I am currently reading the plays of Catharine Trotter (a.k.a. Catharine Trotter Cockburn - she stopped writing plays when she married, but continued writing philosophical work, which is why in early modern philosophy she tends to be indicated with her married as well as her maiden name). They were all written and performed when she was rather young; her last play, The Revolution of Sweden, was written in 1703, when she was 24. (Her birthday, by the way, is coming up, August 16). The writing isn't spectacular, and sometimes a bit awkward, but in general is clear, clean, and vigorous. Here is a sample from Act II of The Revolution of Sweden. which I've chosen partly because it's a good sample of her writing, and partly because it's philosophical in subject-matter.
Background: The events of the play take place in Sweden during a struggle for independence. The Swedish general Gustavus Vasa is leading an army toward Stockholm to free the Swedes from Danish tyranny. The protagonists of the story are Count Arwide (a close friend of Gustavus), his wife Constantia, and Christina (the good wife of the villainous Beron). In this scene the viceroy of Sweden, Beron, and the archbishop of Upsala, all Danish sympathizers, have established themselves in Stockholm, which they are defending against the Swedish army. Constantia has been captured by the viceroy's forces, and intend to use her capture as a means of blackmailing Arwide (the "powerful Rebel") into deserting Gustavus. Here Constantia debates the archbishop.
Const. The Sacred Pow'r forbid
That my poor Country be for my Redemption,
Depriv'd of the least Aid against our Tyrants.
Oh rather let me fall a Sacrifice
To their Inhuman Vengeance!
Arch. To our Justice,
For 'tis of Right to punish lawless Rebels
In their Alliance and curst Progeny.
But Interest of State, may bate of right,
And grant your Life to awe a powerful Rebel.
Const. Wisely that branded Name has been apply'd,
For a pretence to such Barbarities,
As else must ahve bare Fac'd confess'd themselves,
In their most horrid Form.
Is it Rebellion for a wretched People
Oppress'd and Ruin'd, by that Power they gave
For their Defence, the safety of their Rights,
To seek Redress? When Kings who are in Trust
The Guardians of the Laws, the publick Peace and Welfare,
Confess no Law but Arbitrary Will,
Or know no use of Pow'r but to Oppress,
And Injure, with Impunity, themselves
Disown their Office, tacitly acquit
The People, of whose due Obedience, just
Protection, is the Natural and Essential Condition.
Arch. Excellent Maxims, to perpetuate Confusion!
Pernicious Principles! Which ev'n those
Whose turn they serve against the Reigning PRince,
Gladly disclaim when their own Pow'rs establish'd,
Then wou'd they be obey'd as Heav'ns Viceregents,
Accountable to none but him they represent.
Const. Wou'd Princes govern as if they themselves
Believ'd they were accountable to Heav'n,
There had been no occasion to contest
Whether their Pow'r be of Divine, or Humane
Institution; But when such impious Cruelties
Are practis'd, as our Sweden long has been
The Scene of (under this too justly stil'd
The Northern Nero) strong necessity,
Becomes the Peoples Casuist, proves that Piety
And Justice must allow that self-defence, to which
Nature so universally incites.
Arch. Nature indeed, for Mutiny, a Love
Of Novelty, and Spirit of Rebellion,
Are Nature in the giddy Multitude;
Humour and headstrong their Will their Casuist,
Unknowing of that specious Sophistry,
With which their Factious Leaders gild their Cause.
Not the Kings Cruelty, but too Imprudent
Partial Clemency, gave Rise to this Revolt;
Had he not spar'd the Sons of those his Justice doom'd,
Had Young Gustavus, when his Pris'ner, shar'd
His Father's Fate, the King had Reign'd securely,
And Sweden been in Peace.
Const. Most true, My Lord,
The Tyrant shou'd have spar'd no generous Swede,
Whom breach of publick Faith, the Law of Nations,
And Murther of so many Innocents,
Cou'd prompt; or to Redress, or to Avenge
Their Countries Wrongs.-----But can you thus insulting,
Or without Terror, name those noble Victims
Whose Blood still cries out for Vengeance! They, My Lord,
Were sure no Rebels, relying on the Faith
Of Treaties; Solemn Oaths, and the smooth Face of Peace,
Secure they went as to a Friendly Feast,
The Band of Union; but with barbarous Treachery,
Themselves were made th'inhumane Banquet,
To glut the Luxury of sanctify'd Revenge,
And Cruelty.
Arch. No, Rebels! Dare you vindicate those Wretches
Accurst, with sacred, solemn Excommunication.
Was not the Cause of Piety concern'd,
The Int'rest of our Holy FAith engag'd,
T'expel such Poys'nous Vipers from the Earth?
Const. The Cause of Piety! Can that Religion
Of which the Spirit, and distinctive Character
Is Mercy; forgiving Injuries and Universal Love,
Can it e'er authorize Revenge? Icite
To Persecution, and Bloody Massacres?
Well may Infidels be scandaliz'd
At our most Holy Faith, when its Professors
Themselves impute to it the most unnatural
Impieties? Well may Religions sacred Name
Be fall'n to Contempt, when thus abus'd,
To serve the vilest, the most impious Ends!
Arch. Is it for you
To judge of your Superiors, t'instruct your Guide?
When Women preach, 'twill be with Luther's Aid;
A blessed Reformation.
Const. Not to instruct, my Lord, but to awake;
You've shut your Eyes against our present Miseries
And future Dangers, else wou'd you not oppose
Your Countries Liberty, or give pretext
To Luther's growing Schism, which (with its fatal
Consequences) will all be set to the Account
Of those Ambitious Church-Men, who've turn'd
The Spiritual Pow'r, to Secular Tyrannical
Dominion, and giv'n Libertines occasion
In detecting the Usurp'd, to throw off
Undistinguish'd, the just Authority.
Arch. Insolent Assertions!
Such are th'Insinuations which support
Your Party-----But we shall quell these impious
Reformers-----Beron, lead on your Pris'ner,
We shall try if Sweden's great Deliverer
Can save himself.
["The Revolution of Sweden" (pp. 19-21), The Plays of Mary Pix and Catharine Trotter, Volume II: Catharine Trotter; Edan L. Steeves, ed. Garland Publishing (New York: 1982).]
Thursday, August 12, 2004
On the Future of Houyhnhnm Land
Since I won't be teaching early modern next term, I probably won't be using "Houyhnhnm Land" for a class. However, inspired in part by Sharon Howard's Early Modern Resources and its companion blog, Early Modern Notes, I will probably continue posting semi-regularly in order to gather together and evaluate various sorts of resources on early modern philosophy. Most of this will be on-line, although I'll probably occasionally discuss books and articles of note. One of the reasons for doing this is that the internet is something of a mess when it comes to accurate information for philosophy - there are excellent resources, but it would be helpful if people had a means of sorting it all out.
I will probably also occasionally post neater & simpler summaries and conclusions of work in early modern philosophy I've roughed out in Siris.
(Cross-posted to Houyhnhnm Land.)
I will probably also occasionally post neater & simpler summaries and conclusions of work in early modern philosophy I've roughed out in Siris.
(Cross-posted to Houyhnhnm Land.)
Just Warring
An interesting article by Michael Walzer on 'just war theory' (thanks to Ektopos for the link). I didn't disagree with much, but that's because the essay is very general. As I've noted before, I think that properly speaking 'just war theory' in the traditional (e.g., Thomistic) sense is a much more precise theory than people would like it to be. It essentially just says that someone authorized to protect a people from being harmed by their enemies can (if he is authorized to do it, i.e., assuming that the responsibility for protection isn't divided up) take active measures to protect them from being harmed by external enemies without violating justice or charity. (It gets a bit more complicated when the responsibilities of protection are divided up, but mutatis mutandis it's along the same lines in that case.) It is a theory about warfare not in the vague, general sense in which we use it, but in the sense of the actual war-activities of someone authorized to wage war. It barely extends even to the soldiers who actually fight, in an attenuated way through the ethics of obedience. It does not extend to civilians at all; their activities in war are governed by an entirely different part of the ethical theory. While it does give to the war-wager considerable room to maneuver, it also imposes sharp limits. For instance, you can feint but not lie: i.e., you can set things up so that your opponents are misled, but you cannot actually lie to them (violation of truth is violation of justice and charity; all the traditional just war theorists even up into the early modern era agree on this). It is unjust and uncharitable for bishops to fight, or for anyone to fight on high holy days - but, oh, yeah, this is because traditional 'just war theory' is explicitly and unflinchingly a Christian doctrine.
In Aquinas, there is no distinction, and can be no distinction, between jus ad bellum and jus in bello: what makes warring just or unjust is exactly the same in both. The Spanish scholastics distinguish between the two because they are interested not merely in the justice or injustice itself but in the practical reasoning, and the details of the practical reasoning of going to war is at a slightly different level than that of actually fighting the war. While I think we must allow for the latter difference, I am certain that Aquinas is right: there is no fundamental distinction between the justice of going to war and the justice of fighting in a war: it's just useful for practical purposes sometimes to distinguish them. And I think, contrary to Walzer's view, the traditional just war theory requires that we look at war as a very heavy-duty police action - messier, more complicated, less rule-governed, and less likely to end up in a but it is a different, and more terrible, manifestation of exactly the same civic protective authority. Walzer is right that it is different from domestic actions of the police, but it is the other side of the same coin.
In Aquinas, there is no distinction, and can be no distinction, between jus ad bellum and jus in bello: what makes warring just or unjust is exactly the same in both. The Spanish scholastics distinguish between the two because they are interested not merely in the justice or injustice itself but in the practical reasoning, and the details of the practical reasoning of going to war is at a slightly different level than that of actually fighting the war. While I think we must allow for the latter difference, I am certain that Aquinas is right: there is no fundamental distinction between the justice of going to war and the justice of fighting in a war: it's just useful for practical purposes sometimes to distinguish them. And I think, contrary to Walzer's view, the traditional just war theory requires that we look at war as a very heavy-duty police action - messier, more complicated, less rule-governed, and less likely to end up in a but it is a different, and more terrible, manifestation of exactly the same civic protective authority. Walzer is right that it is different from domestic actions of the police, but it is the other side of the same coin.
Wednesday, August 11, 2004
Cinematic Taste
The best (indeed, the only) good negative review of The Village I've found is at "Gnostical Turpitude," here. It has some of the ponderous, sulky silliness virtually all critical reviews of the movie have had, but makes some valid points (most of them are the obvious points, but some of them more subtle).
I have been thinking about movie reviews, and about what I like or don't like in movie reviewing. Here are some very rough preliminary thoughts - aphorisms toward a theory of Cinematic Taste.
1. It is stupid to criticize a movie simply because the basic story idea is silly, stupid, ridiculous, or trite. Take the silliest, stupidest, tritest, and most ridiculous story idea you can think of, and it could potentially make a good movie. The sillier, stupider, triter, and more ridiculous it is, the harder it might be to make a good movie from it - but good movies can be, and sometimes have been, made from worse. It's the application that needs to be considered.
2. People who review movies should try to cultivate the perspective of an impartial spectator in addition to their own perspective. That is, they need to do the hard work of trying to recognize what in their response to the movie was a matter of personal quirk and temperament, and what is something shared in common with people who are not exact clones of themselves. It can be helpful to know your own personal, quirky gut response, but if you are claiming, implicitly or explicitly, to be giving more than a description of your own gut response to the movie, you need to be able to do more than this. You need to try to see how someone might have great sympathies for a movie you hate, or how they might hate a movie you love. This is extremely difficult to do. Difficulty is not an excuse for not at least trying.
3. Plot twists do not need to be clever. As I've said before, plot in a movie is one of its least important elements. A plot twist just needs to move the whole spectacle forward. If it is clever, great. If it's not, read #1. If you still have doubts, see if you have the impudence to say Euripides doesn't know what he's doing since he has Medea ride off in the Chariot of the Sun. If you do, you have bad taste, and shouldn't review movies. Euripides' plot twists may be a weakness in his art; his art is still magnificent.
4. Very many purportedly aesthetic evaluations are really moral evaluations. Moral evaluation of movies is perfectly reasonable; but don't fool yourself about what you are doing. For instance, when I talk about "ponderous, sulky silliness," this is a moral criticism. It is a very, very weak moral criticism; but it is still a moral criticism. Words like silly, frivolous, cheap, simplistic, and clever usually involve an implicit moral evaluation; they suggest a failure to fulfill one's intellectual and social responsibilities properly. They are, whatever anyone might label them, moral evaluations, for much the same reason Aristotle and Aquinas both (rightly) considered boorishness to be a moral vice. It is only because they are moral evaluations that they add anything to the discussion. (It would be possible to use most of these words in ways that do not involve moral evaluation - e.g., you could describe a deliberately silly movie as 'silly', simply as a description - but this is the exception, not the rule.)
5. I suggest that we should follow in the case of movies the suggestion C. S. Lewis makes about literature in An Experiment in Criticism. When it all comes down, the people who are the best judges of books are those who simply love reading, in and for itself, and the books that are best are chiefly those books that these people commonly enjoy reading over and over and over again (e.g., Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice). This is limited, since a book's not being commonly read and re-read by these people doesn't necessarily mean it's not one of the best. Austen's Lady Susan, for instance, is probably the most brilliant epistolary novel ever written, and could well be one of Greats; but it's not commonly read and re-read for the simple reason that it's not commonly read in the first place. But it is true that my judgment about Lady Susan's high quality can never be as sure as my judgment about Pride and Prejudice, because it is harder to find confirmation. Still, I enjoy reading simply in and for itself, and I love Lady Susan, and read and re-read it. Not as much as Pride and Prejudice, to be sure, but quite a bit. It could be that this is purely a personal quirk; but, then again, it might not be. The parallels with movies should be fairly clear.
6. The fact that a lot of people like a movie doesn't mean it's a bad movie. The fact that a lot of people with bad taste like a movie doesn't mean it's a bad movie. Most people who hear Pachelbel's Canon or Beethoven's Für Elise like them. Most people who can manage to read Great Expectations like it. The parallel with movies should be clear. Some good works need an acquired taste or special skills. Some are easily accessible by almost everyone. But whatever work is in question, there is no one with worse taste than a snob, someone who looks down his nose at other people. If you doubt this, read #2 again.
7. You need to distinguish weaknesses from real faults. I find (when it comes to philosophy texts, for instance) that people have difficult doing this. All real faults are weaknesses; some weaknesses are not real faults, just failures to be absolutely perfect. It is no more necessary that a great movie or novel be utterly flawless than that someone presenting an argument must think of every possible objection that anyone from any point of view might at any point in time propose. Even good Homer nods; and it is stupid to demand that he never do it.
8. Keep in mind that no one is more susceptible to a legitimate tu quoque argument than someone engaged in literary, artistic, or any other form of criticism. Tailor your review accordingly.
I have been thinking about movie reviews, and about what I like or don't like in movie reviewing. Here are some very rough preliminary thoughts - aphorisms toward a theory of Cinematic Taste.
1. It is stupid to criticize a movie simply because the basic story idea is silly, stupid, ridiculous, or trite. Take the silliest, stupidest, tritest, and most ridiculous story idea you can think of, and it could potentially make a good movie. The sillier, stupider, triter, and more ridiculous it is, the harder it might be to make a good movie from it - but good movies can be, and sometimes have been, made from worse. It's the application that needs to be considered.
2. People who review movies should try to cultivate the perspective of an impartial spectator in addition to their own perspective. That is, they need to do the hard work of trying to recognize what in their response to the movie was a matter of personal quirk and temperament, and what is something shared in common with people who are not exact clones of themselves. It can be helpful to know your own personal, quirky gut response, but if you are claiming, implicitly or explicitly, to be giving more than a description of your own gut response to the movie, you need to be able to do more than this. You need to try to see how someone might have great sympathies for a movie you hate, or how they might hate a movie you love. This is extremely difficult to do. Difficulty is not an excuse for not at least trying.
3. Plot twists do not need to be clever. As I've said before, plot in a movie is one of its least important elements. A plot twist just needs to move the whole spectacle forward. If it is clever, great. If it's not, read #1. If you still have doubts, see if you have the impudence to say Euripides doesn't know what he's doing since he has Medea ride off in the Chariot of the Sun. If you do, you have bad taste, and shouldn't review movies. Euripides' plot twists may be a weakness in his art; his art is still magnificent.
4. Very many purportedly aesthetic evaluations are really moral evaluations. Moral evaluation of movies is perfectly reasonable; but don't fool yourself about what you are doing. For instance, when I talk about "ponderous, sulky silliness," this is a moral criticism. It is a very, very weak moral criticism; but it is still a moral criticism. Words like silly, frivolous, cheap, simplistic, and clever usually involve an implicit moral evaluation; they suggest a failure to fulfill one's intellectual and social responsibilities properly. They are, whatever anyone might label them, moral evaluations, for much the same reason Aristotle and Aquinas both (rightly) considered boorishness to be a moral vice. It is only because they are moral evaluations that they add anything to the discussion. (It would be possible to use most of these words in ways that do not involve moral evaluation - e.g., you could describe a deliberately silly movie as 'silly', simply as a description - but this is the exception, not the rule.)
5. I suggest that we should follow in the case of movies the suggestion C. S. Lewis makes about literature in An Experiment in Criticism. When it all comes down, the people who are the best judges of books are those who simply love reading, in and for itself, and the books that are best are chiefly those books that these people commonly enjoy reading over and over and over again (e.g., Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice). This is limited, since a book's not being commonly read and re-read by these people doesn't necessarily mean it's not one of the best. Austen's Lady Susan, for instance, is probably the most brilliant epistolary novel ever written, and could well be one of Greats; but it's not commonly read and re-read for the simple reason that it's not commonly read in the first place. But it is true that my judgment about Lady Susan's high quality can never be as sure as my judgment about Pride and Prejudice, because it is harder to find confirmation. Still, I enjoy reading simply in and for itself, and I love Lady Susan, and read and re-read it. Not as much as Pride and Prejudice, to be sure, but quite a bit. It could be that this is purely a personal quirk; but, then again, it might not be. The parallels with movies should be fairly clear.
6. The fact that a lot of people like a movie doesn't mean it's a bad movie. The fact that a lot of people with bad taste like a movie doesn't mean it's a bad movie. Most people who hear Pachelbel's Canon or Beethoven's Für Elise like them. Most people who can manage to read Great Expectations like it. The parallel with movies should be clear. Some good works need an acquired taste or special skills. Some are easily accessible by almost everyone. But whatever work is in question, there is no one with worse taste than a snob, someone who looks down his nose at other people. If you doubt this, read #2 again.
7. You need to distinguish weaknesses from real faults. I find (when it comes to philosophy texts, for instance) that people have difficult doing this. All real faults are weaknesses; some weaknesses are not real faults, just failures to be absolutely perfect. It is no more necessary that a great movie or novel be utterly flawless than that someone presenting an argument must think of every possible objection that anyone from any point of view might at any point in time propose. Even good Homer nods; and it is stupid to demand that he never do it.
8. Keep in mind that no one is more susceptible to a legitimate tu quoque argument than someone engaged in literary, artistic, or any other form of criticism. Tailor your review accordingly.
Two Poetic Offerings
Two poem drafts. The first is an older one, which borrows a great deal from the Song of Songs. I might have been reading Gerard Manley Hopkins when I wrote it.
Two Lovers
Your eyes are dove's eyes,
flicker-wing rolling dewy day,
light cast out, spark overleaping,
ruminant rivers babbling softly,
amaranthine quarry undying.
My love leaps up, hills outrising,
stag-rippling wildness of war
fleshed, flowing, cat-like-pouncing,
manifest panther light outpacing,
golden sun-chariot god-imbued.
She, a lily, bramble-surrounded,
winter-white flawless snowflake,
runs, bannered army-like with wings,
flows, outlooking leopard-mountains,
a garden sealed, belly encircled.
He pastures among lily-lands laden,
love-stirring myrrh-maddened lord,
heart-gladness leaping, cedar-scented,
mouth most sweet, distilling honey,
his chariot-car inlaid with love.
Your lips distill nectar, my bride,
honey-milk tongue with sweet voice,
heart-ravishing jewel, wine overtopping.
Your locks are wavy, raven-black,
dove-like flitting eyes, pure springs,
inmost-being-calling shepherd among lilies.
The second I wrote today while my students were taking their end-of-term exam.
The Trees Are Not Awake
The trees are not awake; they sleep,
they rest with quiet dreams about them,
as still and solemn as the mountains tall,
and only stir at gentle lover's touch
of breezes, or at roughest grasp of gales.
But never do they wake; they dream and dream,
and sleep with justice-sleep for ageless years.
But what, when endless ages pass, shall be
the ending of their sleep, and what
shall come to pass at angel's trump,
when sounds a note so loud, no sleep can stay,
but even death shall wake and dead men rise?
Then shall the trees awake, and rise in full,
and then the oak, the ash, the pine, the elm,
the rowan and the yew, they all shall live
and we, who knew them only in their sleep,
shall know the trees as though we never knew
and only then will know them as they truly are.
Your eyes are dove's eyes,
flicker-wing rolling dewy day,
light cast out, spark overleaping,
ruminant rivers babbling softly,
amaranthine quarry undying.
My love leaps up, hills outrising,
stag-rippling wildness of war
fleshed, flowing, cat-like-pouncing,
manifest panther light outpacing,
golden sun-chariot god-imbued.
She, a lily, bramble-surrounded,
winter-white flawless snowflake,
runs, bannered army-like with wings,
flows, outlooking leopard-mountains,
a garden sealed, belly encircled.
He pastures among lily-lands laden,
love-stirring myrrh-maddened lord,
heart-gladness leaping, cedar-scented,
mouth most sweet, distilling honey,
his chariot-car inlaid with love.
Your lips distill nectar, my bride,
honey-milk tongue with sweet voice,
heart-ravishing jewel, wine overtopping.
Your locks are wavy, raven-black,
dove-like flitting eyes, pure springs,
inmost-being-calling shepherd among lilies.
The second I wrote today while my students were taking their end-of-term exam.
The trees are not awake; they sleep,
they rest with quiet dreams about them,
as still and solemn as the mountains tall,
and only stir at gentle lover's touch
of breezes, or at roughest grasp of gales.
But never do they wake; they dream and dream,
and sleep with justice-sleep for ageless years.
But what, when endless ages pass, shall be
the ending of their sleep, and what
shall come to pass at angel's trump,
when sounds a note so loud, no sleep can stay,
but even death shall wake and dead men rise?
Then shall the trees awake, and rise in full,
and then the oak, the ash, the pine, the elm,
the rowan and the yew, they all shall live
and we, who knew them only in their sleep,
shall know the trees as though we never knew
and only then will know them as they truly are.
Christian Carnival XXX
The newest Christian Carnival is up at "Beyond The Rim...". I submitted my recent post on Trinitarian theology (one of my better posts in recent memory), which is here. As usual many of the submissions were great - indeed, I liked a lot of them this time. Some of the ones I found most notable:
* Reformation at "Minas Tirith"
* Evagrius Ponticus, John, and Barsanuphius at "Dunmoose the Ageless"
* Birthday Reflections at "Fringe" (We Augustborn should stick together)
* Jeremy Pierce has, as usual, an excellent contribution on Lying at "Parableman"
* August Ninth: the martyrs, confessors, and innocents of World War II - I linked to this before
* La Shawn Barber criticizes Jesse Jackson in Jesus Was A Liberal at "La Shawn Barber's Corner"
* Thoughts on Weddings at "matt-hall.net"
* Why God Hates Sin at "Miss O'Hara's"
* God's Omnipresence at "Rebecca Writes"
And the others are good, too. Go over and see.
* Reformation at "Minas Tirith"
* Evagrius Ponticus, John, and Barsanuphius at "Dunmoose the Ageless"
* Birthday Reflections at "Fringe" (We Augustborn should stick together)
* Jeremy Pierce has, as usual, an excellent contribution on Lying at "Parableman"
* August Ninth: the martyrs, confessors, and innocents of World War II - I linked to this before
* La Shawn Barber criticizes Jesse Jackson in Jesus Was A Liberal at "La Shawn Barber's Corner"
* Thoughts on Weddings at "matt-hall.net"
* Why God Hates Sin at "Miss O'Hara's"
* God's Omnipresence at "Rebecca Writes"
And the others are good, too. Go over and see.
Tuesday, August 10, 2004
The Animal that Stands to See the Stars
I came up with this on the spur of the moment last night.
All the Skeptics Do Not Know
All the skeptics do not know
The blowing courses of the snow
Nor the sun in burning sky;
All incessant mewling 'why'
Must cease before the flood of light
That bursts upon the end of night.
We feel the wind upon our face
And know the loves of all our race,
For this, and this alone, is why
The minds of men so doomed to die
Look up, as bodies rise from land
And tall and proud begin to stand
With eyes that pierce the sea-mists far --
Awed at heaven with its stars.
The allusion toward the end is to Aquinas, who in a discussion of the aptness of the body for human intellectual life considers our upright stature. He gives four reasons why it is fitting for a rational animal to stand upright, and the first is this:
I seem vaguely to remember a passage somewhere, though, in which Aquinas is even more specific, and, building on something Aristotle says, notes that we are upright in order to see the stars (astronomy being the first awakening of systematic knowledge). Has anyone come across this passage?
All the Skeptics Do Not Know
All the skeptics do not know
The blowing courses of the snow
Nor the sun in burning sky;
All incessant mewling 'why'
Must cease before the flood of light
That bursts upon the end of night.
We feel the wind upon our face
And know the loves of all our race,
For this, and this alone, is why
The minds of men so doomed to die
Look up, as bodies rise from land
And tall and proud begin to stand
With eyes that pierce the sea-mists far --
Awed at heaven with its stars.
The allusion toward the end is to Aquinas, who in a discussion of the aptness of the body for human intellectual life considers our upright stature. He gives four reasons why it is fitting for a rational animal to stand upright, and the first is this:
First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things.
I seem vaguely to remember a passage somewhere, though, in which Aquinas is even more specific, and, building on something Aristotle says, notes that we are upright in order to see the stars (astronomy being the first awakening of systematic knowledge). Has anyone come across this passage?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)