I'm not really sure what to make of the fact that it is also the nigh-universal way of arguing against it.
The stupid way of arguing against divine command theory (we'll make it More Logical the way philosophers do by turning words into letters and call it SWAADCT), goes like this.
(SWAADCT) Given divine command theory D, and given the assumption that God commands some awful thing A, D would require that A be obligatory.
Notice, incidentally, that I admirably continue the practice of turning words into letters to make it More Logical. Yes, I have been reading some dimwitted discussions of divine command theory that engage extensively in the practice of making things More Logical.
All mockery of the ritualistic behaviors of analytic philosophers aside, this is a truly stupid way to argue against anything. Divine command theories are accounts of obligation itself. Thus, if we are already assuming them even for the sake of argument, saying, "Suppose that God commands some awful thing" is equivalent to saying "Suppose that this awful thing is the kind of thing that would make it obligatory". We have therefore assumed arbitrarily that some awful action has the obligation-making feature required by the theory we are assuming for the sake of argument and then are shocked -- SHOCKED! -- that it logically follows that the awful action is obligatory.
Obviously this is the sort of fun we can have with any account of obligation:
(SWAAU) Given a utilitarian account of obligation U, and given the assumption that some awful thing A is required to maximize utility, U would require that A be obligatory.
(SWAAK) Given a Kantian account of obligation K, and given the assumption that some awful thing A is required by the categorical imperative, K would require that A be obligatory.
Mix and match! Make your own!
Or you know, you could just concede that when your refutation of a position consists of "But when I arbitrarily add assumptions about what fits the account's criteria for obligation, I sometimes get unacceptable conclusions", your conception of how to do meta-ethics is pretty obviously bankrupt.
There are, of course, non-stupid ways of arguing against divine command theory. Catherine Trotter Cockburn has a number of arguments worth taking seriously, for instance. And it is well known that divine command theories suffer most of the problems of legal positivism, and for at least some of them cannot take the usual escape routes that legal positivists take, for the obvious reason that divine command theories are forms of moral positivism and thus merely a way to generalize legal positivism.
UPDATE: For additional discussion on why this approach to divine command theory is a no-go, see my follow-up post.