Thursday, February 22, 2018

Leithart's Questions on Simplicity

Peter Leithart on divine simplicity:

Why can we not say something like this: In finite being, certain things are predicable of wholes that are not predicated of parts, yet in the case of infinite being there is no such disjunction between whole and parts. With finite being parts are in a relation of potency to the whole; in infinite being, each part is fully actualized in itself and in the whole. What can’t we say that the parts are eternally inseparable from the whole, and that the parts are actualized eternally in a whole that is actualized in its parts? What prevents us from talking about the equal ultimacy of parts and whole in infinite being? We’re going to introduce a finite/infinite distinction anyway; why can’t it run between “infinite composite/finite composite” rather than between “infinite simple/finite simple”?

(1) If there is nothing predicable of the whole that is not predicable of the parts, at all, then there is no way to distinguish wholes and parts, and therefore the claim that this is whole and that is part is unfounded.

(2) To be a part is by definition to be potential to some whole. Whether it is actualized is irrelevant; we aren't talking about change here but about whether all the parts considered are together potential-whole, even if that potential is actualized. If they have no potential to compose the whole, then either there are no parts, or there is no whole, or there is no composition. If there is no whole, though, there are no parts, and if there is no composition, well, noncompositeness is literally just another name for simplicity.

(3) Having parts is a limitation that is one of the things we recognized as constituting something as finite rather than infinite being. Parthood is an ordering relation; having parts is a kind of dependency; nothing about those parts always or necessarily existing changes the fact that the relation is one of dependency.

(4) Leithart is ultimately trying to suggest that these matters are matters of metaphysics. There are indeed metaphysical arguments on the point. But first and foremost one has to justify why one is talking about 'parts' and 'wholes' in the first place. Is it just a metaphor? Nothing about the doctrine of divine simplicity prevents that, as long as you recognize it is just a metaphor; although we would still need to know why we are using the metaphor. If it's not a metaphor, we need some reason to explain why we are calling them parts and wholes to begin with. Leithart suggests that the argument for divine simplicity makes the assumption that "there must be a close analogy between the part-whole relation of finite being and a similar relation in infinite being". But it doesn't make this assumption; the assumption, to the extent it is made, is made by the compositionist: he is proposing that there is a close enough analogy between the part-whole relation of finite being and a similar relation in infinite being that the latter can be called a part-whole relation. The defender of divine simplicity is denying this: there can be no "similar relation" in infinite being at all. There is no need for an assumption of a "close analogy" if you're denying that there is any similarity justifying the use of the same terms in both cases; you do need a "close analogy" -- at least, one close enough -- if you are going to say that both cases are genuinely cases of the part-whole relation.

There is no room for just making up a new construal of parts and wholes; they have to be actually parts and wholes, which means that they have to have certain basic features that makes it coherent and rational to call them 'parts' and 'wholes'. And Leithart cannot point to any account of parts and wholes in which (a) they are what a reasonable person would normally call parts and wholes but (b) they don't involve any kind of asymmetric ordering or dependency, formal or otherwise. None exists. Anyone who is using 'part' or 'whole' in a way that doesn't involve (b) is using them in a nonstandard way.

(5) But even if none of this were true, the question at hand is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Anyone who is going to reject this, or even question it, has to be considering what the doctrine itself is actually denying -- and it is not denying just any arbitrary meaning that can be attached to the words 'part' and 'whole', by Leithart or by anyone else. It is denying that God is composite in the way it is characterizing composition. Nothing else is even relevant.

Aquinas for Lent VIII

But since while trying to conform himself to some exemplar, a man is occasionally impeded by an intervening obstacle, he therefore removes that which is most capable of being an impediment: the weight of sin. Now, tribulation is as a certain contest. I Cor 9:25: Every one who contends in the struggle, refraineth himself from all things. For just as in a race and contest one ought to lay aside everything that weighs him down, so also in the contest of tribulation....He, therefore, who wishes to run well to God in tribulation must lay aside every impediment.

[Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Baer, tr. St. Augustine's Press (South Bend, IN: 2006) p. 269.]

Wednesday, February 21, 2018

The Peacock

Today is the feast of St. Pietro Damiani, better known in English as Peter Damian, Doctor of the Church. From his Letter 95:

Do not as very many do, my brother, pay too much attention to the virtue you may possess and thus neglect passing judgment on the vices you have disregarded. But imitate the example of the peacock which naturally acts quite differently. It has its ugly feet, like those of a chicken, always in view, but displays the spectacular beauty of its tail behind it. In its feet it sees something gross that it may despise, but ignores its tail that might cause it to be admired. Before its eyes is that which causes it humiliation, but on the back it carries that for which it can strut before all other birds. You too should hide that which is virtuous within you, but never fail to view and judge what might be sinful and in need of correction.

The Saddest Birds a Season Find to Sing

Tymes Goe by Turnes
by St. Robert Southwell


The lopped trees in tyme may growe againe;
Most naked plants renewe both frute and floure;
The soriest wight may finde release of payne,
The dryest soyle sucke in some moystning shoure;
Tymes goe by turnes and chances chang by course,
From foule to fayre, from better happ to worse.

The sea of Fortune doth not ever floe,
She draws her favours to the lowest ebb;
Her tide hath equall tymes to come and goe,
Her loome doth weave the fine and coarsest webb;
No joy so great but runneth to an ende,
No happ so harde but may in fine amende.

Not allwayes fall of leaf nor ever springe,
No endlesse night yet not eternall daye;
The saddest birdes a season finde to singe,
The roughest storme a calme may soon alaye;
Thus with succeding turnes God tempereth all,
That man may hope to rise yet feare to fall.

A chaunce may wynne that by mischance was lost;
The nett that houldes no greate, takes little fishe;
In some thinges all, in some thinges none are croste,
Fewe all they neede, but none have all they wishe;
Unmedled joyes here to no man befall,
Who least hath some, who most hath never all.

Aquinas for Lent VII

Striving for Wisdom possesses this peculiar advantage: In doing her work she is more than sufficient to herself. For in exterior works a human being needs much help, but in the contemplation of Wisdom the more one remains solitary and alone with oneself, the more efficaciously one works. And therefore, in the words proposed, the Wise Man calls one back to oneself saying [Sirach 32:15-16]: First run into your own house; that is, away from external things you should, with solicitude, retire to your own mind, before it is occupied by what is alien and, through concern for that, is distracted. Hence it is said in Wisdom VIII: "Entering into my house I shall take my rest with her," namely, with Wisdom.

[Thomas Aquinas, An Exposition of the "On the Hebdomads" of Boethius, Schultz and Synan, trs. CUA Press (Washington, D.C.: 2001) p. 5]

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

Links of Note

* Welcome to Monowi, Nebraska: population 1 at BBC Travel

* Ted Jackson, The Search for Jackie Wallace

* Louis Roy, O.P., On Anscombe and Wittgenstein

* A newly discovered draft of Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy

* MrD has a true word on the No True Scotsman Fallacy

* At the SEP:
Hanke and Jung, William of Heytesbury
Lévy, Philo of Alexandria
Mora-Márquez, Simon of Faversham

* Eleanor Cummins discusses the history of squab in America

* Logan Ward on the American College of the Building Arts.

Aquinas for Lent VI

Just as human beings acquire the first thing that completes them, i.e., the soul, from the action of God, so they also acquire the last thing that completes them, that is complete human happiness, directly from God, and they rest in him. This is clear from the fact that the natural longing of a human being cannot rest in anything else except in God alone. For human beings have an innate longing that moves them from the things that have been brought into being to seeking their cause. Therefore this longing will not rest until it reaches the first cause, which is God.

[Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, Atkins and Williams, eds. Cambridge UP (New York: 2005) p. 65.]

Monday, February 19, 2018

Superpossibles II

I previously noted that there are cases in which we say that something is possible (or use another modality definable in terms of possibility) for which possible worlds semantics seems to provide no adequate translation. I called these, for lack of a better term, 'superpossibles'. The two obvious cases are the actual world and God. And I also noted that this raised the question of what other cases there might be.

One candidate would be causal powers, and for reasons analogous to those seen with the actual world and God: namely, that possible worlds talk has no adequate way to handle either actuality itself or hierarchies and dependencies among possibilities. We can run the argument either by linking causal powers to the actual world or to God. First, the reason the modalities of the actual world can't be adequately captured by possible worlds talk is that the actual world itself has different possibilities, and therefore cannot be identified with a possible world, but also cannot be reduced to either a collection of possible worlds or an element in a possible world. But if one accepts the existence of causal powers, it is the causal powers that make the actual world have different possibilities in the first place. Therefore, a fortiori, causal powers deal with possibilities that can, at best, only partially be translated into talk about possible worlds, and this means that causal powers are superpossibles. Or one can analogize to God: modalities attributable to God can't adequately be translated into possible worlds talk because the latter treats possibilities all on the level; but when one attributes possibility to (say) God's existence, one does so in a way that makes this false -- God's possibility has a priority or fundamentality with respect to other possibilities that possible worlds talk has no way to capture. God's possibility is connected to His being able to make other possibilities possible. But causal powers are also actuality-makers, and have a fundamentality with respect to other possibles, although on a smaller scale. So similar reasoning applies.

Because possible worlds semantics is just a device for relating possibilities in an extensional way, so you can consistently assign truth values to modal claims without making radical changes to the logic you use, it treats possibilities as nothing more than instances (in a possible world) and necessities as nothing more than regularities (across possible worlds). But not all our uses of modality work this way, so that possible worlds talk flattens out our notions of modality. If something would be describable in possible worlds analysis as 'true in all possible worlds' or 'true in all possible worlds with such-and-such feature), this could be because it is made to have this feature by something else or because of its own nature; and, likewise, when we talk about possibilities we can perfectly well treat possibilities as having hierarchical relations of dependency between each other, rather than treating them all on a level.

I had noted previously that one of the reasons for the use of the possible worlds framework is that it is, with a few tricks, easily adaptable to talking about a lot of different modalities. All of the candidates for superpossibles that I've mentioned arise with regard to alethic modalities themselves (possibility, necessity); but there are non-alethic modalities that also sometimes get discussed in terms of possible worlds. One would expect superpossibles in these cases, as well. And we can identify a few obvious candidates. Take, for instance, Kant's categorical imperative in terms of the modalities of obligation and permissibility (deontic necessity and possibility). The categorical imperative, by its very definition, has a fundamentality with regard to other permissible things -- whether other things are permissible depends on the categorical imperative, so that the categorical imperative does not involve permissibility in the way other imperatives do, even though obviously it is permissible to do what the categorical imperative requires. So the categorical imperative is a plausible candidate for a deontic superpossible, a superpermissible, whose modal character cannot adequately be captured by possible worlds semantics. A similar argument can be run for regarding self-evident first principles as candidates for epistemic superpossibles.

In other words, the existence of superpossibles, that is, of things whose modalities can only, at best, be partially captured by possible worlds analysis, seems to arise from (1) the limitations in how possible worlds analysis can handle actuality; and (2) the fact that possible worlds analysis assumes that 'possibility' is univocal. It has difficulty, then, capturing modalities intimately linked with actuality, and with modalities that are analogically or hierarchically related, according to prior and posterior. This raises the question of whether there are other lines of argument by which one could discover superpossibles.

Aquinas for Lent V

...because from the Church's precept all believers are bound to take the communion of the sacrament at least once a year, on the feast of Easter especially, therefore the Church decreed that once a year when the time for taking the Eucharist is near all believers should confess. Therefore, I say that delaying confession until this time [i.e., Lent], essentially speaking, is permitted but it can become unlawful accidentally, e.g., if a moment in which confession is required should be near, or if someone delays confession out of contempt. And likewise such a delay may be accidentally meritorious if he delays so that he may confess more prudently or more devoutly because of the holy season.

[Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibetal Questions 1 and 2, Edwards, tr., PIMS (Toronto: 1983) pp. 53-54]

Sunday, February 18, 2018

Till in Deep Calms of Space

Finite and Infinite
by Elizabeth Barrett Browning


The wind sounds only in opposing straits,
The sea, beside the shore; man's spirit rends
Its quiet only up against the ends
Of wants and oppositions, loves and hates,
Where, worked and worn by passionate debates,
And losing by the loss it apprehends,
The flesh rocks round and every breath it sends
Is ravelled to a sigh. All tortured states
Suppose a straitened place. Jehovah Lord,
Make room for rest, around me! out of sight
Now float me of the vexing land abhorred,
Till in deep calms of space my soul may right
Her nature, shoot large sail on lengthening cord,
And rush exultant on the Infinite.

Saturday, February 17, 2018

Elizabeth Barrett Browning on Extension and Minds

Elizabeth Barrett Browning to Lady Mary Shepherd (1828), letter 314:

I am reduced to the necessity of offering my written but warm thanks, for the valuable present, left for me by your Ladyship– I have read several parts of the Essays with a curious pleasure—several with an entire mental satisfaction: and I have everywhere admired the originality, brilliancy, & power, which,—whether your Ladyship’s positions be questionable or the contrary,—undeniably distinguish your mode of supporting them. It is better to appear arrogant than to be dishonest: & it would be dishonest & disingenuous if I were to conceal the opinion I cannot help entertaining, respecting the extension of finite minds. I cannot honestly say that your Ladyship’s arguments have changed or modified that opinion. If finite minds have not a distinct locality, they must inter-exist & be commingled: if they have a distinct locality, they must have bounds: and bounds pre-suppose extension.

This is an interesting argument.

(1) Either finite minds have a distinct locality or not.
(2) If they do not have a distinct locality, they are not distinct.
(3) If they have a distinct locality, they must have bounds.
(4) If they have bounds, they must be extended.

And, presumably (given that she summarizes the argument as concerned with "the extension of finite minds"),

(5) Finite minds are distinct.

So:

(6) Finite minds are extended.

The obvious premise in need of defense is (2), since place-distinction is not the only way to distinguish, but the premise that in a sense matters is (3), since finite minds do prima facie often have distinct localities -- for instance, we associate my mind with my body and not with the moon. There seems to be need of a distinction or two here, though.

Browning seems to be referring to Lady Mary Shepherd's Essay XI, "On the Immateriality of Mind", in which she argues of sensation that "though it does not occupy space as solid extension, yet it has a necessary relation to space, by requiring space in which to exist" (EPEU, p. 386). Her primary concern is to argue that sensation cannot exist on its own; but it does require that finite minds have a distinct locality, and Shepherd does there at least consider the possibility of attributing extension to the immaterial mind, despite its not being her own view. Browning is certainly right that Shepherd's arguments would not have modified her own view; Shepherd hardly talks about the topic at all.

Aquinas for Lent IV

Corporal need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some accident supervening. On the first case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have "to feed the hungry"; while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have "to give drink to the thirsty." The common need with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have "to clothe the naked": while the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have "to harbor the harborless." Again if the need be special, it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have "to visit the sick," or it results from an external cause, and then we have "to ransom the captive." After this life we give "burial to the dead."

Summa Theologiae 2-2.32.2

Friday, February 16, 2018

Dashed Off IV

"The incarnate mind, the tongue, and the tale are in our world coeval." Tolkien

the free adjective as the foundation of fantasy (Tolkien)

4 characteristics of true contrition
(1) real and not merely verbal
(2) from faith rather than incentive
(3) complete in its recognition of the evil of sin
(4) complete in the scope of sins recognized

abstract object realism // immateriality of the soul

Human sexuality is a sign-making thing.

marriage as locution with illocutionary and perlocutionary force

"...a word, whether spoken or written, has a remarkable, even paradoxical quality,--namely that it both goes out and remains where it was to start with." Barfield

The 'cult of victimhood' is an attack on habits of mercy, (1) by making mercy dependent on some status as victim and (2) by encouraging unmerciful behavior to victimizers and (3) by discouraging merciful action by victims. It perversely takes a genuine ground for mercy and twists it to block mercy. It is consistent with, and indeed conducive to, some acts of mercy; but there are few things more toxic to merciful character, because it sets so many different kinds of impediments to mercy.

Genealogy is a matter of culture as well as biology.

Given the way he characterizes the Supreme Law of Human Action, Whewell's Five Virtues are perhaps best considered to be kinds of disposition to human common good: uniting affection (Benevolence), excluding of selfish desire (Justice), maintenance of common understanding (Truth), control of appetites (Purity), and distinct and definite conception of standards (Order).

St. Andrew of Crete on the garments of the Transfiguration, figurally understood:
(1) the words and deeds of the Savior in earthly life (spotless, showing the divine in the mundane without circumscribing it)
(2) the magnificence of those things brought into existence by the Word, esp. Scripture (made pure by the Spirit, revealing the Word to those perfected in the Spirit -- those like Peter, representing depth of faith, firmly anchored in the rock, carrying the Church, and James and John, representing the breadth and height, entrusted with mystical vision)

The book of Jude shows that there may be true prophecy amidst speculation and fable.

Scripture insinuates that the wine of the chalice is to be mixed with water, but gives no explicit institution of it.

Secularization is a disease of custom more than anything.

Titus 1:5 -- the establishment of elders by appointment by appropriate authority arising from the apostles
Acts 6:3 -- while the people select, only the apostles appoint

"there is one chair belonging to one, upon which now by divine authority three bishops sit" Gregory (letter 37 to Eulogius of Alexandria)

*Direct* temporal authority by the pope arises from the custom of the liturgical commonwealth and not from anything intrinsic to the papacy.

five works proper to God (Bellarmine): Creation, Conservation, Salvation, Foreknowledge of the hidden, Miracles

"The same act belongs to the mover as wherefrom it is and to the moved as wherein it is." Aquinas

One who has a democratic mindset and who begins to ridicule without intent to hurt will eventually ridicule with intent to hurt; ridicule is naturally escalating in an environment emphasizing persuasion.

"The Natural Affections are the proper moral School of the Heart." Whewell

From Christ the King, the Church receives the right of global and catholic mission.

The Church does not offer the sacrament of marriage; she receives it from Christ.

Life itself is a beginning of happiness.

Our duties are inevitably going to be somewhat general under most circumstances.

When dealing with wrongs, it is idle to talk about whether society should retaliate; the fact is that it inevitably does so, often as a reflex. The question is not whether but how it should retaliate, and what should be done to guarantee that it only does so in the right mode.

Human beings are such inveterate storytellers that we will defy heaven itself if we like the role it gives us in the imagined stories of our lives.

Acts of justice often arise out of the spontaneous negotiations of life and thus could not always have been determined beforehand.

Opus human generis totaliter accepti est actuare semper totam potentiam intellectus possibilis. (Dante)

Analogical inference requires not merely similarity but similarity within a universe of discourse.
- Can this perhaps give us a good account of a legitimate fallacy of alse analogy, as ignoratio elenchi arising through failure to respect the universe of discourse?

analogical inference as preserving possibility with respect to similarity-as-evidence (evidential possibility given similarity)

The love in charity is God's own religious act.

square of opposition for: theism, non-atheism, atheism, nontheism

Spontaneous interjections are often difficult to interpret due to a surplus of meaning, not a paucity.

rational zymurgy, the zymurgy of reason

Complete holiness is found only in the fullness of divine love.

causation, eminence, and remotion in the interpretive work of HoP

The right to vote is a right for protecting other rights; it does not exist for its own sake.

Christ is both symbol and means of the union of God and man.

"Every philosophic system is the outcome of that or those put forward before it, and contains the germs of its successor." Erdmann
"If Philosophy is the self-comprehension of the spirit, the proof that a philosophic system does not understand itself, is also a proof that it is not a complete philosophy, and therefore must be transcended."

Habituation as such is not a reversible process; one can lose habitus, the effect, but not by reversal, only by moving forward again. It's not like simply changing one's mind.

Universalist arguments seem unusually likely to commit the fallacy of simpliciter et secundum quid. Think about this.

NB that Aristotle treats music not only as imitative but as paradigmatically so.

The Fall of Man is not yet complete.

Hoffman
(1) What moves by locomotion has determinate direction. (2) What has determinate direction is determined to that direction rather than some other. (3) This is final causation.
(1)What moves in a given direction has a tendency to continue in that direction. (2) A tendency to do something is final causation.

"Each thing insofar as it is simple and undivided, always remains in the same state, quantum in se est, and never changes except as a result of external causes." Descartes Principles 2.37 (AT 8a62; CSM 1.240-1)
"Each thing, quantum in se est, strives to persevere in its being." Spinoza, Ethics 3P6
Descartes's df of conatus (Principles 3a56 AT VIIIa, 108, CSM 1, 259): "they are positioned and pushed into motion insuch a way that they will in fact travel in that direction, unless they are prevented by some other cause."
- Hoffman suggests that striving adds to the tending the notion of quantum in se est.

force as actio ad mutandum

Shared skeptical opposition tends to pressure dogmatisms to unite.

"...syncretism is dogmatism as well as scepticism, and it is just in this that the chief weakness of the system, and its formal inconsistency, consists." Erdmann
Is Erdmann right that imperial systems tend toward philosophical syncretisms?

reason : eclectic mixture :: understanding : organic fusion

filmlook & soundflow

possibilities in terms of (a) powers (b) objects of thought
are these, taken broadly, exhaustive?

Philosophy itself is a form of shared intentionality.


Aquinas for Lent III

As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe." Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. On like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason.

Summa Theologiae 2-2.145.2.