To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that every virtue is moral. For moral virtue is named from 'mos', that is, custom. But we are able to become accustomed to the acts of every virtue. Therefore every virtue is moral virtue.
Further, the Philosopher says in Ethic. II that virtue is a choosing habitude consisting in the rational mean. But every virtue seems to be a choosing habitude, because we are able to do the acts of whatever virtue from choosing. Every virtue also consists in some way in the rational mean, as will be obvious below. Therefore every virtue is moral.
Further, Tully says in his Rhetoric that virtue is habitude in the mode of nature in accordance with reason. But since every human virtue is ordered to human good, it must be in accordance with reason, for human good is to be according to reason, as Dionysius says. Therefore every virtue is moral.
But contrariwise is what the Philosopher says in Ethic. I: Speaking of morals, we do not say that one is wise or intelligent, but that one is gentle or sober. So, therefore, wisdom and intellection are not moral. They are, however, virtues, as was said above. Therefore not every virtue is moral.
I reply that it must be said that, toward this being clear, one must consider what 'mos' is, for in this way we will be able to know what moral virtue is. And 'mos' signifies two things. For sometimes it signifies custom, as is said in Acts XV, Unless you are circumcised according to the 'mos' of Moses, you are not able to be saved. Sometimes it means a sort of natural or quasi-natural inclination to enact something, from which some things of brute animals are called 'mores', as is said in 2 Maccab. XI, that rushing on the enemy in the 'mos' of lions, they leveled them. And so 'mos' is taken in Psalm LXVII, where it is said, who makes to dwell those of one 'mos' in a house. And these two significations are in no way distinguished as to word in Latin. But in Greek they are distinguished, for 'ethos', which among us signifies 'mos', sometimes has a long first part, and is written with the Greek letter eta, but sometimes it has a short first part, and is written with epsilon.
Now moral virtue is named from 'mos' according as 'mos' signifies natural or quasi-natural inclination to enact something. And the other signification, which significes custom, is near to this signification, for custom is in a way turned into nature and makes an inclination like the natural. But it is manifest that inclination to act properly agrees with [convenit] striving virtue [appetitivae virtuti], to which it belongs to move all the powers to act, as is obvious from what was said above. And therefore not every virtue is called moral, but only that which is in the striving impulse [vi appetitiva].
To the first it therefore must be said that the objection proceeds from 'mos' inasmuch as it signifies custom.
To the second it must be said that every act of virtue is able to be enacted from choosing, but only virtue that is in the striving part of the soul is able to act with right choosing, for it was said above that to choose is an act of the striving part. Wherefore choosing habitude, which is a source of choosing, is the only one that completes the striving impulse, although the acts of other habitudes are able to fall under choosing.
To the third it must be said that nature is a source of change, as is said in Physic. II. But to move to act is properly in the striving part. And thus to be likened to nature in rational consenting is proper to virtues that are in the striving impulse.
[Thomas Aquinas, ST 1.58.1, my translation. The Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation is here.]