Tuesday, November 14, 2006

Jottings on Fitch's Paradox II

Obviously the chief problems raised by Fitch's Paradox surround the so-called "Knowability Principle":

(KP) p → ◊Kp If a claim is true, it is possible that it is known to be true.

However, I want to set these questions aside, and focus on a clarificatory point. We know that every known is known by somebody under certain conditions. So I think we might get a better handle on this sort of argument if we go through it again, this time indexing our epistemic operators to the epistemic agents. That is, let's keep track of who knows what. The way I'll do this is by inserting an index after each epistemic operator. For instance, instead of (KP) as I've written it above, we'll have an indexed (KP'):

(KP') p → ◊K{∃x|c}p If a claim is true, it is possible that it is known to be true by someone, i.e., by at least one person (under conditions).

This would contrast with a different, and much less plausible principle:

(KP'') p → ◊K{∀x|c}p If a claim is true, it is possible that it is known to be true by everyone (under conditions).

Obviously the two are very different. And we can do things with the |c side, too. For instance:

(KP''') p → ◊K{∃x|∃c}p If a claim is true, it is possible that it is known to be true by someone (under at least some particular set of conditions).

Which contrasts with:

(KP'''') p → ◊K{∃x|∀c}p If a claim is true, it is possible that it is known to be true by at least one person (under any set of conditions).

And, needless to say, we can mix and match. Now, I don't think any of this can be said to be unreasonable. To be known, a thing must be known by somebody; and that person knows it either under some particular set of conditions or under every set of conditions. But when we start doing this, it suddenly becomes clear that our previous argument was glossing over a lot that might turn out to be important for understanding what's really going on in the argument.

So let's begin indexing. First of all, when people accept KP, what specified version(s) of it are they really accepting? Any version which involves ∀c seems unlikely. So let's assume that we are talking about ∃c. That is, we aren't demanding that if a thing is true it is possible that it is known under any set of conditions; we just mean that if a thing is true, there is at least some set of conditions under which it is possible to know it. Suppose that p = "The sky is blue during the day". What appeals to people in (KP) is not the claim that

If the sky is blue during the day, it is possible that it is known (by someone/everyone) in every circumstance that the sky is blue during the day.

That is pretty clearly false; since it is possible for the sky to be blue and yet people only to know that it is under certain circumstances (for instance, people who have lived in caves all their lives, never seeing the sky). So let's assume that we are only talking about things that are known in some circumstance or other, i.e., ∃c.

The second question is: Who are the knowers we are assuming. Do we mean:

If the sky is blue during the day, it is possible that it is known by someone in some circumstance or other that the sky is blue during the day?

Or do we mean:

If the sky is blue during the day, it is possible that it is known by everyone in some circumstance or other that the sky is blue during the day?

The latter commits us to there being some circumstance in which everyone could know that the sky is blue; and this doesn't seem what people want (KP) to say. (Likewise, I'll assume for the rest of the post that ∃c is the only version in view.) So the proper specification would seem to be:

(KP''') p → ◊K{∃x|∃c}p If a claim is true, it is possible that it is known to be true by someone or other (under at least some particular set of conditions).

So we've got that out of the way. Now let's go on to the first stage of the argument:

(1) p ∧ ¬Kp A particular claim is true, and it is not known to be true.
(2) (p ∧ ¬Kp) → ◊K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (1) implies that it is possible to know both that the particular claim is true and that it is not known to be true.
(3) ◊K(p ∧ ¬Kp) It is possible to know that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known to be true.

First with (1). (1) is intended to tell us that there is a truth, and it is not known. Do we mean that it is not known by at least some particular person, or that it is not known by anyone?

It's hard to say, actually, since people who make this claim say things that sometimes suggest one, sometimes the other. Also, we have to keep in mind that we can't assume (at this stage) that the same 'someone or other' or 'particular person(s)' are in view. So I'll use a different variable, and for now I'll assume ∃y, i.e., at least one person (who may or may not be the same person(s) in (KP''')), but let's not forget the possible alternative. So:

(1') p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p A particular claim is true, and it is not known to be true by someone or other.

Now to find (2'). This is supposed to follow from (1') and (KP'''). But the variables are tricky here. So I suggest:

(2') (p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) → ◊K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) If a particular claim is true and is not known to be true by someone or other, it follows that it is possible that "a particular claim is true and is not known to be true by someone or other" is known by someone or other (who may or may not be the same person).

And (3') has to follow from (1') and (2'). So:

(3') ◊K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) It is possible that it is known by someone or other that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known, by someone or other who may or may not be the same someone, to be true.

Put it all together:

(1') p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p A particular claim is true, and it is not known to be true by someone or other.
(2') (p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃cp) → ◊K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) If a particular claim is true and is not known to be true by someone or other, it follows that it is possible that "a particular claim is true and is not known to be true by someone or other" is known by someone or other (who may or may not be the same person).
(3') ◊K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) It is possible that it is known by someone or other that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known, by someone or other who may or may not be the same someone, to be true.

So far, so good. But what happens when we move on to (4)? Remember in the first post when I noted that it wasn't at all surprising that (4) led to a contradiction? Well, what about (4')?

(4') K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) It is known by someone or other that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known, by someone or other, who may or may not be the same someone, to be true.

Suppose that p = "The sky is blue," and suppose that it is true. Then (4') tells us that someone knows both that the sky is blue and that it is not known by someone (who may or may not be the same person).

And that seems less likely to yield a contradiction doesn't it? In fact, we know it doesn't, where the particular knower(s) we are describing by 'x' are not the same knower(s) we are describing by 'y'. For instance, suppose that at least one of the x-knowers is Tom, and that at least one of the y-knowers is Cindy, and that Tom is not Cindy. Then from (4') we can conclude that

It is known by Tom both that the sky is blue and that this is not known by Cindy.

Perhaps Cindy has never seen the sky and has been misinformed that the sky is mauve. So it would seem that (4') can't lead to a contradiction; there are non-contradictory instances of it.

But we know where the argument is heading, and it is toward a contradiction. Maybe it does raise a contradiction, even though (4'), as such, implies no contradiction. How so? Things are not nearly so simple as they had seemed at first; but it may well be that we don't need (4') to yield a contradiction in every instance; the paradox possibly just needs some instance of (4') to yield a contradiction. A paradox that holds only for some instances of (4') is a paradox still. Will it turn out to be so? Stay tuned for our next crazy installment. If your head is spinning a bit, good. But the roller coaster is just starting. I'll continue the indexing in a future post; and we'll also get into lots more issues, and come back to (KP) in particular, further on. And keep in mind that these are all sketchy thoughts.

Monday, November 13, 2006

Links and a Few Notes

* Chernoff Faces: a way to illustrate statistical data as cartoon faces. (ht: Mixing Memory)

* Michael Vendsel is beginning a series on Barth's interpretation of Anselm at Cynthia Nielsen's "Per Caritatem". Part I; Part II. While I think Barth's interpretation is flawed, one of the nice things about it is that it takes the first section of the Proslogion seriously; and Barth's interpretation of the origin of id quo maius cogitari non potest is, I think, at least in the ballpark.

* An interesting article on Benedict XV's attempt to preserve peace in Europe, and the contrasts with Wilsonian internationalism.

* I think I've linked to the Nietzsche Family Circus generator before, but this one is the funniest combination I've come across, and I had to share it. One wonders what pictures in particular inspired Dolly's comment.

* Suzanne McCarthy has been doing a series of posts on the "Junia, of note among the apostles" verse of Romans 16.

* At "The Inklings" you can read George Orwell's 1945 review of C. S. Lewis's That Hideous Strength.

* The Pope discusses faith and reason again. (ht: Sacramentum Vitae)

* In order not to feel compelled to devote another post to A. C. Grayling's comments on religion, should Grayling comment on religion again, I will simply note here the general structure Grayling's comments seem to share so far, allowing for some minor variations:

a) He starts out by stating something that a little bit of research would show to be clearly false or at least dubious;
b) Using this to transition into comments about how stupid and ignorant religious people in general are;
c) During which he lectures everyone on what various words really mean, without considering how they are actually used by ordinary English speakers;
d) And ends with a plea for mutual respect and tolerance.

And that seems to be about it; put that way, there doesn't seem to be much more that needs to be said.

* Theodore Dalrymple discusses what makes Samuel Johnson great. (ht: LTA)

* I recently had someone come to my weblog with the search question, "Is the earth a perfect sphere?" The answer, of course, is that it is not. It is an oblate spheroid -- and only an approximate one of those.

* Don't forget the Carnival of the Citizens.

* Also, don't forget the Cliopatria Award nominations.

Jottings on Fitch's Paradox I

None of this is to be taken as more than a few sketch thoughts.

Fitch's Paradox is a paradox that has occupied quite a few people in epistemology. Discovered by Fitch in 1963, the result is usually characterized along the lines of "If all truths are knowable, all truths are known." What makes it a paradox is that the knowability principle (KP) is usually considered to be very plausible:

(KP) p → ◊Kp If a claim is true, it is possible that it is known to be true.

But if KP is true, and Fitch's argument is right, then it follows that all truths are known. And it's difficult to determine what could be wrong with Fitch's argument. So here's the argument as portrayed in the SEP article linked to above, with a rough English translation to the right.

(1) p ∧ ¬Kp A particular claim is true, and it is not known to be true.
(2) (p ∧ ¬Kp) → ◊K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (1) implies that it is possible to know both that the particular claim is true and that it is not known to be true.
(3) ◊K(p ∧ ¬Kp) It is possible to know that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known to be true.

(1) is just a particular instance of the claim that there is at least one truth that is not known. (2) follows by KP from (1). (3) follows from (1) and (2). Now suppose that it is not only possible to know (p ∧ ¬Kp) but that this is actually known:

(4) K(p ∧ ¬Kp) It is known that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known to be true.
(5) Kp ∧ K¬Kp The particular claim is known to be true and it is known that it is not known to be true.
(6) Kp ∧ ¬Kp The particular claim is known to be true and it is not known to be true.

(4) is our supposition; (5) follws from (4) by the standard epistemic principle that a conjuction is known only if its conjucts are known; and (6) follows from the standard epistemic principle that if p is known, p is true. We have a contradiction here, of course. So (4)) is false.

(7) ¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) It is not known both that the particular claim is true and that it is not known to be true.
(8) ¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (7) is necessary.
(9) ¬◊K(p ∧ ¬Kp) It is not possible that this is known: both that p is true and that it is not known to be true.
(10) ¬∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp) There is no particular claim for which it is true both that the claim is true and that it is not known to be true.
(11) ∀p(p → Kp) For any particular claim, if it is true, it is known to be true.

We know that (7) is true because we showed that (4) led to a contradiction. Because (4) led to a contradiction, however, (7) must be necessarily true, which gives us (8). (8) tells us that it is necessary that something is not true; and whenever it is necessary that something is not true, it is not possible for it to be true. So, given (8), we have (9). (9) contradicts (3). From this it follows that there is not some particular claim for which (p ∧ ¬Kp) is true. That's what (10) says; and from (10) we can get (11) directly. So if something is true, it is known to be true.

The general consensus is that this is very odd. I am, as I said, going to have a few sketchy thoughts on this; but I'll save those for another post. Right now, I want to make two brief points.

The first is that it is not at all surprising that (4) is necessarily false. Suppose that p = "The sky is blue". (4) then claims that this is true:

Both of these are known: The sky is blue and it is not known that the sky is blue.

It is not in the least surprising that that this leads to a contradiction. But this suggests that the whole argument from (4) to (11) is right, because if (4) is necessarily false, (7) is necessarily true; and the rest of the argument seems to follow in good order.

The second is a matter of translation. I already said that the result is usually put in terms of knowability: KP is usually read, "If p is true, it is knowable." I translated differently, as you can see. This is because I think "knowable" is a very bad translation of the double operator, ◊K. To see this, think about what we really mean when we say the following two things:

This is knowable: The sky is blue.
It is possible that this is known: The sky is blue.


The two are not equivalent, and for good reason. The English word 'knowable' in all but a very small handful of uses hides a third operator, a temporal operator -- an incipit, to be exact:

This can come to be known (can begin to be known): The sky is blue.

So when I say that some claim is knowable, I usually don't mean that it is possible that it is known; I mean that it is possible that it could come to be known. So I think there's reason to stay away from the added complications that are introduced by the word 'knowable'. Using 'knowable' makes it sound even more paradoxical; but (1) it doesn't need to be made to sound more paradoxical; and (2) it is misleading.

Both of these points will be seen again. More on Fitch's Paradox in a future post.

Sunday, November 12, 2006

Neither Fish nor Fowl nor Good Red Herring

What American accent do you have?
Your Result: The Midland

"You have a Midland accent" is just another way of saying "you don't have an accent." You probably are from the Midland (Pennsylvania, southern Ohio, southern Indiana, southern Illinois, and Missouri) but then for all we know you could be from Florida or Charleston or one of those big southern cities like Atlanta or Dallas. You have a good voice for TV and radio.

The West
The South
Boston
North Central
The Inland North
Philadelphia
The Northeast
What American accent do you have?
Take More Quizzes

Epitaph, Intended for Himself

The following is by James Beattie (1735-1803). You can read more of Beattie's poetry here.

Escaped the gloom of mortal life, a soul
Here leaves its mouldering tenement of clay,
Safe where no cares their whelming billows roll,
No doubts bewilder, and no hopes betray.

Like thee, I once have stemm'd the sea of life;
Like thee, have languish'd after empty joys;
Like thee, have labour'd in the stormy strife;
Been grieved for trifles, and amused with toys.

Yet, for a while, 'gainst Passion's threatful blast
Let steady Reason urge the struggling oar;
Shot through the dreary gloom, the morn at last
Gives to thy longing eye the blissful shore.

Forget my frailties, thou art also frail;
Forgive my lapses, for thyself mayst fall;
Nor read, unmoved, my artless tender tale,
I was a friend, O man! to thee, to all.

A Poem Draft

Karta Purakh

all-enlightening boundless being
True is His Name
never captured
never dying
never by the concept tamed
forming all
all things seeing

every seeing eye He makes
to see Him in a given guise
the wisest knowing Him as light
the sweetest knowing Him as grace
the bravest knowing Him as might
in the everlasting Name

His Name is True
never failing
never bounded by guise or word
He knows no bounding
all expressing
makes each spirit in its kind
builds the souls of living nations
makes them all to sing and live
the bounded masks unbound creation

every living mind He makes
to know Him in a vital guise
the purest heart as vital goodness
the softest heart as touching beauty
the warmest heart as fire truest
every guise is but a glimpsing
none can capture all His Name

all this world is fiercely burning
all this land is mired in flame
save it Lord with showered blessing
through every door that may deliver
save it Lord in every way

unbounded God within His people
moves about in living form
the unformed speaks in bounded creature
takes a shape in living works
the noumenal by all uncaptured
captures all
takes all by storm
through the lovers of the True

Carnival of the Citizens Call for Submissions

Richard at "Philosophy, et cetera" has begun the call for submissions:

The inaugural Carnival of Citizens will be held here in two weeks' time. Submissions -- due by November 23 -- should be written in a generous and deliberative spirit, to engage rather than insult those who might disagree with the author. (See the guidelines for more details, and let me know if they are at all unclear.)

Submissions are invited on any topic relevant to public debate. For example, suppose you have the attention of a friendly and reasonable "opponent": what would you want to discuss with them? To advance your own view, what crucial insight or argument would you bring to their attention? To better understand their view, what would you like further explained?

Alternatively: you might write a post explaining why you deviate from the "party line" on some particular issue....Or you may be able to think up other possible approaches that align with the carnival's civic values -- if so, go for it!

While I have high hopes for the new carnival, it can only succeed by securing the good will and participation of diverse bloggers, spanning the entire spectrum of political perspectives. So please help "spread the word"!

Do think seriously about contributing something.