Habitude XII

 After he discusses the causes of habitudes, St. Thomas goes into the important question of the intension and remission of habitude. The importance of this question cannot be overestimated. In working out intension and remission of habitudes, scholastics tried to clarify the matter by expanding their view to the intension and remission of dispositions generally, and it is out of this that the late medieval scholastics discovered the Mean Speed Theorem, the Calculatores first began applying crude geometrical tools to explore how acceleration works, and the first tentative shifts away from Aristotelian physics began to pick up steam so that the early modern experimental revolution should begin to happen. The topic that particularly precipitated all of this, however, was originally not a physical one but an extremely important one for spiritual life: the increase and decrease of the virtue of charity. Thus it is quite important. It also leads to some relatively technical discussions. So I've decided to do here what I did with the topic of the subject of habitudes: I'll mix commentary and selective translation.

Increase and Decrease of Habitude

The first question that has to be asked, of course, is whether habitude admits of intension and remission. Intension is a kind of increase, and remission a kind of decrease, and we mostly associate increase and decrease with quantity. However, says Aquinas, we transfer the idea to capture that is true about quality: that just as there is a kind of distinguishable completeness that is tracked by quantitative increase, so there is a kind of distinguishable completeness for quality. We can recognize greatness not just of (say) size, but also goodness. The quantitative analogue is exactly that, only an analogue, but the analogy can sometimes be quite tight. This is a point that distinguishes both quality and quantity from substance, for instance. Not all qualities have this feature, however; it is a feature of quality that arises from how the quality relates to other things. As St. Thomas says:

If any form, or anything whatsoever, gets the notion of the species from itself or from something of itself, it has a determinate notion, which is able neither to exceed by more nor to fail by less, and such are hotness and whiteness, and other suchlike qualities, which are not said by ordering to another, and even more so substance, which is being per se. But those which receive their species from something to which they are ordered can be diversified in themselves by more or by less, and nonetheless be the same species, according to the unity of that to which they are ordered, from which they receive their species. [ST 2-1.52.1]

Health, for instance, varies according to more and less, because it is a disposition that concerns something other than itself, and can be related to it in various ways (generally by various excesses and deficiencies) while still being health. If we only called health what was completely healthy, then there would be no increase or decrease of health, by definition; but 'health' would then be the maximum, or the most perfect balance, of something that did admit of more and less. 

This, however, is only one of the ways a disposition can increase or decrease, namely, by the very nature of its form as related to other things. Dispositions can also vary by how their subjects participate that form. If a form consitutes the very species of a thing, then that thing does not have a participation that admits of more and less; this is the case with substantial forms. This is also with quantitative forms or qualitative forms like shapes that are derive very closely from substances and quantities, because they are not just divisible in a way that admits of more and less. Actions that are more associated with actions and passions, however, are 'farther away' from substance and quantity; their subjects may participate them to a greater or lesser degree.

Thus habitudes may increase or decrease (1) in themselves or (2) according to participation by subject.

The Manner of the Increase and Decrease

This increase and decrease, however, that we find in intension and remission of qualities, cannot be by addition (which would effectively make it reducible to quantity. If something is more intensely Q, this is not the same as having more of Q. As Aquinas likes to put it, more and less white is not the same as larger and smaller white. If we consider intension and remission of the quality in itself, any addition or subtraction would actually change the kind of thing we are talking about; we would have a new thing that was not the previous quality. This doesn't rule out there being a kind of addition or subtraction for quality. You can for instance, know more or fewer things just as you can know them more or less well. But this is not guaranteed either; Aquinas points out that bodily habitudes like health, while admitting greater and lesser degree, do not themselves admit of larger and smaller amounts, at least if we're not just using a metaphor.

We've seen, however, that habitudes can be caused by multiplication of acts, and so we can ask if they are increased in some kind of one-to-one way with those acts. Aquinas's answer is interesting:

Because the use of habitudes consists in human willing, as is obvious from what was said above, then as one who has the habitude might not use it, or even act contrarily to it, so also can it happen that the habitude is used according to an act not proportionally corresponding to the intensity of the habitude. Thus if the intension of the act is proportionally equated to the intension of the habitude, or even exceeds it, then each act either increases the habitude or disposes to its increase, so that we may speak of the increase of the habitudes on a similarity to animal increase. For not all food taken in actually increases the animal, as not every drop hollows out a stone, but food being multiplied eventually makes an increase. So also, with multiplication of acts, the habitude grows. But if the intension of the act proportionally falls short of the intension of the habitude, such an act does not dispose to the increase of the habitude, but rather to its decrease. [ST 2-1.52.3]

'Intension' could also be translated as 'intensity'. Thus, for instance, if we have a virtue, let's say generosity, that is of such-and-such intensity, acts of generosity that are less intense than that will eventually reduce the intensity of the generosity. To increase in virtue, or knowledge, or such, the intensity of the acts matters. And much the same is true of remission or decrease, mutatis mutandis.

Corruption of Habitude

Forms perish, or are corrupted, either by their contraries or the corruption of their subjects. Your health can break down either by a sickness being introduced or you dying. In an incorruptible subject, of course, the latter sort of loss of form cannot occur. What this means is that whether or not a habitude can be lost simply depends, in the case of corruption by subject, on the corruptibility of their subject; habitudes depend for their existence on the existence of their subjects.

Corruption by contrary is a somewhat more complicated matter. It of course depends first and foremost on whether the habitude has a contrary. Intelligible species in the agent or potential intellect do not have a contrary, so any intelligible species caused in the latter by the former is incorruptible. Examples of this are first principles, both of the theoretical and of the practical intellect, "which by no oblivion or deception are able to be corrupted" (ST 2-1.53.1). However, habitudes concerned with conclusions do admit of contraries, either because they depend on assumptions that are not necessarily known, or because false reasoning can lead to a different conclusion. So habitudes like knowledge or opinion are corruptible and can be lost. Moral virtues likewise can be lost, as we know all too well, because they presuppose the movement of reason, and so they can be erased, whether through ignorance or the influence of the passions or deliberate choices; fortunately, moral vices can also be lost, for essentially the same reason.

In some cases habitudes can be lost not merely by acts themselves that are contrary, but simply through the cessation of some sustaining act. This occurs when the action is removing some impediment to the habitude, and therefore removing the action results in an external contrary being imposed. This is especially true in the case of both moral virtues and intellectual virtues, which begin to erode if you stop using them. You eventually stop knowing things that you don't actively know; you eventually lose opinions just from not doing anything with them; you eventually stop being honest by no longer doing honest things. How quickly this happens, of course, depends on the opposing forces and the extent of one's exposure to them.

Witching Softness, and Eye-Soothing Sheen

December's Moonlight
by Anne Garton 

Sure it was not remembered, placid moonlight,
When dread December darkly flitted past,
The gloomy fancy -- nought save the stormy night,
With its chill breath and wildly howling blast!
Now on the gaze fair sights are opening fast;
So purely calm, it seems almost a scene
Bestowed from Paradise! The shining queen,
Smiling on courtly stars around her cast,
In stateliest silence moves -- a golden zone
Circling her silver vest. The blue demesne
Is sweetly decked with fabrics, not of stone,
But witching softness, and eye-soothing sheen.
 Its influence lights on dreary plains below,
 For Autumn's parted spells I will not languish now.

Links of Note

 * Daniel D. De Haan, Thomist Classical Theism: Divine Simplicity within Aquinas' Triplex Via Theology (PDF)

* Henry Oliver, The triumph of logical English, at "Works in Progress"

* Daniel Klugman, Cracked Foundations: Pascal's Internal Critique of Descartes's Theory of Knowledge (PDF)

* Miles Hentrup, Hegel's Theory of Rational Proof (PDF)

* Bradley J. Birzer discusses Stephen Lawhead.

* Miguel Garcia Godinez, The Ontology of Social Practices (PDF)

* Nicholas Hune-Brown, Investigating a Possible Scammer in Journalism's AI Era, at "The Local", on a rising worry about journalistic scams.

* Michael Deigan, Questions Should Have Answers (PDF)

* Flame & Light, Word-Sculpture

* Alex Ding Zhang, Hugo Grotius on the Loose Obligation of Natural Law (PDF)

A Poem Draft and a Poem Re-Draft

 The Engineer

I walk the world with weary blade
that cuts the knots that have no name;
unconquered kingdoms I have saved;
I've sought, though never grasped, the grail.
To know the word that worlds will kill
yet never wield it, is my whim,
of box of trouble, loose the lid,
but never open, thus to win;
and should those problems prison fly
I hunt each one both day and night
in quest that is all front, no side,
with little deeds until I die.
At end no marble marks my grave
save massive monuments I've made
that line the ever-widening ways
of palaces where children play.

Aiming for Love Enduring 

 Even the overwhelming sun shall die,
but not my love; it shall, I swear, endure,
and remain in youth while stars flare out in sigh;
my love shall last, for it is holy, pure.
You scoff? My friend, you see the slightest part;
your equations cannot be stretched so far;
you have no experiments in the ways of the heart,
have never measured love against a star.
Your scoffing is just that, mere scoffing,
bare assertion that no evidence has known,
but if you are right, then at your death-coughing
you will have had a scoff, but be all alone.
But if I am wrong, I yet will live more sane,
and if I am right, I have truly soared above;
for if I am right, my love shall ever remain,
and if I am wrong, I shall have ventured in love.

Tabulated Syllogisms

 We can represent each categorical proposition in a tabular way, as follows:

	X	Y
All X is Y	-1	1
No X is Y	-1	-1
Some X is Y	1	1
Some X is not y	1	-1

Given this, we can represent syllogisms in a similar way.

BARBARA	S	M	P
All M is P	0	-1	1
All S is M	-1	1	0
All S is P	-1	0	1

Notice that the premises add to the conclusion, All S is P. We can do the same for the other First Figure syllogisms:

CELARENT	S	M	P
No M is P	0	-1	-1
All S is M	-1	1	0
All S is P	-1	0	-1

DARII	S	M	P
All M is P	0	-1	1
Some S is M	1	1	0
Some S is P	1	0	1

FERIO	S	M	P
No M is P	0	-1	-1
Some S is M	1	1	0
Some S is not P	1	0	-1

If we look at Second, Third, and Fourth Figure, we find that the C's all have the same pattern as Celarent, showing that they can be directly converted to Celarent in the First Figure. The D's and F's reduce to Darii and Ferio, for the most part; in fact, the only exceptions to this general pattern in the traditional figures are Bramantip/Baralipton/Bamalip (Fourth Figure), Darapti (Third Figure), Felapton (Third Figure), and Fesapo (Fourth Figure). These all have to involve subalternation in some way so as to get particular conclusions from universal premises. If we tabulate the the way we tabulated the First Figure, we find that the premises do not directly add to the conclusion. For instance, this is Bramantip:

BRAMANTIP	S	M	P
All P is M	0	1	-1
All M is S	1	-1	0
Some S is P	1	0	1

The P's do not add. But this is because there is a subalternation step. In Bramantip, this subalternation step is 'Some P is P', which gives us a double-dose of P. Thus:

BRAMANTIP	S	M	P
All P is M	0	1	-1
All M is S	1	-1	0
Some P is P	0	0	2
Some S is P	1	0	1

Bramantip, using 'Some P is P', is the weirdest of the valid syllogisms; Darapti, Felapton, and Fesapo use 'Some M is M' , because they all have -1 for both the M places in the premise, and therefore need something that can cancel out a -2 for M.  The same method will work for subalternated moods that take ordinary syllogisms with universal conclusions that are then subalternated (Barbari, Celaront, Cesaro, etc.), except that in those cases the subalternation can be handled extramodally -- i.e., one way to do them is to reach the conclusion using the standard mood and figure and then add the subalternation premise to the conclusion to get the particular conclusion (for these, the subalternation premise is always 'Some S is S').

The premises adding to the conclusion is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for validity of syllogism; the tables don't actually track figure (which requires considering order, not just value), so they only identify syllogisms that are invalid purely because of mood. For validity, syllogisms also need to be regular, i.e., universal conclusions have to come from all universal premises, and particular conclusions have to come from premises that have one and only one particular proposition (which may be the subalternation premise).

Habitude XI

 To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that no habitude is poured into human beings from God. For God has himself equally to all. If therefore He pours some habitudes into some, he would pour them into all, which is obviously false.

Further, God works in everything according to the way appropriate to its nature, because divine providence is for saving nature, as says Dionysius, De Div. Nom. ch. IV. But human habitudes are naturally caused by acts, as was said. Therefore God does not cause any habitudes in human beings apart from acts.

Further, if any habitude is poured out from God, through that habitude a human being is able to produce many acts. But from those acts a like habitude is cased, as is said in Ethic. II. It follows therefore that there are two acts of the same species in the same human being, one acquired, the other poured, which it seems is impossible, for two forms of one species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore no habitude is poured into a human being from God.

But contrariwise is what is said in Eccli. XV: The Lord filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding. But wisdom and understanding are sorts of habitudes. Therefore some human habitudes are poured out from God.

I reply that it must be said that some human habitudes are poured out from God for two reasons. The first reason is that there are some habitudes by which a human being is disposed well to an end exceeding the faculty of human nature, which is ultimate and complete human beatitude, as was said above. And because it is needful that habitudes be proportionate to that to which the human being is disposed according to them, it is also necessary that habitudes disposing in any way to such an end exceed the faculty of human nature. Thus such habitudes are not able to be in a human being save from divine pouring, as it is with all gratuitous virtues. 

Another reason is because God is able to produce the effects of secondary causes apart from the secondary causes themselves, as was said at the first. Therefore, just as sometimes to show his force he produces health without the natural cause, so also sometimes to show his force he pours into man those habitudes that are able to be caused by natural force. So he gave to the apostles knowledge of scripture and of all languages, which human beings through study or custom are able to acquire, although not so completely.

To the first therefore it must be said that God, with respect to his nature, equally has himself to all, but according to the order of his wisdom, for a definite reason he grants to some what he does not grant to others.

To the second it must be said that God working in everything according to their ways, does not exclude God from working that which nature is not able to work, but it follows from this that nothing is worked contrary to what is appropriate to nature.

To the third it must be said that acts which are produced by a poured habitude do not cause any habitude, but confirm a pre-existing habitude, just medicinal remedies applied to a man healthy by nature do not cause any health but rather strengthen the prior habitude of health.

[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.51.4, my translation. The Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation is here.]

I have deliberately avoided the word 'infused'; it's a perfectly good word, but I think it's worth remembering the underlying metaphor. I've also translated with 'faculty' rather than a more generic term like 'capacity' because the technical meaning is operative here -- a faculty is a power or capacity that can be directly disposed by will, which then makes it possible for the power or capacity be disposed well or badly.

This short article has more going on than might meet the eye. It will, of course, be the foundation of some of the most important discussions of virtue in the Summa. We also have here the essential argument for a key Thomistic idea, that we have no natural habitude to our natural end, because the latter is our natural end in the sense that we have it as an end by nature, not in the sense that it is within the capability of human nature to achieve it. It is therefore natural to human beings to seek a higher power than our own. This idea would lead to argument in the nineteenth century, by the clumsy device of an imaginary 'pure state of nature', and then again in the twentieth century, over the natural desire to see God.

In addition, the response to the third objection is more important than it might look, because it identifies a principle that will play a significant role in the Thomistic account of infused virtue.

This article completes St. Thomas's tour of habitudes in light of their causes. We have

natural habitudes

acquired habitudes

infused habitudes

but we've also discovered that the boundaries among these are not quite so hard and fast as might be assumed. There are natural habitudes that also require human acts for their full specification, and thus are in a sense mediate between natural and acquired habitudes, and as God can infuse any habitude whatsoever, something's being a natural or an acquired habitude does not necessarily rule out its also being an infused habitude. There are, of course, infused habitudes that are definitely neither natural or acquired habitudes, but the mere fact that something is poured out on someone by God does not itself make it itself  'supernatural', as we might say today. Likewise, the fact that something is a natural or acquired habitude does not exclude the possibility that it is a direct gift from God.

Dashed Off XXX

 This is the beginning of the notebook begun at the end of July 2024.

We recognize God from being moved by Him, being created by Him, resting upon Him, being uplifted by Him, and being guided by Him. Many ordinary people will spontaneously say such things. But these are the Five Ways, loosely expressed in experiential terms.

the flavor story of a meal
the hospitality story of a meal
the prestige story of a meal

Treating everything as a matter of exchange for one's own benefit is the root of all evil.

'his name' / 'her name' etc. as quasi-demonstrative (cf.: His name is Bob. This is Bob. He is Bob.)

prudence: the world as a field of need for plan and decision (the agible)
justice: as a field of the due (jural goods)
fortitude: as a field of challenge and achievement
temperance: as a field of need for balance of good

Familial society and civil society need mediation. (Rosmini)

regulation of the modality of rights
(1) to protect rights from suppression
(2) to settle disputes (by agreement, custom, and reason)
(3) to modify minimally the exercise of rights to avoid harm (by agreement, custom, and reason)
(4) to form frameworks by which people may exercise their rights in mutually beneficial cooperations

"The effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves. Invariably what inspires wonder casts a spell on us and is always superior to what is merely convincing and pleasing." Longinus

Sex must be done in a way consistent with friendship and justice to all who are potentially affected by it.

'white horse is not horse' and ignoratio elenchi

The New Natural Law principle, "Do not choose to destroy, damage, or impede any instantiation of a basic human good" (Finnis), is defective in formulation in two ways:
(1) it is common good instantiations, and not individual good instantiations, that are relevant to moral ought;
(2) choices are often comparative and thus the principle has to be formulated as to deal with choices between instantiations of basic human activity (which is nto the same as choices between basic human goods).

the family as community of grace and prayer

humanizing goods

"For the role of prudence is to ensure that one's natural understanding of the basic human goods *is brought all the way down to action and a whole lifetime of actions*." Finnis

that something continues to exist as a presupposition of scientific inquiry, and the ultimate foundation of conservation laws

ideals to strive for (must be practicable) vs. ideals for assessment of progress (organize ideals to strive for into judgments of value)

modality of rights: "everything that can be done with or about a rigth without diminishing the good contained in it" (Rosmini)

Not all aspects of our union with Christ are experienced.

the already-knowledge account of immediate inferences
-- it is easy to see how Simplification is justified (knowing the conjunction is already knowing the conjuncts), but Addition seems to fail (knowing p is not already knowing that q is a logical possibility) (cp. Williamson)

Nothing we clearly imagine is impossible, but only to the extent we clearly imagine it.

The good and bad of reasoning gets you farther than it might seem, because many other kinds of good and bad are specific applications to particular domains, while others are extensions or analogues.

the role of scientist as witness to phenomena in science communication

obstinacy as misplaced loyalty

passive vs active participation in the human moral community

Humanity is both received and expressed.

In choosing, we partition the circumstances in which we find ourselves, dividing accidental circumstances from specifying circumstances, and indeed making the particular division betwene them by the choosing itself.

Human belief is not very systematic.

justice as order, justice as right, justice as participation in the divine

wisdom, sanctity, adventure, harmony

the juridical city, i.e., civilized life qua juridical

Act in a way always consistent with the friendships of civilized life.

law, right, and liturgy

sacrifice, purity, and wisdom as the three aspects of imitation of Christ at which human beings have special potential to excel, in part because they create special challenges for us

three ways of considering what is right: component of honorable life, requirement of non-injury, one's own/due
-- these perhaps can be considered positive, negative, union of two, or else formal, material, total

the right as the mediating factor in just relation and action between persons

Headlines are not descriptions of what the article says; headlines are editorial comments by which the editors express why they think it is important.

Justice creates derivative rights as part of its respect for rights.

incongruity immediately resolved: surprise
incongruity of uncertain character: puzzlement/bafflement
unresolved and definite incongruity: humor
-- but this is idealized; as Beattie and Gerard note, other sentiments can interfere, either overriding or redirecting the first impulse

humorous laughter -> uneasy laughter -> bitter laughter

The city that is the heart of civilization is the relatively self-sufficient city, i.e., not the urban area alone but all that makes the city possible and sustainable.

Everything is germinal philosophy.

One thing that makes Norse mythology splendid is the well-roundedness of the major gods -- they are complex, and we can both identify with them and find them alien, sometimes at the same time.

three aspects of a functional state: representation, preservation of rights, orderly action encouraging order

Many things are believed because they are beloved.

rite : moral person :: habitus : natural person

political philosophy as katabasis and anabasis

"There is no point in abstaining from vice unless you embrace moral excellence, because when it comes to noble pursuits, the beginning is not as praiseworthy as the end." Jerome

"Any right whatsoever, held by a person, causes inequality in others because it causes duy in them." Rosmini

Distributive justice is based on the inequality created by rights. (Rosmini)

the jural equality between state and citizen

common good -> community -> community as moral system -> suum of community

injustice qua intention of inequality in interaction (taking advantage) vs. injustice qua intention toward unjust thing (violating rights)

prudence, fortitude, and temperance with respect to another as included in complete justice

academic life as scaffold-building

Many modern discussions of love make more sense if you substitute 'need for love' or 'desire for love' in place of 'love'.

One sign of an adequate ethics is that it can serve as the framework for excellent stories with rich characterization.

We all owe to the human community as a moral person to act in a way appropriate to its survival and betterment.

A (subjective) right is possession of title to a jural good given a general obligation regarding it.

It is against the nature of governance to impede people from acting according to their officia, except in emergencies. (cf. SCG 71.4)