* Brad at "21st Century Reformation" discusses the 20th Century Two-step, the tendency to Get-Saved-and-Tell-People-About-It while skipping all the actual work (discipleship) of living the Christian life.
* An interesting article, called Sex in the Body of Christ, on chastity as spiritual discipline.
* Jeremy at "Parableman" discusses Eschatology and the Christian Life.
* The Diet of Bookworms looks like it might be the source of many intersting posts in the blogosphere in the months to come.
Tuesday, May 17, 2005
Huxley on Whewell on Classification
The Finest Freethinker criticizes the Omniscientist:
[T. H. Huxley, "On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences," Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews. Macmillan (London: 1880) 81-83.]
Huxley notes in a footnote the passage to which he is referring in Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. I think, however, that Huxley has misunderstood Whewell on this point; for what Huxley calls a definition, Whewell would, I think, still call a type. If, for instance, by a freak of development a filly were to be born with a complete inability to suckle her young, we would not hold that a mammal had given birth to a non-mammal. Whewell thinks biologists classify by type not because they are ignorant, but because they have to do so, given the variety of nature. They can give well-defined characters of the type, but only a type. The distinction between the resemblance that is felt and the resemblance that is defined is actually found in slightly different terms in Whewell, as well, when he distinguishes between primitive and more sophisticated attempts at natural classification. (I suspect, too, that Whewell would regard Huxley's defined class of Mammalia as an artificial classification rather than a natural grouping; as opposed to the natural group of roses. But I'd have to go back and see for sure.)
Not to give this lecture a too controversial tone, however, I must only advert to one more doctrine, held by a thinker of our own age and country, whose opinions are worthy of all respect, it is, that the Biological sciences differ from all others, inasmuch as in them classification takes place by type and not by definition.
It is said, in short, that a natural-history class is not capable of being defined--that the class Rosaceae, for instance, or the class of Fishes, is not accurately and absolutely definable, inasmuch as its members will present exceptions to every possible definition; and that the members of the class are united together only by the circumstance that they are all more like some imaginary average rose or average fish, than they resemble anything else.
But here, as before, I think the distinction has arisen entirely from confusing a transitory imperfection with an essential character. So long as our information concerning them is imperfect, we class all objects together according to resemblances which we feel, but cannot define; we group them round types, in short. Thus, if you ask an ordinary person what kinds of animals there are, he will probably say, beasts, birds, reptiles, fishes, insects, &c. Ask him to define a beast from a reptile, and eh cannot do it; but he says, things like a frog or a lizard are reptiles. You see he does class by type, and not by definition. But how does this classification differ from that of the scientific Zoologist? How does the meaning of the scientific class-name of "Mammalia" differ from the unscientific of "Beasts"?
Why, exactly because the former depends on a definition, the latter on a type. The class Mammalia is scientifically defined as "all animals which have a vertebrated skeleton and suckle their young." Here is no reference to type, but a definition rigorous enough for a geometrician. And such is the character which every scientific naturalist recognises as that to which his classes must aspire--knowing, as he does, that classification by type is simply an acknowledgment of ignorance and a temporary device.
[T. H. Huxley, "On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences," Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews. Macmillan (London: 1880) 81-83.]
Huxley notes in a footnote the passage to which he is referring in Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. I think, however, that Huxley has misunderstood Whewell on this point; for what Huxley calls a definition, Whewell would, I think, still call a type. If, for instance, by a freak of development a filly were to be born with a complete inability to suckle her young, we would not hold that a mammal had given birth to a non-mammal. Whewell thinks biologists classify by type not because they are ignorant, but because they have to do so, given the variety of nature. They can give well-defined characters of the type, but only a type. The distinction between the resemblance that is felt and the resemblance that is defined is actually found in slightly different terms in Whewell, as well, when he distinguishes between primitive and more sophisticated attempts at natural classification. (I suspect, too, that Whewell would regard Huxley's defined class of Mammalia as an artificial classification rather than a natural grouping; as opposed to the natural group of roses. But I'd have to go back and see for sure.)
Nihilism and Value Fictionalism
This weekend there was a Graduate conference here at UT. I only attended one of the sessions, but had the opportunity to hear an excellent paper by Jonathan Ichikawa on value fictionalism as a response to nihilism. (The paper is in PDF here.) His basic argument (as summarized in the associated handout):
I originally intended to ask a question about whether this really does justice to the psychology of the person suffering depression from nihilism, but Simon Blackburn asked it before I did. So I asked a variant of the question, namely, whether this does justice to the psychology of the happy nihilist. Think of a Romantically-conceived Prometheus, viewing the Law of Zeus. Naturally, it's the first Law of Zeus that One must obey Zeus; but Prometheus sees through all the pompous pretensions of Zeus to authority and normativity, and finds it funny. The above argument doesn't really seem to deal with such a nihilism. Ichikawa suggested that the real issue is practical reason; unless we admit some sort of normativity or authoritativeness to reasons, we can't act.
I am much, much farther away from nihilism than Ichikawa is -- almost as far away as one can be -- but I think the nihilist is on much stronger ground than this. When I am thirsty, I don't need a normative or authoritative reason to drink a glass of water; I just need an inclination to do so (which I do, ex suppositione). Likewise with the rest of life. There is a sort of normativity or authoritativeness associated with reasons; but this is just the straightforward fact that a person can rationally propose a standard of behavior and hold himself to it -- and that, really, is all there is to normativity. We have something identifiable as a norm, and we treat it as a norm by expecting it to be upheld. But this is basically to say that the person himself has an authority over his acts inasmuch as he is the natural originator of them, and not much else; it does not follow that it is necessary to practical reason that his reasons have authority over him. The mistake, I think, is thinking that values are necessarily normative, which they are not. A nihilist is not being inconsistent in valuing things and yet considering it pompous, pretentious, or irrational to attribute authority or normativity to the value. It would be utterly absurd for me to attribute some 'normative force' to my reason for acting on my inclination to drink water; I just have a reason to drink, and so I drink. And I could, potentially have something I consider a better reason not to drink, not because there's something called 'normative force' that one reason has in greater quantity than another, but simply because I like it better. Ichikawa is addressing the sort of person who is inclined to say that he acts not out of 'normative reasons' but 'because he just feels like it'; but, I think, 'I just feel like it' is actually able to cover an immense range of human behavior.
Ichikawa gives some rational credit to the nihilist on the basis of Mackie's argument from queerness and Harman's argument from moral explanation; that is why he proposes a value fictionalism rather than a value realism. Since I think both arguments beg the question and are based, moreover, on necessarily false premises if my own theism is true, I don't give the nihilist such credit. If Mackie's and Harman's arguments were to succeed, however, I think the nihilist is immune to Ichikawa's argument; the nihilist is still quite capable of acting. There are lots of things we do that we do on the basis of no reason except that we felt like doing it, a reason neither normative or authoritative unless one makes it so; and the nihilist is just extending this to everything. Reasons are not 'normative entities'; they don't need to exert 'normative force' or 'prescriptive force' on us; they just need to be had and acted upon (if we feel like acting on them).
There is a place for normativity in practical reason; and I think a full account of practical reason requires it (and I think defenders of Mackie and Harman are unreasonable in not realizing that this is so, and in a way independent of the quite arbitrarily-chosen extrinsic standards to which they insist it conform to be admitted). Not, however, in order to act, since the nihilist has an account that can cover an indefinitely large range of human action. The problem with nihilism is that it is irrational, not that it is impractical.
...in order for a (fictional) reason to have normative force, we must treat it as authoritative. To treat fictions as authoritative is to commit oneself to the valuing game. A inclination to stop playing the game, if it is to have force, must be endorsed as normative. And to endorse it as normative is to play the game. So the fact that it is 'only' a game will not cause us to stop playing it, even when our inclinations are against it. They only count against when we are affirming it.
I originally intended to ask a question about whether this really does justice to the psychology of the person suffering depression from nihilism, but Simon Blackburn asked it before I did. So I asked a variant of the question, namely, whether this does justice to the psychology of the happy nihilist. Think of a Romantically-conceived Prometheus, viewing the Law of Zeus. Naturally, it's the first Law of Zeus that One must obey Zeus; but Prometheus sees through all the pompous pretensions of Zeus to authority and normativity, and finds it funny. The above argument doesn't really seem to deal with such a nihilism. Ichikawa suggested that the real issue is practical reason; unless we admit some sort of normativity or authoritativeness to reasons, we can't act.
I am much, much farther away from nihilism than Ichikawa is -- almost as far away as one can be -- but I think the nihilist is on much stronger ground than this. When I am thirsty, I don't need a normative or authoritative reason to drink a glass of water; I just need an inclination to do so (which I do, ex suppositione). Likewise with the rest of life. There is a sort of normativity or authoritativeness associated with reasons; but this is just the straightforward fact that a person can rationally propose a standard of behavior and hold himself to it -- and that, really, is all there is to normativity. We have something identifiable as a norm, and we treat it as a norm by expecting it to be upheld. But this is basically to say that the person himself has an authority over his acts inasmuch as he is the natural originator of them, and not much else; it does not follow that it is necessary to practical reason that his reasons have authority over him. The mistake, I think, is thinking that values are necessarily normative, which they are not. A nihilist is not being inconsistent in valuing things and yet considering it pompous, pretentious, or irrational to attribute authority or normativity to the value. It would be utterly absurd for me to attribute some 'normative force' to my reason for acting on my inclination to drink water; I just have a reason to drink, and so I drink. And I could, potentially have something I consider a better reason not to drink, not because there's something called 'normative force' that one reason has in greater quantity than another, but simply because I like it better. Ichikawa is addressing the sort of person who is inclined to say that he acts not out of 'normative reasons' but 'because he just feels like it'; but, I think, 'I just feel like it' is actually able to cover an immense range of human behavior.
Ichikawa gives some rational credit to the nihilist on the basis of Mackie's argument from queerness and Harman's argument from moral explanation; that is why he proposes a value fictionalism rather than a value realism. Since I think both arguments beg the question and are based, moreover, on necessarily false premises if my own theism is true, I don't give the nihilist such credit. If Mackie's and Harman's arguments were to succeed, however, I think the nihilist is immune to Ichikawa's argument; the nihilist is still quite capable of acting. There are lots of things we do that we do on the basis of no reason except that we felt like doing it, a reason neither normative or authoritative unless one makes it so; and the nihilist is just extending this to everything. Reasons are not 'normative entities'; they don't need to exert 'normative force' or 'prescriptive force' on us; they just need to be had and acted upon (if we feel like acting on them).
There is a place for normativity in practical reason; and I think a full account of practical reason requires it (and I think defenders of Mackie and Harman are unreasonable in not realizing that this is so, and in a way independent of the quite arbitrarily-chosen extrinsic standards to which they insist it conform to be admitted). Not, however, in order to act, since the nihilist has an account that can cover an indefinitely large range of human action. The problem with nihilism is that it is irrational, not that it is impractical.
Sunday, May 15, 2005
Various and Sundry
* An Annotated Wimsey; much needed, although only partial. The notes on the interesting but very odd The Documents in the Case (non-Wimsey) are especially good. Never having read Bulwer-Lytton, I hadn't had a good grasp on why "It was a dark and stormy night" has become the proverbial bad literary opening; but the Whose Body? notes conveniently give the full sentence:
The sentence starts out just fine, but then gets worse and worse until it's the literary equivalent of nails on a blackboard. And the fact that it gets worse and worse makes its good start almost painful. So now you know, if you didn't already.
* Michael Spencer discusses Christian sexuality in Sex in Dangerous Places.
* Hugh Montefiore died Friday (HT: NT Gateway Weblog, which has a list of obituaries). He was a pro-nuclear-power environmentalist, Bishop of Birmingham, and Biblical scholar. He was 85.
* Paul Newall has put up an interview on Incompleteness and Scientific Theories (HT: Studi Galileiani), which is an interesting read. I think that it's very clearly not the case that underdetermination is always due to incompleteness of data. In physical theory, i.e., the sort of heavily mathematical theories Duhem solely concerns himself with, underdetermination appears to be due not so much to the incompleteness of the data (although perhaps that contributes) but due to the power of the instrument used: mathematics is a vastly more powerful instrument for generating theory than any methods of data-gathering are for constraining it. One can see an analogy to this if one considers the common exercise of completing a series of numbers:
1, 2, 3, ?
What number comes after 3? If we interpret the data in terms of one possible mathematical pattern (e.g., addition of one), we will get a different result than if we interpret the data in terms of another mathematical pattern (e.g., as part of a Fibonacci sequence). And Duhem's argument for what we would call underdetermination of theory basically insists that we can come up with any number of mathematical ways to organize any set of generalizations from experiment; we are limited in this only by the ingenuity of physicists and mathematicians. Duhem has a rather complicated story for why we don't, in fact, always accept just any mathematical pattern that organizes the data, which gets into psychology; and, in fact, in Duhem's philosophy of science, underdetermination is never a genuine problem, since Duhem doesn't think theory choice in physics needs to be justified by observation, anyway -- observation just gives the material for organization. But the basic point is that in mathematics, the potential for theorizing on any given set of data has no discernible bounds; this is something on the theory side itself, even abstracting from any fuzziness or incompleteness on the empirical side. (That said, Duhem also recognizes underdetermination through the incompleteness of the data, in his discussions of measurement.) I'm not quite sure why this turned into a discussion of Duhem. I also disagree with the 'empirical undecidability' of God's existence as Mathen defines it in the interview, of course. It's absurd to say we can't argue for the existence of x on the basis of our experiences unless our scientific theories for those experiences are complete -- if we believed that, we could never argue for the existence of anything. But there's no reason to restrict it to God's existence: any cause of any experience is in the same boat, because there might always be some other cause that's really doing it (which would show up on a more complete scientific theory). This, in fact, is the reason for Newton's Fourth Rule of Reasoning; thinking that this makes an issue undecidable is just a version of what Newton calls the evasion of induction by hypotheses.
* Haiku summaries of great works of literature at "Mansfield Fox" (HT: Death in the Afternoon). The summary of the Acts of the Apostles is especially appropriate for this Whitsunday:
The Church is born as
The Holy Spirit descends.
Comedy ensues.
* I received a hit from a search engine that shows a profound faith in the informative power of the internet: how to be the master of the world. If only it were that easy....
It was a dark and stormy night; the rain fell in torrents -- except at occasional intervals, when it was checked by a violent gust of wind which swept up the streets (for it is in London that our scene lies), rattling along the housetops, and fiercely agitating the scanty flame of the lamps that struggled against the darkness.
The sentence starts out just fine, but then gets worse and worse until it's the literary equivalent of nails on a blackboard. And the fact that it gets worse and worse makes its good start almost painful. So now you know, if you didn't already.
* Michael Spencer discusses Christian sexuality in Sex in Dangerous Places.
* Hugh Montefiore died Friday (HT: NT Gateway Weblog, which has a list of obituaries). He was a pro-nuclear-power environmentalist, Bishop of Birmingham, and Biblical scholar. He was 85.
* Paul Newall has put up an interview on Incompleteness and Scientific Theories (HT: Studi Galileiani), which is an interesting read. I think that it's very clearly not the case that underdetermination is always due to incompleteness of data. In physical theory, i.e., the sort of heavily mathematical theories Duhem solely concerns himself with, underdetermination appears to be due not so much to the incompleteness of the data (although perhaps that contributes) but due to the power of the instrument used: mathematics is a vastly more powerful instrument for generating theory than any methods of data-gathering are for constraining it. One can see an analogy to this if one considers the common exercise of completing a series of numbers:
1, 2, 3, ?
What number comes after 3? If we interpret the data in terms of one possible mathematical pattern (e.g., addition of one), we will get a different result than if we interpret the data in terms of another mathematical pattern (e.g., as part of a Fibonacci sequence). And Duhem's argument for what we would call underdetermination of theory basically insists that we can come up with any number of mathematical ways to organize any set of generalizations from experiment; we are limited in this only by the ingenuity of physicists and mathematicians. Duhem has a rather complicated story for why we don't, in fact, always accept just any mathematical pattern that organizes the data, which gets into psychology; and, in fact, in Duhem's philosophy of science, underdetermination is never a genuine problem, since Duhem doesn't think theory choice in physics needs to be justified by observation, anyway -- observation just gives the material for organization. But the basic point is that in mathematics, the potential for theorizing on any given set of data has no discernible bounds; this is something on the theory side itself, even abstracting from any fuzziness or incompleteness on the empirical side. (That said, Duhem also recognizes underdetermination through the incompleteness of the data, in his discussions of measurement.) I'm not quite sure why this turned into a discussion of Duhem. I also disagree with the 'empirical undecidability' of God's existence as Mathen defines it in the interview, of course. It's absurd to say we can't argue for the existence of x on the basis of our experiences unless our scientific theories for those experiences are complete -- if we believed that, we could never argue for the existence of anything. But there's no reason to restrict it to God's existence: any cause of any experience is in the same boat, because there might always be some other cause that's really doing it (which would show up on a more complete scientific theory). This, in fact, is the reason for Newton's Fourth Rule of Reasoning; thinking that this makes an issue undecidable is just a version of what Newton calls the evasion of induction by hypotheses.
* Haiku summaries of great works of literature at "Mansfield Fox" (HT: Death in the Afternoon). The summary of the Acts of the Apostles is especially appropriate for this Whitsunday:
The Church is born as
The Holy Spirit descends.
Comedy ensues.
* I received a hit from a search engine that shows a profound faith in the informative power of the internet: how to be the master of the world. If only it were that easy....
Whitsunday
WHEN God of old came down from Heaven,
In power and wrath he came;
Before his feet the clouds were riven,
Half darkness and half flame:
Around the trembling mountain's base
The prostrate people lay,
Convinc'd of sin, but not of grace;
It was a dreadful day.
But when He came the second time,
He came in power and love,
Softer than gale at morning prime
Hover'd his holy Dove.
The fires that rush'd on Sinai down
In sudden torrents dread,
Now gently light, a glorious crown,
On every sainted head.
Like arrows went those lightnings forth,
Wing'd with the sinner's doom,
But these, like tongues, o'er all the earth
Proclaiming life to come:
And as on Israel's awe-struck ear
The voice exceeding loud,
The trump, that angels quake to hear,
Thrill'd from the deep, dark cloud,
So, when the Spirit of our God
Came down his flock to find,
A voice from heaven was heard abroad,
A rushing, mighty wind.
Nor doth the outward ear alone
At that high warning start;
Conscience gives back th' appalling tone;
'Tis echoed in the heart.
It fills the Church of God; it fills
The sinful world around;
Only in stubborn hearts and wills
No place for it is found.
To other strains our souls are set:
A giddy whirl of sin
Fills ear and brain, and will not let
Heaven's harmonies come in.
Come, Lord, come, Wisdom, Love, and Power,
Open our ears to hear;
Let us not miss th' accepted hour;
Save, Lord, by Love or Fear.
-John Keble, Whitsunday, The Christian Year (1827)
In power and wrath he came;
Before his feet the clouds were riven,
Half darkness and half flame:
Around the trembling mountain's base
The prostrate people lay,
Convinc'd of sin, but not of grace;
It was a dreadful day.
But when He came the second time,
He came in power and love,
Softer than gale at morning prime
Hover'd his holy Dove.
The fires that rush'd on Sinai down
In sudden torrents dread,
Now gently light, a glorious crown,
On every sainted head.
Like arrows went those lightnings forth,
Wing'd with the sinner's doom,
But these, like tongues, o'er all the earth
Proclaiming life to come:
And as on Israel's awe-struck ear
The voice exceeding loud,
The trump, that angels quake to hear,
Thrill'd from the deep, dark cloud,
So, when the Spirit of our God
Came down his flock to find,
A voice from heaven was heard abroad,
A rushing, mighty wind.
Nor doth the outward ear alone
At that high warning start;
Conscience gives back th' appalling tone;
'Tis echoed in the heart.
It fills the Church of God; it fills
The sinful world around;
Only in stubborn hearts and wills
No place for it is found.
To other strains our souls are set:
A giddy whirl of sin
Fills ear and brain, and will not let
Heaven's harmonies come in.
Come, Lord, come, Wisdom, Love, and Power,
Open our ears to hear;
Let us not miss th' accepted hour;
Save, Lord, by Love or Fear.
-John Keble, Whitsunday, The Christian Year (1827)
Saturday, May 14, 2005
Reading for the Holy Days: Pentecost Edition
Pentecost has come in with padded cat's feet this year, so quietly I almost missed it.
* There will be Pentecost grid blogging, in which Christians from around the world will be blogging in all sorts of languages. A great idea!
* Pentecost at British Library Images Online
* Celebrating Pentecost at "Friary Notes"
* From 1 Corinthians 12:
Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit;
and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord;
and there are varieties of activities,
but it is the same God who empowers them all in everyone.
To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good....
All these are empowered by one and the same Spirit,
who apportions to each one individually as he wills.
For just as the body is one and has many members,
and all the members of the body, though many, are one body,
so it is with Christ.
For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body--
Jews or Greeks, slaves or free--
and all were made to drink of one Spirit.
For the body does not consist of one member but of many....
If the whole body were an eye, where would be the sense of hearing?
If the whole body were an ear, where would be the sense of smell?
But as it is, God arranged the members in the body,
each one of them, as he chose.
If all were a single member, where would the body be?
As it is, there are many parts, yet one body.
The eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of you,"
nor again the head to the feet, "I have no need of you."
On the contrary, the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable...
But God has so composed the body, giving greater honor to the part that lacked it,
that there may be no division in the body,
but that the members may have the same care for one another.
If one member suffers, all suffer together;
if one member is honored, all rejoice together.
Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it....
As usual, if I come across new things of interest, I'll put them up.
UPDATE:
* Whitsunday, Year A
* Insanity at "Letters to the Pope"
* Martin Luther's Holy Pentecost Sermon at "The Trivium Blog" (HT: Rebecca Writes)
* There will be Pentecost grid blogging, in which Christians from around the world will be blogging in all sorts of languages. A great idea!
* Pentecost at British Library Images Online
* Celebrating Pentecost at "Friary Notes"
* From 1 Corinthians 12:
Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit;
and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord;
and there are varieties of activities,
but it is the same God who empowers them all in everyone.
To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good....
All these are empowered by one and the same Spirit,
who apportions to each one individually as he wills.
For just as the body is one and has many members,
and all the members of the body, though many, are one body,
so it is with Christ.
For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body--
Jews or Greeks, slaves or free--
and all were made to drink of one Spirit.
For the body does not consist of one member but of many....
If the whole body were an eye, where would be the sense of hearing?
If the whole body were an ear, where would be the sense of smell?
But as it is, God arranged the members in the body,
each one of them, as he chose.
If all were a single member, where would the body be?
As it is, there are many parts, yet one body.
The eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of you,"
nor again the head to the feet, "I have no need of you."
On the contrary, the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable...
But God has so composed the body, giving greater honor to the part that lacked it,
that there may be no division in the body,
but that the members may have the same care for one another.
If one member suffers, all suffer together;
if one member is honored, all rejoice together.
Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it....
As usual, if I come across new things of interest, I'll put them up.
UPDATE:
* Whitsunday, Year A
* Insanity at "Letters to the Pope"
* Martin Luther's Holy Pentecost Sermon at "The Trivium Blog" (HT: Rebecca Writes)
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