Friday, August 10, 2018

Dashed Off XVIII

All of Peirce's theory of signs is base din some sense on ◊, T, □; for instance, qualisign : Diamond :: sinsign : True :: legisign : Box. This raises questions about the exact interp. of the modalities in question, also of the appropriate logic & its interp. For instance, in some sense delome implies dicent implies rheme, but this is by reduction, it seems, and not nec. in the sense that a delome should be considered a rheme. (But then again....) The issue is complicated by Peirce's pragmatism, since it suggests that the interpretations should always be pragmatic: e.g., in terms of possibility, actuality, or generality (necessity of some kind) in the context of inquiry.

signification by community, by opposing relatedness, and by imputation
- commonality, correspondence, convention

NB that in 3Dialogues III, Berkeley has Philonous argue on the basis of the independence of sensible things on my mind, as well as continuous existence. (Their independence & continuity is due to their grounding in an independent and continuing Mind.)

"...the element of the wondrous in the structure of the world picture increases with the discovery of every new law." Planck

"...a bit of fun helps thought and tends to keep it pragmatical." Peirce (EP 2:12 [CP 5.71])

"Analogy suggests that the laws of natures are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness." Peirce (EP 2:13 [CP 5.107])

formalized arguments as iconic signs

formulae as diagrams of operational sequences

Something is only evidence in a context; change the context enough and you change the status of the evidence.

Natural rights cannot be arbitrary but by nature must be with respect to natural common good.

Royce's error argument is obviously strongest if you have a coherence, rather than a correspondence, theory of truth; modifying a coherence theory to avoid the argument starts turning it into a correspondence theory.

One can obviously have analogues to the error argument based on evil, ugliness, bad design, and the like.

The absolution that Symeon the New Theologian attributes to the illuminated seems to be, if he is not merely mistaken, intercessory and invocative rather than sacramental -- a child's speaking for his father rather than a magistrate's speaking for the Crown.

Most arguments against natural law can easily be adapted to arguments against natural rights -- unsurprisingly, since the latter can only be rights under the former. But this is often overlooked.

responsible participation in the liturgical commonwealth
(1) as coming together for support of sacramental life.
(1.a) patience with each other
(1.b) truthfulness
(1.c) amiability
(1.d) moderation in manner of action
(1.e) sociability
(1.f) indignation against abuses.
(2) as organizing resources for support of sacramental life
(2.a) generosity to those in need
(2.b) supporting the Church splendidly
(3) as overcoming challenges
(3.a) self-discipline in action
(3.b) striving to be greater and better, and honoring those who are
(3.c) not compromising with the world or settling; seeking honor only before God
(3.d) fortitude even unto martyrdom

"It is an eternal law in heaven that the lesser shall share by means of the greater in what lies beyond being." Palamas (Hom 53)

Box: sameness across differences; Diamond: differences

the Divided Line as semiotic
image as sign of body as sign of mathematical object as sign of Form as sign of Good
ascent from sign to signified

The question of the deposition of popes
(Cajetan): Divine law requires that if anyone is heretical, they be avoided; avoiding a pope under divine law would require an exercise of authority; it cannot be an authority higher than that of a pope; therefore it must be a ministerial rather than a jurisdictional power. There is a relevant ministerial power, the one whereby the man is joined to office. (A power causing union so as to generate may equally be a cause of corruption.) It would work by causing in the person a disposition inconsistent with the papacy -- publicity of pertinacity, or some such.
(Suarez): The Church cannot possess a true power of jurisdiction over the pope (only Christ can); but it can declare heresy in the name of Christ; by virtue of this declaration, Christ takes back the papacy; at which point the man becomes subject to the Church.
(Bellarmine): The pope will not in fact fall into such heresy, but arguing solely from principles, a notorious heretic is ipso facto no longer a member of the Church; one who is not a member of the Church cannot be pope; therefore the matter depends on the conditions by which one can say the pope is in notorious heresy.
--- The whole deposition problem is in the inconsistent triad: (1) The Holy See is judged of no one; (2) The pope may be deposed for heresy, under the right conditions; (3) Deposition for heresy requires judgment by a superior. One of these must be weakened or distinguished. Bellarmine distinguishes (c) by holding that in extraordinary circumanstances one may be ipso facto deposed. Cajetan weakes (c) by saying that if conditions are met, it actually requires only a declaration. Suarez takes the declaration to be dispositive to Christ's deposition, and thus distinguishes (a).
--- The common opinion that in a matter of deposition the declaration could be issued by the College of Cardinals seems to me to be completely worthless and without foundation. The College is entirely an instrument of the papacy and has no authority beyond what is given to it by the papacy. It is not like an ecumenical council, or even a general council, which has full and intrinsic authority even sedevacante.
--- Note that Vatican I strickly speaking says only that (1) No ecclesial authority surpasses the authority of the Holy See; (2) the Holy See's judgment is not to be disclaimed; (3) no one may judge the Holy See's judgments; (4) No one may appeal to an ecumenical council, as if to a higher authority, from the judgments of the Holy See. This is more limited than one might expect. However, safeguarding this seems to require that the person of the Pope is also in some way and to some extent exempt for any tribunal less than divine. (Note, for a traditional view, the Apology of Ennodius from the Synod of Palmyra 502.) A question remains, though, of how far this goes. It is clear that the office itself cannot be judged, nor the man in office to the extent he exercises the office. It is also clear that the man can be rebuked without any formal judgment of this kind. And it is less clear, even if probable, that the man cannot be judged in other respects. Note, however, Unam Sanctam, and the question becomes how much the man can actually be distinguished from the office.
--- The usual appeal to canon 1556 is irrelevant to the problem; an ecumenical council (or even less!) also has authority over canon law, for instance, and the canons must anyway in unusual circumstances be interpreted appropriately to the situation, which is precisely the point at issue.

"If we pray in a properly Christian way, we cannot say more than what is contained in the Lord's prayer." Sheptytsky

Every experience is an experience of cause and effect.

act & potential -> cause
act & potential & intellect -> sufficient reason
act & potential & will -> proper value

"all the instruments we use for knowing and speaking are signs." John of St. Thomas

The truth of the problem of induction is that we have only a very vague sense of our rational powers; we know our rational capability mostly indirectly.

the importance of low-probability, high-leverage lines of inquiry

What is predicated analogically is predicated in some way according to an ordering of sign to signified.

Thinking requires a thinker because thinking and thinker are one thing, not separated, in the actual thought.

thinking requires a thinker, obligation requires an obliger (law requires a legislator), design requires a designer

Descartes in effect identifies sin and ignorance (letter to Pere Mesland 1644, AT IV, 117)

'individuality includes infinity' (Leibniz)

Sets presuppose possible variations.

Life is what gives death meaning, not vice versa.

All knowledge of fact involves knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation on another.

Hobbes's God is literally an indestructible, invisible, homogenous fluid.
Hobbes's Church is simply the nation as required by the dictator to assemble in a profession of faith as an act of loyalty.

"Were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other." Cudworth

Determining 'degrees of belief' by betting behavior is like measuring creativity by salary.

"Theology is thought, whether we agree with it or not. Mythology was never thought, and nobody could really agree with it or disagree with it." Chesterton

It is remarkable how many human capabilities depend on interaction -- human individuals are undeniably more in community than they are alone, even setting aside what human beings achieve cooperatively.

Herder opposes the divine origin thesis for language for the same reason he opposes root innateness of language: it is inconsistent with infinite perfectibility because it sets limits to human progress. Note that all of his more general objections are analogous to objections to divine arguments: rudeness of the early, God of the gaps, unpromising for inquiry, inability to know divine purposes, unfittingness to the divine.

occasionalism (impotentism) // immaterialism

pleasantness, usefulness, and nobleness as the primary families of value in itself

market value, sentimental value, and dignity as the primary families of value with respect to use

What begins to be has a cause.
What begins to be understood has a perceived sufficient reason.
What begins to be loved has a perceived and "felt" natural value.

The question of how much evidence one needs to draw a conclusion is an axiological question, not a logical one.

Devotion requires reflection or meditation.
Devotion constructs its own duties.

The evidential relation is ternary: E is evidence for H in the context of inquiry I.

The concept of evidence depends on the concept of truth. Any account of evidence that is divorced from the account of truth is untenable.

kinds of art culture
talent-expressive, deliberately wide appreciation: Classical
talent-expressive, deliberately narrow appreciation: Technical
taste-expressive, deliberately wide appreciation: Popular
taste-expressive, deliberately narrow appreciation: Gated

Confucian ethics can be seen as in some sense pluralistic: we have, as it were, four basic morality systems, based on sympathy, on shame, on deference, and on standards, which are as it were integrated into a fifth, concerned with a fully human life that balances the other four in a sustainable way.

icon : word in letters :: saint : word in speech :: Christ : word in mind

uses of episode
(1) character establishment
(2) plotline linking
(3) plausibility building for plot points

In the sacraments, Christ is Weaver, Loom, and Tapestry all at once.

Every contract, to be fully just, must involve a regard for common good, deference to that which lends the contract authority, and fairness in exchange.

All grace is, seen as from the Father, favor; seen as from the Son, assimilation to Christ; and seen as from the Spirit, communion.

Just as baptism can be done in incomplete (emergency) and completed form, preserving the essence in both, so it makes sense to say that marriage too has an incomplete and completed (formally recognized) form. Think about this.

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