Saturday, February 11, 2006

Links

* Abbé Suger and a Medieval Theory of Light at "Philolog". Suger is always fascinating; I did a short post on him some time ago, with useful links.

* "The Little Professor" has some great links on Victorian spirit photography.

* Alejandro at "Reality Conditions" reviews Nagel's The Last Word. I'll probably be posting something on it in the next few days; I agree with the basic point of the review, but I think, for example, that Nagel can be defended from the charge that he is inflating his result to get the 'Platonic-Cartesian' theory of reason. Indeed, I think that one of Nagel's successful suppositions is that it really doesn't take much to push one to the point of holding such a theory of reason -- it's the opposing, empiricist theory of reason that is a stretch. So I'll be discussing that at some point.

* Sharon points out this beginning-level medieval Latin tutorial. Also, see Experience Latin with Fr. Reginald Foster.

* Tomorrow is the birthday-anniversary of Charles Darwin, who would be 197. It's also Lincoln's birthday, Cotton Mather's birthday, and the anniversary of the deaths of Lady Jane Grey, Immanuel Kant, and Richard Dedekind; and it is the anniversary of the founding of Georgia. I mention it in case any of you bloggers lack things to talk about tomorrow....

* UPDATE: There's an interesting post on The Jews in John's Gospel at "Better Bible Blogs". I discussed this issue from a more purely literary side some time ago. The first key to translating well is to read well; which is a difficult thing to do, but necessary (as I think cases like this show).

UPDATE 2: In the comments Clark asks about Greek tutorials. Some possibilities that look promising:

Ancient Greek Tutorials
Little Greek 101: Learning New Testament Greek (incomplete, but what's there looks good)
NT Greek.net

Square Meme

I was tagged by Silversmith. Alas, it turns out I am dull, dull, dull:

Four jobs I've had

I've taught (four classes). But other than that, some grading, and some volunteer program coordinating, I've been pretty much jobless.

Four DVDs I keep watching

I don't really watch many DVDs -- on my own I don't have a DVD player, and when I'm with friends or family who do they always have cable or satellite as well.

Four places I wish I had lived

Hmmm. I'll have to get back to you on this one.

Four TV shows I watch

Battlestar Galactica, Stargate Atlantis, Stargate SG-1, Gilmore Girls

Yes, you read that correctly. Other candidates are: The Simpsons, Grounded for Life, and, occasionally, House.

Four places I've traveled

Boston, Massachusetts
Morelia, Mexico
Oxford, England
Pheonix, Arizona

Four websites I visit daily

Almost any four from my blogroll would count.

Four foods I love

Roast beef with Yorkshire pudding
Pizza
Succotash
Deep-fried turkey

Four early musical influences

America
Kenny Loggins
The Oak Ridge Boys
Johnny Paycheck

I remember that when I was a very, very young boy I used to go around singing "Elvira" and "Take This Job and Shove It". Indeed, they are the earliest memories I have of singing anything.

The Trinity and Consistency

There is an interesting discussion at Prosblogion about whether the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent. In particular, the question is whether there is a consistent way of accepting the following heptad:

1. The Father is God.
2. The Son is God.
3. The Holy Spirit is God.
4. The Father is not the Son.
5. The Father is not the Holy Spirit.
6. The Son is not the Holy Spirit.
7. There is exactly one God.

In the comments I put forward my (among philosophers) idiosyncratic view that this problem was entirely solved by the Church Fathers, and given especially lucid treatment by Basil and by Gregory of Nyssa:

To see this, think of Gregory of Nyssa's "On Not Three Gods". Gregory takes the standard (eespecially Eastern) view that while the metaphysics of the Trinity is unique, the logic of it is entirely ordinary. For, says Gregory, take three human beings. The 'is God' in (1)-(3) are usually understood as meaning 'has a divine nature'. Thus we get the parallel:

(1a) Peter has a human nature.
(2a) Paul has a human nature.
(3a) John has a human nature.

Now, Peter, Paul, and John are different people, so:

(4a) Peter is not Paul.
(5a) Paul is not John.
(6a) Peter is not John.

And says, Gregory, this is also true:

(7a) There is exactly one nature that is human nature.

For, Gregory points, out, this follows if you hold (as he does) that everything that is human shares (in whatever metaphysical way you prefer) one human nature.

Now, we know that (1a)-(7a) are not logically inconsistent. (Even if you think Gregory is stretching on (7a), it's not obvious that he's making a logical error.) The difference in the two cases, Gregory insists, is not logical, but metaphysical. The difference between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit on the one hand, and Peter, Paul, and John on the other, is just that they are related to their natures in a different way: Whereas human beings share a human nature by (as it were) dividing it up materially, the Persons of the Trinity share it by way of the traditional Trinitarian processions.


There are additional questions that might be raised, particularly about whether the parallel to (7a) (There is exactly one nature that is divine nature) is an adequate translation of (7). Gregory deals with such questions (indeed, "To Ablabius, on Not Three Gods" is primarily devoted to exactly these questions), but I thought the above was enough for a comment.

I've dealt briefly with this issue a long time ago. Perhaps this discussion will allow me to update my discussion then by helping me to get more clear about other people's objections and questions.

UPDATE: Added (7) to the heptad.

Friday, February 10, 2006

The Fig and the Olive

In Treatise 1.4.5, Hume presents an argument for the following claim:

N An object may exist but be nowhere

In support of this Hume claims that our sense of place or locality is rooted entirely in our senses of sight and touch; other senses convey a sense of place only by association with these. In light of this he argues (T. 1.4.5.9):

1. Whatever has a place must either be extended or be a mathematical point.
2. Whatever is extended has a figure or shape.
3. A desire has no figure or shape
4. Mathematical points can be combined and disposed so as to form a volume.
5. A desire is not so disposable.
6. Therefore a desire has no place.

So, despite the apparently counterintuitive nature of N (which was explicitly denied by Samuel Clarke in his correspondence with Leibniz), Hume says of it that "this is not only possible, but...the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner" (T 1.4.5.10). We can say that an object is nowhere when its parts are not so related to each other as to form a figure or volume, and the whole is not related to other things so as to be distant or contiguous. Hume puts all our perceptions in this category (with the exception of those of sight and touch, which he thinks are extended). Indeed, not only are most of our perceptions (and their objects) nowhere, they are such that they could not possibly be in a place. If this is so, however, most of our perceptions (and their objects) cannot be 'locally conjoined' to matter, i.e., they cannot be united to matter in a place, because any relation requires that both be similar enough to serve as the ground of relation.

But we do often try to attribute local conjunction to the things Hume says can't be locally conjoined to anything. Suppose, says Hume, that we have a fig at one end of a table and an olive at the other end. We are naturally inclined to say that the taste of the fig is at the fig's end of the table, and the taste of the olive is at the other end. Hume thinks that the reason we do this is mere prejudice: we associate the fig's taste with the fig, knowing that the fig-body can cause a fig-taste to follow it in time. Since the fig-body and the fig-taste are related by causation and temporal succession, we assume that they are also related by local conjunction. Indeed, Hume's view is that this is almost impossible to avoid: when we are faced with an incomplete union the imagination has a natural tendency to fill in whatever relation is necessary to make the union complete; only then can we be satisfied. On reflection, Hume thinks, we would recognize that the result we've arrived at is clearly unintelligible and incoherent. For where in the fig-body is the taste located? There is no extended thing or set of points within the fig that constitute the fig-taste; therefore the locality we give the fig-taste is that of the fig-body and every part of it. In other words, we assume that the fig-taste is located in the whole fig-body, and located wholly in every part of the fig-body (totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte, as the scholastics would say). Hume thinks that this is an obvious contradiction: it is equivalent to saying that the fig-taste is both in a place and not there at the same time.

So, Hume argues, we are faced with a trilemma. Either

(a) some beings exist without any place;

or

(b) all beings (including things like desires and passions) are extended and figured;

or

(c) some things are so incorporated with extended objects that they are wholly in the whole and wholly in every part.

Since Hume has argued against (b) and (c), the only option left is (a), which is equivalent to N.

Such is only one of the more interesting and unusual arguments in Treatise 1.4.5, which is universally recognized by Hume scholars as one of the most bizarre and difficult to interpret sections of Hume's entire corpus.

Thursday, February 09, 2006

Theoxeny

Ovid's Metamorphoses (Baucis and Philemon)

Both obeyed,
and leaning on their staves toiled up the steep.
Not farther from the summit than the flight
of one swift arrow from a hunter's how,
they paused to view their little home once more;
and as they turned their eyes, they saw the fields
around their own engulfed in a morass,
although their own remained,--and while they wept
bewailing the sad fate of many friends,
and wondered at the change, they saw their home,
so old and little for their simple need--
put on new splendor, and as it increased
it changed into a temple of the gods.
Where first the frame was fashioned of rude stakes
columns of marble glistened, and the thatch
gleamed golden in the sun, and legends carved,
adorned the doors. And al] the ground shone white
with marble rich, and after this was done,
the Son of Saturn said with gentle voice,
'Now tell us, good old man and you his wife,
worthy and faithful, what is your desire?'


The Hospitality of Abraham (Genesis 18):

The LORD appeared to Abraham near the great trees of Mamre while he was sitting at the entrance to his tent in the heat of the day. Abraham looked up and saw three men standing nearby. When he saw them, he hurried from the entrance of his tent to meet them and bowed low to the ground. He said, "If I have found favor in your eyes, my lord, do not pass your servant by. Let a little water be brought, and then you may all wash your feet and rest under this tree. Let me get you something to eat, so you can be refreshed and then go on your way—now that you have come to your servant."


The Odyssey (Book I)

Minerva answered, "Do not try to keep me, for I would be on my way at once. As for any present you may be disposed to make me, keep it till I come again, and I will take it home with me. You shall give me a very good one, and I will give you one of no less value in return."
With these words she flew away like a bird into the air, but she had given Telemachus courage, and had made him think more than ever about his father. He felt the change, wondered at it, and knew that the stranger had been a god, so he went straight to where the suitors were sitting.

The Sin of Sodom

Now this was the sin of your sister Sodom:
She and her daughters were arrogant,
overfed and unconcerned;
they did not help the poor and needy.

Ezekiel 16:49

My Secret Identity is Uncovered

You are mild-mannered, good,
strong and you love to help others.

Superman
75%
Spider-Man
60%
Robin
60%
Hulk
60%
Supergirl
53%
Green Lantern
45%
Catwoman
45%
Batman
30%
The Flash
30%
Wonder Woman
28%
Iron Man
25%

Click here to take the Superhero Personality Test