Saturday, November 18, 2006

Jottings on Fitch's Paradox III

In my last set of sketchy thoughts, I proceeded in the indexing of the premises of the argument, as presented in the SEP, as far as premise (4):

(4') K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) It is known by someone or other that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known, by someone or other, who may or may not be the same someone, to be true.

Now, the way the argument moves from here requires that a reductio be made, and a contradiction be derived from (4). Here's the original set of premises:

(4) K(p ∧ ¬Kp) It is known that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known to be true.
(5) Kp ∧ K¬Kp The particular claim is known to be true and it is known that it is not known to be true.
(6) Kp ∧ ¬Kp The particular claim is known to be true and it is not known to be true.

(5) comes from (4) by the standard rule that a conjunction is known only if its conjuncts are known. So (5) has to be indexed as:

(5') K{∃x|∃c}p ∧ K{∃x|∃c}¬K{∃y|∃c}p It is known by someone or other that the particular claim is true and it is known by that same someone or other that it is not known, by someone or other, who may or may not be the same someone, to be true.

And here, of course, we are stymied a bit. For the only thing that can be derived from this is:

(6') K{∃x|∃c}p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p It is known by someone or other that the particular claim is true, and it is not known by someone or other (who may or may not be the same someone or other) that it is true.

And that's obviously not a contradiction.

However, let's assume that x=y here. That is, let's assume that the same someone or other is involved all the way through. Even this, as it turns out, is not quite enough to give us a contradiction. The astute reader will have noticed that I have been ignoring the |c side of the index, and pretending that we can assume that all the relevant circumstances or conditions of knowing are the same throughout. This, of course, is not quite legitimate, and a more accurate indexing will take this into account. I would suggest the following so far:

(1') p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p A particular claim is true, and it is not known to be true by someone or other (given some set of circumstnaces).
(2') (p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) → ◊K{∃x|∃d}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) If a particular claim is true and is not known to be true by someone or other (given the original set of circumstances), it follows that it is possible that "a particular claim is true and is not known to be true by someone or other" is known by someone or other (who may or may not be the same person and who may or may not be in the same circumstances).
(3') ◊K{∃x|∃d}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) It is possible that it is known by someone or other that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known, by someone or other who may or may not be the same someone and may or may not be in the same circumstances, to be true.

(4') K{∃x|∃d}(p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p) It is known by someone or other in some circumstances that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known, by someone or other, who may or may not be the same someone and may or may not be in the same circumstances, to be true.
(5') K{∃x|∃d}p ∧ K{∃x|∃c}¬K{∃y|∃c}p It is known by someone or other in some circumstances that the particular claim is true and it is known by that same someone or other that it is not known, by someone or other, who may or may not be the same someone and may or may not be in the same circumstances, to be true.
(6') K{∃x|∃d}p ∧ ¬K{∃y|∃c}p It is known by someone or other that the particular claim is true, and it is not known by someone or other (who may or may not be the same someone or other and may or may not be in the same circumstances) that it is true.

It can easily be seen that, taking this into account, the assumption that x and y are the same person(s) is not enough to yield a contradiction and make the reductio viable. Suppose that x and y are both Tom, and suppose that p is the claim that the sky is blue. And suppose the set of conditions c is describable as 'being a baby who has never seen the sky and cannot understand any testimony about it' and the set of conditions d is describable as 'being a young man who has seen the sky'. The result then is:

It is known by Tom, when he was a young man who had seen the sky, that the sky is blue; and it is not known by Tom, when he was a baby who had never seen the sky and could not understand any testimony about it, that the sky is blue.

Which is not a contradiction in the slightest; it's exactly what you'd expect if Tom originally (as a baby) didn't know that the sky was blue, and came to know at some point (by the time he was a young man) that the sky was blue. In other words, it's exactly what you'd expect if we can come to know things through learning about them.

So to have a genuine contradiction here, not only must we assume that x is y; we must assume that d is c, as well. So what has been shown to be contradictory is the following:

(4'*) K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃c|∃c}p) It is known by someone or other in some circumstances that both the particular claim is true and that it is not known by the same someone or other in those same circumstances to be true.

(4'*) is necessarily false. This leads us into the rest of the argument.

(7') ¬K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃x|∃c}p) It is not known by the same person under a given set of conditions both that the particular claim is true and that it is not known by the same person under the same set of conditions to be true.
(8') ¬K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃x|∃c}p) (7) is necessary.
(9') ¬◊K{∃x|∃c}(p ∧ ¬K{∃x|∃c}p) It is not possible that this is known by the same person under a given set of conditions: both that p is true and that it is not known by that same person under that same set of conditions to be true.
(10') ¬∃p(p ∧ ¬K{∃x|∃c}p) There is no particular claim for which it is true both that the claim is true and that it is not known by someone under some set of conditions to be true.
(11') ∀p(p → Kp) For any particular claim, if it is true, it is known to be true by someone under some set of conditions.

(7') we get from the reductio of (4'*); (8') we know because (4'*) was not just false but impossible. (8') tells us that it is impossible for anyone to know both a given claim and that they don't know it (setting aside all differences of conditions, e.g., different times of life). So (9') follows from (8'). It still contradicts (3') only if we assume that x is y and that c is d. But it does do that, given that assumption.

Can we get (10') from (9'), though? We can get the unindexed (10) from (9) by using the negation of (3) to deny the consequent of (2), which by modus tollens gives us the negation of (1). We've been assuming as well that x is y and that c is d, that is, that there is only one knower involved, and only one set of conditions for knowing. But anyone who has gone this far, of course, can, instead of following the trail back to the negation of (1), simply hold that the argument up to (9') shows that it is impossible for us to make this assumption, at least legitimately, for non-omniscient knowers. Nothing precludes such a response; and it is certainly more plausible than the argument itself.

Thus KP doesn't seem to result in the paradox. What creates the paradox is the assumption that KP requires that a given claim is true only if it can possibly be known by any particular knower under any set of conditions. But, of course, this assumption is manifestly false. Not only is the alleged requirement absurd, it's not what people mean when they say that every truth is such that it is possible for it to be known.

Which raises the question of what people really do mean, or, at least, what they can consistently mean, when they use principles like KP. Another post, although I can't promise that it will necessarily be the next one.

And keep in mind that these are all sketchy thoughts, and that none of them should be taken as any sign that I know what I'm talking about.

Friday, November 17, 2006

'Half Monk, Half Hit Man'

I just finished watching the newest Bond film, Casino Royale. I highly recommend it, and I do mean highly. This is easily one of the best, and perhaps the best, Bond film of the past few decades. Daniel Craig plays a Bond just beginning to get his bearings, but this allows him to show both more brutality and more humanity. 007, after all, is not a superhero; he is not an action hero; he is a killer who is in Her Majesty's secret service, the loyal but ruthless attack dog sent after the worst and most elusive of Britain's enemies, who is so good at eliminating them that he can do it with style.

My primary two criticisms are: (1) The exposition during the poker game was heavy-handed and purposeless -- most people are not that ignorant of poker, and those who are wouldn't be interested enough to care. But this is a minor irritation in an otherwise great series of scenes. (2) Whoever decided the music volume should be hit over the head -- while it's OK for much of the film, it occasionally becomes intrusive and loud where it should become soft and subtle, letting the images speak for themselves.

Other than that, it was quite good. It's a bit violent and brutal in parts, but an excellent reinvention of the franchise.

Wednesday, November 15, 2006

Philosophia Naturalis

To celebrate St. Albert's Day, I thought I'd provide a few links to recent science-oriented posts in the blogosphere that I've found interesting.

* Coturnix at "A Blog Around the Clock" discusses circadian rhythms.

* Michelle at "The Culture of Chemistry" introduces us to the meaning of the term 'eutectic'.

* Jennifer Ouellette discusses wireless energy transfer at the "Industrial Physics Forum" weblog.

* Andrew Jaffe at "Leaves on the Line" reviews Paul Davies's The Goldilocks Dilemma.

* Jacques Distler at "Musings" discusses the role of rigor in physics.

* Mark at "Chemistry World blog" points to the link between Damascus swords and carbon nanotubes.

* Derek Lowe at "In the Pipeline" discusses chemical disposal in scientific contexts.

* Carl Zimmer at "The Loom" talks about the sequencing of the bee genome.

The Sun

You scored as XIX: The Sun. This is the happiest card in the deck. It is full of joy and optimism, everything is right with the world. We are as innocent children playing in the fields without care. The Sun brings success, well-being and happiness in all spheres - material, emotional, spiritual -wherever our desires lay.When this card appears in a Tarot spread it indicates success, joy and happiness. Obstacles will be overcome, goals achieved.When badly aspected, it can indicate a stagnation through over-indulgence, too much of a good thing.

XIX: The Sun

88%

XIII: Death

88%

XVI: The Tower

69%

0 - The Fool

63%

XI: Justice

63%

II - The High Priestess

56%

IV - The Emperor

50%

VIII - Strength

50%

III - The Empress

44%

I - Magician

44%

X - Wheel of Fortune

44%

VI: The Lovers

38%

XV: The Devil

25%

Which Major Arcana Tarot Card Are You?
created with QuizFarm.com


I keep trying to remember whether Charles Williams ever mentions it, and I can't recall that he ever does. Which is not surprising, because the whole book is devoted to The Fool almost exclusively. By the way, that's The Fool on the horse in the card above; a common symbolism with Tarot cards is The Fool's Journey -- in which The Fool goes through all the Major Arcana as a symbol for life.

Notice, by the way, that I'm The Sun only narrowly. I almost was Death (XIII). Death, of course, is the card of change, the letting-go that allows for birth and prevents stagnation -- sorrowful hope and hopeful sorrow. Which is in some ways the exact opposite of The Sun.

Curiously, the first time I ever came across Tarot cards was reading a Nancy Drew mystery, in which the names of the three of the cards -- Death, the Fool, and The Devil -- are important clues. That, and The Greater Trumps, are about the only uses of Tarot symbolism that I've ever come across that are even remotely interesting, and those weren't particularly great. You'd think the pretty pictures would inspire something worthwhile. But, no, they don't, which goes to show that pretty pictures, like good looks, don't get you very much.

Albertus Magnus

Today is the Feast of St. Albert the Great (1206-1280), who, it is said, was so well respected in his time that he was often called 'Albert the Great' while he was still alive; and was called by one of his students "the wonder and miracle of our times" (nostri temporis stupor et miraculum). He was, famously, the teacher of St. Thomas Aquinas (whom he outlived). The tale goes that once some of Albert's other students were making fun of Thomas -- a big man from the beginning, and lost in his own world -- by calling him the 'dumb ox'; to which Albert replied, "This dumb ox will one day bellow so loudly that the sound of it will fill the world."

Also famously, Albert is the patron saint of scientists, and while he has some typical medieval limitations, his biography is filled with stories that show why. (As the saying goes, his defects were the defects of his age, his merits were his alone.) One of the most famous ones is when, having heard that ostriches eat iron, he went out and tried to feed iron to an ostrich (he wasn't able to get the ostrich to eat it). Here's another story in Albert's own words:

The formicaleon (the lish of Job 4:11) is called the ant-lion, which is also called murmicaleon. To begin with, this animal is not an ant as some say. For I have a great deal of experience of it and have shown my colleagues that this animal has very much the shape of the tick, and it hides itself in the sand, digging in it a hemispherical cup, at the bottom of which is the ant-lion's mouth; and when the ants, bent on gain, cross the pit, it seizes and devours them. This we have very often watched.

MacDonald on Imagination

By those who consider a balanced repose the end of culture, the imagination must necessarily be regarded as the one faculty before all others to be suppressed. "Are there not facts?" say they. "Why forsake them for fancies? Is there not that which may be known? Why forsake it for inventions? What God hath made, into that let man inquire."

We answer: To inquire into what God has made is the main function of the imagination. It is aroused by facts, is nourished by facts, seeks for higher and yet higher laws in those facts; but refuses to regard science as the sole interpreter of nature, or the laws of science as the only region of discovery.


[George MacDonald, The Imagination: Its Function and its Culture.]

The funny thing -- if you find it funny -- is that today, as in MacDonald's time, there are people who would be utterly shocked by a statement like this, seeing it as an attack on science. But as MacDonald points out later in the essay, if scientists spent all their time focus on the ascertained, if they spent all their time looking backwards at what science has established, they would never make any discoveries, because to make discoveries you have to look forward at what might (or might not) be the case. As MacDonald says, "It is the far-seeing imagination which beholds what might be a form of things, and says to the intellect: 'Try whether that may not be the form of these things.'"

Thought for the Day

People don't usually want to change the world for the better; they want the world to have been changed for the better.