* Michael Pahl at "the stuff of earth" has a series on the historicity of Jesus: Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V. I like Pahl's approach, although in a sense it is a moot: to argue seriously, without detriment to our ability to do history in the first place, that Jesus did not exist, you have to argue that none of the witnesses to his existence -- the non-Christian witnesses Pahl discusses in Part II, the New Testament witnesses discussed in Part III, the existence of the Church prior to the writing of the New Testament, the witness of the apostolic Fathers -- can be relied upon on this point. This is not proof in the sense Pahl discusses in Part IV, but any historian can point to excellent historical existence claims put forward on much less evidence. If we have any knowledge of who existed two thousand years ago, Jesus is a good candidate; if he's not a good candidate, most of the people we think existed then are not good candidates. While it's not obvious, Part V makes a controversial theological claim that needs more defense than Pahl gives, namely, that things would not be much different historically if we had only the (false) belief that Jesus existed -- since for this to be true it has to be false that the Church has a special connection to the Living Christ. But his other two points about the theological implications of the historicity of Jesus are well worth reading and thinking about.
* If you liked Buffy the Vampire Slayer and/or Angel, and you aren't watching the second season of Cherub the Vampire with Bunny Slippers, you're missing out.
* In discussing the current situation between Israel and Lebanon, The Elfin Ethicist makes an important point that's exactly right:
But a just war is not about killing guilty people. It's about protecting innocent people. So even if going to war is otherwise justifiable, it may not be wise in the long run. That distinction is lost on our hawks and adventurists, who may appeal to just war criteria but who seem to have little respect for unintended consequences.
* Clayton Littlejohn presents some mereological puzzles for your enjoyment. My answers: (1) Head to the DMA for the statue and sue the dumpster diver for copyright infringement. (2) The thief has the original parts, but he's just copied the statue in such a way that the copy has the original parts. The original has been adulterated to the point that it is a reconstruction. It's as if someone restoring a painting were to replace all the paint; the result is not the original+touch-up but simply a forgery. (3) If I implied at any point in the negotiation that Junkbarge was unique, he should sue me for fraud; but he has the statue. I just have a twinned statue. And this is true, I think, in all these cases. The statue is what was originally placed in the DMA. Replacements The other statue, however, is definitely a twinning: it is, as it were, split off of the original. But this has perhaps as much to do with our notion of 'artifact' (or 'artwork') as with mereology itself.
It reminds me of a mereology joke. An Illinois farmer happened to mention to a city slicker that he had an axe that had been used by Abraham Lincoln. The city slicker was eager to see it, so they went out to look at it.
"Why, it's in excellent condition!" the city slicker said.
"It ought to be," the farmer replied. "The head has been replaced twice and the handle three times."
* An algorithm for multiplying roman numerals. (HT, GMBM)
UPDATE:
* Ralph Luker notes that the current edition of Essays in Philosophy looks at philosophy of history.
* Benjamin Cohen answers the question, "If you could have practiced science in any time and any place throughout history, which would it be, and why?" with the answer mid-eighteenth century France, because of the optimism. It's a good answer. But, of course, we have to keep in mind the Other Side. Lavoisier, for instance, had his head chopped off in the French Revolution, and Rousseau was both paranoid and extremely pessimistic about the whole trend of the times. But it's a good answer.
