Dialogue Summer 2004

Today I received the Summer issue of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie, the journal of the Canadian Philosophical Association. It's a bit of a mixed bag, as it always is, but usually there's something interesting, and so it was this time.

Jefrey Grupp has an article, "Problems with the Platonist Exemplification Tie between Located Entities and an Unlocated Entity," which was certainly interesting. I've read it through twice, and read some passages in it several more times, and my conclusion is that the reason why Platonic realists don't really bother much with the problem is that it's a complete non-problem. The article is something of a sequel to another article by Grupp, which I haven't read. There he argues that direct attachments like the Platonist notion of exemplification between located entities (in this case, particulars) and unlocated entities (in this case, universals) are impossible, "since such an attachment requires the unlcoated entity to be in space, at a spatial place, since the located entity is necessarily spatially located" (p. 494). Thus they would imply entities that are located and unlocated at the same time. Now, it's possible that Grupp has a knock-down argument in the article I haven't read, but I've come across similar claims in philosophy of religion, and they never work. And we have, in fact, good reason to think none will. An 'attachment' like a particular's exemplifying a certain Platonic universal is likely to be sui generis, so arguments like Grupp's really do need to argue that such attachments are conceptually impossible. But how would they be? The concept of the terms wouldn't rule it out, and it's hard to see why the concept of exemplification or attachment itself would rule it out. And this is especially true if the attachment is a relation in a fairly ordinary sense, since you can potentially have relations between any sorts of objects you want (even between a located and a non-located entity).

However, this article is not on this argument, but on a further argument. Grupp's further argument is a response to those who claim that perhaps the exemplification tie is simply an ontological primitive that doesn't cross 'realms'. He argues:

1. Suppose we have a wholly spatially located entity, L, e.g., a lion, and a wholly unlocated platonic universal, S, e.g., sublimity, which L exemplifies.

2. Since L is wholly spatially located, L only exemplifes n-adic properties, such as S, at x and nowhere else, because L is nowhere else but at x.

3. Therefore an exemplification not at x is an exemplification that does not have to do with L.

4. Since S is wholly spatially unlocated, it cannot fail to be spatially unlocated (Grupp, oddly, decides to call this 'being at y'), S only involves a direct attachment to the exemplification tie at y, and nowhere else, because S is nowhere else but at y.

5. Therefore an exemplification not at y is an exemplification that does not have to do with S.

6. If L exemplifies n-adic properties only at x, if S involves a direct attachment to the exemplification tie only at y, and if the exemplification tie does not cross realms, since x is not y, L and S apparently cannot have any dealings with each other: for L to tie to S, S, which is wholly at y, must be at x, and thus be both located and unlocated, or L, which is wholly at x, must be at y, and thus both located and unlocated.

7. Therefore L and S cannot be tied by exemplification.

My first thought: the attachment in this case is not between L's locatedness and S's nonlocatedness, but between L, which necessarily has a physical position, and S, which is not the sort of thing to have a physical position at all. Grupp describes the latter as 'being at y'. But this 'at' is not a physical 'at'. Now, exemplification by its nature would be an asymmetric attachment: L exemplifies S at x, but S does not exemplify L at all; its role in the story is just to be exemplified by L at x. Therefore, it isn't obvious that S and L are parallel in the way Grupp's argument actually requires. L's exemplifying S perhaps necessarily requires the exemplification of S to be where L is; but we have no reason whatsoever to think that S's being exemplified by L requires the exemplification of S to be unlocated. S's being exemplified by L requires only that L exemplify S; it does not necessarily require anything about S. If this is so, however, Grupp cannot force a contradiction.

Further: S may be wholly unlocated in itself, as a Platonic universal, but it does not follow from this that S cannot be located in any way; particularly if you think 'being exemplified by' is one way something can be located somewhere. In this case, S would be wholly unlocated in itself, but located in L by L's exemplification of S.

Grupp's argument is very ambitious; if it worked it would destroy any metaphysical position that posited a relation between located and unlocated entities (Plantingan possible worlds metaphysics, most theisms, Platonic philosophies of mathematics, Cartesian dualism, etc.). And, what is more, it would destroy them all as a result of identifying a fairly basic contradiction at their heart. We have, however, no reason to think it works; and this is not surprising (what would be surprising would be if all these positions turned out to be subject to such an easily identified contradiction). In fact, arguments like Grupp's have been considered, and rejected (rightly, I think), in discussions of divine omnipresence, on the grounds that location itself is a derivative property depending on more fundamental properties. It therefore cannot conflict with any attachments that are involved in these properties (and while we need not assume that one of these attachments is exemplification, Platonic realists certainly would).

There's also an interesting article by Manuela Ungureanu, called "Reading the Minds of Others: Radical Interpretation and the Empirical Study of Childhood Cognitive Development", defending Davidson from a common criticism. The Davidson stuff is blah, but the cognitive stuff is very interesting.

And Larmer continues his debate with Overall on miracles. This has to be one of the most pointless disputes I've ever seen; I don't know why they keep it up. I don't agree with a lot of what Larmer has said in it; but Overall's last contribution was bad to the point of being an example of what one should not do in a philosophical discussion, consisting as it did almost entirely of things like rhetorical questions (yes, for several pages most of the sentences where either direct rhetorical questions or the sort of indicative sentence that really is more like a rhetorical question than a genuine argument). Very disappointing; and very undergraduate. Her original paper was much better, although the argument in it is just silly: she's arguing that if there are miracles, this would prove that God does not exist. Yes, you read that correctly. It turns out just to be a bizarre variation of the problem of evil.

The Big Forty-Four

The Forty-fourth Christian Carnival is up at ChristWeb. There are some good ones this time around. Some notables:

* A post in a continuing series on the early Christian understanding of Christ's divinity at "markdroberts.com".

* Star in the East at "Sierra Faith" (some good pictures)

* A brief reflection on Foreknowledge and Free-will at "viewpoint"; the 'God is like a vast sphere' analogy may sound a bit strange, but in fact it isn't so very different from the old aphorism, God is a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere, as used by (among others) Nicholas of Cusa - who would like this analogy, I think.

* A post on Lyotard at "Allthings2all".

* The qualifications of a spiritual leader at "A Physicist's Perspective," on Nehemiah.

* A very interesting post on spiritual poisons at "21st century Reformation"

This is only a small sample of the all the posts (forty-seven in all).

Watchworthy

Here. Perhaps it can be the trailer for a new indy film: Catholic Ragemonkey: The Movie.

(You have to click the "I'm sure I don't know what he's talking about" link.)

Sor Juana Chats with a Rose

Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1651-1695), born Juana de Asbaje y Ramírez, is one of the foremost Spanish-language poets of the seventeenth century, and certainly has a place as one of the greatest Mexican poets ever. Here's one of her most famous poems, along with a rough draft of my translation; you can find a somewhat more literal rendering here.

En que da moral censura a una rosa, y en ella a sus semejantes

Rosa divina que en gentil cultura
eres, con tu fragrante sutileza,
magisterio purpúreo en la belleza,
enseñanza nevada a la hermosura;

amago de la human arquitectura,
ejemplo de la vana gentileza,
en cuyo sér unió naturaleza
la cuna alegre y triste sepultura:

¡cuán altiva en tu pompa, presumida,
soberbia, el riesgo de morir desdeñas,
y luego desmayada y encogida

de tu caduco sér das mustias señas,
con que con docta muerte y necia vida,
viviendo engañas y muriendo enseñas!


In which she rebukes a rose, and in it those like it

Divine rose, you are grown in grace,
with all your fragrant subtleness,
great teacher with scarlet beauty blessed,
snowy demonstration in a lovely face,

twin of human frame and doom,
example of a gentility vain,
in whom are unified the twain,
the happy cradle and the grieving tomb.

What haughtiness in your pomp, such pride,
such presumption, as you disdain your mortal fate
and later are dismayed and hide

as dying you give signs of withered state
with which, by learnéd death and foolish life,
alive you lied and dying demonstrate!

UPDATE(11/23): Made a slight improvement in a very lame line in my translation.

Another Labyrinth, and a Free Association

My mom sent me this link to a church labyrinth in Austin, TX, based on the one at Chartres:

St. David's Episcopal Church.

Which is way cool. I notice, though, that they have 'trained facilitators' for groups who want to use their canvas labyrinth, and I find that a bit puzzling. Why would one need a trained facilitator to help you walk and pray along a path laid out on the ground? Maybe they have activities. One could be "Race to Jerusalem". Perhaps it would have some analogy to the old legend of the "Race to Mecca":

A very wealthy man dies with two sons. His will states that only one son will receive anything, and which one that is will be determined by a horserace from Medina to Mecca. The son whose horse reaches Mecca last receives the inheritance.

So the race is on, and months pass and neither son has really progressed much beyond Medina; each is trying to be the last one to reach Mecca, and there are infinitely many ways to defer reaching the goal. One day an old man happens by and asks why they both look so frustrated. They tell him the whole story.

The old man stands in thought a moment, then said, "You are certain that the will states that the son whose horse reaches Mecca last will receive the inheritance?"

"Yes," said one of the sons; "hence our frustration."

"Then the problem is easily solved: each of you must ride your brother's horse and make sure it reaches Mecca before your own."

So they each jumped on the other's horse and spurred the horses for all they were worth toward Mecca.

OK, that's enough free association for now.

Another Poem Draft

This came to me today, when I was late getting out the door; so I was even later getting out the door. I'm not wholly happy with the second stanza, but the last two make good use of ambiguities in meaning (as just the obvious example, 'know as the rolling sun does rise' could mean 'know, as sure as the sun rises' or 'know, while the sun rises). Can you catch the allusion in the second stanza? The answer is here, if you can't.

A Texas Hymn

The birds woke me at the sunrise hour
when the grass was all a-dew and all was pale
beneath the light of one high white star
that signaled to the world that all was well.

And I, taking in the breeze that trickled down
the blades of greenest grass and then wound
around my legs to tickle tired feet,
knew the light, and knew the light was sweet.

When thirsty men drink from the flowing spring,
they come to life, new-quickened by the source,
as do I, when I hear the early morning sing
in bird, in light, in wind in gentle course,

and know, as the rolling sun does rise,
there is a Holy Spirit, God's own breath,
who fills with light the sky and human eyes
and raises even souls like mine from death.

November PLoS Biology

The November issue of PLoS Biology is out. Some highlights:

* It has sometimes been suggested that our brains have two visual systems, one for perceiving and one for acting; there's new evidence that this hypothesis is flawed. Synopsis. Research.

* There's some suggestive evidence that the prefrontal cortex might be doing more in working memory cases than just short-term memory. Synopsis. Research.

* There's an interesting essay on biodiversity.