Wednesday, April 20, 2005

Who'd've Thunk?

So Ratzinger is the new pope. Who would have thought? I knew he had support; but I doubted (as most people doubted -- admit it, you did too) that it was enough to get him elected. There are, I am sure, quite a few liberal Catholics around the world who are weeping now. And he has taken the name Benedict XVI; which means that the St. Malachy's prophecy people must be leaping for joy. Strange day.

Monday, April 18, 2005

Conclave

As you know, the Conclave of Cardinals meets today to consider who will be the next pope.

Some interesting near-popes:

* Valentinus (c. 100 - c. 160): Valentinus, a Gnostic heretic, is at least an alleged near-pope; if I recall correctly, Tertullian writes somewhere that he had almost been elected bishop of Rome, at some point before he fell into heresy.

* Pedro de Luna (1328-1402): During the 1378 conclave, he was the Italian who was most likely to be Pope. Pedro de Luna voted for the man who was elected Pope Urban VI, but later was convinced that the election was invalid, and helped to elect and support the first anti-pope of the Avignon schism, Clement VII. He was elected the second Avignon pope: Benedict XIII.

* Johannes Bessarion (c. 1400-1472): Bessarion was one of the greats of the Italian Renaissance. One of the Greek bishops who was involved in the Council of Florence, he was made cardinal by Pope Eugenius IV.

* Hyacinthe Sigismond Gerdil (1718-1802): In the seventeenth century, certain Catholic nations claimed that they had a right to exclude a papal candidate (the veto could be used only once during the conclave). Gerdil, the last great Malebranchean, failed to be elected due to such a veto; the Germans didn't want a Frenchman on the papal throne. His best-known work is a defense of Malebranche against Locke. Needless to say, Gerdil is my favorite almost-pope.

* Mariano Rampolla (1843-1913): He was also vetoed, by the Austrians. The person who became pope instead, Pius X, ruled that any cardinal who put forward such an exclusion in papal elections in the future would be excommunicated. It was probably never stricly legal in the first place; who knows what a Gerdil or Imperiali or Rampolla papacy might have been if people had not simply gone along with it?

The Dragon Fears the Peredixion Tree

Browse The Medieval Bestiary. (Hat-tip: Medieval Bestiary Links, via Dictionary of Received Ideas.)

Augustine on the Utility of Believing

It is clear from various things that Pascal says (e.g., in fragment 234) that in the Wager argument he partly considers himself to be making an extension of an Augustinian point. Here's a passage from Augustine's De Utilitate Credendi that can be related to the Wager argument. De Utilitate Credendi is an argument against the Manichaeans, who attacked the Catholic faith for its emphasis on belief rather than certainty. It's a different argument than Pascal gives, but it clearly has some affinities, particularly in that it appears addressed to the same kind of person (the one who refuses to allow that believing without knowing is a genuine option), and in that it proceeds dialectically.

23. But you will say, consider now whether we ought to believe in religion. For, although we grant that it is one thing to believe, another to be credulous, it does not follow that it is no fault to believe in matters of religion. For what if it be a fault both to believe and to be credulous, as (it is) both to be drunk and to be a drunkard? Now he who thinks this certain, it seems to me can have no friend; for, if it is base to believe any thing, either he acts basely who believes a friend, or in nothing believing a friend I see not how he can call either him or himself a friend. Here perhaps you may say, I grant that we must believe something at some time; now make plain, how in the case of religion it be not base to believe before one knows. I will do so, if I can. Wherefore I ask of you, which you esteem the graver fault, to deliver religion to one unworthy, or to believe what is said by them who deliver it....Wherefore now suppose him present, who is about to deliver to you a religion, in what way shall you assure him, that you approach with a true mind, and that, so far as this matter is concerned, there is in you no fraud or feigning? You will say, your own good conscience that you are no way reigning, asserting this with words as strong as you can, but yet with words. For you cannot lay open man to man the hiding places of your soul, so that you may be thoroughly known. But if he shall say, Lo, I believe you, but is it not more fair that you also believe me, when, if I hold any truth, you are about to receive, I about to give, a benefit? what will you answer, save that you must believe?

24. But you say, Were it not better that you should give me a reason, that, wherever, that shall lead me, I may follow without any; rashness? Perhaps it were: but, it being so great a matter, that you are by reason to come to the knowledge of God, do you think that all are qualified to understand the reasons, by which the human soul is led to know God, or many, or few? Few I think, you say. Do you believe that you are in the number of these? It is not for me, you say, to answer this. Therefore you think it is for him to believe you in this also: and this indeed he does: only do you remember, that he hath already twice believed you saying things uncertain; that you are unwilling to believe him even once admonishing you in a religious spirit.


In some ways I find this a more interesting argument than Pascal's, although I think it more limited in nature (in part because it has in mind as its interlocutor a member of the Manichaean mystery religion -- which is the reason why Augustine frames the argument in terms of induction into a higher religious state -- rather than Pascal's man of the world). But in Augustine, as in Pascal, it is part of a larger argument, and Augustine goes on to point out the fact that we consider it unreasonable to believe only what is certain.

Pascal is also influenced by Montaigne, who argued that there is no a priori reason not to believe in the resurrection; the reason some people are inclined to disbelieve claims that someone has risen from the dead is simply habit, so people who think that in disbelieving the resurrection they are doing more than just holding a (less than certain) belief are deluding themselves. (Pascal makes a similar argument in one of the fragments.) The connection is that Augustine and Montaigne both, in different ways, argue that it is unreasonable to try to eliminate belief in favor of something more certain in some areas of life (because those areas do not admit of certainty). Pascal sees himself to be going beyond both Augustine and Montaigne on this point by laying out more clearly why it is unreasonable to reject belief out of hand.

Sunday, April 17, 2005

Yuck Factor

I found this post at "PEA Soup" interesting. I've dealt with similar issues before. I was very puzzled, however, by the following comment by Michael Cholbi:

First off, it seems to me that to make any sense at all of disgust playing a justificatory role in moral epistemology we have to think of it (and other cognate attitudes, emotions, etc.) as being a cognitive state, some sort of judgment or belief-like state with specific intentional content. Otherwise, it's hard to see how the emotions can be truth-apt, as Crispin Wright might say.


Perhaps I am just overly Humean, but this strikes me as utterly false. It is easy to find cases in which a justificatory role is played by something that's not a cognitive state. Necessity is the most obvious example. To borrow from Hume, if we recognize nature has determined us to judge as well as to breathe, it becomes very silly to ask in reply, "But what is our justification for judging?" If you can't not judge, any sense in which you need a further justification for doing it is just a bizarre sense, one we have no reason to take seriously. Disgust doesn't straightforwardly necessitate in this way. However, it is a fact of human nature that any moral epistemology has to take into account: human disgust affects moral reasoning. And what is more, it actually does play a justificatory role in human reasoning; people really do appeal to it to justify reasoning in particular ways. But even more than this, it appears that it is virtually inevitable that it do so (the incest example is a case in point). The only question, then, is not, "Does disgust play a justificatory role in our moral reasoning?" but "What justificatory role does it play, and what are the limits of this sort of justification?"

I also find the idea that truth-aptness requires a cognitive state to be rather strange in this context. The only sense of 'truth-apt' that I can see to be relevant for justification is 'makes it more likely for us to make true judgments'. There is nothing that is intrinsically truth-apt in this sense: even logical inference is not intrinsically truth-apt. Truth-aptness arises under particular conditions; and there appears to be no a priori reason why sentiments and passions could not, under certain conditions, make us more likely to make true judgments. The only question is: Under what conditions are they truth-apt? It can easily be seen that this is the same question asked above, in different words.

Readables

* A lecture on Divine Wisdom and Christian Humanism by Father Augustine DiNoia.

* Selections from Brain Dead Person by Masahiro Morioka (hat-tip: Fido the Yak). The basic idea is summarized in the essay, Two Aspects of Brain Dead Being, and the background is presented in an essay on the brain death debate in Japanese bioethics, Reconsidering Brain Death.

* Jacobi's Open Letter to Fichte (21 March 1799):

I maintain: the human being finds God because he can only find himself simultaneously with God; and he is unfathomable to himself because the essence of God is necessarily unfathomable. Necessarily! Because otherwise a super-godly capacity would have to reside in the human being, and God would have to be able to be invented by the human being. God would then only be a thought of the finite, an imagined being, and certainly not the highest being, existing solely in itself, the free creator of all other beings, the beginning and the end. That is not the way it is, and for that reason the human being loses himself as soon as he resists finding himself in God as his creator in a manner inconceivable to his reason; as soon as he wants to base himself in himself alone. Everything then gradually dissolves before him into his own Nothingness. But a human being has this choice, a single one: Nothingness or a God.

(Hat-tip: The 4th Century)

* A consequentialist fortune cookie at "Mumblings of a Platonist"

* Theological Thursdays: Knowing God: God Unchanging at "Beyond the Rim"

Another Scribble

Phoenix

You have heard that the Phoenix
dies the death of bright fire,
fierce flames of great burning,
feeding a mortal desire.
You have heard that fine feathers,
red-gold, are thus turned
to an ash of blackened dust
when the Phoenix is burned,
and that amid deathly ash
the egg of great price
breaks, weakened by the flame,
that the Phoenix may rise.
You have heard of all this,
but have you heard that they say
that the Phoenix in the morning
sings the song of the Way?
What a wondrous song!
For no other can compare
in sweetness and glory,
in order most fair!
For the truth is but this:
the Phoenix-made flame
is the falling of morals
and the mixing of names.
But when the Phoenix comes forth
in a birthing of light,
the Way is returned
and the names are made right
by the voice of its singing,
beyond even nightingale:
a sign of great surety
that the Way shall not fail!

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