Saturday, March 02, 2019

Anne Brontë, The Tenant of Wildfell Hall

Introduction

Opening Passage: There are actually two versions of the opening floating around; in one, it opens prior to Chapter 1 with the beginning of the letter that frames the narrative, while in the other it simply opens with Chapter 1. The version I happened to have had was in the latter category:

You must go back with me to the autumn of 1827.

My father, as you know, was a sort of gentleman farmer in —shire; and I, by his express desire, succeeded him in the same quiet occupation, not very willingly, for ambition urged me to higher aims, and self-conceit assured me that, in disregarding its voice, I was burying my talent in the earth, and hiding my light under a bushel. My mother had done her utmost to persuade me that I was capable of great achievements; but my father, who thought ambition was the surest road to ruin, and change but another word for destruction, would listen to no scheme for bettering either my own condition, or that of my fellow mortals. He assured me it was all rubbish, and exhorted me, with his dying breath, to continue in the good old way, to follow his steps, and those of his father before him, and let my highest ambition be to walk honestly through the world, looking neither to the right hand nor to the left, and to transmit the paternal acres to my children in, at least, as flourishing a condition as he left them to me.

Summary: Gilbert Markham is writing to his friend and brother-in-law about events that occurred twenty years before. A young widow, going by the name Helen Graham, arrives with her young boy and a servant to rent part of Wildfell Hall; this sets all the locals a-twitch to learn more about her, but she is very unforthcoming. After a somewhat rocky start, Markham and the young widow begin to get along very well, but jealousy and gossip begin to whisper some rather nasty things about Helen, until she is finally forced to divulge her story to him: she is fleeing a malicious husband, Arthur Huntingdon.

Tenant is a story of the dark side of marriage: Helen Huntingdon chooses a husband badly, and it goes from passionate to inconsistent to a spiral of struggle and resentment in a matter of a few years, until she flees in order to protect her child from being corrupted by her husband. It recognizes the value and power of marriage -- but for that very reason, it is not something to treat lightly, because when it goes bad, it goes very bad. And how it can be otherwise? One of the things Tenant recognizes is that human beings are capable of being quite dangerous to each other. This danger is in most cases moderated by social conventions and our desire to look good in front of the world, but within the sphere of a marriage itself, these things at times fall away and we interact with each other without a social buffer. And men in particular (although not solely men) are dangerous creatures; they are far from being only dangerous creatures, but take the mildest-seeming man and there are circumstances that can bring out his fangs and claws. Marriage can work, but it requires that a man take his own dangerousness seriously, and that a woman have more regard for character than for anything else. That granted, a great deal may be achieved even with the most unpromising of materials. One of the arcs I found most interesting in the story is that of Ralph Hattersley. A crass and vulgar man who keeps bad and carousing company, Hattersley ends up being a decent husband, although perhaps never any less vulgar, because he means no harm, and, more importantly, means not to harm. He does, inevitably, because of the company he keeps and the habit he develops, but his marital selfishness is merely taking his wife's good temper too much for granted, and thus he is open to good advice, should it be given. This contrasts with Arthur, who more careless of others and more frivolous in temper and habit, whose selfishness is a willful desire to have his own way without regard for any rule. Despite giving a very dark picture of marriage gone bad, the novel is not anti-marriage; rather, its criticism is of people who treat marriage as if it were not a powerfully sacred thing, and, like all sacred things, requiring both discipline and the cultivation of honest sympathy.

While Helen is the heroine, she does not escape the novel's ceaseless consideration of the flaws of its character. She has a streak of pride (it is what gets her into the mess), and she is only able to get happiness in the end by overcoming it. It's noteworthy, and perhaps all too realistic, that she does not really understand what she has thrown herself into until very late.

Tenant is usually considered to be partly a response to Emily Brontë's Wuthering Heights; it's not exactly an answer, but it can be read as an attempt to strip away the impressiveness, the romanticization of the overweening passions that bring such destruction in their wake. In Wuthering Heights these things are not presented in a positive light, but they are presented in a striking way, as if they were overwhelming forces of nature. Tenant, a much quieter novel despite its realism about abusiveness, insists on the principle that they are not forces of nature at all, and that they are not overwhelming, so that our giving into them is sordid, almost sickening at times, not striking. Wuthering Heights is usually considered the more technically brilliant of the two, but I'm not sure that this is really fair to Tenant, which is trying to do something considerably more difficult, namely, to prevent the reader from adding an ameliorating sheen as a cover to the awfulness of misstep and wrongdoing in matters of marriage, and yet to do so without being ruthless and (as we say) 'gritty'. Emily has surely taken an easier road than Anne. But Anne has done very well here. There are many ways in which I liked Tenant better than I ever remember liking Wuthering Heights.

Favorite Passage:

‘God help me now!’ I murmured, sinking on my knees among the damp weeds and brushwood that surrounded me, and looking up at the moonlit sky, through the scant foliage above. It seemed all dim and quivering now to my darkened sight. My burning, bursting heart strove to pour forth its agony to God, but could not frame its anguish into prayer; until a gust of wind swept over me, which, while it scattered the dead leaves, like blighted hopes, around, cooled my forehead, and seemed a little to revive my sinking frame. Then, while I lifted up my soul in speechless, earnest supplication, some heavenly influence seemed to strengthen me within: I breathed more freely; my vision cleared; I saw distinctly the pure moon shining on, and the light clouds skimming the clear, dark sky; and then I saw the eternal stars twinkling down upon me; I knew their God was mine, and He was strong to save and swift to hear. ‘I will never leave thee, nor forsake thee,’ seemed whispered from above their myriad orbs. No, no; I felt He would not leave me comfortless: in spite of earth and hell I should have strength for all my trials, and win a glorious rest at last!

Recommendation: Highly Recommended.

Friday, March 01, 2019

Classifying Ethical Approaches

Three of the load-bearing phenomena of ethics are happiness, obligation, and character. Each of these can be considered in a lot of different ways, but as it happens, in each case most approaches to ethical questions in general fall under one of two possible responses to each.

(1) Happiness: In practice, the key ethical divide on the question of happiness is whether happiness is subjective (S) or objective (O); another way to put the matter is to ask whether the feeling of happiness and actual happiness can come apart. Mill and Aristotle both talk about something that can be characterized as happiness, the fulfilling good of a life, but Mill's account is subjective, characterizing this fulfilling good in terms of pleasures and pains, while Aristotle's account is objective, characterizing it as a totality of good relevant to one's nature.

(2) Obligation: The most significant divide on the question of obligation is between positivists (P), who think that all obligations are made into obligations for us, and naturalists (N), who think that some obligations are not made but natural to us in some way (due to the nature of reason, usually). Thus divine command theorists and natural law theorists are divided by the fact that divine command theorists are positivists and natural law theorists are naturalists.

(3) Character: Dispute about the nature of character is a trickier landscape, but a big division in approaches is the one between those who take the standard of good character to be based on some kind of moral sentiment or feeling (F) or on reason itself in some way (R). Thus Hume and Aquinas both take character to be very important, but Hume is a sentimentalist and Aquinas a rationalist.

These are very different divides, but there is a sort of commonality among the three, since in each case one side makes the idea in question more objective than the other. There are also different ways you could divide ethical approaches that interact with these in important and interesting ways, the most important being the divide among consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists. An ONR virtue ethicist and an ONR deontologist will have a lot in common, but they will differ as to the kinds of things they think are fundamental. In any case, these other divides can be set aside for now.

We then have a set of families into which we can divide fully developed ethical approaches, that is, ethical approaches that have some kind of substantive account of each of these:

SPF
SPR
SNF
SNR
OPF
OPR
ONF
ONR

Aristotelian approaches to ethics are usually ONR, although occasionally you find modern Aristotle-inspired approaches that are OPR, a position that is suggested by Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy". Kantianism is very explicitly SNR; much of the structure of Kant's overall approach to ethics is that he accepts the empiricist account of happiness, which is subjectivist, and wishes to integrate that with a rationalist account of obligation, which is naturalist. Utilitarians are all S's, although not all consequentialists are, and Mill is a positivist about obligations, so he's at least an SP. It's a bit trickier to say whether he is SPF or SPR; he says things consistent with both. Without a full study, I think the evidence, particularly from the essay "On Bentham" indicates that he is SPF. Hume seems to be SNF -- he's definitely an F, since he thinks character is recognized as good or bad by moral sentiment, and he does not in fact treat all obligations in positivist terms, but traces some of them back to the same moral sentiment, which would make him technically an N. The ethical approaches that tend to say things that sound most like ONF are moral sense theories, although I suspect that they are sometimes really SNF. I'm not sure if there are any OPF approaches, but perhaps some divine command theories come close.

Thursday, February 28, 2019

Both Shade and Substance, Beef and Bone

The DOG in the RIVER
by Christopher Smart


The churl that wants another's fare
Deserves at least to lose his share.
As thro' the stream a dog convey'd
A piece of meat, he spy'd his shade
In the clear mirrour of the flood;
And thinking it was flesh and blood,
Snapp'd to deprive him of the treat--
But mark the glutton's self-defeat
Miss'd both another's and his own,
Both shade and substance, beef and bone.

An adaptation from Phaedrus's Fables.

Poem Retrospective XXVIII

The Walls of Jericho

You and I were just children
long ago,
but where our golden youth went
only God and His angels know.

We played out by the trainyard,
three as one,
till we couldn't see our faces
from the setting of the sun.

And the train on the track played a trumpet
deep and low
that spoke the brazen note
that broke the walls of Jericho.

And Tom was a valiant soldier
off for war;
we'd spear him in the chest
then he'd get back up for more.

You let down the embankment
a scarlet thread
but Tom went off to dinner
and left us all for dead.

And the train on the track played a trumpet
deep and low
that spoke the brazen note
that broke the walls of Jericho.

Then we all went off to college
and Tom to war,
and the priest said at the service
that death is but a door.

You and I were just children
long ago,
but where our sunny days went
only God and His angels know.

And the train on the track plays a trumpet
deep and low
that speaks the brazen note
and breaks the walls of Jericho.

Wednesday, February 27, 2019

Doctor of Peace

Today is the feast of St. Gregory of Narek, Doctor of the Church.

From his "Litany for the Transfiguration":

Treasure beyond measure and beyond description,
indefinable union of the Holy Trinity:
the Father, unattainable in thought, without beginning and Creator God;
light of light, consubstantial Son, born of the Father before anything,
eternally inseparable and undividable from the paternal bosom,
the same in equality and unity, indubitable and immutable nature;
in honor equal to the Father and the Son, sharing in their glory, Holy Spirit,
who proceeds from the Father and fills every creature
and is worshiped and praised with the Father and the Son, inexpressible in essence,
unseen by the seraphim and incomprehensible by the cherubim,
unattainbale in thought, higher than anything.
O immortal King, unfathomable by authorities and principalities:
Please accept the supplications and entreaties of your ransomed people,
as it pleases you, we pray.

[St. Gregory of Narek, The Festal Works of St. Gregory of Narek, Terian, ed. and tr., Liturgical Press (Collegeville, MN: 2106) p. 131. This is a very good work, with a great deal of interesting material.]

Poem Retrospective XXVII

Parmenides' Vision

Rapt, thrown upward, undone,
In ecstatic vision seeking vital clue,
I journeyed on the well-known path;
She came:
Great gold-winged goddess, chariot-driven,
More splendid far than Cyprian glory
On sands made manifest to Anchises' son.
She came,
And, speaking, said to my dreaming ears:
Two ways lie before you; one is true, one appears,
Both gated, and above the former
The message of the gods shines forth
Like the words above the Delphic road,
Holy:
What is, is, and is not what is not.
Upon that path lies your way, said she,
The way of truth and not of seeming;
What appears will pass, what is real remains;
wisdom's lover finds sweet relief
In what is.
Then the fleeting, swift-footed, gold-winged goddess
Was gone, and I amazed.

Tuesday, February 26, 2019

Republic

The Guarantee Clause of the U. S. Constitution begins, "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government...." Historically this has tended to be applied mostly in cases of state admission, giving Congress the authority to accept or reject a state constitution as consistent with republican principles, so that state constitutions that have been accepted are presumptively taken to be so consistent. However, while there hasn't been much movement on other grounds (because the relevant authority is not the courts but Congress), it seems clear that the mere having of a constitution apparently consistent with republican principles is not the same as being guaranteed a republican form of government -- consistency with republicanism is not not the same as being republican in application.

What are the basic principles of a republic? You could have variations, but historically Americans have tended to follow Madison in Federalist Papers #39:

...we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.... It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified....

Thus a republican form of government takes the government only to be able to exercise its powers insofar as it derives them directly and indirectly from its people, and only exemplified in cases where those administering the government in any of its powers get their appointment from those people.

I would argue on the basis of this that the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is in fact a violation of the principles of republicanism; that, because of this, Congress has the authority to overturn it if it ever is completed; and that, in fact, Congress has the constitutional duty to do so. While states do have the right to determine how to allocate their electors, the United States has the constitutional duty to guarantee that they do so in a form consistent with republican government.

Under the NPVIC, the electors for the state would be chosen not on the basis of decisions made by the people of that state, but on the basis of a number obtained by adding official popular vote totals from all the different states. This means that the electors are chosen not because they represent the people of the state but because they represent an abstract assessment of the nation, and this abstract assessment is not only based on considering the rest of the nation as more important than the people of the state that the electors are supposed to represent, it is, because state election laws are different, obtained in a way inconsistent with the will of the people of that state, expressed in their election laws, as to how votes should be handled. The appointment of the electors for a state under such a compact is neither a direct nor an indirect expression of the people. The whole point of the Compact, in fact, is to sever the appointment of electors by a state from the expressed will of the people of the state.

Similarly, states assigning electors according to the NPVIC are assigning them on the basis of a process that cannot be directly affected by the people and that cannot be adequately monitored, reviewed, and corrected by their representatives. The people of Colorado have no direct say in the election laws of Connecticut, or of any other state than their own. The elections in different states are monitored, reviewed, and corrected only by the governments of those states, so representatives in Colorado do not have the authority or ability to guarantee that everything in Connecticut is being done in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Colorado. There are, in fact, only two ways to appoint electors that do not sever the appointments from the direct or indirect control of the people of a state: by appointing on the basis of the votes of the people of that state, according to election laws determined by the state legislature; or by the specific deliberation of those who represent the people of that state, according to election laws determined by the state legislature. Neither of these occurs in the NPVIC scenario: the appointment of electors in the Compact is not based on the popular vote of that particular state, but on a number, to which the state popular vote is only an easily swamped contributor. Nor does the appointment involve any specific deliberation by the legislature as to what will best represent the interests of the people of that particular state. The Compact amounts, in fact, to a complete refusal to recognize the electors as representatives of the people of that particular state.

NPV is a bad idea simply on its own merits -- its advocates are unrelenting liars, it solves none of the problems it purports to solve, it is incapable of providing any of the things its advocates promise, and it is based explicitly on the incoherent motivation of treating the normal functioning of the Electoral College as bad while not doing the appropriate thing to fix it (namely, Constitutional amendment). But it is more than that; it is a betrayal of republican principle. And, I would suggest, should be regarded by everyone as unconstitutional.