Friday, August 12, 2005

Links and Notes

* Theology of the Living Dead at "JimmyAkin.Org". Is it immoral to kill zombies? Well, like most things, it depends: How human are they?

* Two excellent discussions of Anselm's real theory of atonement:
(1) In a Paper: Feudal Imagery or Christian Tradition (PDF) by Nicholas Cohen;
(2) On a Weblog: A Semi-Anselmian Reply to Forde at "verbum ipsum"

* A discussion of whether infinite regresses are vicious at "Mormon Metaphysics"

* The Temple Mount blogburst for Tisha B'Av is up at "Kesher Talk"; there are lots of great entries.

* The Mysterious Fate of the Great Library of Alexandria at Bede's Library (HT: Maverick Philosopher)

* Daniel at "The Lyceum" has an interesting post arguing that it's a mistake to teach that there is a particular slippery slope fallacy. Also worth reading on the subject of slippery slope arguments is a paper I've linked to before, Eugene Volokh's Beyond the Slippery Slope, which looks at various empirical slippery slope arguments used in law and policy.

* Shulamite takes us From The Principle of Contradiction to God at "Vomit the Lukewarm".

* August 12, 1099: The First Crusade comes to an end with the Battle of Ascalon, where Godfrey of Bouillon defeated al-Afdal. Ascalon itself, however, remained in the hands of the Fatimids; the Crusaders returned to Jerusalem, which had already been taken. The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem remained until the brilliant and remarkable Saladin retook it again on October 2, 1187, thereby triggering the Third Crusade.

* UPDATE: An interesting post on intelligent design at "Easily Distracted". I'd post something on it, but I agree with a lot of what Alan Jacobs says in the comments, and while there are important things I disagree with, they aren't enough to motivate me to post on them at this moment. I'd further add, though, that, whatever mistakes one might attribute to him, Dembski (the dominant source of this movement in the direction of complexity and information theory) clearly doesn't make the mistake identified in Burke's (1); and I actually don't think it is so very common. People aren't so much inclined to deny that great complexity can come from initially simple conditions; they just reach a point where they think things get too complex to do so. And that's what sounds like common-sense; in part because it is common-sense: there should be some cut-off point, beyond which the complexity just becomes too great. The tricky thing is getting the right cut-off point; and that requires not common sense but analysis.

FURTHER UPDATES:

* As Macht notes in the comments, I equivocated in the previous note on 'complexity'.

* Hugo has put up a fascinating interview with Munévar on Feyerabend. Worth reading.