I had to walk home to get something before I settle myself in for a long night's work here. As I left the department, there was a stunning sunset sky overhead. So, as I walked I made this up, and then scribbled it down when I got home.
Skies
I grow sad when I think of wondrous skies
that have never been seen by human eyes
nor ever painted by artists' hands,
that mightily hang over times and lands
beyond where the reckoning mind can go,
sad when I look to the heavens and know
as another sunrise or sunset begins
that there are, uncaptured by the camera's lens,
such skies as this, and even more fair,
for which no artist ever did care,
though it deserved to hang where the Masters are,
more lovely than all their works by far,
and deserved to be loved for a million years,
but, alas! in a moment it disappears,
to be seen never again by human eye;
I grow sad when I think of that vanishing sky.
A bit rough, but not bad for off the top of my head as I was walking (I've done much worse under such circumstances).
Saturday, August 14, 2004
From a Letter by Mary Astell
The following is the opening of Letter V of the Letters Concerning the Love of God, a correspondence between Astell and Norris on the "Seraphick" subject of love. This selection doesn't get into very much of the heavier thought of the letters, but I have picked this one out for several reasons.
1. It contains Astell's description of her philosophical work, "I have courted Truth with a kind of Romantick Passion," which is one of my favorite summations of philosophy ever.
2. It gives something of the situation of women in the late 17th century, as seen from the perspective of a largely self-taught woman of considerable brilliance.
3. It also conveys Astell's sense of the purpose of philosophical thought, and its role with regard to the development of the human person.
This letter was written December 12, 1693. After this opening, she goes on to clarify their common ground the question they had previously been discussing (whether God is the cause of pain), and then, because she has been asked by Norris to do so, to present her views on the nature and effects of love of God. They spend most of the rest of the correspondence on this topic. It becomes a rather substantive philosophical discussion that grows out of a philosophical agreement. It is not, as most significant philosophical correspondences are, an epistolary debate; rather, it is an epistolary collaboration in which they both assist each other in clarifying various issues related to their topic of discussion.
______________
Sir,
So candid and condescending a Treatment of a Stranger, a Woman, and so inconsiderable an one as my self, shews you to be as much above the Generality of the World in your Practice, as you are in your Theory and Speculation. Hitherto I have courted Truth with a kind of Romantick Passion, in spite of all Difficulties and Discouragements : for knowledge is thought so unnecessary an Accomplishment for a Woman, that few will give themselves the Trouble to assits us in the Attainment of it. Not considering that the improvement of one single Soul is an Employment more worthy of a wise Man, than most of those things to which Custom appropriates the Name of Business and Affairs. But now, since you have so generously put into my Hand an Opportunity of obtaining what I so greedily long after, that I may make the best Improvement of so great an Advantage, I give up my self entirely to your Conduct, so far as is consistent with a rational not blind Obedience, bring a free and unprejudiced Mind to receive from your Hand such Gravings and Impressions as shall seem most convenient, and though I can't engage for a prompt and comprehensive Genius, yet I will for a docible Temper.
The Esteem I have for those necessary and useful Rules you have already presribed, shall appear by my strict Observation of them : For indeed the Span of Life is too short to be trifled away in unconcerning and unprofitable Matters; and that Soul who has any Sense of a better Life, can't chuse but desire that every minute of her Time may be employed in the regulating of her Will with the most critical Exactness, and the extending her Understanding to its utmost stretch, that so she may obtain the most enlarg'd Knowledge and ample Fruition of GOD her only Good, that her Nature is capable of.
1. It contains Astell's description of her philosophical work, "I have courted Truth with a kind of Romantick Passion," which is one of my favorite summations of philosophy ever.
2. It gives something of the situation of women in the late 17th century, as seen from the perspective of a largely self-taught woman of considerable brilliance.
3. It also conveys Astell's sense of the purpose of philosophical thought, and its role with regard to the development of the human person.
This letter was written December 12, 1693. After this opening, she goes on to clarify their common ground the question they had previously been discussing (whether God is the cause of pain), and then, because she has been asked by Norris to do so, to present her views on the nature and effects of love of God. They spend most of the rest of the correspondence on this topic. It becomes a rather substantive philosophical discussion that grows out of a philosophical agreement. It is not, as most significant philosophical correspondences are, an epistolary debate; rather, it is an epistolary collaboration in which they both assist each other in clarifying various issues related to their topic of discussion.
______________
Sir,
So candid and condescending a Treatment of a Stranger, a Woman, and so inconsiderable an one as my self, shews you to be as much above the Generality of the World in your Practice, as you are in your Theory and Speculation. Hitherto I have courted Truth with a kind of Romantick Passion, in spite of all Difficulties and Discouragements : for knowledge is thought so unnecessary an Accomplishment for a Woman, that few will give themselves the Trouble to assits us in the Attainment of it. Not considering that the improvement of one single Soul is an Employment more worthy of a wise Man, than most of those things to which Custom appropriates the Name of Business and Affairs. But now, since you have so generously put into my Hand an Opportunity of obtaining what I so greedily long after, that I may make the best Improvement of so great an Advantage, I give up my self entirely to your Conduct, so far as is consistent with a rational not blind Obedience, bring a free and unprejudiced Mind to receive from your Hand such Gravings and Impressions as shall seem most convenient, and though I can't engage for a prompt and comprehensive Genius, yet I will for a docible Temper.
The Esteem I have for those necessary and useful Rules you have already presribed, shall appear by my strict Observation of them : For indeed the Span of Life is too short to be trifled away in unconcerning and unprofitable Matters; and that Soul who has any Sense of a better Life, can't chuse but desire that every minute of her Time may be employed in the regulating of her Will with the most critical Exactness, and the extending her Understanding to its utmost stretch, that so she may obtain the most enlarg'd Knowledge and ample Fruition of GOD her only Good, that her Nature is capable of.
Friday, August 13, 2004
Support Our Linkage Sponsors (and Miscellaneous Topics)
I've been meaning to get around to neighborliness again, but it's just one of those things that keeps slipping away. So, since I'm here for the night to do some much needed work on a chapter, I might as well take a bit of a break to get it done. As near as I can tell from Technorati and BlogShares, these are most of the weblogs that have blogrolled me:
Parableman
The Elfin Ethicist
Early Modern Notes
Catholic Ragemonkey
A Journey Through Time
(There are a few I haven't listed because, since they blog on more personal matters, I don't know if they would want to be listed. You should know who you are; if you want to be listed, let me know by comments or e-mail.) But I know this is incomplete, because there's at least one more:
Cliopatria
BlogShares didn't pick it up because it's always rather behind. I'm not sure why Technorati didn't. In any case, if you have blogrolled me and aren't listed here, and want to be mentioned, let me know.
In any case, these are all great sites, and worthy of your time.
It might be worthwhile, since I'm on the subject, to say something about my own blogroll. In general, the following rules are in play:
1. I only blogroll sites that are updated fairly often; I'm the Cookie Monster of intellectual tidbits, so I need constant feeding.
2. I prefer not to blogroll political bloggers, by which I mean people who blog chiefly on partisan politics. Political bloggers are the parasitic scum of the blogosphere. Well, that's a little extreme. But, in general, I don't think it a good use of my blogroll to reward political blogging. This isn't an absolutely hard-and-fast rule, but if a political blogger gets on my blogroll it's because they(*) at least semi-regularly blog on something that I find more interesting (I think I tend to go easier on political mavericks, too, but I'm not sure). And naturally, many weblogs that would not be considered 'political' under my definition here nonetheless talk about politics: it's just that they do it as a reasonable part of a more important project (religion is the primary one, but there are others like philosophy and history). "More important" is the operative phrase.
3. And, of course, I have to like reading it!
(*) Yes, I am aware that "political blogger" is singular; but "they" is the most convenient neutral pronoun. I don't have a problem with, but can see the reason for changing, the generic "he", but I am beginning to have a considerable distaste for the continual writing of "he or she". I am what I have arbitrarily called a linguistic exemplarist: that is, I think a major guide to language usage should be the example of the greatest literary writers in the language. My full rules (the stupid names for them are off the top of my head):
1. The Exemplarity Rule: Do what the greats do - if you, like they, can get away with doing it.
2. The St. Paul Rule: All things are permissible but not all things are edifying; avoid in any particular case what is likely to be especially scandalous to others.
3. The Shining Use Rule: If it has a clear use and value for the great traditional strengths of English (vigorous balance and balanced vigor, the famous English 'punch' or 'impression'), don't be afraid to use it if the occasion allows for it. (Example: whom, which neatly differentiates the objective, as in: Whom shall we send and who will go for us? Example: subjunctive, as in: Would it were so, but it is not so. Example: y'all, which provides a lovely second person general plural that is transformable to the second person universal plural construction "all y'all", as in: All y'all need to wash up, and y'all also need to decide what to do today. Example: the Newfie after-perfect, as in: What are you after-doing now? - which is a presentist version of the sentence "What have you done?")
For Rule 1, see this great site on Jane Austen's extensive use of the singular 'their' and 'they', which also notes other authors who use it: "Geoffrey Chaucer, Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare, the King James Bible, The Spectator, Jonathan Swift, Daniel Defoe, Frances Sheridan, Oliver Goldsmith, Henry Fielding, Maria Edgeworth, Percy Shelley, Lord Byron, William Makepeace Thackeray, Sir Walter Scott, George Eliot, Charles Dickens, Mrs. Gaskell, Anthony Trollope, John Ruskin, Robert Louis Stevenson, Walt Whitman, George Bernard Shaw, Lewis Carroll, Oscar Wilde, Rudyard Kipling, H. G. Wells, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Edith Wharton, W. H. Auden, Lord Dunsany, George Orwell, and C. S. Lewis." This is good company. Good company means (as a rule) good grammar (in a previous post, "Marginalia," I argued this with regard to the phrase "different than"). Indeed, this is the best company; if you aren't getting your prose skills from these people, from what source are you getting them?
Rule 2 is much more of a judgment call. For a good example of when Rule 2 is obviously in play, consider this example from Pride and Prejudice:
"Of whom does Jane ever think ill? And who is there, whatever might be their former conduct, that she would believe capable of such an attempt, till it were proved against them?"
Did you even notice it? If the style is good, the singular use of 'they' and other such forms works beautifully. Even if it were not so, you use it yourself. You know you do. But there are types of writing in which this construction should be avoided, because it will cause scandal. I don't recall ever having used it in a philosophy paper, but philosophers seem to get inordinately distracted by grammatical issues when they read philosophy papers. I have heard them fuss at great length over prepositions at the end of sentences; although split infinitives seem to get under their radar. So I wouldn't recommend it for a philosophy paper. I wouldn't recommend it for a school assignment, either. But in a blogging environment we can tolerate a bit of informality and thumb our noses at the Vigilantes - as long as we do it deliberately.
Rule 3 is obviously in play here; what else would be the reason for its occurrence, despite scolding grammarians, in practically all the major prose stylists in the English language?
Wow, this has been a Miscellany.
Parableman
The Elfin Ethicist
Early Modern Notes
Catholic Ragemonkey
A Journey Through Time
(There are a few I haven't listed because, since they blog on more personal matters, I don't know if they would want to be listed. You should know who you are; if you want to be listed, let me know by comments or e-mail.) But I know this is incomplete, because there's at least one more:
Cliopatria
BlogShares didn't pick it up because it's always rather behind. I'm not sure why Technorati didn't. In any case, if you have blogrolled me and aren't listed here, and want to be mentioned, let me know.
In any case, these are all great sites, and worthy of your time.
It might be worthwhile, since I'm on the subject, to say something about my own blogroll. In general, the following rules are in play:
1. I only blogroll sites that are updated fairly often; I'm the Cookie Monster of intellectual tidbits, so I need constant feeding.
2. I prefer not to blogroll political bloggers, by which I mean people who blog chiefly on partisan politics. Political bloggers are the parasitic scum of the blogosphere. Well, that's a little extreme. But, in general, I don't think it a good use of my blogroll to reward political blogging. This isn't an absolutely hard-and-fast rule, but if a political blogger gets on my blogroll it's because they(*) at least semi-regularly blog on something that I find more interesting (I think I tend to go easier on political mavericks, too, but I'm not sure). And naturally, many weblogs that would not be considered 'political' under my definition here nonetheless talk about politics: it's just that they do it as a reasonable part of a more important project (religion is the primary one, but there are others like philosophy and history). "More important" is the operative phrase.
3. And, of course, I have to like reading it!
(*) Yes, I am aware that "political blogger" is singular; but "they" is the most convenient neutral pronoun. I don't have a problem with, but can see the reason for changing, the generic "he", but I am beginning to have a considerable distaste for the continual writing of "he or she". I am what I have arbitrarily called a linguistic exemplarist: that is, I think a major guide to language usage should be the example of the greatest literary writers in the language. My full rules (the stupid names for them are off the top of my head):
1. The Exemplarity Rule: Do what the greats do - if you, like they, can get away with doing it.
2. The St. Paul Rule: All things are permissible but not all things are edifying; avoid in any particular case what is likely to be especially scandalous to others.
3. The Shining Use Rule: If it has a clear use and value for the great traditional strengths of English (vigorous balance and balanced vigor, the famous English 'punch' or 'impression'), don't be afraid to use it if the occasion allows for it. (Example: whom, which neatly differentiates the objective, as in: Whom shall we send and who will go for us? Example: subjunctive, as in: Would it were so, but it is not so. Example: y'all, which provides a lovely second person general plural that is transformable to the second person universal plural construction "all y'all", as in: All y'all need to wash up, and y'all also need to decide what to do today. Example: the Newfie after-perfect, as in: What are you after-doing now? - which is a presentist version of the sentence "What have you done?")
For Rule 1, see this great site on Jane Austen's extensive use of the singular 'their' and 'they', which also notes other authors who use it: "Geoffrey Chaucer, Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare, the King James Bible, The Spectator, Jonathan Swift, Daniel Defoe, Frances Sheridan, Oliver Goldsmith, Henry Fielding, Maria Edgeworth, Percy Shelley, Lord Byron, William Makepeace Thackeray, Sir Walter Scott, George Eliot, Charles Dickens, Mrs. Gaskell, Anthony Trollope, John Ruskin, Robert Louis Stevenson, Walt Whitman, George Bernard Shaw, Lewis Carroll, Oscar Wilde, Rudyard Kipling, H. G. Wells, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Edith Wharton, W. H. Auden, Lord Dunsany, George Orwell, and C. S. Lewis." This is good company. Good company means (as a rule) good grammar (in a previous post, "Marginalia," I argued this with regard to the phrase "different than"). Indeed, this is the best company; if you aren't getting your prose skills from these people, from what source are you getting them?
Rule 2 is much more of a judgment call. For a good example of when Rule 2 is obviously in play, consider this example from Pride and Prejudice:
"Of whom does Jane ever think ill? And who is there, whatever might be their former conduct, that she would believe capable of such an attempt, till it were proved against them?"
Did you even notice it? If the style is good, the singular use of 'they' and other such forms works beautifully. Even if it were not so, you use it yourself. You know you do. But there are types of writing in which this construction should be avoided, because it will cause scandal. I don't recall ever having used it in a philosophy paper, but philosophers seem to get inordinately distracted by grammatical issues when they read philosophy papers. I have heard them fuss at great length over prepositions at the end of sentences; although split infinitives seem to get under their radar. So I wouldn't recommend it for a philosophy paper. I wouldn't recommend it for a school assignment, either. But in a blogging environment we can tolerate a bit of informality and thumb our noses at the Vigilantes - as long as we do it deliberately.
Rule 3 is obviously in play here; what else would be the reason for its occurrence, despite scolding grammarians, in practically all the major prose stylists in the English language?
Wow, this has been a Miscellany.
Not Very Surprising, But No Oracle, Either
According to the SelectSmart.com ethical philosophy quiz, these are my three closest matches (I think #1 is automatically set to 100%):
1. Thomas Aquinas 100%
2. Augustine 90%
3. Plato 88%
That Aristotle was fifth at 78% wasn't surprising either. That Bentham was fourth at 87%, however, is a sign of the fallibility of internet quizzes.
1. Thomas Aquinas 100%
2. Augustine 90%
3. Plato 88%
That Aristotle was fifth at 78% wasn't surprising either. That Bentham was fourth at 87%, however, is a sign of the fallibility of internet quizzes.
The Self-obedience of the People
The following is from the writings of James Wilson (1742-1798), who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution for Pennsylvania, and served as one of the first Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. His most famous opinion was in Chisolm v. Georgia (which is worth reading, if only to contrast its philosophical astuteness with the gobbledy-gook that passes for Supreme Court opinions these days). Additional writings can be found here.
"The question, which has been proposed--the question, in the negative answer to which, tyranny has triumphed so long and so generally--the question, concerning which philosophers and patriots have indulged, and been pleased with indulging, a contrary sentiment--the question, which, in the United States, is now put upon an experiment--this all-important question is--not merely nor chiefly--are men capable of governing? Of this, even tyrants will admit the affirmative; and will point to themselves as living proofs of its truth. But the question is--are men capable of governing themselves? In other words; are they qualified--and are they disposed to be their own masters? For a moral as well as an intellectual capability is involved in the question. In still other words; are they qualified--and are they disposed to obey themselves? For to government, the correlative inseparable is obedience. To think, to speak, or to act, as if the former may be exercised, and, at the same time, the latter may not be performed, is to think, to speak, or to act, in a manner the most contradictory and absurd."
"The question, which has been proposed--the question, in the negative answer to which, tyranny has triumphed so long and so generally--the question, concerning which philosophers and patriots have indulged, and been pleased with indulging, a contrary sentiment--the question, which, in the United States, is now put upon an experiment--this all-important question is--not merely nor chiefly--are men capable of governing? Of this, even tyrants will admit the affirmative; and will point to themselves as living proofs of its truth. But the question is--are men capable of governing themselves? In other words; are they qualified--and are they disposed to be their own masters? For a moral as well as an intellectual capability is involved in the question. In still other words; are they qualified--and are they disposed to obey themselves? For to government, the correlative inseparable is obedience. To think, to speak, or to act, as if the former may be exercised, and, at the same time, the latter may not be performed, is to think, to speak, or to act, in a manner the most contradictory and absurd."
Bleg on Early Modern Philosophical Resources
I have begun doing some of the preliminary work of hunting down on-line resources for early modern philosophy to put up in Houyhnhnm Land. Currently I have some preliminary lists up on Catharine Trotter Cockburn and Mary Astell, without much evaluation (I'm starting with philosophers for whom there is a scarcity of good information), but the list will expand over the next month or so. If anyone reading this (now or in the future) has placed on-line any significant resources on any thinkers that are listed (significant = more than just a brief mention), especially articles or papers on their work, or selections from their original works, or if you have come across such resources, please contact me at bwatson{at}chass{dot}utoronto{dot}ca.
Currently I am simply dividing up resources into "Little Bits" (elementary information and blurbs), "Somewhat More Substantive" (general overviews and slightly more extended discussions of particular points related to philosophy), "Significant" (developed research on the philosophical views - currently I have none in this category), and "Actual Works". My ideal would be able to have lots of real research, rather than the very elementary introductory stuff that currently seems to be about all that's there; but we have to work with what we can get.
Currently I am simply dividing up resources into "Little Bits" (elementary information and blurbs), "Somewhat More Substantive" (general overviews and slightly more extended discussions of particular points related to philosophy), "Significant" (developed research on the philosophical views - currently I have none in this category), and "Actual Works". My ideal would be able to have lots of real research, rather than the very elementary introductory stuff that currently seems to be about all that's there; but we have to work with what we can get.
Thursday, August 12, 2004
Existential Angst and Eternal Being
Since the anniversary of the death of Edith Stein was just recently, and I missed doing anything special for it, I thought that I would give a belated commemoration of some sort. Since I haven't found all that much on her philosophical work, I thought I'd summarize some interesting argument from her masterpiece, Finite and Eternal Being. In doing this, I face two obstacles. The first is that, not having all that much background in phenomenology, I might be getting in a bit over my head. The second is that it's hard to isolate any particular argument. The whole book is one long interwoven discussion involving interactions with Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and her close friend and fellow phenomenologist, Hedwig Conrad-Martius; while Maritain, Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross, Husserl, and even Heidegger occasionally show up to make contributions. (For an account of the friendship between Stein and Conrad-Martius, see this post at the weblog, "A Catholic Blog for Lovers.") So I'll have to abstract from a great deal, and just give a rough, crude summary. I don't intend to provide anything in the way of evaluation here, but only to call attention to the argument by laying out some of its more prominent features.
The argument I've chosen is in some sense the starting point of Finite and Eternal Being. "Whenever the human mind in its quest for truth has sought an indubitably certain point of departure," she says, "it always encountered the inescapable fact of its own being or existence" (FEB p. 35 - all citations are from the ICS translation). She cites in this connection Descartes, Augustine, and Husserl. The Sum, the "I am" is the most primordial knowledge available to us. It is not the first knowledge, in the sense of being temporally or logically first, but it is the most intimate and immediate knowledge one has, when one has it. This certitude of one's own existence is prior to reflection; in self-knowledge, she says, "the intellect relinquishes its natural attitude of being concerned with external objects in order to turn upon itself" (p. 37).
This being that I am, when brought into focus, has what Stein calls the dual aspect of being and not-being. I am "unable to endure this dual perspective," i.e., I experience this duality in my non-permanence or temporality; from this she concludes that "the being of which I am conscious as mine is inseparable from temporality" (p. 37). To be me is to be through time, to be in flux. But in this flux we as it were 'break apart'; our perspective is dual: we recognize both non-being and being in our change. This gives us the idea of pure being which, in itself, has no mixture of not-being, whether that of the no-longer or that of the not-yet. Pure being is eternal:
In recognizing being and not-being within ourselves, actuality and potentiality simultaneously begin to come into focus. The being manifested to ourselves in self-knowledge is manifested as actually present; but it contains in itself the potentiality of future actual being and presupposes the potentiality of past actual being: "My present being is simultaneously actual and potential being; and insofar as it is actual, it is the concrete realization of a possibility which antecedes my present actuality" (pp. 38-39). The ego, the I, lives, and is, and is actual, but not enduringly so. It is in a constant state of passing: it is a being thrown into existence [Dasein]. It has been placed into existence; it is received being.
Whence is it received? Either the ego receives its life from the worlds it experiences (external, internal, or both) or it owes its being directly to pure being itself. The two are not, of course, mutually exclusive. What is our relation to pure being? My own being is a being that involves not-being, as we have noted; but it also involves being "in touch with the fullness of being" (p. 55), as we also have noted. Once we grasp the idea of pure act or eternal being, this idea becomes the measure of our being - we approximate it in various ways from moment to moment. But, Stein asks, how do we learn to see eternal being as our source or cause? We get a feel for the nullity and transiency involved in our being from (among other things) existential dread:
(The quote is from Heidegger, Being and Time.) However, this angst (=dread or anxiety doesn't dominate our lives; we have what might be called a feeling of security, a trust in our own continuance. This is something to wonder at, because we are clearly transient creatures, indeed, always in flux and always a hair's breadth from death. Is this all due to an illusion or self-deception? Is it purely irrational? No, because this exposure to the possibility of nothingness is counterbalanced by our exposure to the certainty of being. In this we rest secure. But this security is not self-given; it is received, and thus, Stein notes, "In my own being, then, I encounter another kind of being that is not mine but that is the support and ground of my own unsupported and groundless being" (p. 58). There isn't much detail to this feeling of security; it needs to be clarified.
Stein identifies two ways in which we may become aware of eternal being as the source of our own being. The first is the way of faith, and the second is the way of discursive reasoning. In the way of faith, God reveals himself as I AM, as Creator, as Sustainer, as Life-giver. In the way of philosophy or discursive reasoning, she argues that my being, which is received being, and like all finite being, cannot have its ultimate origin and source in another received being. We must, as it were, trace ourselves back to necessary being. This converts the very vague feeling of security we feel in feeling ourselves anchored in being into something more robust. The way of discursive knowledge, however, fails to do much more than give us a clearer terminology, a tidied-up grasp of this very vague feeling; the way of faith, on the other hand, "reveals to us the God of personal nearness, the loving and merciful God, and therewith we are given a certitude which no natural knowledge can impart" (p. 60). But the way of faith is also a dark way; it is a condescension. She quotes Augustine's gloss on God's words in Exodus 3: "For this, I am who am--that pertains to me. But this, the God of Abraham and the God of Jacob, pertains to your understanding" (p. 60). The first is true, but in a sense incomprehensible; but the latter is adapted to our understanding. When it comes to knowing God, all ways are dark ways; the Light is so bright it blinds us.
The argument I've chosen is in some sense the starting point of Finite and Eternal Being. "Whenever the human mind in its quest for truth has sought an indubitably certain point of departure," she says, "it always encountered the inescapable fact of its own being or existence" (FEB p. 35 - all citations are from the ICS translation). She cites in this connection Descartes, Augustine, and Husserl. The Sum, the "I am" is the most primordial knowledge available to us. It is not the first knowledge, in the sense of being temporally or logically first, but it is the most intimate and immediate knowledge one has, when one has it. This certitude of one's own existence is prior to reflection; in self-knowledge, she says, "the intellect relinquishes its natural attitude of being concerned with external objects in order to turn upon itself" (p. 37).
This being that I am, when brought into focus, has what Stein calls the dual aspect of being and not-being. I am "unable to endure this dual perspective," i.e., I experience this duality in my non-permanence or temporality; from this she concludes that "the being of which I am conscious as mine is inseparable from temporality" (p. 37). To be me is to be through time, to be in flux. But in this flux we as it were 'break apart'; our perspective is dual: we recognize both non-being and being in our change. This gives us the idea of pure being which, in itself, has no mixture of not-being, whether that of the no-longer or that of the not-yet. Pure being is eternal:
And thus eternal and temporal, immutable and mutable being (and also not-being) are ideas which the intellect encounters within itself; they are not borrowed from anything outside itself. This means that we have now found a legitimate point of departure for a philosophy base don natural reason and natural knowledge. (p. 37)
In recognizing being and not-being within ourselves, actuality and potentiality simultaneously begin to come into focus. The being manifested to ourselves in self-knowledge is manifested as actually present; but it contains in itself the potentiality of future actual being and presupposes the potentiality of past actual being: "My present being is simultaneously actual and potential being; and insofar as it is actual, it is the concrete realization of a possibility which antecedes my present actuality" (pp. 38-39). The ego, the I, lives, and is, and is actual, but not enduringly so. It is in a constant state of passing: it is a being thrown into existence [Dasein]. It has been placed into existence; it is received being.
Whence is it received? Either the ego receives its life from the worlds it experiences (external, internal, or both) or it owes its being directly to pure being itself. The two are not, of course, mutually exclusive. What is our relation to pure being? My own being is a being that involves not-being, as we have noted; but it also involves being "in touch with the fullness of being" (p. 55), as we also have noted. Once we grasp the idea of pure act or eternal being, this idea becomes the measure of our being - we approximate it in various ways from moment to moment. But, Stein asks, how do we learn to see eternal being as our source or cause? We get a feel for the nullity and transiency involved in our being from (among other things) existential dread:
Existential anxiety accompanies the unredeemed human being throughout life and in many disguises--as fear of this or that particular thing or being. In the last analysis, however, this anxiety or dread is the fear of being no more, and it is thus the experience of anxiety which "brings people face to face with nothingness." (p. 57)
(The quote is from Heidegger, Being and Time.) However, this angst (=dread or anxiety doesn't dominate our lives; we have what might be called a feeling of security, a trust in our own continuance. This is something to wonder at, because we are clearly transient creatures, indeed, always in flux and always a hair's breadth from death. Is this all due to an illusion or self-deception? Is it purely irrational? No, because this exposure to the possibility of nothingness is counterbalanced by our exposure to the certainty of being. In this we rest secure. But this security is not self-given; it is received, and thus, Stein notes, "In my own being, then, I encounter another kind of being that is not mine but that is the support and ground of my own unsupported and groundless being" (p. 58). There isn't much detail to this feeling of security; it needs to be clarified.
Stein identifies two ways in which we may become aware of eternal being as the source of our own being. The first is the way of faith, and the second is the way of discursive reasoning. In the way of faith, God reveals himself as I AM, as Creator, as Sustainer, as Life-giver. In the way of philosophy or discursive reasoning, she argues that my being, which is received being, and like all finite being, cannot have its ultimate origin and source in another received being. We must, as it were, trace ourselves back to necessary being. This converts the very vague feeling of security we feel in feeling ourselves anchored in being into something more robust. The way of discursive knowledge, however, fails to do much more than give us a clearer terminology, a tidied-up grasp of this very vague feeling; the way of faith, on the other hand, "reveals to us the God of personal nearness, the loving and merciful God, and therewith we are given a certitude which no natural knowledge can impart" (p. 60). But the way of faith is also a dark way; it is a condescension. She quotes Augustine's gloss on God's words in Exodus 3: "For this, I am who am--that pertains to me. But this, the God of Abraham and the God of Jacob, pertains to your understanding" (p. 60). The first is true, but in a sense incomprehensible; but the latter is adapted to our understanding. When it comes to knowing God, all ways are dark ways; the Light is so bright it blinds us.
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