This completes the notebook that was finished in April 2024.
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In myths the world is less personified than not depersonified.
Texts detached from communities are mere residues.
Reactive attitudes are
(a) formats of communication or address
(b) in the action of one moral person (A) to another (B)
(c) on the basis of how (A) classifies the actions of (B)
(d) in light of expectation or demand for good relations between (A) and (B) in community.
-- Sometimes the structure attributed to reactive attitudes is nto A to B but A to B on behalf of C
personal: A to B on behalf of A
vicarious: A to B on behalf of B or C
self-reaction: A to A on behalf of A
Perhaps we should actually distinguish direct and indirect reactive attitudes.
-- the issue of 'A to B in light of abstract commitment'. Perhaps 'personal investment', 'abstract commitment', and 'behalf of another'.
-- Hieronymi: "a reactive attitude is x's reaction to x's perception of or beliefs about the quality of y's will toward z. In the impersonal reactive attitudes, x, y, and z are different persons. In the case of the personal reactive attitudes, teh same person stands in for x and z. In the case of self-directed attitudes, the same person stands in for x and y."
-- Strawson: "Just as there are personal and vicarious reactive attitudes associated with demans on others for oneself and demands on others for others, so there are self-reactive attitudes associated with demans on oneself for others."
Olivi's seven affects proclaiming free choice (from his commentary on the Sentences)
(1) affectus zeli et misericordiae
(2) affectus gloriationis et erubescentiae
(3) affectus amicitiae et inimicitiae
(4) affects ingratitudinis et gratitudinis
(5) affectus subjectionis seu reverentiae et dominationis seu liberatis invictae et beatae
(6) affectus spei et diffidentiae
(7) affectus timoris et sollicitudinis
-- The essential idea is that reasonable people do not assume these affect against evils performed by what does not have 'the free use of reason'. If we had no free will, these affects would require assuming falsehoods. But it is inexplicable, even impossible, for all these affects to be based entirely on such falsehoods. Each of these is a recognition of reason qua free; the best explanation for such a recognition is that reason can be reason qua free; the only explanation for so many different such recognitions is that there is free use of reason.
Human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us consistently to accept a general theoretical commitment that suggests that these ordinary interpersonal relationships are unreasonable or falsely grounded.
We are natural persons who must grow into being persons, and on the process of doing so give ourselves artificial personhoods. We are potential persons developing as person by way of making ourselves persons.
faith : reason :: reason : passion
the material as that which requires something else to be intelligible
"The humble man no longer presumes to determine where he stands; he leaves it to God." Dietrich von Hildebrand
"The most perfect state or nation cannot glorify God as much as a perfect marriage."
The quality of any afterfaith depends on the quality fo the faith.
Legal systems arise naturally even if we assume that all particular laws are artificial.
"Perhaps every new learning makes room for itself by creating a new ignorance." C. S. Lewis
communion : eucharist :: satisfaction : penance
Christ is present in the eucharist as agent, as object, and as res -- agentially, objectively, and really/substantially.
Kant's Analogies of Experience as ways of thinking about the unity fo the world through unities of experience
formats of sacramental confession
(1) public general: used only for emergencies (e.g., immanent death)
(2) public personal: most common in ancient church
(3) private
formats of sacramental satisfaction
(1) public: order of penitents
(2) public: personal
(3) private: penitential pilgrimage
(4) private: vow
(5) private: prayer
spacetime as a symbol of providence
A 'moral cause' is that which gives reason to the 'physical cause'.
Human beings form legal systems because human reason already has the features that we externalize into legal systems.
Cognitive tool use is even more natural to us than physical tool use.
The sacramental character is a title to further grace, related to the exercise of priestly office. Thi sis true also of the covenantal bond in the Old Testament sacrifices and in matrimony.
physical causality
--- dispositive
--- perfective
moral causality
--- dispositive
--- --- precative
--- --- meritorious
--- --- juridical
--- perfective ?
occasional causality
teaching as shared light
Commands and counsels are instrumental dispositive moral causes.
J. Hogan's laws of ornament (Am. Eccl. Rev. vol 24, pp. 474ff)
(1) unity: The same style of decoration should be used throughout.
(2) subordination: Ornament should be appropriate to utility, place, and structure
(3) measure and proportion: There must be proportion of size and pattern between what adorns and what is adorned.
(4) treatment: The imitative forms of adornment should be conventionalized.
representing heraldic tinctures:
Aurum puncta notant
Argentum absentia signi
Linea staris rubeum
Caeruleumque jacens
Descendit virida in loerani
qua purpura surgit
cumque jacens stanti linea mixta nigrum est.
the three primaries of knowledge:
(1) fact: existing thinking subject
(2) principle: noncontradiction
(3) condition: intellectual aptitude for truth
"The mind while we are in this present life, whether it contemplate, meditate, deliberate, or howsoever exercise itself, worketh nothing without continual recourse to imagination, the only storehouse of wit and peculiar chair of memory." Hooker
Human narratives consist of oppositions and resolutions of oppositions.
farce as an insulation from terror
opificium --> officium (work-doing)
A certain pragmatism is required for heroism.
To consider: Any general condition on means of verifying certain propositions can ground a modality. For example, we can verfiy at a place, or a time, or with respect to a fiction, et.
-- In other words: verification and modality are related.
Some things are justified and yet can still be bad habits to let yourself get into.
ius = quod iustum est = ipsam reme iustam = dikaion
ius vs ius specified genitively vs ius specified datively
ius: 'a kind of moral facultas which anyone has concerning his own rem or a rem due to him'
"What the law of nature obliges to an end, ius gives to the means." Wolff
what is due us so as to be our own
Every right presupposes a standard of reason.
Eternal Life, Christian Liberty, and the Pursuit of Beatitude
Pontifex Maximus
-- Foundation of Collegium Ponificium is attributed to Numa Pompilius (Kingdom of Rome) as advisors to the rex in matters of religion. It was headed by the Pont. Max.
-- In Roman Republic a rex sacrorum was appointed the college to perform functions previously performed by the rex; he was deliberately restricted from actual political office and subordinated to Pont. Max. The Pont. Max., on the other hand, was a political office.
-- Julius Caesar became a pontifex in 73 BC and was made Pont. Max. in 63 BC (hence the Julian calendar).
-- The purpose of the Collegium was to maintain pax deorum. Most authority was invested in Pont. Max., with other pontiffs forming his consilium; the Pont. Max. specifically administered the just divinum: regulation of calendar and ceremonies, consecration of places and objects, regulation of burials, marriages, adoptions, inheritances. The Collegium also kept the archives of the state.
-- Marcus Aemilius Lepidus becomes Pont. Max. in 44 BC with death of Julius Caesar, and holds the post until 13 BC, after which he is succeeded by Augustus Caesar.; the title began to be an imperial title. In the Third Century, with co-rulers, there could be more than one Pont. Max.
-- Gratian is the last emperor to use the title, relinquishing it between 376 and 383.
-- Theodosius in 380, making Christianity the official religion of the empire, designates Damasus as pontifex (Peter of Alexandria he designates as episcopus). Leo is sometimes said to be the first to use the title of himself.
-- The official title today is Summus Pontifex Ecclesiae Universalist; but Pontifex Maximus is often still used customarily and in inscriptions.
-- the first Pontifex Maximus is by tradition Numa Marcius, advisor to Numa Pompilius; our list has a gap for the rest of the Kingdom and is patchy for the Republi.
It is custom that makes constitutional law, law.
Good custom has the authority of reason as well as the people.
"The food of the mind is ever accumulating, while its digestive power remains as it was." T. H. Green
"A great part of the discipline of life rises simply from its slowness. The long years of patient waiting and silent labour, the struggle with listlessness and pain, the loss of time by illness, the hope deferred, the doubt that lays hold on delay -- these are the tests of that pertinacity in man which is but a step below heroism."
"Man reads back into himself, so to speak, the distinctions which have issued from him, and which he finds in language. In this retranslation, he changes the fluidity which belongs to them in language, where they represent ever-shifting attitudes of thought and perpetually cross each other, for the fixedness of separate things. He has suffered and said 'I feel'; has contrived means to escape his suffering, and said 'I think'; but it has been the 'I' that has felt as well as thought, and has thought in its feeling."
"It is the true nemesis of human life that any spiritual impulse, not accompanied by clear comprehensive thought, is enslaved by its own realisation."
false titles
--- (1) titulus fictus
--- --- --- (a) not granted
--- --- --- (b) not granted for relevant case, place, time, or person
--- (2) titulus coloratus
--- --- --- (a) defect in grantor (e.g.,, if authorization has unknowingly lapsed)
--- --- --- (b) defect in grantee (e.g., if there is an unknown impediment)
--- --- --- (c) defect in concession (e.g., if obtained incorrectly)
--- (3) titulus simpliciter nullus
--- --- --- (a) grantor had no right to grant
--- --- --- (b) grant is manifestly defective in itself
[Titulus coloratus may suffice for jurisdition or other relevant authority if (a) there is relevant common error on the point or (b) the defect is curable, at least in principle. If the common error is common enough, or necessity intervenes, titulus fictus may also suffice.]
We human beings are often our own punishment.
thought experiments in analytic philosophy
(1) hypothetical instantiations
(2) idealizations
(3) what-if narratives
(4) allegorical fables (philosophical myths)
-- All of these require different kinds of analysis.
-- Analytic philosophers often have eccentric or even idiosyncratic visions about how to draw the lines -- e.g., many thought experiments in metaphysics are really (4) but analytic philosophers rarely treat them as such.
capacity to be and the boundedness of being (as measured by restriction among possible worlds to which it pertains, interpretating possible worlds in all its alethic-metaphysial ways -- times, locations, possibilities)
"It must be remembered that no art lives by *nature*, only by acts of voluntary attention on the part of human individuals. When these ar enot made it ceases to exist." C. S. Lewis
"Affirmation and denial is very often the expression of testimony, which is a different act of the mind and ought to be distinguished from judgment." Reid
Every religion seems to involve a system of courtesies.
fictions in which we are invested vs those in which we are not invested
to 'rekindle hearts in a world that grows chill'
"There are attitudes in man which disclose quite clearly the cahracter of his earthly situation as being a *status viae*. Such are questioning, longing, and hope." Dietrich von Hildebrand
"Philosophy implies a *wondering* about its object. In philosophy one 'wakes up' in a special way. When a man embarks upon a philosophical analysis of the world, he begins to stare at the world in wonder, instead of taking it for granted."
'listening acts' corresponding to speech acts
When we contemplate, we are as it were infused with what we contemplate.
transconsiderational identity of objects
All fictions have roots in reality.
(1) For a given Box and Diamond, not everything can be nonBoxish.
(2) Every Boxish thing is either fundamental or relative to more encompassingly Boxish things.
(3) There is a most fundamental kind of Box.
(4) Therefore there is a fundamental kind of Boxish thing.
the Holy See as an inheritor of Roman civil and tribal religion
(1) by supereminence
(2) by reception as Pontifex Maximus and as Bishop of Old Rome
(3) by long practical possession
insights as droplets and drops
In the right context, everyone is a dramatic personality.
A 'state of affairs' is an arbitrary slice of 'affairs', i.e., of actions and passions.
Every social act can be (in principle) done on another's behalf.
"Hoc nomen persona significat substantiam particularem, prout subjicitur proprietate quae sonat dignitatem." Aquinas (Sent 1.23.1.1 co)
"Persona de sui ratione dicit suppositum distinctum proprietate and dignitatem pertinente." Bonaventure (Sent 1.23.1.1 co)
"Unus enim homo ex natura sua non ordinatur ad alterius sicut ad finem." Aquinas (Sent 2.44.1.3 ad 1)
"Natura omnes hoimes aequalis in liberate fecit." (Sent 2.44.1.3 ad 1)
"Dignitas significat bonitatem alicuius propter seipsam." (Sent 3.35.1.4A co)
All talk of possibility is a way of talking about the actual.
due process and legal courtesy as grounded in jural dignity
Gricean theory seems to work best for answers to questions, because answering a question is a case in which something like the cooperative principle ("Contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the conversation") applies. Who does not cooperate, is not answering the question. And in this light the Maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner describe the conditions for answering well. But it fits so well because answers have a specific role within a larger conversational context, where that role is 'called forth' by that context, which sets an end requiring a specific kind of means.
Implicatures are often not completely required, but simply appropriate.
implicatures as often arising out of common patterns of cooperation as much as this particular cooperative context
When people give examples of implicatures, they often do not give sufficient information. The examples often really have uncertain or ambiguous implicatures.
An implicature is what is not said but ought to be understood.
The maxims relevant to implicature can vary depending on the context and kind of cooperation (hence stylishness, politeness, etc.).
What Gricean theory gets right is subordination of linguistic communication to ends; where it errs is in assuming one general and universal end. Sperber and Wilson do the same with less common sense.
One can work out an implicature by inference, and one can work out an implication by inference, but neither implicatur nor implication are inferences.
Figures of speech are not implicatures, but they may implicate; what expressions implicate may also be figurative.
"It is not love of liberty that makes men write Utopias." C. S. Lewis
Christ as archegos, making a multitude of others like himself in nobility and excellence, as an excellent family
The demos is hard to ennoble, but hard to corrupt. Both can be and have been done, however, by slow pressures.
pambasileia
-- The pambasileus has a phronesis so extraordinary that it exceeds that of the rest of the polity, thus making him a ruler that is not part of the city. In fact, he is to the polity as whole to part.
-- Aristotle raises the question of how, given the disparity, it would be possible to live in society with him (cf. Pol 3.19 1284a on the god among men, who can only be recognized by a wholly just society and inevitably is ostracized or executed by a less just polity). How does one shar ein rule with him? How can there be equality of justice between them?
Social facts are structured by reason, which is governed by natural law.
Bugbears should not be multiplied without necessity.
upward and downward transposition of ideas
Be prudent and charitable, and let God do the ecumenism.
