Saturday, May 04, 2013
Bentham on Infanticide
The Bentham Project is putting online Jeremy Bentham's Not Paul, but Jesus, Volume III, which has never been published. The basic thesis of NPBJ is that Paul was an imposter who parasitically inserted his own views into the religion of Jesus, including, most importantly, the teaching of ascetic self-denial. Only volume I was ever published, and that under the synonym Gamaliel Smith.
Volume III is the most interesting philosophically, since it is really only here that we get Bentham's full argument against what he keeps calling ascetic self-denial. Bentham's hatred of this idea is very, very strong: the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people requires that there only be self-denial for the specific purpose of getting even greater pleasures, and Bentham does not hesitate to make clear that he regards advocates of ascetic self-denial as morally detestable. It has often been noted that to this end he strongly advocates the importance of abortion and homosexual sex for population control; it's somewhat less often recognized that he also advocates infanticide and pedophilia. I found the discussion of infanticide particularly interesting, since he argues that the pain caused by punishment of infanticide far exceeds any pain caused by infanticide, because infanticide causes no pain of the first order -- infant psychology is too undeveloped to be seriously harmed -- and no pain of the second order -- since the death of one infant cannot make other infants anxious -- whereas punishing infanticide, particularly as a form of murder, causes great pain of the first order -- since the punishment induces pain -- and also of the second order -- since it prevents others from using the remedy to eliminate misery. Plus, infanticide is a remedy for overpopulation -- "this gentlest of all remedies", which seems a bit of an exaggeration even on his own terms.
In any case, I found his response to the claim that this should not be a matter of calculation to sum Bentham up to a T:
The trade analogy is curiously not to the point. The objection to which he is responding is not committed to saying that reasoning is never appropriate but
only to saying that there are at least some topics on which utilitarian calculation is not appropriate. No serious businessman thinks that every business decision is determined by taking of stock and keeping of accounts; even in the most blatant caricatures one can find of greedy businessmen one rarely finds any suggestion that there are no areas of business that should be governed by just bare ordinary human decency and respectability rather than calculation for profit. Economy in trade does not reduce to taking stock and keeping accounts; these things simply trace the line between what is feasible and what is not.
It is interesting, too, to contrast this attitude on the question with Mill's utilitarianism, in which "the determination of an act in respect of conduciveness or destructiveness to human happiness" does depend on something else besides calculation (namely, cultivated taste).
Volume III is the most interesting philosophically, since it is really only here that we get Bentham's full argument against what he keeps calling ascetic self-denial. Bentham's hatred of this idea is very, very strong: the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people requires that there only be self-denial for the specific purpose of getting even greater pleasures, and Bentham does not hesitate to make clear that he regards advocates of ascetic self-denial as morally detestable. It has often been noted that to this end he strongly advocates the importance of abortion and homosexual sex for population control; it's somewhat less often recognized that he also advocates infanticide and pedophilia. I found the discussion of infanticide particularly interesting, since he argues that the pain caused by punishment of infanticide far exceeds any pain caused by infanticide, because infanticide causes no pain of the first order -- infant psychology is too undeveloped to be seriously harmed -- and no pain of the second order -- since the death of one infant cannot make other infants anxious -- whereas punishing infanticide, particularly as a form of murder, causes great pain of the first order -- since the punishment induces pain -- and also of the second order -- since it prevents others from using the remedy to eliminate misery. Plus, infanticide is a remedy for overpopulation -- "this gentlest of all remedies", which seems a bit of an exaggeration even on his own terms.
In any case, I found his response to the claim that this should not be a matter of calculation to sum Bentham up to a T:
No calculation! no calculation! exclaims the shallow and empty-headed sentimentalist, who, by ostentation of passion, trusting to congenial weakness on the part of his reader, trusts, and in point of experience on but too good grounds, to drive reason out of the field.
No calculation! as if the distinction of right and wrong—as if the determination of an act in respect of conduciveness or destructiveness to human happiness—depended on any thing else than calculation.
In morals or politics, no calculation! in trade, as well might a man cry, no taking of stock! no keeping of accounts: thus thinking to serve economy―economy in trade.
The trade analogy is curiously not to the point. The objection to which he is responding is not committed to saying that reasoning is never appropriate but
only to saying that there are at least some topics on which utilitarian calculation is not appropriate. No serious businessman thinks that every business decision is determined by taking of stock and keeping of accounts; even in the most blatant caricatures one can find of greedy businessmen one rarely finds any suggestion that there are no areas of business that should be governed by just bare ordinary human decency and respectability rather than calculation for profit. Economy in trade does not reduce to taking stock and keeping accounts; these things simply trace the line between what is feasible and what is not.
It is interesting, too, to contrast this attitude on the question with Mill's utilitarianism, in which "the determination of an act in respect of conduciveness or destructiveness to human happiness" does depend on something else besides calculation (namely, cultivated taste).
Aquinas for May IV
Sicut in rebus naturalibus sunt propria principia activa in unoquoque genere, licet Deus sit causa agens prima et communis, ita etiam requiritur proprium lumen intellectuale in homine, quamvis Deus sit prima lux omnes communiter illuminans.
"Just as in a natural thing of whatever kind there are its own active principles, although God is the primary and common agent cause, so also there must be in man his own intellectual light, however much God may be the first light illuminating all in common."
De anima art. 4 ad 7
"Just as in a natural thing of whatever kind there are its own active principles, although God is the primary and common agent cause, so also there must be in man his own intellectual light, however much God may be the first light illuminating all in common."
De anima art. 4 ad 7
Friday, May 03, 2013
Athanasius the Great
Yesterday was the memorial of St. Athanasius, Doctor of the Church. From his book against the heathen, Part III (sect. 40):
Athanasius was patriarch of Alexandria for forty-five years; he spent seventeen or so of those years in exile, having been exiled no less than five distinct times by four different Emperors (once by Constantine due to an apparently false accusation, twice by the pro-Arian Constantius, once by the pagan Julian, and once by the pro-Arian Valens). He was a pillar of the Roman-Alexandrian alliance that constituted the most important and influential structural element of the Church in the fourth century, and which made up the bulwark of the Church in the resistance to Arianism; the most significant act of Pope St. Julius I was to insist repeatedly on Athanasius's legitimacy during his second exile.
Who then is this, save the Father of Christ, most holy and above all created existence, Who like an excellent pilot, by His own Wisdom and His own Word, our Lord and Saviour Christ, steers and preserves and orders all things, and does as seems to Him best? But that is best which has been done, and which we see taking place, since that is what He wills; and this a man can hardly refuse to believe.
For if the movement of creation were irrational, and the universe were borne along without plan, a man might fairly disbelieve what we say. But if it subsist in reason and wisdom and skill, and is perfectly ordered throughout, it follows that He that is over it and has ordered it is none other than the [reason or] Word of God.
But by Word I mean, not that which is involved and inherent in all things created, which some are wont to call the seminal principle, which is without soul and has no power of reason or thought, but only works by external art, according to the skill of him that applies it—nor such a word as belongs to rational beings and which consists of syllables, and has the air as its vehicle of expression—but I mean the living and powerful Word of the good God, the God of the Universe, the very Word which is God John 1:1, Who while different from things that are made, and from all Creation, is the One own Word of the good Father, Who by His own providence ordered and illumines this Universe.
For being the good Word of the Good Father He produced the order of all things, combining one with another things contrary, and reducing them to one harmonious order. He being the Power of God and Wisdom of God causes the heaven to revolve, and has suspended the earth, and made it fast, though resting upon nothing, by His own nod. Illumined by Him, the sun gives light to the world, and the moon has her measured period of shining. By reason of Him the water is suspended in the clouds; the rains shower upon the earth, and the sea is kept within bounds, while the earth bears grasses and is clothed with all manner of plants.
And if a man were incredulously to ask, as regards what we are saying, if there be a Word of God at all , such an one would indeed be mad to doubt concerning the Word of God, but yet demonstration is possible from what is seen, because all things subsist by the Word and Wisdom of God, nor would any created thing have had a fixed existence had it not been made by reason, and that reason the Word of God, as we have said.
Athanasius was patriarch of Alexandria for forty-five years; he spent seventeen or so of those years in exile, having been exiled no less than five distinct times by four different Emperors (once by Constantine due to an apparently false accusation, twice by the pro-Arian Constantius, once by the pagan Julian, and once by the pro-Arian Valens). He was a pillar of the Roman-Alexandrian alliance that constituted the most important and influential structural element of the Church in the fourth century, and which made up the bulwark of the Church in the resistance to Arianism; the most significant act of Pope St. Julius I was to insist repeatedly on Athanasius's legitimacy during his second exile.
Aquinas for May III
Creatura assimilatur Deo in unitate, in quantum unaquaeque in se una est, et in quantum omnes unum sunt unitate ordinis.
"The creature is likened to God in unity, inasmuch as it is one in itself, and inasmuch as all are one by the unity of order."
De potentia q. 3 art 16 ad 2
"The creature is likened to God in unity, inasmuch as it is one in itself, and inasmuch as all are one by the unity of order."
De potentia q. 3 art 16 ad 2
Thursday, May 02, 2013
Aquinas for May II
Posse eligere malum, non est de ratione liberi arbitrii; sed consequitur liberum arbitrium, secundum quod est in natura creata possibili ad defectum.
"To be able to choose evil is not intrinsic to the concept of free will; but it follows from a free will insofar as it is in a created nature capable of failing."
De Veritate q. 24 art 3 ad 2
"To be able to choose evil is not intrinsic to the concept of free will; but it follows from a free will insofar as it is in a created nature capable of failing."
De Veritate q. 24 art 3 ad 2
Wednesday, May 01, 2013
Aquinas for May I
Prima principia, quorum cognitio est nobis innata, sunt quaedam similitudines increatae veritatis.
"First principles, the cognition of which is innate to us, are particular likenesses to uncreated truth."
De Veritate q. 10 art 6 ad 6
"First principles, the cognition of which is innate to us, are particular likenesses to uncreated truth."
De Veritate q. 10 art 6 ad 6
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