Interesting Links

* "Leithart.com" has a post on Aquinas's argument that it is fitting to convey divine truths by way of bodily images. (HT: BHT) There's also an interesting post on Scotus on univocity.

* The discussion on Heidegger and Nazism continues with a great post at The Rhine River. (Looking at my comment just now, it's a bit long -- I should have written another blog post rather than taking up so much space in the comments section. I'll try to keep that in mind if I comment again.)

* Bill Vallicella has a very nice summary of the set-theoretical paradox of omniscience. My (limited) understanding is that it actually depends considerably on what formulation of set theory we are using (see here and also here, for example; the latter link shows just how interesting the paradox is, since it would have ramifications for possible worlds semantics as well -- the paradox is one form of a general type of set-theoretical paradox for the semantics of modal logic). I'm also not convinced that we should concede that omniscience is defined as knowledge of the set of all possible truths, rather than knowledge of all possible truths (which may or may not make a set in the relevant sense), although Grim in the exchange linked to in The Maverick's post denies that this would make a difference. I also wonder if one could perhaps deny the emphasis on propositions, and say that what this sort of paradox shows (if it even works) is that divine omniscience is such that its content cannot be fully specified as a set of propositions, because there is no set of all propositions specifying it. (This is perhaps not so far out as it might seem; on some medieval accounts of omniscience, for instance, divine knowledge of enunciables, i.e., propositions, is an entirely incidental result of the arguments that God has flawless self-knowledge and practical, non-propositional knowledge of things as creatable -- to put it crudely and a little misleadingly, divine know-how.) On such a view that paradox would cause no problems for the doctrine of omniscience, although some might be uncomfortable with the notion of omniscience as non-propositional knowledge. In any case, it's a good paradox to ponder.

* John da Fiesole at "Disputations" discusses the Fra Angelico exhibit at New York's Metropolitan, with pictures and links to reviews.

* Read John Haldane's What Philosophy Can Do (in the November issue of First Things). Haldane, of course, is a major member of the analytic Thomism movement (in the tradition of Anscombe and Geach).

* BTW, I really liked this comment in his Public Square column by Fr. Neuhaus:

Actress Jane Fonda’s 1998 conversion to Christianity received considerable attention. She recently told the Baltimore Sun, “I believe people have different ways of approaching the Word. For me, it’s metaphor, written by people a long time after Christ died and interpreted by specific groups. I read the gospels that aren’t included in the Bible. These make me feel good about calling myself a Christian.” She may be on to something. The ones that are in the Bible sometimes make me feel bad about calling myself a Christian.

Not Very Recommended

The other day I read through Atheism: A Reader, by S. T. Joshi . I don't particularly recommend it; the general impression it gives of atheism is that it is very intellectually lightweight. That's not the fault of atheists, however, but of the editor, whose only genuinely redeeming choice was George Eliot's delightful 1855 "Evangelical Teaching". Feuerbach and Marxist atheism are missing; there's a completely irrelevant section on immortality (as has been known since the eighteenth century, there's nothing particularly theistic about immortality and nothing particularly atheistic about its denial), and the whole thing comes across as piecemeal eclecticism. Nietzsche-inspired atheism simply cannot mix with Feuerbach-inspired atheism; neither sits well with Hume-inspired atheism; and it scarcely needs to be said that none of these really fits with Spinoza-inspired atheism. Pick it up at a library to read George Eliot; Shelley's essay is perhaps worth a scan as well. Everything else is rather unimpressive; even for the big names we don't really get a sense of why they are atheists. And if we looked more closely we would see that the reasons are all inconsistent: theists may be theists together, but atheists are usually atheists alone. That's the difference between a reasoned affirmation and a reasoned denial of an existence claim.

Shepherd on Experimental Reasoning

Lady Mary Shepherd on causal reasoning [An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, pp. 107-108]:

"If the human body is in the same state on any occasion, as on that when bread nourished it; there is as great a necessity it should again nourish as that it should be white.

"Thus all experimental reasoning consists in an observation, and a demonstration, as has before been shown;--an observation, whether teh circumstances from which an object is produced, and in which it is placed, are the same upon one occasion as upon another;--and a demonstration, that if it is so, all its exhibitions will be the same."

Shepherd's account of causal reasoning is opposed to Hume's. Hume thinks of induction as the most general sort of reasoning about matters of fact possible. Shepherd has denied this, and with considerable plausibility. One way to see Shepherd's insight is to phrase it in terms of suppositional reasoning, where we identify what follows, what cannot follow, and what is consistent with, a given set of suppositions. This sort of reasoning is (1) deductive; and (2) a more general form of reasoning about matters of fact, since it bridges the gap, which Hume considered to be insurmountable, between reasoning about relations of ideas and reasoning about matters of fact. We clear argue suppositionally in mathematics, for instance; and we also clearly do it in physics. And Shepherd considers all such reasoning to be causal. In mathematics, we reason about how one set of supposed things (e.g., a particular acute angle in a right triangle) causes another set of things to be what it is (e.g., the other acute angle in the triangle). On Shepherd's view causal reasoning in physics is exactly the same as this. The difference between physics and mathematics is not the form of reasoning, which is logically the same; the difference is that physics requires an additional step before we get to the causal reasoning. In mathematics you can suppose whatever you will. In physics, we want our reasoning to tell us something about a given state of affairs. So physics, in addition to its causal reasoning, requires a step in which we match our suppositions to the facts.

Given this move, Shepherd is able to disentangle two issues: the problem of induction and the problem of causal reasoning. Causal reasoning is deductive; it is, however, ex suppositione. When we expect that a new case will be like an old case, our reasoning moves from experience to expectation in the following way:

(1) Experience: We have analyzed previous instances of such-and-such conditions.

(2) The Observation Step, which is probabilistic: that the current conditions are the same as we have found in previous cases.

(3) The Demonstration Step, which is certain: that if they are the same, the conditions must exhibit themselves in the same way.

(4) Expectation: We therefore expect the new to be like the old. If it is not, the problem is not with our reasoning (3), assuming it has been done carefully, but with our matching of supposition to reality (2).

Thus there is no Humean mystery about why we believe that the future will resemble the past; we believe it will because the current conditions have implications, which we have discovered by reasoning about the same conditions that have come before. There is therefore no vicious circle in the justification of induction. Since induction is not the most general form of reasoning about matters of fact, we can justify induction in terms of a more general form of reasoning. There are still issues involved in induction -- for example, the Observation Step will necessarily only be probabilistic -- but these are not justificatory problems for induction itself. And Shepherd recognizes quite correctly the right way to deal with these problems: try out our suppositions. It is noteworthy that Shepherd, unlike Hume, talks a great deal about testing, since it plays an important role in her account. Having developed an expectation on the basis of certain suppositions, we test it experimentally against facts, and if it fails, we go back and reconsider our suppositions. As she notes, it is her account of reasoning, not Hume's, that more clearly takes scientific practice into account.

The Pauline Epistles as Ecclesiology (Aquinas)

On Aquinas's view, the Pauline Epistles contain a complete ecclesiology. The basic distinction on which he bases this position is most clearly found in the Commentary on the Hebrews:

These three things are found in the body of the Church, just as they are found in a natural body, namely, the mystical body itself, its chief members (prelates and rulers) and the head, namely, Christ, from Whom life flows to all the members. Some of the epistles deal with the grace of the New Testament, so far as it extends to the whole mystical body of the Church. This is a theme of all the epistles he sent to the churches, i.e., to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, up to the first epistle to Timothy. In others he treats of this grace, insofar as it extends to individual persons, namely, Timothy, Titus, Philemon. But in the epistle to the Hebrews he treats of this grace, inasmuch as it pertains to the head, namely, Christ.

He also makes more clear the breakdown among particular Pauline epistles in his Commentary on Romans. The basic structure of it is as follows.

I. THE CHURCH AS THE MYSTICAL BODY

The first series of epistles have to do with God's grace:

Romans: describes God's grace (which works sacramentally)
I Corinthans: describes the sacramental life of the Church
II Corinthians: describes the ministers of the sacraments
Galatians: excludes superfluous sacraments, against those who want to mingle old and new sacraments

The next series of Epistles have to do with the faith of the Church.

Ephesians: for the fortification of the faith of the Church, particularly by describing the unity of the faith
Philippians: for the growth and preservation of the Church

Colossians begins the theme of protecting the faith:

Colossians: for the protection of the Church from corruption and error
I Thessalonians: for the protection of the Church from present persecution
II Thessalonians: for the protection of the Church from future persecutions, by warning of the Antichrist

II. THE CHURCH AS COMPOSED OF INDIVIDUALS

The first three have to do with the individual as having responsibility in the Church:

I Timothy: with regard to the unity of the Church
II Timothy: with regard to the steadfastness of the Church against persecutors
Titus: with regard to the protection of the Church from heretics

Philemon adds to this by helping us to understand the role of the Christian who has temporal responsibility in the world.

III. CHRIST AS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH

Hebrews is the pinnacle of the ecclesiology, for it discusses Christ, the Head of the Church.

Of course, Aquinas doesn't think the above themes are the only things found in the epistles; it's just that, by seeing the epistles thematically in this way, we can see that the Holy Spirit, by giving us Paul's epistle, has given us a complete study of the role of grace in the Church.

You can read some very good translations of some of Aquinas's commentaries on the Pauline epistles online in PDF format.

Reading Hume on Ought and Is

One of the most influential and misunderstood passages in Hume is the last paragraph of Treatise 3.1:

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

This is usually understood to be an argument that 'one cannot infer an ought from an is'. However, that's not what it says at all. So here's a little lesson in how to read Hume (and, indeed, almost any other philosopher).

(1) Look for the conclusions being drawn. We have a tendency to read our own conclusions into arguments; and since the conclusion determines the nature of the argument, this leads to severe misreading. Notice the moral Hume draws from his observation:

I am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

In other words, Hume is really targeting a specific position, one that grounds morality on "the relations of objects" and that thinks moral distinctions can be perceived by reason. 'The vulgar systems of morality' is vague in this passage; we'll come back to it.

(2) Don't assume you understand the words. One of the trickiest sentences in this passage is the one that says:

For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

What makes it tricky is the word 'deduction'. We think of deduction as an inference. That is one thing that 'deduction' can mean in the early modern period. However, it can also mean an explanation or an account. So we need to proceed carefully and not merely assume that it's the inference that's the problem here. Perhaps Hume is talking about an explanation or description. (There is good reason, in fact, to think that 'X is a deduction from Y' here means 'Y explains X'.)

(3) Determine the textual context of the passage. Treatise 3.1 is devoted to arguing against moral rationalism, i.e., the view that distinctions between vice and virtue are discerned by reason (sound familiar). Hume himself is arguing for an alternative position, moral sentimentalism, which holds that we have a special moral sense for determining vice and virtue.

(4) Determine the historical context of the passage. Two major opponents are in view in this section, Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston, both moral rationalists. Wollaston held that morality is a matter of the significance of our actions; vicious actions are those which are 'acting lies' and virtuous actions are those which exhibit truth. Clarke held that morality is a matter of eternal relations discerned by reason; these eternal relations are relations of fitness or aptness. Much of Hume's critique builds on an earlier critique of the same thinkers by Francis Hutcheson, the other great moral sentimentalist of the day. In both Hume's and Hutcheson's critique, the repeated criticism is that moral rationalisms of all types argue in a circle.

(5) Conclude in light of the information gathered. Hume adds to his circularity charge a recommendation to those who read the moral rationalists. Whenever Hume reads these authors, he notices a pattern in their explanations. They start out by talking about God, human nature, etc., and then at some point switch over to talking about duty, obligation, etc. Hume doesn't criticize inferences from Is to Ought (he makes them himself, as all moral sentimentalists do), but the particular way in which moral rationalists, purporting to explain our moral duties and obligations, actually just gloss over the matter entirely. The problem is not that they conclude Ought from Is but that the connection or relevance of their explanation of morality (the Is) to morality itself (the Ought) is not explained, even though (given their position) they need to provide such an explanation. This is confirmed by Hume's mention of 'vulgar systems of morality', because the vulgar (=popular) justification of morality ends up trying to explain morality by morality: X is virtuous because it is our duty, etc. This is precisely the problem with the moral rationalists, in Hume's view. It's another way in which they tend to beg the question.

This, of course, is all very rough, but it should give the basic idea of how to go about interpreting the passage.

Two Attitudes to Truth

There is this difference between him who loves the truth and him who hates it. He who hates the truth, lies in the darkness of mortal sin. He hates what God loves, and loves what God hates. God hates sin, and the inordinate joys and luxuries of the world, and such a man loves it all, fattening himself on the world's wretched trifles, and corrupting himself in every rank. If he has an office in which he ought to minister in some way to his neighbour, he serves him only so far as he can get some good for himself out of it, and no farther, and becomes a lover of himself. Christ the Blessed gave His life for us, and such a man will not give one word to serve his neighbour unless he sees it paid, and overpaid. If the neighbour happens to be a poor man who cannot pay, he makes him wait before telling him the truth, and often does not tell it to him at all, but makes fun of him; and where he ought to be pitiful and a father of the poor, he becomes cruel to his own soul because he wrongs the poor. But the wretched man does not see that the Highest Judge will return to him
nothing else than what he receives from him, since every sin is justly punished and every good rewarded. Christ embraced voluntary poverty and was a lover of continence; the wretched man who has made himself a follower and lover of falsehood does just the contrary; not only does he fail to be content with what he has, or to refrain through love of virtue, but he robs other people. Nor does he remain content in the state of marriage, in which, if it is observed as it should be, a man can stay with a good conscience; but he plunges into every wretchedness, like a brute beast, without moderation, and as the pig rolls in filth, so does he in the filth of impurity.

--Saint Catherine Benincasa of Siena, Letter to Lorenzo del Pino of Bologna (Catherine's letters are online at Project Gutenberg)

Natural Law and Divine Command

Jim Ryan argues that natural law theory is a divine command theory. I think his argument misses the point that for the natural law theorist the primary issue for human beings is not biological function but rationality, and, in particular, what is involved in being a rational animal. The natural law theorist isn't appealing to divine choice at all but ultimately to truths deemed necessary. A natural law in the strict sense is just a conclusion that follows from Good is to be sought and evil is to be shunned and other necessary principles, when we add the relevant facts; a natural law in the weaker sense is a principle that has to be followed because its contradictory is conducive to violating a natural law. So for a real natural law theorist, assuming we have a natural law theorist who thinks homosexuality violates natural law, the complaint about homosexuality would not be that we have certain biological functions, but that it is irrational; and one of the reasons a natural law theorist might give for that is an argument about what role biological function should have in our practical reasoning. So the natural law theorist is not pointing to an arbitrary decision in the way a divine command theorist is; he is arguing for what would be, if he is right, a general and universal principle of practical reason. God, in fact, only enters into the matter in the sense that natural reason participates eternal reason. In other words, God's choice only enters into it in that He chose to create beings who were rational. The moral force of the dictates is derived from reason, not from divine intentions about biology, although divine intentions might be relevant to determining how serious the violation of reason is.

Natural law theory is not a specific morality; it is a theory of law that (1) understands law to be a promulgated dictate of practical reason having authority; (2) holds that there is a higher law than positive law, namely, the moral dictates of practical reason; and (3) regards the principles of the higher law as being universal, for the same reason that any principle of reason is universal: anyone who violates the principle violates reason. This is why any charge of 'naturalistic fallacy' against the natural law theorist is absurd in the first place; the natural law theorist doesn't consider nature as such, but reason. In the face of the charge, the natural law theorist doesn't have to retreat to divine intentions, but simply to point out that the person making the charge is effectively making the absurd demand that morality have nothing to do with practical reason.