Nadia Kizenko has a good piece (ht: Ralph Luker) on the recent reunion between Moscow and ROCOR, a critical one that asks the right questions. A problem with the article, I think, is that it overlooks how much Moscow actually did have to concede in order to make the reunification go through. Some of these concessions -- like the canonization of Tsar Nicholas II and numerous martyrs and confessors under the Soviet regime -- seem small on the outside but in the context of Russian Orthodox life are actually rather significant; likewise, ROCOR remains autonomous. Further, as Daniel Larison points out, Putin is at best jumping on to a process that began long before he became involved.
Given that so much emphasis is put on Moscow's appeasement the Communists, it would probably have been worthwhile to point out that ROCOR's history of collaboration is not exactly pristine, either, since (as the Patriarchate has not been slow to point out) ROCOR has to deal with the fact that segments of it went so far in their fight against the Communists as to collaborate with the Nazis. Both sides have much soul-searching to do; and one can reasonably hope that reunification will force them to do more of it.
It is also too early to say that there is a "tide of defection from the disappointed faithful" in ROCOR. There is certainly a good deal of minority protest; at present it looks relatively minor. Perhaps it will spread, although I doubt it will do so to any great extent. We will see.
But Kizenko is exactly right that Putin's role in it all is worrisome; I find his speech on the occasion -- all about the split being a result of political life in Russia itself, and thus the reunification serving "our common goals" -- somewhat ominous, and think that Kizenko's interpretation of Putin's actions ("Mr. Putin is thus the first modern Russian leader to incorporate all aspects of Russia's "usable past" in claiming his legitimacy") to ring too true when considered in light of the comments Putin has actually made on the subject. The reunification does not end the need for vigilance on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. It does, however, begin the need not to be alarmist.
I'm a bit puzzled by Kizenko's claim that "according to the terms of the agreement, Moscow regains control over bishops' appointments and the right to open or close all parishes"; since according to the Act of Canonical Communion, ROCOR's Council of Bishops retains the right to elect its own bishops and to make decisions on the establishment or liquidation of its dioceses. What Moscow gains is simply the right to confirm the election and to be included in the decisions. These are certainly not trivial extensions of Moscow's power, but they seem to fall short of Kizenko's claim.
UPDATE: Nicholas Ohotin responds to Kizenko.
