The affairs of the world can be set straight only by the firmest and most determined exhibition of the will to lead and make the right prevail.
Happily, the present situation in the world of affairs affords us the opportunity to retrieve the past and to render mankind the inestimable service of proving that there is at least one great and powerful nation which can turn away from programs of self-interest and devote itself to practicing and establishing the highest ideals of disinterested service and the consistent maintenance of exalted standards of conscience and of right.
The only way in which we can worthily give proof of our appreciation of the high significance of Armistice Day is by resolving to put self-interest away and once more formulate and act upon the highest ideals and purposes of international policy. Thus, and only thus, can we return to the true traditions of America.
Saturday, November 11, 2006
Armistice II
From Woodrow Wilson's The Significance of Armistice Day (November 10, 1923):
Armistice
From Franklin Roosevelt's Armistice Day Address (November 11, 1941):
We know that it was, in literal truth, to make the world safe for democracy that we took up arms in 1917. It was, in simple truth and in literal fact, to make the world habitable for decent and self-respecting men that those whom we now remember gave their lives. They died to prevent then the very thing that now, a quarter century later, has happened from one end of Europe to the other.
Now that it has happened we know in full the reason why they died.
We know also what obligation and duty their sacrifice imposes upon us. They did not die to make the world safe for decency and self-respect for five years or ten or maybe twenty. They died to make it safe. And if, by some fault of ours who lived beyond the war, its safety has again been threatened then the obligation and the duty are ours. It is in our charge now, as it was America's charge after the Civil War, to see to it "that these dead shall not have died in vain." Sergeant York spoke thus of the cynics and doubters: "The thing they forget is that liberty and freedom and democracy are so very precious that you do not fight to win them once and stop. Liberty and freedom and democracy are prizes awarded only to those peoples who fight to win them and then keep fighting eternally to hold them."
The people of America agree with that. They believe that liberty is worth fighting for. And if they are obliged to fight they will fight eternally to hold it.
This duty we owe, not to ourselves alone, but to the many dead who died to gain our freedom for us-to make the world a place where freedom can live and grow into the ages.
Hume on Abstruse Reasoning
There is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning. that it may silence, without convincing an antagonist, and requires the same intense study to make us sensible of its force, that was at first requisite for its invention. When we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, its conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning; and `tis difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attain'd with difficulty. This is still more conspicuous in a long chain of reasoning, where we must preserve to the end the evidence of the first propositions, and where we often lose sight of ail the most receiv'd maxims, either of philosophy or common life.
Treatise 3.1.1
Treatise 3.1.1
Grayling on Atheism
Wow; A.C. Grayling manages to churn out yet more gobbledy-gook on the subject of religion. It starts in the very first paragraph, where he claims that the Archbishop of Westminster "officially thinks the former is damned (it is official Roman Catholic doctrine that there is no salvation outside the church)". Since it is official Roman Catholic doctrine that no one knows who is damned except God, and since it is official Catholic doctrine that Christians are joined to the Church by baptism, this is a rather inauspicious beginning.
He does make some valid and worthwhile points on the meanings of 'secularism' and 'humanism', although he conveniently glosses over details like how the Council for Secular Humanism, or the International Humanist and Ethical Union mysteriously fail to understand the "simple lesson in semantics" that he thinks religious people fail to grasp because due to their religious faith they "live in an inspissated gloaming of incense and obfuscation, through the swirls of which it is hard to see anything clearly." Apparently the lesson in semantics is not so simple.
Then he says:
Well, there would be good reason for not calling oneself an 'a-fairyist', namely, that it's an ugly barbarism as terms go. 'Atheism', it should perhaps be pointed out, and which Grayling somehow mysteriously fails to recall, is a term also used by nonreligious people to refer to those who do not have a belief in the existence of supernatural entities or agencies; as noted, for instance, by Atheist Alliance International, American Atheists, and the like, a quirk they share with virtually all those who speak the English language, which seems to trip Grayling up a lot. Further, it's clear that there are atheists out there who think of God that there is "something whose existence could be a subject of discussion worth the time"; at least, there are more than a few atheists who spend a lot of time discussing it. Perhaps Grayling is right that atheists should, if they accept the label 'atheist', also accept the labels 'afairyist, aghostist, agoblinist' or at least some less crude neologisms for that which the labels are supposed to suggest; but as we don't have labels like 'fairyist, ghostist, and goblinist' it doesn't seem that atheists are being at all unreasonable if they don't think it to be entirely a high priority. He then makes the smashing point that since Christians don't believe in Vishnu, or Loki, or Ares, or many others, that they are 'atheists' about vast numbers of gods. Which is true if we are using the term 'atheist' figuratively to mean 'someone who does not believe in some particular given god' rather than its more common meaning, 'someone who does not believe that there are gods'; but what exactly the point of this is, we are left to puzzle out on their own.
He then goes on to suggest that there are volcanoes in the Middle East, does us the favor of reiterating Frazer without letting us know that Frazer actually has an argument, and insists that Jesus' crucifixion is of no significance because lots of people are tortured, especially pregnant women in labor. I'm being a bit facetious, but Grayling is not quite so far off from this as one might expect.
What I found particularly funny was this:
I see; so epistemology teaches us that the dispute between theists and atheists is about rationality and not about whether what is believed is true or false, although exactly how it teaches us this, or what epistemological theory he has in mind, or how it relates to the problem of evil, is all left a bit mysterious. So that must close the book on the matter; here we were, getting all bothered about the question, when really all we had to do was listen to the teachings of epistemology.
Nonetheless, I can't completely criticize Grayling's essay; I like his last paragraph. And much as I tease, my dominant response to the article is compassion for any atheist who might be associated in people's minds with those like Grayling who seem to think that the rational way to dismiss religion and encourage tolerance consists in lecturing people, not quite accurately, about the meanings of terms. If atheism is Hundred Acre Wood, some atheists are Eeyores, some are Poohs, some are Piglets, some are Kangas, and some are Owls; and Grayling is someone who is trying to be an Owl but can't manage to copy the Owls in anything but an Owlish sense of language, which is, of course, simultaneously pedantic and confused. Perhaps this is fortunate for everyone; atheists everywhere can breath a sigh of relief, and, if ever confronted with an attack on Grayling, can shrug it off by truthfully saying that the man sometimes doesn't even seem to know what 'atheist' means.
I wouldn't be so hard on his argument if Grayling weren't a professor of philosophy. I don't mind Frazer-like freethinkers, for instance; I enjoy reading their works, and always have, and they make some interesting points. I don't mind people who are worried about the label 'atheist'; they may also have a point. I don't even so much mind when people like Dawkins mangle philosophical arguments, because they sometimes have a point worth considering, too -- although I'll occasionally step in and point out the mangling. But I would expect someone with a background in philosophy to take the trouble to express these points less absurdly.
He does make some valid and worthwhile points on the meanings of 'secularism' and 'humanism', although he conveniently glosses over details like how the Council for Secular Humanism, or the International Humanist and Ethical Union mysteriously fail to understand the "simple lesson in semantics" that he thinks religious people fail to grasp because due to their religious faith they "live in an inspissated gloaming of incense and obfuscation, through the swirls of which it is hard to see anything clearly." Apparently the lesson in semantics is not so simple.
Then he says:
"Atheism" is a word used by religious people to refer to those who do not share their belief in the existence of supernatural entities or agencies. Presumably (as I can never tire of pointing out) believers in fairies would call those who do not share their views "a-fairyists", hence trying to keep the debate on fairy turf, as if it had some sensible content; as if there were something whose existence could be a subject of discussion worth the time.
Well, there would be good reason for not calling oneself an 'a-fairyist', namely, that it's an ugly barbarism as terms go. 'Atheism', it should perhaps be pointed out, and which Grayling somehow mysteriously fails to recall, is a term also used by nonreligious people to refer to those who do not have a belief in the existence of supernatural entities or agencies; as noted, for instance, by Atheist Alliance International, American Atheists, and the like, a quirk they share with virtually all those who speak the English language, which seems to trip Grayling up a lot. Further, it's clear that there are atheists out there who think of God that there is "something whose existence could be a subject of discussion worth the time"; at least, there are more than a few atheists who spend a lot of time discussing it. Perhaps Grayling is right that atheists should, if they accept the label 'atheist', also accept the labels 'afairyist, aghostist, agoblinist' or at least some less crude neologisms for that which the labels are supposed to suggest; but as we don't have labels like 'fairyist, ghostist, and goblinist' it doesn't seem that atheists are being at all unreasonable if they don't think it to be entirely a high priority. He then makes the smashing point that since Christians don't believe in Vishnu, or Loki, or Ares, or many others, that they are 'atheists' about vast numbers of gods. Which is true if we are using the term 'atheist' figuratively to mean 'someone who does not believe in some particular given god' rather than its more common meaning, 'someone who does not believe that there are gods'; but what exactly the point of this is, we are left to puzzle out on their own.
He then goes on to suggest that there are volcanoes in the Middle East, does us the favor of reiterating Frazer without letting us know that Frazer actually has an argument, and insists that Jesus' crucifixion is of no significance because lots of people are tortured, especially pregnant women in labor. I'm being a bit facetious, but Grayling is not quite so far off from this as one might expect.
What I found particularly funny was this:
Even some on my own side of the argument here make the mistake of thinking that the dispute about supernaturalistic beliefs is whether they are true or false. Epistemology teaches us that the key point is about rationality. If a person gets wet every time he is in the rain without an umbrella, yet persists in hoping that the next time he is umbrella-less in the rain he will stay dry, then he is seriously irrational. To believe in the existence of (say) a benevolent and omnipotent deity in the face of childhood cancers and mass deaths in tsunamis and earthquakes, is exactly the same kind of serious irrationality.
I see; so epistemology teaches us that the dispute between theists and atheists is about rationality and not about whether what is believed is true or false, although exactly how it teaches us this, or what epistemological theory he has in mind, or how it relates to the problem of evil, is all left a bit mysterious. So that must close the book on the matter; here we were, getting all bothered about the question, when really all we had to do was listen to the teachings of epistemology.
Nonetheless, I can't completely criticize Grayling's essay; I like his last paragraph. And much as I tease, my dominant response to the article is compassion for any atheist who might be associated in people's minds with those like Grayling who seem to think that the rational way to dismiss religion and encourage tolerance consists in lecturing people, not quite accurately, about the meanings of terms. If atheism is Hundred Acre Wood, some atheists are Eeyores, some are Poohs, some are Piglets, some are Kangas, and some are Owls; and Grayling is someone who is trying to be an Owl but can't manage to copy the Owls in anything but an Owlish sense of language, which is, of course, simultaneously pedantic and confused. Perhaps this is fortunate for everyone; atheists everywhere can breath a sigh of relief, and, if ever confronted with an attack on Grayling, can shrug it off by truthfully saying that the man sometimes doesn't even seem to know what 'atheist' means.
I wouldn't be so hard on his argument if Grayling weren't a professor of philosophy. I don't mind Frazer-like freethinkers, for instance; I enjoy reading their works, and always have, and they make some interesting points. I don't mind people who are worried about the label 'atheist'; they may also have a point. I don't even so much mind when people like Dawkins mangle philosophical arguments, because they sometimes have a point worth considering, too -- although I'll occasionally step in and point out the mangling. But I would expect someone with a background in philosophy to take the trouble to express these points less absurdly.
Friday, November 10, 2006
Golden Chain
Vain images possess the sensual mind,
To real agents and true causes blind.
But soon as intellect's bright sun displays
O'er the benighted orb his fulgent rays,
Delusive phantoms fly before the light,
Nature and truth lie open at the sight:
Causes connect with effects supply
A golden chain, whose radiant links on high
Fix'd to the sovereign throne from thence depend
And reach e'en down to tar the nether end.
From George Berkeley's poem, "On Tar," which can be read in full here. The poem describes the reasoning of his important but little-read philosophical work, Siris. It also is the source of the subtitle of this weblog, of course. I pointed out the source of the image of the golden chain here -- too cautiously, since there's no real doubt that that passage in the Iliad is the source. The same passage in the Iliad is the source of the motto I put on the Seal of Siris: Seiren Chruseien Kremesantes, Hang a Chain of Gold.
The Tasks of Philosophy
David Corfield has a really excellent post on The Tasks of Philosophy at "n-Category Café". Go and read it.
Subduer of the Hun
Today is the Feast Day of St. Leo I, Bishop of Rome, called the Great. The Medieval Sourcebook has a great set of selections summarizing the most famous event of Leo's life -- the day he saved Rome by facing Attila the Hun in person. Attila was advancing on Rome; Roman senate sorted through various proposed plans for opposing him, and none of them were promising. So in a last act of desperation they decided to send a delegation to beg Attila for peace. Leo and two others were chosen for the task; Leo went in full episcopal regalia. And Attila was so impressed by Leo that he promised peace and left. Raphael has a famous painting of the scene. Whatever the precise details of the event, the story has always represented something of an ideal -- a rarely attainable one -- in which armies are subdued and turned aside not by other armies, nor even by warriors, but by servants of peace wielding the instruments of peace. Leo actually did something similar later on. The Vandals under Gaiseric advanced on Rome. While Leo wasn't able to turn Gaiseric aside as he had Attila, he persuaded Gaiseric to do no more than loot the city -- no killing of people and no burning of buildings. Not quite as impressive as with the Huns, but an impressive example of diplomacy nonetheless.
St. Leo's most famous writing is the Tome of Leo, a must-read for anyone interested in Christology and the Incarnation. You can also read some of his sermons. From Sermon 95:
St. Leo's most famous writing is the Tome of Leo, a must-read for anyone interested in Christology and the Incarnation. You can also read some of his sermons. From Sermon 95:
"Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be called the sons of God." This blessedness, beloved, belongs not to any and every kind of agreement and harmony, but to that of which the Apostle speaks: "have peace towards God;" and of which the Prophet David speaks: "Much peace have they that love Thy law, and they have no cause of offences." This peace even the closest ties of friendship and the exactest likeness of mind do not really gain, if they do not agree with God's will. Similarity of bad desires, leagues in crimes, associations of vice, cannot merit this peace. The love of the world does not consort with the love of God, nor doth he enter the alliance of the sons of God who will not separate himself from the children of this generation Whereas they who are in mind always with God, "giving diligence to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace," never dissent from the eternal law, uttering that prayer of faith, "Thy will be done as in heaven so on earth." These are "the peacemakers," these are thoroughly of one mind, and fully harmonious, and are to be called sons "of God and joint-heirs with Christ," because this shall be the record of the love of God and the love of our neighbour, that we shall suffer no calamities, be in fear of no offence, but all the strife of trial ended, rest in God's most perfect peace, through our Lord, Who, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, liveth and reigneth for ever and ever. Amen.
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