore, is defensive, i.e., what is strictly required to defend one's own citizens. And this suggests to me that one reason the post is a bit unnerving is that, unlike the Declaration of Independence, it is not unified; the first part of the second paragraph (the right of intervention part) actually is completely separate from the second part (the abuses and usurpations part). In the Declaration of Independence, the two go together because the people whose safety and happiness underlies the right of abolition are the same people against whom the abuses and usurpations are committed. But in the post, the two are split: the people are the ones who have the right to abolition, because it is their safety and happiness that are at stake; and they are the ones who would suffer by the imprudent abolition of longstanding authority. But it is the intervener who is worried about the particular abuses in question, since we have moved from the intention to place its people under despotism to the intention to endanger others with certain kinds of weapons.
It's interesting how this sort of thing makes you think through things you otherwise would never have thought through.
But, of course, the original statement of the Declaration of Independence brought up exactly similar questions. There was at the time an interesting sermon by George Campbell, one of Scotland's great early modern philosophers, that discussed the Declaration of Independence, and he actually mocks the document for accepting as self-evident so many things that few reasonable people had ever thought self-evident before. It's a bit jarring to read it; it's one thing to read someone who might quibble with some of the language -- it's something entirely different to read someone (and what is more, someone quite brilliant and rational) who thought that the argument of the Declaration of Independence was irrational and incoherent.
But to get back to the right of intervention issue; the real issue is what lies behind this right. In just war theory, for instance, as it has usually been conceived, there is no right of military intervention, properly speaking, whatsoever. The just war tradition sees war powers as an extension of the responsibility of the governing agent(s) to protect the people they govern. On this view, the only military intervention that can even conceivably be legitimate, therefore, is defensive, i.e., what is strictly required to defend one's own citizens. And this suggests to me that one reason the post is a bit unnerving is that, unlike the Declaration of Independence, it is not unified; the first part of the second paragraph (the right of intervention part) actually is completely separate from the second part (the abuses and usurpations part). In the Declaration of Independence, the two go together because the people whose safety and happiness underlies the right of abolition are the same people against whom the abuses and usurpations are committed. But in the post, the two are split: the people are the ones who have the right to abolition, because it is their safety and happiness that are at stake; and they are the ones who would suffer by the imprudent abolition of longstanding authority. But it is the intervener who is worried about the particular abuses in question, since we have moved from the intention to place its people under despotism to the intention to endanger others with certain kinds of weapons.
It's interesting how this sort of thing makes you think through things you otherwise would never have thought through.
Thursday, March 17, 2005
Whewell on the Basis of the First Law of Motion
This isn't Whewell's most complete discussion, but it's the one I happen to have on hand:
If we call to mind the axioms which we formerly stated, as containing the most important conditions involved in the idea of Cause, it will be seen that our conviction in this case depends upon the first axiom of Causation, that nothing can happen without a cause. Every change in the velocity of the moving body must have a cause; and if the change can, in any manner, be referred to the presence of other bodies, these are said to exert force upon the moving body: and the conception of force is thus evolved from the general idea of cause. Force is any cause which has motion, or change of motion, for its effect; and thus, all the change of velocity of a bodywhich can be referred to extraneous bodies,--as the air which surrounds it, or the support on which it rests,--is considered as the effect of forces; and this consideration is looked upon as explaining the difference between the motion which really takes place in the experiment, and that motion which, as the law asserts, would take place if the body were not acted on by any forces.
Thus the truth of the first law of motion depends upon the axiom that no change can take place without a cause; and follows from the definition of force, if we suppose that there can be none but an external cause of change. But in order to establish the law, it was necessary further to be assured that there is no internal cause of change of velocity belonging to all matter whatever, and operating in such a manner that the mere progress of time is sufficient to produce a diminution of velocity in all moving bodies. It appears from the history of mechanical science, that this latter step required a reference to observation and experiment; and that the first law of motion is so far, historically at least, dependent upon our experience.
William Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. 1 (London: John W. Parker, 1847) pp. 217-218.
He also considers the other laws of motion in the same way, connecting them to basic causal principles.
If we call to mind the axioms which we formerly stated, as containing the most important conditions involved in the idea of Cause, it will be seen that our conviction in this case depends upon the first axiom of Causation, that nothing can happen without a cause. Every change in the velocity of the moving body must have a cause; and if the change can, in any manner, be referred to the presence of other bodies, these are said to exert force upon the moving body: and the conception of force is thus evolved from the general idea of cause. Force is any cause which has motion, or change of motion, for its effect; and thus, all the change of velocity of a bodywhich can be referred to extraneous bodies,--as the air which surrounds it, or the support on which it rests,--is considered as the effect of forces; and this consideration is looked upon as explaining the difference between the motion which really takes place in the experiment, and that motion which, as the law asserts, would take place if the body were not acted on by any forces.
Thus the truth of the first law of motion depends upon the axiom that no change can take place without a cause; and follows from the definition of force, if we suppose that there can be none but an external cause of change. But in order to establish the law, it was necessary further to be assured that there is no internal cause of change of velocity belonging to all matter whatever, and operating in such a manner that the mere progress of time is sufficient to produce a diminution of velocity in all moving bodies. It appears from the history of mechanical science, that this latter step required a reference to observation and experiment; and that the first law of motion is so far, historically at least, dependent upon our experience.
William Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. 1 (London: John W. Parker, 1847) pp. 217-218.
He also considers the other laws of motion in the same way, connecting them to basic causal principles.
Manifestior Via II
Blogger's not letting me into my Edit Post section at the moment, so this will have to go in a new post. I said:
While this is close, on further thought, it isn't quite right. Here's a way to look at it. The First Way is easily shown to be valid. There are only three questions the proof really raises:
(1) Is there really motion?
(2) Is it true that whatever is moved is moved by another?
(3) Is it true that no infinite regress of movers is possible?
If the answer to all three questions is 'yes', the proof is sound. The question we are considering here is (2). Now, it is important to understand what is being asked here. If we find an object in motion, we can ask several sorts of questions, e.g.,
(a) Why is this object in motion at all?
(b) Why is this object continuing to be in motion, given that it already has been in motion?
The inertia principle doesn't quite shed full light on either of these questions. It is, however, part of the answer to (b), since it says that continuing in motion (or at rest) is what objects do, as a general principle (assuming no cause of change). But the second question is actually rather irrelevant to the First Way. The principle that whatever is moved is moved by another is relevant to (a): if it is true, we can ask, what makes this thing to have been in motion? And we can answer a number of things. It may have been wrenched into the motion it has (violent motion); it may have been responding to natural force (natural motion); etc. But the inertia principle doesn't prevent us from asking this sort of question at all. So it doesn't appear that the issue of persistence in locomotion is relevant to the principle at all. (The issue about generators merely points out that Aquinas's argument is not based on the assumption that everything that is currently in motion is currently being moved by some direct cause. It is often incorrectly thought that it does.)
The principle is related to the causal principle that "Everything that begins to be has a cause of its beginning to be"; the latter, in fact, is just a slightly less general form of the principle (if you suppose that there is no motion that has always existed, they are equivalent). This is the relevance of Whewell's analysis; Whewell showed that not only is it reasonable to think the laws of motion are consistent with this latter principle, they can follow from it if you add a supposition or two. I have never seen anyone do an analysis at the level of sophistication at which Whewell does his that suggests otherwise.
In any case, Aquinas's interpretation of the 'whatever is moved is moved by another' principle, as it is unfolded elsewhere in Aquinas's work, doesn't have any problem with persistence in a state of rest or motion: the mover in such a case is (proximately) the nature of the moving object and (remotely) the generator of the nature (or, alternatively, the remover of impediment to motion).
While this is close, on further thought, it isn't quite right. Here's a way to look at it. The First Way is easily shown to be valid. There are only three questions the proof really raises:
(1) Is there really motion?
(2) Is it true that whatever is moved is moved by another?
(3) Is it true that no infinite regress of movers is possible?
If the answer to all three questions is 'yes', the proof is sound. The question we are considering here is (2). Now, it is important to understand what is being asked here. If we find an object in motion, we can ask several sorts of questions, e.g.,
(a) Why is this object in motion at all?
(b) Why is this object continuing to be in motion, given that it already has been in motion?
The inertia principle doesn't quite shed full light on either of these questions. It is, however, part of the answer to (b), since it says that continuing in motion (or at rest) is what objects do, as a general principle (assuming no cause of change). But the second question is actually rather irrelevant to the First Way. The principle that whatever is moved is moved by another is relevant to (a): if it is true, we can ask, what makes this thing to have been in motion? And we can answer a number of things. It may have been wrenched into the motion it has (violent motion); it may have been responding to natural force (natural motion); etc. But the inertia principle doesn't prevent us from asking this sort of question at all. So it doesn't appear that the issue of persistence in locomotion is relevant to the principle at all. (The issue about generators merely points out that Aquinas's argument is not based on the assumption that everything that is currently in motion is currently being moved by some direct cause. It is often incorrectly thought that it does.)
The principle is related to the causal principle that "Everything that begins to be has a cause of its beginning to be"; the latter, in fact, is just a slightly less general form of the principle (if you suppose that there is no motion that has always existed, they are equivalent). This is the relevance of Whewell's analysis; Whewell showed that not only is it reasonable to think the laws of motion are consistent with this latter principle, they can follow from it if you add a supposition or two. I have never seen anyone do an analysis at the level of sophistication at which Whewell does his that suggests otherwise.
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