In reading the recent issue of Faith and Philosophy I came across an interesting argument, tucked away in a footnote, in an article by Graham Oppy. In this article, Oppy is continuing his debate with Koons on Koons's version of the cosmological argument. The passage to which the following is a footnote is on reasons why nontheists would reject the view that the universe, as the sum of all wholly contingent events, has a cause.
Here's a sketch for another argument, this time for the conclusion that no theist ought to accept the claim that every wholy contingent event has cause. This argument relies on the assumption that theists must buy into the free willd efence against arguments from evil. (That assumption, in turn, can be underwritten by Mackie's famous argument: if free will is compatible with determinism, then God could--and hence should--have made a world in which everyone always freely chooses the good.) The free will defence relies on the assumption that people have libertarian freedom, i.e. it relies on the assumption that, when people make free choices, there is nothing in the world which determines or causes those choices. So, consider an occasion on which a person X freely chooses A rather than B. Plainly, the event of X's freely choosing A rather than B is a wholly contingent event--but, as a result of doctrinal commitments elsewhere, the theist is required to deny that there is a cause of X's freely choosing A rather than B. So, by the theist's own lights, it simply isn't true that every wholly contingent event has a cause. Given that theists have good reason to reject the claim that every wholly contingent event has a cause, they are hardly well placed to insist that non-theists ought to accept it.
(Graham Oppy, "Faulty Reasoning about Default Principles in Cosmological Arguments," Faith and Philosophy (April 2004) 249n10.)
This is, as I said, an interesting argument, but I'm inclined to think it does not work. For the libertarian is actually not committed to the claim that there are no causes to their choices; they are only committed to the claim that some choices are not sufficiently determined by causes in the world. By 'being sufficiently determined by a cause' I mean: there is no sufficient cause, i.e., a cause which is a sufficient condition, for this choice in particular. There may, however, be other kinds of causes, e.g., necessary causes; and one form of necessary cause is that there be adequate cause for a choice. And this is one of the big differences between the libertarian and the determinist, I think; the determinist is committed to the claim that all adequate causes are sufficient causes, the libertarian is not. So the libertarian can perfectly well allow that there is a cause for X's choosing A rather than B; namely, that cause or set of causes adequate for choosing A. What the libertarian will deny is that this cause or set of causes adequate for choosing A necessitate the choosing of A; they suffice (in the ordinary colloquial sense) for the choosing of A, but do not suffice (in the technical philosophical sense) for the choosing of A. So I don't think a commitment to incompatibilist free will can be converted into an argument for the claim that some wholly contingent things are uncaused.
Tuesday, December 07, 2004
Philosophers' Carnival VI
The newest Philosophers' Carnival has been up for a bit. My contribution was my set of notes on Aquinas's First Way; there were one or two others I could have contributed, but because that one came amid a deluge of posts for the St. Catharine's Day Pageant, I chose it, in case it deserved a wider hearing. And I've already gotten some excellent comments from Clayton Littlejohn, which I'll have to think over and to which I'll have to respond when I've done so. A brief foretaste: I don't think Aquinas holds a transmission theory of causation; I'm glad it was brought up, because I think it is a common misinterpretation. But I'll have to get to that later tonight or tomorrow. There are several other good posts, including one on Behe's design argument (I think it goes a little too quickly in one or two places, but it does a good job of laying out, in a clear, concise way, the questions the argument raises). Go over and see.
Monday, December 06, 2004
Were This Blog a Superhero...
This has been going around like crazy, so I took a gander at it. I learned something very important about myself: if a Superhero ever asks for my help in color-coordinating his costume, I should refuse for the good of all mankind. But this result wasn't too bad, I think. Yes, it's a bit pretentious; but I blame that on the Superhero idea in the first place. And the lion is a necessary accessory around here!
(Hat-tip: MM, but DTWW convinced me that all the cool kids were doing it. While you're at it, also check out scribblingwoman and Majikthise.)
(Hat-tip: MM, but DTWW convinced me that all the cool kids were doing it. While you're at it, also check out scribblingwoman and Majikthise.)
Moral Sciences Tripos
I decided last night that I would, in addition to Shepherd and Malebranche sections, add Whewell and Astell sections to H.L. So up went the first Whewell page. In it Whewell discusses the place of Moral Philosophy at the University of Cambridge in his time, and gives the 'Moral Sciences Tripos', i.e., the reading list for University Examinations in Moral Philosophy. It's an interesting document for people curious about nineteenth century British education, but more importantly it's an important document for those interested in the history of ethics, since it gives some of the flavor of the major ethical dispute of nineteenth century Britain (over utilitarianism) and the role a university like Cambridge played in that argument.
Sunday, December 05, 2004
Mary Astell on the Rudiments of Knowledge
...there are certain Notices which we may call the Rudiments of Knowledge, which none who are Rational are without however they come by them. It may happen indeed that a habit of Vice or a long disuse has so obscur'd them that they seem to be extinguish'd but it does only seem so, for were they really extinguish'd the person would be no longer Rational, and no better than the Shade and Picture of a Man. Because as Irrational Creatures act only by the Will of him who made them, and according to the Power of that Mechanisme by which they are form'd, so every one who pretends to Reason, who is a Voluntary Agent and therefore Worthy of Praise or Blame, Reward or Punishment, must Chuse his Actions and determine his Will to that Coice by some Reasonings or Principles either true or false, and in proportion to the Principles and the Consequences he deduces from them he is to be accounted, if they are Right and Conclusive a Wise Man, if Evil, Rash, and Injudicious a Fool. If then it be the property of Rational Creatures and Essential to their very Natures to Chuse their Actions, and to determine their Wills to that Choice by such Principles and Reasonings as their Understandings are furnish'd with, they who are desirous to be rank'd in that Order of Beings must conduct their Lives by these Measures, being with their Intellectuals, inform themselves what are the plain and first Principles of Action and Act accordingly.
By which it appears that there are some degrees of Knowledge necessary before there can be any Human Acts, for till we are capable of Chusing our own Actions and directing them by some Principle, tho we Move and Speak and so many such like things, we live not the Life of a Rational Creature but ony of an Animal. If it be farther demanded what these Principles are? Not to dispute the Number of 'em here, no body I suppose will deny us one, which is, That we ought as much as we can to endeavour the Perfecting of our Beings, and that we be as happy as possibly we may. For this we see is Natural to every Creature of what sort soever, which endeavours to be in as good Condition as its Nature and Circumsntaces will permit. And now we have got a Principle which one would think were sufficent for the Conduct of our Actions thro' the whole Course of our Lives; and so indeed it were, cou'd we as easily discern, wherein our Happiness consists as 'tis natural to wish and desire it.
Mary Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies Part II, chapter 1.
Astell, in addition to devoting herself to defending Tory politics and Anglican religion, had a strong interest in improving the educational situation of women. A Serious Proposal to the Ladies Part II (1697) is the sequel to A Serious Proposal to the Ladies (1694). The latter was a proposal intended to give women an alternative to marriage, by creating a sort of Ladies' Academy, in which women could forego marriage in order to pursue knowledge and piety. Part II is a rather impressive little manual on how to reason clearly and rationally, and can in a sense be said to be the proposal of a sort of 'curriculum' for the proposed retreat for women.
By which it appears that there are some degrees of Knowledge necessary before there can be any Human Acts, for till we are capable of Chusing our own Actions and directing them by some Principle, tho we Move and Speak and so many such like things, we live not the Life of a Rational Creature but ony of an Animal. If it be farther demanded what these Principles are? Not to dispute the Number of 'em here, no body I suppose will deny us one, which is, That we ought as much as we can to endeavour the Perfecting of our Beings, and that we be as happy as possibly we may. For this we see is Natural to every Creature of what sort soever, which endeavours to be in as good Condition as its Nature and Circumsntaces will permit. And now we have got a Principle which one would think were sufficent for the Conduct of our Actions thro' the whole Course of our Lives; and so indeed it were, cou'd we as easily discern, wherein our Happiness consists as 'tis natural to wish and desire it.
Mary Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies Part II, chapter 1.
Astell, in addition to devoting herself to defending Tory politics and Anglican religion, had a strong interest in improving the educational situation of women. A Serious Proposal to the Ladies Part II (1697) is the sequel to A Serious Proposal to the Ladies (1694). The latter was a proposal intended to give women an alternative to marriage, by creating a sort of Ladies' Academy, in which women could forego marriage in order to pursue knowledge and piety. Part II is a rather impressive little manual on how to reason clearly and rationally, and can in a sense be said to be the proposal of a sort of 'curriculum' for the proposed retreat for women.
The Name 'Siris'
I recently got a hit from a search engine in which the referring phrase was "what does the name siris mean". Unfortunately, that string doesn't yield any information about the name 'Siris'; this blog comes up in the search, but posts that explicitly discuss the name don't. And it's worth reminding people, because a lot of people forget; and, plus, sometimes people misread or misremember the name as 'Sirius', and a dog-star this blog is not.
'Siris' is a word invented by George Berkeley. It derives from the Greek word transliterated (if I recall correctly) as sireis, meaning 'chain'. He used it as the title of a very interesting work, Siris: a chain of philosophical reflexions & Inquiries concerning the virtues of tar water, which starts with a discussion of the folk remedy tar-water and thence passes on to speculative chemistry, cosmology, metaphysics, finally ending with philosophical intimations of the Christian Trinity. While it is largely ignored, it deserves to be remembered as one of Berkeley's four primary philosophical works (the other three being the Principles, the Three Dialogues, and the also-neglected Alciphron).
Thus my blog title and the description. The 'golden chain' comes not from Siris itself but from Berkeley's poem 'On Tar', a poetic summary of the philosophical argument of Siris. I posted a brief commentary on this poem in July.
'Siris' is a word invented by George Berkeley. It derives from the Greek word transliterated (if I recall correctly) as sireis, meaning 'chain'. He used it as the title of a very interesting work, Siris: a chain of philosophical reflexions & Inquiries concerning the virtues of tar water, which starts with a discussion of the folk remedy tar-water and thence passes on to speculative chemistry, cosmology, metaphysics, finally ending with philosophical intimations of the Christian Trinity. While it is largely ignored, it deserves to be remembered as one of Berkeley's four primary philosophical works (the other three being the Principles, the Three Dialogues, and the also-neglected Alciphron).
Thus my blog title and the description. The 'golden chain' comes not from Siris itself but from Berkeley's poem 'On Tar', a poetic summary of the philosophical argument of Siris. I posted a brief commentary on this poem in July.
Eco on HoP
Clark recently mentioned Eco's The Search for a Perfect Language. Here's a quote from that book that I wrote down in my notes when I read it last year or so:
It is frequently claimed in American philosophy departments that, in order to be a philosopher, it is not necessary to revisit the history of philosophy. It is like the claim that one can become a painter without having seen a single work of Raphael, or a writer without having read the classics. Such things are theoretically possible; but the 'primitive' artist, condemned to an ignorance of the past, is always recognizable as such and rightly labelled as a naïf. It is only when we reconsider past projects revealed as utopian or as failures that we are apprised of the dangers and possibilities for failure for our allegedly new projects. The study of the deeds of our ancestors is thus more than an antiquarian pasttime, it is an immunological precaution.
It is frequently claimed in American philosophy departments that, in order to be a philosopher, it is not necessary to revisit the history of philosophy. It is like the claim that one can become a painter without having seen a single work of Raphael, or a writer without having read the classics. Such things are theoretically possible; but the 'primitive' artist, condemned to an ignorance of the past, is always recognizable as such and rightly labelled as a naïf. It is only when we reconsider past projects revealed as utopian or as failures that we are apprised of the dangers and possibilities for failure for our allegedly new projects. The study of the deeds of our ancestors is thus more than an antiquarian pasttime, it is an immunological precaution.
Saturday, December 04, 2004
Some Thoughts on an Aristotelian View of Propositional Logic
How would propositional logic fit with regard to the Aristotelian Organon? By the Aristotelian Organon, I mean the extended (medieval) Organon, which numbers the books of logic as nine:
1) Isagoge (Porphyry's)
2) Categories
3) Peri Hermeneias (De Interpretatione)
4) Prior Analytics
5) Posterior Analytics
6) Topics
7) Sophistical Refutations
8) Rhetoric
9) Poetics
We can set aside 1,7, 8, and 9 as not relevant to the question. Now, of the rest, we can roughly say that logic qua Categories discusses terms; logic qua De Interpretatione discusses the structure of non-complex propositions; logic qua Prior Analytics discusses the formal structure of deduction; logic qua Posterior Analytics discusses demonstrative argument; and logic qua Topics discusses dialectical argument. In a philosophy of logic structured according to the Organon, where would propositional logic fit?
There's a sense, of course, in which all formal structures fit into Prior Analytics, but that's not really a very interesting thing. But there is more to logical argument than formal structure alone on this view (there is beyond this the actual application of the structure to subject-matter), so that's not the whole answer. Demonstrative reasoning according to this view proceeds terministically: that is, it is in virtue of the terms of the premises that the deduction goes through. Propositional logic, however, is (by definition) non-terministic. So it can't be demonstrative, which means it would have to be dialectical. The application of propositional logic to actual subject-matter is a matter of dialectical reasoning rather than demonstrative reasoning. And this is exactly the Aristotelian view. So how does this sort of thing work?
Let's take as true a single complex proposition like (p -> q), i.e., q if p. One can reasonably ask why, given p, q follows; but this cannot be answered in purely propositional terms, since the answer to this question would require looking at the terms of the proposition. To say why (p -> q) is true requires looking at the terministic and operational structure of p and q. So what good is q if p in argument? An Aristotelian would reply in this way. Without complex propositions like these, one would have to argue directly for q. If, however, we can take (p -> q) as a principle agreed upon by all relevant persons, we can then argue for q indirectly by arguing for p. This radically increases the flexibility of our argumentative resources. So suppose we were arguing that Something is caused. If we can take it as agreed upon by all relevant persons that If something begins to exist, something is caused, we can then argue for our conclusion by arguing for the conclusion Something begins to exist. On some views (e.g., Aristotelian, or Shepherd's), If something begins to exist, something is caused is a necessary proposition, since something's beginning to exist is just its being caused (under a different description). But this is not necessary for the propositional logic itself; all we need for that to work is to be able to posit the complex proposition (p -> q). If that taken as agreed upon, our dialectical resources have been expanded.
This suggests something about what is going on in the so-called 'special topics'. Every special science is held to have (in addition to the general topics that govern all sciences) its own 'special topics' peculiar to it. Our little meditation on the dialectical work of complex propositions suggests that what these special topics usually (always?) do is provide inferential guidelines to expand our dialectical resources in that particular field. In other words, because they draw connections between different propositional truths, they allow us to substitute one thing for another. For instance, one might have in physics a special topic devoted to saying how one gets a proposition expressed in terms of energy from a proposition expressed in terms of matter. If one needs to know or prove something about energy, this sort of complex proposition allows one to tackle this problem by way of what one knows or can prove about matter. Such a complex proposition has increased one's resources for concluding things about energy. Now, it's possible that this complex proposition expresses a necessary truth; but this requires terministic analysis that the special sciences do not in their normal progress usually require, unless one wishes strictly to demonstrate something in an Aristotelian sense. All the special sciences require is that the complex propositions we choose not be arbitrary, but chosen due to their aptness for rendering true conclusions. This is all dialectical reasoning: we don't need to show the premises to be strictly necessary; all we need is for the premises to be agreed upon, for expert reasons, by the relevant experts.
[UPDATE: In a revision slip I originally stated that on an Aristotelian view or on Shepherd's view 'beginning to exist' is equivalent to 'being caused'. This, of course, is blatantly false; so I've fixed the error.]
1) Isagoge (Porphyry's)
2) Categories
3) Peri Hermeneias (De Interpretatione)
4) Prior Analytics
5) Posterior Analytics
6) Topics
7) Sophistical Refutations
8) Rhetoric
9) Poetics
We can set aside 1,7, 8, and 9 as not relevant to the question. Now, of the rest, we can roughly say that logic qua Categories discusses terms; logic qua De Interpretatione discusses the structure of non-complex propositions; logic qua Prior Analytics discusses the formal structure of deduction; logic qua Posterior Analytics discusses demonstrative argument; and logic qua Topics discusses dialectical argument. In a philosophy of logic structured according to the Organon, where would propositional logic fit?
There's a sense, of course, in which all formal structures fit into Prior Analytics, but that's not really a very interesting thing. But there is more to logical argument than formal structure alone on this view (there is beyond this the actual application of the structure to subject-matter), so that's not the whole answer. Demonstrative reasoning according to this view proceeds terministically: that is, it is in virtue of the terms of the premises that the deduction goes through. Propositional logic, however, is (by definition) non-terministic. So it can't be demonstrative, which means it would have to be dialectical. The application of propositional logic to actual subject-matter is a matter of dialectical reasoning rather than demonstrative reasoning. And this is exactly the Aristotelian view. So how does this sort of thing work?
Let's take as true a single complex proposition like (p -> q), i.e., q if p. One can reasonably ask why, given p, q follows; but this cannot be answered in purely propositional terms, since the answer to this question would require looking at the terms of the proposition. To say why (p -> q) is true requires looking at the terministic and operational structure of p and q. So what good is q if p in argument? An Aristotelian would reply in this way. Without complex propositions like these, one would have to argue directly for q. If, however, we can take (p -> q) as a principle agreed upon by all relevant persons, we can then argue for q indirectly by arguing for p. This radically increases the flexibility of our argumentative resources. So suppose we were arguing that Something is caused. If we can take it as agreed upon by all relevant persons that If something begins to exist, something is caused, we can then argue for our conclusion by arguing for the conclusion Something begins to exist. On some views (e.g., Aristotelian, or Shepherd's), If something begins to exist, something is caused is a necessary proposition, since something's beginning to exist is just its being caused (under a different description). But this is not necessary for the propositional logic itself; all we need for that to work is to be able to posit the complex proposition (p -> q). If that taken as agreed upon, our dialectical resources have been expanded.
This suggests something about what is going on in the so-called 'special topics'. Every special science is held to have (in addition to the general topics that govern all sciences) its own 'special topics' peculiar to it. Our little meditation on the dialectical work of complex propositions suggests that what these special topics usually (always?) do is provide inferential guidelines to expand our dialectical resources in that particular field. In other words, because they draw connections between different propositional truths, they allow us to substitute one thing for another. For instance, one might have in physics a special topic devoted to saying how one gets a proposition expressed in terms of energy from a proposition expressed in terms of matter. If one needs to know or prove something about energy, this sort of complex proposition allows one to tackle this problem by way of what one knows or can prove about matter. Such a complex proposition has increased one's resources for concluding things about energy. Now, it's possible that this complex proposition expresses a necessary truth; but this requires terministic analysis that the special sciences do not in their normal progress usually require, unless one wishes strictly to demonstrate something in an Aristotelian sense. All the special sciences require is that the complex propositions we choose not be arbitrary, but chosen due to their aptness for rendering true conclusions. This is all dialectical reasoning: we don't need to show the premises to be strictly necessary; all we need is for the premises to be agreed upon, for expert reasons, by the relevant experts.
[UPDATE: In a revision slip I originally stated that on an Aristotelian view or on Shepherd's view 'beginning to exist' is equivalent to 'being caused'. This, of course, is blatantly false; so I've fixed the error.]
Another Shepherd Summary
At Houyhnhnm Land I have put up a passage in which Lady Mary Shepherd summarizes her view of the psychological process involved in causal reasoning. I'm still not entirely satisfied with the style of the page; but when I get it to where I want it, I'll finalize it (e.g., double-check for browser compatibility, etc.) and use it as the basic format for all my additional pages. The idea is eventually to have a set of pages devoted to Lady Mary Shepherd's causal theory, with a number of key passages, commentaries, cross-referencing to passages in Locke and Hume, and so forth. I also want to start doing something similar with Malebranche, although that's a bit more complicated due to translation issues. (I've already translated the Preface to his Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion; this (French) Preface is unavailable in English, since Jolley and Scott oddly refused to translate it as being 'philosophically uninteresting'. I'll put it up as soon as I've gone over it, and in particular have reworked my translation of the Latin quotations, which are many and difficult to translate. It is this difficulty that I suspect is what 'philosophically uninteresting' really means!)
F&P
The April 2004 edition of Faith and Philosophy (journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers) arrived here yesterday. It looks interesting. There's an article about various positions cur Deus Homo, i.e., views about the purpose of the Incarnation. The biggest question in this, of course, is whether God would have become man had there been no sin. I've only looked briefly at it; it doesn't look like she really focuses on the only genuinely strong argument for the affirmative position (Scotus's argument from the predestination of Christ). There is also what looks like an interesting article contrasting Aquinas's and Aristotle's accounts of the virtue of magnanimity.
Friday, December 03, 2004
Boethii
There was a talk on Boethius of Dacia today; I couldn't go because I was meeting with students in a class for which I'm grading. But I've been very surprised at how many graduate students don't know that Boethius of Dacia is different from Ancius Manlius Severus Boethius. The latter is the Boethius, the one who wrote The Consolation of Philosophy. The former is a Latin Averroist, often associated with Siger of Brabant. Now, I can understand not being able to place Boethius of Dacia; but confusing them entirely just seems to me to be a bit odd. But perhaps that's just me?
For Reading
* At "Science and Politics", Coturnix has a series on biological time in Darwinian perspective, which looks at biological methodology. It's a bit long, so you might find it useful to print it out and read it at leisure away from the computer screen.
* A post on students at "Bitch Ph.D."
* The Maverick Philosopher gives a Kantian analysis of four kinds of pride.
* Hugo Schwyzer posts an Auden poem. I rather suspect that the upper room at midnight is one of those perpetual and inevitable iterations of human society, like taxes or death or the oldest profession.
UPDATE: Also, there's a good post on the nature of scientific explanation at "prosthesis".
* A post on students at "Bitch Ph.D."
* The Maverick Philosopher gives a Kantian analysis of four kinds of pride.
* Hugo Schwyzer posts an Auden poem. I rather suspect that the upper room at midnight is one of those perpetual and inevitable iterations of human society, like taxes or death or the oldest profession.
UPDATE: Also, there's a good post on the nature of scientific explanation at "prosthesis".
Thursday, December 02, 2004
Planck on the Metaphysical Foundations of Science
The essential point of the positivist theory is no other source of knowledge except the straight and short way of perception through the senses. Positivism always holds trictly to that. Now, the two sentences: (1) there is a real outer world which exists independently of our act of knowing and (2) the real outer world is not directly knowable form together the cardinal hinge on which the whole structure of physical science turns. And yet there is a certain degree of contradiction between those two sentences. This fact discloses the presence of the irrational, or mystic, element which adheres to physical science as to every other branch of human knowledge. The effect of this is that a science is never in a position completely and exhaustively to solve the problem it has to face. We must accept that as a hard and fast, irrefutable fact, and this fact cannot be removed by a theory which restricts the scope of science at its very start. Therefore, we see the task of science arising before us as an incessant struggle toward a goal which will never be reached, because by its very nature it is unreachable. It is of a metaphysical character, and, as such, is always again and again beyond our achievement.
This is from Max Planck's discussion of the issue in Positivism and External Reality (for some reason I didn't put any further information in my notes; I think it was quoted in Jaki's The Road of Science and the Ways to God - in the Planck chapter, of course). This conception of science pervades his writings on the subject, as can easily be seen by looking at the Scientific Autobiography and The Philosophy of Physics. Consider the following passage from Scientific Autobiography:
In any case, we may say in summary that according to what exact natural science teaches us, the entire realm of nature, in which we human beings on our tiny mote of a planet play only an infinitesimally small part, is ruled by definite laws which are independent of the existence of thinking human beings; but these laws, insofar as they can at all be comprehended by our senses, can be given a formulation which is adapted for purposeful activity. Thus, natural science exhibits a rational world order the inner essence of which is and remains unknowable to us, since only our sense data (which can never be completely excluded) supply evidence for it. Nevertheless, the truly prolific results of natural-scientific research justify the conclusion that continuing efforts will at least keep bringing us progressively nearer to the inattainable goal, and they strengthen our inner hope for a constant advancement of our insight into the ways of the omnipotent Reason which rules over Nature. (tr. by Frank Gaynor, Greenwood Press (1971) pp. 181-182)
This is from Max Planck's discussion of the issue in Positivism and External Reality (for some reason I didn't put any further information in my notes; I think it was quoted in Jaki's The Road of Science and the Ways to God - in the Planck chapter, of course). This conception of science pervades his writings on the subject, as can easily be seen by looking at the Scientific Autobiography and The Philosophy of Physics. Consider the following passage from Scientific Autobiography:
In any case, we may say in summary that according to what exact natural science teaches us, the entire realm of nature, in which we human beings on our tiny mote of a planet play only an infinitesimally small part, is ruled by definite laws which are independent of the existence of thinking human beings; but these laws, insofar as they can at all be comprehended by our senses, can be given a formulation which is adapted for purposeful activity. Thus, natural science exhibits a rational world order the inner essence of which is and remains unknowable to us, since only our sense data (which can never be completely excluded) supply evidence for it. Nevertheless, the truly prolific results of natural-scientific research justify the conclusion that continuing efforts will at least keep bringing us progressively nearer to the inattainable goal, and they strengthen our inner hope for a constant advancement of our insight into the ways of the omnipotent Reason which rules over Nature. (tr. by Frank Gaynor, Greenwood Press (1971) pp. 181-182)
Wednesday, December 01, 2004
Election Question for Non-U.S. Readers
On my New Mexico ballot for this past election, these were the things I had to vote for:
1) President/Vice President ticket
2) U. S. Representative
3) Justice of State Supreme Court (one to elect)
4) Justice of State Supreme Court (two, whether to retain)
5) Judge of the Court of Appeals
6) State Senator
7) State Representative
8) Public Regulation Commissioner
9) District Judge (two)
10) District Attorney
11) County Commissioner
12) County Clerk
13) County Treasurer
14) Director of Flood Control Authority
15) Bond questions (five)
16) Amendments to the State Constitution (three)
I'm just curious; for those who vote in elections other than those in the U.S., what sort of choices do you vote for when you go to the polls each election (and how many)? I realized recently that I probably just assume that people in other nations face similar sorts of choices, but never having voted in any other elections, I wouldn't actually know.
1) President/Vice President ticket
2) U. S. Representative
3) Justice of State Supreme Court (one to elect)
4) Justice of State Supreme Court (two, whether to retain)
5) Judge of the Court of Appeals
6) State Senator
7) State Representative
8) Public Regulation Commissioner
9) District Judge (two)
10) District Attorney
11) County Commissioner
12) County Clerk
13) County Treasurer
14) Director of Flood Control Authority
15) Bond questions (five)
16) Amendments to the State Constitution (three)
I'm just curious; for those who vote in elections other than those in the U.S., what sort of choices do you vote for when you go to the polls each election (and how many)? I realized recently that I probably just assume that people in other nations face similar sorts of choices, but never having voted in any other elections, I wouldn't actually know.
Response to Grupp's Response
One of the valuable things about blogging is unexpected discussion; I keep forgetting that sometimes it might be useful to check for further information online. For instance, I noted in my musings on Grupp's article in Dialogue that I hadn't been able to read his earlier article on the subject; but he has it online. Even if I turn out to be entirely wrong (and I might), I, at least, will have had the benefit of being alerted to an interesting paper I might not otherwise have been able to read. Those who want to read the more recent Dialogue paper, can also find it online. [UPDATE: I just realized that I didn't provide a link for Grupp's response, to which I'm responding; it's found in a prior post, but for ease it should be here as well. Here's the link.]
I should clarify what I'm trying to do; Grupp is right that my original comments are a bit cryptic in parts. I'm having difficulty seeing how his argument actually works, so my arguments shouldn't be considered categorically as attempts at refutation but rather as doubts or problems I'm having with the argument. They might, in the end, turn out to be refutations; but they might also turn out to be something else entirely. So I'm not going for a very strong claim with my arguments.
Grupp's argument (which can be found in the online articles) is that the positing of a Platonic exemplification tie introduces apparent contradictions having to do with the attachment of a located and an unlocated entity. Now, this is roughly the course the argument takes in the Dialogue article (as I summarized it in my original comments):
1. Suppose we have a wholly spatially located entity, L, e.g., a lion, and a wholly unlocated platonic universal, S, e.g., sublimity, which L exemplifies.
2. Since L is wholly spatially located, L only exemplifes n-adic properties, such as S, at x and nowhere else, because L is nowhere else but at x.
3. Therefore an exemplification not at x is an exemplification that does not have to do with L.
4. Since S is wholly spatially unlocated, it cannot fail to be spatially unlocated (Grupp calls this 'being at y'), S only involves a direct attachment to the exemplification tie at y, and nowhere else, because S is nowhere else but at y.
5. Therefore an exemplification not at y is an exemplification that does not have to do with S.
6. If L exemplifies n-adic properties only at x, if S involves a direct attachment to the exemplification tie only at y, and if the exemplification tie does not cross realms, since x is not y, L and S apparently cannot have any dealings with each other: for L to tie to S, S, which is wholly at y, must be at x, and thus be both located and unlocated, or L, which is wholly at x, must be at y, and thus both located and unlocated.
7. Therefore L and S cannot be tied by exemplification.
My first doubt about this was that the way Grupp has phrased the argument here gives it a superficial plausibility it does not strictly have. That is, the argument as it is put forward on p. 495 of the Dialogue article, makes the attribution of locatedness to the exemplification tie look parallel to the attribution of unlocatedness. L exemplifies S; L is wholly at x, so the exemplification must be at x; S is wholly at y, so the exemplification must be at y; hence the contradiction. However, suppose we grant that since L is located wholly at x, the exemplification tie must be at x. It does not follow from this that since S is unlocated, the exemplification tie must be unlocated. The cases are not parallel, although putting it in terms of 'being at x' and 'being at y' makes them look so. Grupp has given the Platonist no argument or reason to believe that she is committed to the exemplification tie's being unlocated, even if she agrees that she is committed to the exemplification tie's being located. In other words: Grupp claims that "A direct attaching with the exemplification tie that is not at y is a direct attaching that does not have to do with S" (p. 495), but this just means that an exemplification tie that is not unlocated can't have anything to do with S because S is unlocated. Now, it is by no means clear to me that a Platonic realist needs to accept such a claim without an argument. (Some might be committed to it, of course; but the question, I take it, is whether all positings of exemplification ties are committed to it.)
There is, I think, good reason to think that at least some Platonic realists would be inclined to deny such a claim. Two of the metaphors which Platonists of various stripes have occasionally used to describe the exemplification tie (or something analogous to it) are imitation and mental intention. Take imitation. Suppose we have an ectype, E, like a painting, and an archetype, A, like the person the painting depicts. E imitates A. Now E is wholly at x; and therefore the imitation of A is wholly at x. It has to be if E is an imitation of A, because E is wholly at x. But the imitation is of A. Now, it follows from nothing in this mix that the imitation tie has to be wherever A is. Or take mental intention or perception (e.g., Whitehead's ingression of eternal objects). P thinks about O. P is wholly at x; therefore the thinking about O is wholly at x. But it follows from nothing in this that the thinking about O is wholly wherever O is. And we can extend this to other properties besides location. So these sorts of metaphors suggest that we can conclude nothing about the exemplification tie as such directly from the properties of S. But this does seem to be what Grupp is trying to do in the argument.
If this is so, then whatever one's particular view about whether the exemplification tie is where L is, at x, we have no reason to believe that any contradiction ensues from the exemplification tie's attaching a located with an unlocated entity. Some Platonic realists might be committed to something like such a contradiction, if they characterize the attachment of the exemplification tie in a certain way; but there doesn't seem to be enough here to regard it as a general problem for Platonic realists. Platonic realists in general do not appear to be committed to a view in which S's being unlocated has any implications for the characteristics of the exemplification tie; the only thing that is essential is that L's exemplification of S actually be of S. Grupp seems to assume that to be of S the exemplification has to be unlocated; but I see no reason why this would be plausible to most Platonic realists. If this is so, then the Platonic realist can agree with #1, #2, and #3 above; but deny that #4 and #5 are true (and hence #6 and #7).
My 'further thought' [i.e., in the original comments - ed.] on the topic is (on further further thought!) somewhat irrelevant to the argument as such. I do want to clarify it, though. I said:
Grupp responds to this:
The issue in my further thought is the 'with respect to S'. As I said, I've come to think that it's actually not relevant to Grupp's argument, strictly speaking. But I want to point out that Grupp's conclusion here ("this however is not platonist metaphysics and platonistic property possession, but, rather, some sort of minimalist realist or Aristotelian property possession") is not necessarily true. Again, perhaps my comment is a bit cryptic. Let's detour slightly to consider the case of action at a distance. Now, it is an old maxim that everything is in some sense present or located wherever it acts. If action at a distance is possible, then, with the maxim it would mean that objects capable of acting at a distance can be (in a looser sense) present or located in places where they are not (in a stricter sense) present or located. And this seems quite reasonable; it is not location in the strictest sense, but it is an entirely plausible way of thinking about the matter: acting-on-O is a way to be located where O is, in an extended sense of 'location'. It's the looser sense/ stricter sense that makes it irrelevant to Grupp's argument, since (I take it) the argument is only about location in the stricter sense, and wouldn't be concerned with the looser sense at all. But the thought still can serve a (small) function in the discourse by reminding us that even if a Platonic realist were to allow that S is in some sense located, they would not necessarily be committed to an Aristotelian view. For while S, as a Platonic universal, is strictly speaking unlocated (and necessarily so), there is nothing to prevent the Platonic realist from allowing that in a looser sense of location it can be located wherever it is exemplified. And this does have some small importance, beyond the purely semantic point, because of one reason for talking this way that I suspect would perhaps be somewhat plausible to anyone who found Platonic realism itself plausible. If location (in the strict sense) is a derivative property of some sort, and necessarily presupposes exemplification (it being impossible for something exemplifying no properties to be located anywhere), then the reason for the apparent plausibility of speaking of exemplification ties as in some way located would become very clear: all location presupposes exemplification, and (naturally) we find that universals are exemplified in the world largely (some might say wholly) in located things, so by a very easy metonymy we can shift between the two. And if this is the case, then it would seem that Platonic realists need not be committed to #2 and #3; i.e., the exemplification tie cannot be (and does not need to be) strictly characterized as located, because it is what location itself presupposes. But I only bring this up as a possibility. My point is that it is possible for a Platonic realist to allow that S is in some completely reasonable sense located even though (because he is a Platonic realist) in a strict sense he must say it is not; but, as I noted, this is not in itself relevant to Grupp's argument, so I'll leave the clarification of what I originally intended at that.
This is an interesting discussion, and I'd like to thank Grupp for picking my original comments up and responding to them. Even if I turn out to be way off base, I've already found it to be excellent mental exercise and quite thought-provoking; even to lose this argument would still leave me happy and heavily benefited by having engaged in it. I hope the above clarifies my position somewhat; it's still possible that I'm misunderstanding or missing something in Grupp's approach. (It's also possible, given that my own sympathies are Aristotelian, that I'm attributing things to Platonic realists that no Platonic realist would ever hold; but this is the less likely danger.) In any case, as I said, it's been an enjoyable conversation.
I should clarify what I'm trying to do; Grupp is right that my original comments are a bit cryptic in parts. I'm having difficulty seeing how his argument actually works, so my arguments shouldn't be considered categorically as attempts at refutation but rather as doubts or problems I'm having with the argument. They might, in the end, turn out to be refutations; but they might also turn out to be something else entirely. So I'm not going for a very strong claim with my arguments.
Grupp's argument (which can be found in the online articles) is that the positing of a Platonic exemplification tie introduces apparent contradictions having to do with the attachment of a located and an unlocated entity. Now, this is roughly the course the argument takes in the Dialogue article (as I summarized it in my original comments):
1. Suppose we have a wholly spatially located entity, L, e.g., a lion, and a wholly unlocated platonic universal, S, e.g., sublimity, which L exemplifies.
2. Since L is wholly spatially located, L only exemplifes n-adic properties, such as S, at x and nowhere else, because L is nowhere else but at x.
3. Therefore an exemplification not at x is an exemplification that does not have to do with L.
4. Since S is wholly spatially unlocated, it cannot fail to be spatially unlocated (Grupp calls this 'being at y'), S only involves a direct attachment to the exemplification tie at y, and nowhere else, because S is nowhere else but at y.
5. Therefore an exemplification not at y is an exemplification that does not have to do with S.
6. If L exemplifies n-adic properties only at x, if S involves a direct attachment to the exemplification tie only at y, and if the exemplification tie does not cross realms, since x is not y, L and S apparently cannot have any dealings with each other: for L to tie to S, S, which is wholly at y, must be at x, and thus be both located and unlocated, or L, which is wholly at x, must be at y, and thus both located and unlocated.
7. Therefore L and S cannot be tied by exemplification.
My first doubt about this was that the way Grupp has phrased the argument here gives it a superficial plausibility it does not strictly have. That is, the argument as it is put forward on p. 495 of the Dialogue article, makes the attribution of locatedness to the exemplification tie look parallel to the attribution of unlocatedness. L exemplifies S; L is wholly at x, so the exemplification must be at x; S is wholly at y, so the exemplification must be at y; hence the contradiction. However, suppose we grant that since L is located wholly at x, the exemplification tie must be at x. It does not follow from this that since S is unlocated, the exemplification tie must be unlocated. The cases are not parallel, although putting it in terms of 'being at x' and 'being at y' makes them look so. Grupp has given the Platonist no argument or reason to believe that she is committed to the exemplification tie's being unlocated, even if she agrees that she is committed to the exemplification tie's being located. In other words: Grupp claims that "A direct attaching with the exemplification tie that is not at y is a direct attaching that does not have to do with S" (p. 495), but this just means that an exemplification tie that is not unlocated can't have anything to do with S because S is unlocated. Now, it is by no means clear to me that a Platonic realist needs to accept such a claim without an argument. (Some might be committed to it, of course; but the question, I take it, is whether all positings of exemplification ties are committed to it.)
There is, I think, good reason to think that at least some Platonic realists would be inclined to deny such a claim. Two of the metaphors which Platonists of various stripes have occasionally used to describe the exemplification tie (or something analogous to it) are imitation and mental intention. Take imitation. Suppose we have an ectype, E, like a painting, and an archetype, A, like the person the painting depicts. E imitates A. Now E is wholly at x; and therefore the imitation of A is wholly at x. It has to be if E is an imitation of A, because E is wholly at x. But the imitation is of A. Now, it follows from nothing in this mix that the imitation tie has to be wherever A is. Or take mental intention or perception (e.g., Whitehead's ingression of eternal objects). P thinks about O. P is wholly at x; therefore the thinking about O is wholly at x. But it follows from nothing in this that the thinking about O is wholly wherever O is. And we can extend this to other properties besides location. So these sorts of metaphors suggest that we can conclude nothing about the exemplification tie as such directly from the properties of S. But this does seem to be what Grupp is trying to do in the argument.
If this is so, then whatever one's particular view about whether the exemplification tie is where L is, at x, we have no reason to believe that any contradiction ensues from the exemplification tie's attaching a located with an unlocated entity. Some Platonic realists might be committed to something like such a contradiction, if they characterize the attachment of the exemplification tie in a certain way; but there doesn't seem to be enough here to regard it as a general problem for Platonic realists. Platonic realists in general do not appear to be committed to a view in which S's being unlocated has any implications for the characteristics of the exemplification tie; the only thing that is essential is that L's exemplification of S actually be of S. Grupp seems to assume that to be of S the exemplification has to be unlocated; but I see no reason why this would be plausible to most Platonic realists. If this is so, then the Platonic realist can agree with #1, #2, and #3 above; but deny that #4 and #5 are true (and hence #6 and #7).
My 'further thought' [i.e., in the original comments - ed.] on the topic is (on further further thought!) somewhat irrelevant to the argument as such. I do want to clarify it, though. I said:
S may be wholly unlocated in itself, as a Platonic universal, but it does not follow from this that S cannot be located in any way; particularly if you think 'being exemplified by' is one way something can be located somewhere. In this case, S would be wholly unlocated in itself, but located in L by L's exemplification of S.
Grupp responds to this:
The author of the Siris entry is discussing my work as if we can avoid the problems I outline in my article by merely maintaining that either the exemplification tie, or the property S, is located where physical particular L is located at. With respect to S, this however is not platonistic metaphysics and platonistic property possession, but, rather, some sort of minimalist realist or Aristotelian property possession (which I very briefly discuss earlier in my article).
The issue in my further thought is the 'with respect to S'. As I said, I've come to think that it's actually not relevant to Grupp's argument, strictly speaking. But I want to point out that Grupp's conclusion here ("this however is not platonist metaphysics and platonistic property possession, but, rather, some sort of minimalist realist or Aristotelian property possession") is not necessarily true. Again, perhaps my comment is a bit cryptic. Let's detour slightly to consider the case of action at a distance. Now, it is an old maxim that everything is in some sense present or located wherever it acts. If action at a distance is possible, then, with the maxim it would mean that objects capable of acting at a distance can be (in a looser sense) present or located in places where they are not (in a stricter sense) present or located. And this seems quite reasonable; it is not location in the strictest sense, but it is an entirely plausible way of thinking about the matter: acting-on-O is a way to be located where O is, in an extended sense of 'location'. It's the looser sense/ stricter sense that makes it irrelevant to Grupp's argument, since (I take it) the argument is only about location in the stricter sense, and wouldn't be concerned with the looser sense at all. But the thought still can serve a (small) function in the discourse by reminding us that even if a Platonic realist were to allow that S is in some sense located, they would not necessarily be committed to an Aristotelian view. For while S, as a Platonic universal, is strictly speaking unlocated (and necessarily so), there is nothing to prevent the Platonic realist from allowing that in a looser sense of location it can be located wherever it is exemplified. And this does have some small importance, beyond the purely semantic point, because of one reason for talking this way that I suspect would perhaps be somewhat plausible to anyone who found Platonic realism itself plausible. If location (in the strict sense) is a derivative property of some sort, and necessarily presupposes exemplification (it being impossible for something exemplifying no properties to be located anywhere), then the reason for the apparent plausibility of speaking of exemplification ties as in some way located would become very clear: all location presupposes exemplification, and (naturally) we find that universals are exemplified in the world largely (some might say wholly) in located things, so by a very easy metonymy we can shift between the two. And if this is the case, then it would seem that Platonic realists need not be committed to #2 and #3; i.e., the exemplification tie cannot be (and does not need to be) strictly characterized as located, because it is what location itself presupposes. But I only bring this up as a possibility. My point is that it is possible for a Platonic realist to allow that S is in some completely reasonable sense located even though (because he is a Platonic realist) in a strict sense he must say it is not; but, as I noted, this is not in itself relevant to Grupp's argument, so I'll leave the clarification of what I originally intended at that.
This is an interesting discussion, and I'd like to thank Grupp for picking my original comments up and responding to them. Even if I turn out to be way off base, I've already found it to be excellent mental exercise and quite thought-provoking; even to lose this argument would still leave me happy and heavily benefited by having engaged in it. I hope the above clarifies my position somewhat; it's still possible that I'm misunderstanding or missing something in Grupp's approach. (It's also possible, given that my own sympathies are Aristotelian, that I'm attributing things to Platonic realists that no Platonic realist would ever hold; but this is the less likely danger.) In any case, as I said, it's been an enjoyable conversation.
A Higher Flight in More Exalted Regions
Man in his present state, feels occasional aspirations towards another, prompted by the craving want of some unknown unimaginable good, of which he has no intimation but from the consciousness of an unsatisfied capacity:--Let him not then too easily reject the belief that this capacity has a corresponding object, that his nature is capable of a nobler manifestation, a higher flight in more exalted regions than this, and enlarged as to every power of action, thought, and enjoyment.
Lady Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, p. 159 (in the chapter on the "Difference Between Body and Mind").
This paragraph occurs shortly after her comment, "I confess I think the further we extend our views into the regions of metaphysics, the more possible and probable does the resurrection from the dead appear; or at least an existence analogous to it" (p. 157). It is clear from Shepherd's essay on the eternity of the mind that she doesn't think immortality of the soul or resurrection from the dead is demonstrable; she simply argues that philosophically it is possible and that there are philosophical arguments that give it some probability. She then goes on to say what she hopes will be the case:
As for myself, though I think that, independant of the inference from scripture, the reunion of memory to future consciousness presents no philosophical difficulty, yet I could be well content in the trust that, the inquiry for truth should be rewarded by the finding it, whether the present labour in its search be remembered or not; that the charity which sympathizes in witnessing pain, should be enlarged only to promote or to delight in the perception of pleasure, whether former misery be obliterated from the fancy, or not;--that an instinctive devotion towards God should meet with higher demonstrations of his presence than our faint conceptions here are able to embrace, though the satisfaction arising from the comparison should then be denied; and that the conflict here with doubt, difficulty, suffering, temptation, and the observation of evil, should terminate as well as the memory of it, in the personal consciousness, and the notice of surrounding happiness; in a secure and perptual possession of truth; in the love and the enjoyment of the practice of every noble and kindly virtue.
Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, "Eternity of Mind," pp. 384-385.
Lady Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, p. 159 (in the chapter on the "Difference Between Body and Mind").
This paragraph occurs shortly after her comment, "I confess I think the further we extend our views into the regions of metaphysics, the more possible and probable does the resurrection from the dead appear; or at least an existence analogous to it" (p. 157). It is clear from Shepherd's essay on the eternity of the mind that she doesn't think immortality of the soul or resurrection from the dead is demonstrable; she simply argues that philosophically it is possible and that there are philosophical arguments that give it some probability. She then goes on to say what she hopes will be the case:
As for myself, though I think that, independant of the inference from scripture, the reunion of memory to future consciousness presents no philosophical difficulty, yet I could be well content in the trust that, the inquiry for truth should be rewarded by the finding it, whether the present labour in its search be remembered or not; that the charity which sympathizes in witnessing pain, should be enlarged only to promote or to delight in the perception of pleasure, whether former misery be obliterated from the fancy, or not;--that an instinctive devotion towards God should meet with higher demonstrations of his presence than our faint conceptions here are able to embrace, though the satisfaction arising from the comparison should then be denied; and that the conflict here with doubt, difficulty, suffering, temptation, and the observation of evil, should terminate as well as the memory of it, in the personal consciousness, and the notice of surrounding happiness; in a secure and perptual possession of truth; in the love and the enjoyment of the practice of every noble and kindly virtue.
Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, "Eternity of Mind," pp. 384-385.
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