Not Quite So Almost Perfect

Almost Perfect- INFP 13% Extraversion, 66% Intuition, 46% Thinking, 40% Judging

So, you want to make the world a better place? Too bad it's never gonna happen. Of all the types, you have to be one of the hardest to find fault in. You have a selfless and caring nature. You're a good listener and someone who wants to avoid conflict. You genuinely desire to do good. Of course, these all add up to an incredibly overpowered conscience which makes you feel guilty and responsible when anything goes wrong. Of course, it MUST be your fault EVERYTIME. Though you're constantly on a mission to find the truth, you have no use for hard facts and logic, which is a source of great confusion for those of us with brains. Despite this, in a losing argument, you're not above spouting off inaccurate fact after fact in an effort to protect your precious values. You're most probably a perfectionist, which in this case, is a bad thing. Any group work is destined to fail because of your incredibly high standards. Disregard what I said before. You're just easy to find fault in as everyone else! Luckily, you're generally very hard on yourself, meaning I don't need to waste my precious time insulting you. Instead, just find all your own faults and insult yourself. ***************** If you want to learn more about your personality type in a slightly less negative way, check out this.

Link: The Brutally Honest Personality Test written by UltimateMaster on OkCupid Free Online Dating, home of the The Dating Persona Test

Herself a Rose Who Bore a Rose

Herself a rose, who bore the Rose,
She bore the Rose and felt its thorn.
All Loveliness new-born
Took on her bosom its repose,
And slept and woke there night and morn.

Lily herself, she bore the one
Fair Lily; sweeter, whiter, far
Than she or others are:
The Sun of Righteousness her Son,
She was His morning star.

She gracious, He essential Grace,
He was the Fountain, she the rill:
Her goodness to fulfil
And gladness, with proportioned pace
He led her steps thro' good and ill.

Christ's mirror she of grace and love,
Of beauty and of life and death:
By hope and love and faith
Transfigured to His Likeness, 'Dove,
Spouse, Sister, Mother,' Jesus saith.

Christina Rossetti, ca. 1887

Happily Saturnine

You Should Rule Saturn

Saturn is a mysterious planet that can rarely be seen with the naked eye. You are perfect to rule Saturn because like its rings, you don't always follow the rules of nature. And like Saturn, to really be able to understand you, someone must delve beyond your appearance. You are not an easy person to befriend. However, once you enter a friendship, you'll be a friend for life. You think slowly but deeply. You only gain great understanding after a situation has past.

What Planet Should You Rule?

(ht: Johnny-Dee)

Stemwedel and Cohen on Popper

Janet Stemwedel and Benjamin Cohen discuss Popper (via Instant Messenger) at Page 3.14. Worth reading.

benjaminrcohen: Now, this reminds me too...Popper's working in a scientific moment when physics is the ascendant form of inquiry amongst all others

benjaminrcohen: and that isn't the case anymore, at least not in the same way it was in the first half of the century

janetdstemwedel: The Vienna Circle also thought physics was the bees' knees.

benjaminrcohen: Hempel and Carnap and the lot?

janetdstemwedel: Also, Bertrand Russell circa 1912 when he wrote that mature science (like physics) had no use for a concept of cause.

benjaminrcohen: So we shouldn't throw in Duhem, being French and all, since we know what's what with the French

janetdstemwedel: Duhem was kind of into chemistry though, so I cut him slack

Duhem should also be cut a bit of slack because he insists, surprisingly vehemently, that he is only talking about physics, and that other sciences can't be assumed to work the same way, and, appealing to Claude Bernard, he even gives physiology as an example of a science that works in a way completely different from physics. The notion that there is a single scientific method, or that there is a feature all sciences and only sciences share, is completely foreign to Duhem. He also recognizes the limits of his arguments, which depend crucially on the fact that theory in physics consists entirely of mathematical equations applicable to experimental facts. One of the many reasons why Duhem, for all his limitations, is a better philosopher of science than most philosophers of science we have had since.

The Mysterious Rest of Us

Russell Jacoby has an interesting essay in the CHE on Hannah Arendt (ht: Cliopatria). Reading it, I feel almost as if I came in on a telephone conversation and don't know who's on the other end of the line. When Jacoby talks about those who 'lionize' Arendt, those for whom she is a philosophical hero, one might assume that he means the philosophical community; but Jacoby seems to negate that when he contrasts her to Rawls -- Rawls isn't competition for Arendt because, while political philosophers might like him, he doesn't move 'the rest of us'. Who the Rest of Us are, I don't think we ever really learn, and since they would have to be the ones making the mistake of overrating her, not knowing who the Rest of Us are puts up an impediment to evaluating the essay. So I have no criticisms, since, lacking the context for it, I don't really know what Jacoby's argument actually is; I'd have to guess, and that's not particularly helpful.

There's another puzzle in the essay. The 'devotees' and 'supporters' of Arendt appear to be academic philosophers. If this is so, however, part of Jacoby's argument starts looking a little strange. He argues:

So Arendt's two most famous books make opposite points, since she never reconciled them. Her minions pussyfoot around the contradiction or pedantically try to harmonize the notion of radical and banal evil. Others are less docile. Gershom Scholem, the scholar of Jewish mysticism, protested in a letter to her that her totalitarian book had offered a "contradictory" thesis to her Eichmann report: "At that time, you had not yet made your discovery, apparently, that evil is banal." Arendt agreed: "You are quite right: I have changed my mind and do no longer speak of 'radical evil.'" Her honesty is refreshing but damns her Origins study. It means that her most important book — the Eichmann report — stands unique in her oeuvre; it is not only her least philosophical book, but its notion of evil undermines the theory of her previous work.

I don't know what 'least philosophical' is supposed to mean here (certainly Eichmann in Jerusalem is the work that is most discussed in the philosophical mode as well as in other modes), but setting that aside, there is nothing bad or problematic or even unusual about someone coming to a different conclusion in one book than they did before. Jacoby tries to make a case of this, by saying that her 'supporters' -- undefined but apparently including Richard Bernstein -- 'lack her own forthrightness' and 'try to paper over the fissure'. But Bernstein, Jacoby's example, doesn't really suggest this. After all, Bernstein is a philosopher, and, while Arendt's own opinion of the relation between her two works has some weight, his primary interest is always going to be not Arendt's opinion of the relations among her works but their actual relations. It could very well be that Arendt was wrong to concede so much to Scholem. Arendt has a privileged position when it comes to interpreting her arguments, of course, but it's radically naive to think she has an incorrigible one. People forget details of arguments -- yes, even of their own arguments; they can be misled or confused by the language they use to convey an argument into thinking they're committed to A when really they're just committed to the vaguely similar but different A'; they can give two related arguments without seeing their connection; and so forth. Jacoby apparently considers this point, but he consigns it to the same sort of 'lack of forthrightness' without any argument.

Moreover, the primary interest in work like Arendt is not whether it is right, but whether it makes an interesting argument worth thinking about. If our concern is with what's right, either the earlier work, or the later work, or neither has to be right; and we just focus on that. But if our concern is with what's worth thinking about, then either or both could be wrong, or they both could contradict each other, and still be worthy of our interest. Part of philosophy is dialectical -- opposing arguments and opposing positions -- and a great deal of the interest of Eichmann in Jerusalem is due to the fact that, far from standing alone, it overcomes the arguments of the earlier work by a close philosophical case study.

All in all, it's a very puzzling essay. As I said, I'm certain that I'm missing something; Jacoby clearly has particular people, or at least particular groups of people, in mind. It's just hard to say who, and without knowing who, there's very little to do but be mystified by why he thinks his argument shows that Arendt is only famous as a political philosopher because she has no competition. (When he actually considers the competition, for instance, he mysteriously restricts, momentarily, the field to American political philosophy, which would eliminate, say, Jurgen Habermas or Simone Weil or Charles Taylor; he doesn't consider Noam Chomsky who, whatever else may be said of him, doesn't vanish into technical details and is far more popularly known than Arendt ever has been; he doesn't seem to include any feminist philosophers -- for instance, he mentions Sartre but ignores Simone de Beauvoir. Are there reasons for this? I do not know; if so, they are not given.)

Two More Notes

* Tomorrow is the Feast of St. Ambrose. Here's Augustine on Ambrose (Confessions, Book 5):

And to Milan I came, unto Ambrose the bishop, known to the whole world as among the best of men, Thy devout servant; whose eloquent discourse did at that time strenuously dispense unto Thy people the flour of Thy wheat, the "gladness" of Thy "oil," and the sober intoxication of Thy "wine." To him was I unknowingly led by Thee, that by him I might knowingly be led to Thee. That man of God received me like a father, and looked with a benevolent and episcopal kindliness on my change of abode. And I began to love him, not at first, indeed, as a teacher of the truth,—which I entirely despaired of in Thy Church,—but as a man friendly to myself. And I studiously hearkened to him preaching to the people, not with the motive I should, but, as it were, trying to discover whether his eloquence came up to the fame thereof, or flowed fuller or lower than was asserted; and I hung on his words intently, but of the matter I was but as a careless and contemptuous spectator; and I was delighted with the pleasantness of his speech, more erudite, yet less cheerful and soothing in manner, than that of Faustus. Of the matter, however, there could be no comparison; for the latter was straying amid Manichaean deceptions, whilst the former was teaching salvation most soundly. But "salvation is far from the wicked," such as I then stood before him; and yet I was drawing nearer gradually and unconsciously.

Ambrose, of course, is probably second only to Monica in importance for Augustine's conversion from Manichaeanism to Christianity. Another feature of Ambrose's life for which he is famous is his fearlessness in standing up to Emperors; the Ancient History Sourcebook has what is perhaps the best known example, as described by Theodoret.

Rebecca recently posted a hymn attributed to Ambrose for the first Sunday in Advent.

* I've gone on record before saying that while I tend to accept something like Gyula Klima's favorable (but qualified) assessment of Anselm's argument, the two most interesting and plausible unfavorable assessments I know are those of Peter King (PDF) and Peter Millican (PDF). (The two objections are very different, although both authors provide good reasons why the common arguments against it are dubious.) At OPP there's recently been posted a paper by Yujin Nagasawa (PDF), which I'm still in the process of reading, arguing that Millican's objection rests on an error of interpretation. One of the reasons for this is an argument, which I don't find at all plausible given the stated purpose of the Proslogion, that Anselm is actually deliberately ambiguous on the interpretation of the argument; but he gives other arguments.

Something Else Besides Sincerity

Chris has recently had several posts on the subject of atheism (here, here, here, and here). The last of these in particular has a long comments thread; I really don't have much to say on it, except that atheists of the sort Chris is criticizing, who don't see any nuance in religion at all, need to step back a bit and read a few George Eliot novels, since they are clearly getting an unbalanced diet.

George Eliot certainly falls within the atheism of suspicion; being Feuerbachian, she's also an excellent appreciator of religious nuance. Moreover, she's an outstanding observer of human nature. I suggest that Chris and people like him can see themselves as George Eliot atheists, in the powerful intellectual tradition of Mary Anne Evans herself.

In any case, here's a quotation that I think Chris would really like. Some context is in order. The novel it's from is Romola, perhaps my favorite of Eliot's novels. Romola takes place in late fifteenth-century Florence, where the city is being torn apart by political parties. One of these is headed by Savonarola, a narrow, dogmatic Dominican. However, Eliot is a consummate novelist, and she doesn't leave the characterization of Savonarola at that. For Savonarola is not a villain; he is a good man. The main character, Romola, becomes a sort of student of his, and becoming so, her vista opens up on a level of moral action she had never before recognized. Even though both Florence and Romola's life are falling apart, she learns from Savonarola how to ignite "that flame of unselfish emotion by which a life of sadness might still be a life of active love." In Eliot's powerful image, she becomes a sort of Visible Madonna to complement, and contrast with, Florence's patron, the Unseen Madonna.

So Savonarola is a sort of hero. However, he is a man caught up in contradictions. He is a mystic, an apocalyptic visionary; but he is also a very pragmatic politician. Both are equally important parts of who he is, and for a while he is able to join them both. However, as he does it becomes harder and harder for him to distinguish between the Kingdom of God he preaches and the political party he leads. As long as he manages to keep them apart, he manages to rule Florence by grabbing hold of its spirit and showing it a new life. However, it would take a more superhuman strength than Savonarola has to keep the two distinguished, and slowly they begin to meld. This leads, among other things, to a break between Romola and Savonarola, as Romola goes on beyond Savonarola's religion into a morality of love. But, more relevant to the quotation, it leads to Savonarola's downfall. The Kingdom of God that Savonarola preaches is a kingdom that is supported by miracles; the political party he leads has its power from the will of the people. However, as the two begin to blur together, the people more and more wish to see Savonarola's politics supported by miracles, and he is challenged by fanatics opposing him to a literal Trial by Fire. If his political regime truly has divine favor, the people begin to think, he will walk through the fire and not be harmed.

We thus come up Savonarola in his cell, caught in the contradiction of being both prophet and politician. His prophetic side is certain that the Kingdom of God is supported by miracles; his pragmatic side, on which his political savvy is based, recognizes the folly of the trial; but his increasing inability to distinguish prophecy and politics, ideal and real, the Rule inspired by God and the rule inspired by Savonarola, puts him in a bind that can only end badly for him (and eventually does). This is from a long passage in Chapter 64, in which we find Savonarola struggling to decide what to do.

To the common run of mankind it has always seemed a proof of mental vigour to find moral questions easy, and judge conduct according to concise alternatives. And nothing was likely to seem plainer than that a man who at one time declared that God would not leave him without the guarantee of a miracle, and yet drew back when it was proposed to test his declaration, had said what he did not believe. Were not Fra Domenico and Fra Mariano, and scores of Piagnoni besides, ready to enter the fire? What was the cause of their superior courage, if it was not their superior faith? Savonarola could not have explained his conduct satisfactorily to his friends, even if he had been able to explain it thoroughly to himself. And he was not. Our naked feelings make haste to clothe themselves in propositions which lie at hand among our store of opinions, and to give a true account of what passes within us something else is necessary besides sincerity, even when sincerity is unmixed.

[Emphasis added.]