Tuesday, March 15, 2005

A Pictorial Doubt about a Form of Determinism

There is a past state and a present state:

[past] [now]

A common determinist claim is that the whole state of the world at moment t (the past moment) entails a given state at t' (the present moment):

[past] -> [now]

However, we might ask how it is that anything in the past logically entails anything in the present. The events of the past as such don't appear to yield such an entailment. Therefore, it must be the union of the past state with some supposition or set of suppositions that overarch both the past and the present. This supposition cannot, however, be simply general (for the most part) in its application, because that introduces something less than an entailment:

~~~~~~~~~~~
[past] ~> [now]

So it must be one that is much stronger:

___________
[past] -> [now]

In other words, it has to be a universal and necessary [that should read: non-probabilistic--ed.] supposition. Now the question is: we are supposed to believe

__________
[past] [now]

rather than the weaker

~~~~~~~~~~
[past] [now]

But it seems this could not be established by empirical evidence without begging the question. And it does not seem there is any necessary truth that overarches past and present in such a way that it requires us to say that the present state is logically entailed by the past state, at least none that wouldn't highly controversial. So what could it be?

Another Poem Draft

Coursing Star

Leap up, high star, at the voice of your Maker,
Leap up and rejoice at eternity's song.
In the spinning of the stars, He is there.
In the streaming of the dust, He is there.
In the fire and morning light, He is there.
Golden in the pond a water lily turns,
Bright in its flashing, rippling the pool.
Leap up, bright lily; leap up, coursing star!
Ripple your praises in harmonic creation.
Leap up, great fire; leap up with delight!
In the height of your fire forge living song.
In a canyon shouts echo, rebounding,
Resounding, returning, touching all things.
Leap up, coursing star, with your echoing light;
With your echoing force turn wandering worlds.
Leap up, coursing star, flying through spaces;
Sing with your brethren the praise of the Lord!

Monday, March 14, 2005

Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Philosophical Fairy Tale

I'm currently reading Paul Wood's edition of Thomas Reid's correspondence, so I will probably be putting up interesting things from it the next few weeks. Here's the first, a selection from a letter to Lord Kames (14 February 1763). I have modified the punctuation and capitalization a bit to make it easier to read. It has intrigue, romance, and nefarious plots. It does not, however, have Rodents of Unusual Size.

*****

"Do not primary and secondary qualities in Philosophy put your Lordship in mind of two partners in a Country Dance? They stand cheek by joul for a long time very cordially. They they set, cast off, and turn their backs as if mutually affronted and never to see one another any more. After some time they meet as good friends as ever; set, cast off again, and so on to the end of the Dance, when they are found hand to hand, in perfect friendship.

"In the first ages of the world when Common Sense reigned uncontrouled by the subtleties of philosophy, primary and secondary qualities dwelt peaceably under the same roof and were joynt proprietors of the same subject, body. Democritus and Epicurus set them at variance. And pretending to find out that secondary qualities were mere spectres and illusions of sense, they banished them to Fairy Land. Aristotle took compassion upon them, recalled them, and restored them to their former Inheritance. And during his Administration they dwelt cordially with the primary, and the distinction betwixt the one and the other was forgot.

"DesCartes, Malebranche, & Locke set them at variance again, but were not so cruel to the secondary qualities as their predecessors in atomical philosophy had been. They indeed turned them out of body, but seemed to make ample amends by giving them a place in the mind, and making them sensations of the mind. And now one would think that both parties must remain ever satisfied and never more have any thing to do with each other. But Fate had ordained that they should not dwell long asunder, and like true lovers they both soon repent of the separation.

"For First, the secondary qualities, far from being vain of their new possession, seemed to disdain being called by its name; and retaining a strange and unaccountable liking to the old material subject, and to their old companions, still retained the name and title of Secondary Qualities of Body, even among those who believed that they had no part nor lot in body, but in the mind onely.

"Secondly, the primary qualities, now in the sole and undisturbed possession of the material subject, were so far from being satisfied with their condition, that unable to brook a longer separation, they took a desparate resolution, unparalleled in history, & in a body forsook their native country and inheritance to follow their old companions.

"This extraordinary event your Lordship knows happened in the aera and under the Philosophical Administration of Bishop Berkley. The good Bishop did the best he could to accommodate both primary and secondary qualities with lodgings in the human mind. And having both become meer sensations, they lost their distinction again. In the mean time, the old material subject, which had made so magnificent a figure in ages past, being now stript of all its qualities, looked so pitifull, that it is said to have sunk into the Abyss to cover the shame of its nakedness.

"The next aera again disjoyned primary and secondary qualities, not onely from one another but from every subject. For having now no where to lay their head but in the human mind; a bold and cunning Engineer (by what motive induced to so daring an attempt remains a secret) dexterously sapped the foundation of this edifice, untill at last the substratum cracked and gave way, and the whole superstructure fell to pieces. Primary and secondary qualities as well [as] all the other inhabitants who survived the Ruin, were left with Epicurus' Atoms, vacuum per inane vagari.

"In this situation of things your Lordship acts charitably as well as justly, by restoring both primary and secondary qualities to their ancient inheritance, to which I think htey had always a just title."

Thomas Reid, The Correspondence of Thomas Reid. Paul Wood, ed. Edinburgh University Press (Edinburgh: 2002) pp. 27-28.

A Vow of Silence?

It has been a while since I've posted an internet quiz. This one is via Flos Carmeli.

The Monk
You scored 13% Cardinal, 69% Monk, 41% Lady, and 37% Knight!


You live a peaceful, quiet life. Very little danger comes you way and you live a long time. You are wise and modest, but also stagnant. You have little comfort, little food and have taken a vow of silence. But who needs chatter when just sitting in the cloister of your abbey with The Good Book makes you perfectly content.



Link: The Who Would You Be in 1400 AD Test written by KnightlyKnave on Ok Cupid

Wegner and Will

An interesting paper by Tim Bayne (PDF; via OPP) on Wegner's claim (in The Illusion of Conscious Will) that conscious will is an illusion. For my part I'm a bit puzzled though. It has been several months since I read Wegner's book (which is quite an interesting book). But I don't recall him arguing for the claim that conscious will is an illusion in the book. He does gesture at argument (e.g., by citing Dennett) and some of the phenomena he considers might be used as part of an argument for such a claim, but as I recall the book, Wegner largely just takes it for granted that conscious will is an illusion. His argument is not for this claim, but for the claim that even people who consider conscious will an illusion can find the phenomena of conscious will to be an interesting and fruitful field of scientific study. And his argument for this claim, I think, is quite excellent. But everyone else seems to read Wegner as arguing for the claim that conscious will is an illusion, which suggests that perhaps I just missed something in my reading.

Another Scribble

This odd draft was inspired last night by reading something in Umberto Eco's Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. It's a bit weak and flabby in parts, but it's somewhat interesting.

Roses

I see her face on every billboard passing,
on television, and hear her name
a hundred times a day, on radio,
in dialogue, in whispers echoing
from out my subconscious into light.
Her form haunts my every waking hour,
I cannot turn attention to the side,
but must give to her the natural prayer,
the natural piety, of my haunted mind.
As Romans in ancient days gave nod to numen
Of tree or water, hoping for return,
I spend my days in nod to a woman,
without return, no nod of recognition,
for she does not know me, nor I (in truth) her.
She is an ideal passing, an idea in my mind,
calling to the will to make it love.
And love I must, as I lie here waking,
for her voice still echoes in my mind
from when I saw her, Sylvie, on the screen,
an ideal woman beyond my reaching grasp,
than whom a better never will I find.

But as I lie here waking, I am half-sleeping,
my memory reaching backward, searching
for I know not what, in fancy's play,
and I am taken back to a childhood day,
all shrouded in the obscure fog of time,
and suddenly, as were it thrust on me,
I recall unto myself an older love,
whose image haunted me in vernal youth.
She was the one who taught me that true prayer
is attention of the mind, that piety
is rush of will and though around the one,
the idea that stands for more, but stands alone.
As when the lover dreams of roses, he knows he dreams,
and knows the beloved is the object of the dream,
but yet is caught in wandernig, trying to see
how this rose captures, but does not hold, a blushing girl;
so were my thoughts of Sylvie, or it seemed
that all my thoughts were symbols of Marie,
the two being but one, in fancy's play --
I started briefly to the waking day,
wondering at the invention of my mind,
to reach back through the depths of time,
and teach me what I knew, but did not think:
beloved Sylvie is but code for fair Marie;
my love for one is but my other love,
remotely present Sylvie is but absented Marie,
not as though they were the same,
but in the will that loves them, and the thought,
the only difference is appearance and the name.

But now I drift again through foggy times
to think, not of Sylvie, but of Marie,
although it takes no effort (they are one,
the one a masking for the other in my mind),
and drift in musement's play upon a girl
I hardly knew, but loved in every way,
and think her face, her voice, her form
as if were present her every charm,
and all of it seems so clearly ideal,
an idea before me that now draws
my love away, but yet, it slips away,
for thinking of Marie, I think another girl,
her sister, Jeanne, who was my closest friend,
through whom I knew the ideal girl,
and in the shifting play of shifting mind,,
I interchange the other for the one,
commingled and conjoined, all differences unknowing,
and find there is no change, no change at all.
Maries presence was but Jeanne's, yet symbolized,
something standing for this something that I knew,
though I thought it not, and knew it never.
And somewhere on the cusp of now and ever
a chain of nods, of references to other,
Marie a yes to Jeanne, and Sylvie to Marie,
ideal for ideal traded, and both for real,
the thing made ideated in another thing.
Sylvie was the rose; she stood a sign
for yet another girl, who was idea,
that stood for yet another, who was Jeanne.
And loving every symbol was but to love the real,
and loving every woman a loving of fair Jeanne.

Whoops

I've been looking over my paper on Malebranche and Hume's Treatise 1.2.6 for the Hume Society meeting this summer before I pass it on to the commentator, and I came across a bit of a puzzle. While the anonymous reviewers who recommended the paper weren't supposed to write extended comments, some of them did write things that the organizers thought might be useful to the authors of the paper, so the organizers passed the relevant sections of those comments on to authors who were interested in reading what they had said. I was one. Looking over the commentator's comments, however, I find it addresses a problem that isn't in my final draft of the paper. This puzzled me, so I looked more closely. The commentator quotes a few lines that aren't found in that draft, either, but are found in an earlier draft of the paper. Since I haven't modified the paper since submitting it, I had the final draft ready to submit by the deadline. But the only possible interpretation of the evidences before me is: I didn't send it! I got it ready, prepared to submit it, and submitted an earlier rough draft instead! Now, that's what I call absentmindedness. The only thing I can think of that explains it would be if I mislabeled the relevant file; since I submitted by e-mail, I just uploaded the file. And apparently I uploaded the wrong one. Well, no harm done, since they accepted it anyway; but my only excuse for it is that for the entire months of October and November I was half asleep.

On the bright side, I had already fixed the problem noted by the commentator, which is a good sign of something or other.