To understand what Descartes is doing in the Meditations, we have to be able to see why he was regarded as a purveyor of a 'new philosophy', but we also have to know something of what links him to the ideas of Bonaventure and Anselm before him. Thus the voice that rings out at the end of the Third Meditation--in a passage that most modern students probably would not recognize as by Descartes at all, since they would be encouraged just to skip it--speaks in a language redolent more of the early Middle Ages than of the early modern revolution. 'Let me here rest for a while in the contemplation of God himself and gaze upon, wonder at, and adore the beauty of this immense light' (immensi hujus luminis pulchritudinem...intueri, admirari, adorare). The meditator's voice here is the voice of the worshipper rather than the philosopher; or perhaps we should more aptly say that Descartes is adopting a modality of thought vividly exemplified in the writings of many of the Christian Fathers, a mode which mixes critical reasoning and devotion, one in which philosophizing and religious contemplation are inextricably intertwined.
John Cottingham, "Why Do History of Philosophy?" in Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy, Sorell & Rogers, ed. Clarendon (Oxford: 2005) 36-37. I wouldn't put everything exactly the same way, but this is quite right. (The link, by the way, linking Descartes to Bonaventure and Anselm is Augustinian thought, which is part of the very atmosphere of thought in seventeenth-century France.)
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
Mill on the Art of Life
Philosoraptor called my attention to the following chapter in the System of Logic:

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation By John Stuart Mill
So, in effect, utility is the theory of all practical reason, the departments of which are ethics, politics, and aesthetics (where the last is understood as encompassing all matters of good and bad taste). What I find particularly interesting is that Mill uses this as an argument against intuitionists:

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation By John Stuart Mill
This is a fascinating (although I think somewhat implausible) argument. There is nothing about intuitionism as such that requires that it apply only to moral judgments, and certainly Whewell's intuitionism, which is the major contemporary rival to Mill's utilitarianism, does not. But it is notable that Mill here uses a failure to allow for a non-moral aspect to human life against the intuitionists -- which is a criticism he had also made, in slightly different form, against Benthamite utilitarians.
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation By John Stuart Mill
So, in effect, utility is the theory of all practical reason, the departments of which are ethics, politics, and aesthetics (where the last is understood as encompassing all matters of good and bad taste). What I find particularly interesting is that Mill uses this as an argument against intuitionists:
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation By John Stuart Mill
This is a fascinating (although I think somewhat implausible) argument. There is nothing about intuitionism as such that requires that it apply only to moral judgments, and certainly Whewell's intuitionism, which is the major contemporary rival to Mill's utilitarianism, does not. But it is notable that Mill here uses a failure to allow for a non-moral aspect to human life against the intuitionists -- which is a criticism he had also made, in slightly different form, against Benthamite utilitarians.
Dooyeweerd and Cognitive Science
An interesting paper at PLoS One (by Colzato, van den Wildenberg, and Hommel):
It did turn out that the Calvinists were more likely to focus local rather than global aspects of the scene; or, more strictly, they were consistently quicker at identifying small shapes, in a way consistent with being less distracted by the context of the shapes. The explanation given for this in terms of Calvinist view of self (or, rather, what they attribute to the Calvinist view of self) strikes me as a bit implausible (I would want first to rule out that it is not something specific in Dutch Calvinist religious practice that trains the attention in this way), and it's absurd to pin anything in cognitive science on a single experiment; but it would be interesting to see how it holds up under further testing, and also how Calvinists compare with non-Calvinist non-atheists and with Calvinists from other cultures.
We investigated whether Calvinists and atheists, brought up in the same country and culture (the Netherlands), differ with respect to the way they attend to and process global and local features of visual stimuli. Cultural (and, possibly, other) differences in perceptual processing and attentional emphasis are assumed to be produced by social practice that provides selective reward for attending to particular stimulus features and adopting particular attentional control settings. We speculate that practicing a religion and being exposed to particular religious practices may lead, among other things, to a chronic bias towards particular attentional control parameters. In particular, our study was inspired by the Dutch neo-Calvinism concept of sphere sovereignty, which emphasizes that each sphere or sector of society has its own responsibilities and authorities, and stands equal to other spheres. If Dutch Calvinists, as compared to Dutch atheists, have been rewarded more for adopting a processing style that emphasizes a rather independent view of the self, this would be likely to induce an attentional set that facilitates the processing of the local details.
It did turn out that the Calvinists were more likely to focus local rather than global aspects of the scene; or, more strictly, they were consistently quicker at identifying small shapes, in a way consistent with being less distracted by the context of the shapes. The explanation given for this in terms of Calvinist view of self (or, rather, what they attribute to the Calvinist view of self) strikes me as a bit implausible (I would want first to rule out that it is not something specific in Dutch Calvinist religious practice that trains the attention in this way), and it's absurd to pin anything in cognitive science on a single experiment; but it would be interesting to see how it holds up under further testing, and also how Calvinists compare with non-Calvinist non-atheists and with Calvinists from other cultures.
Sunday, November 16, 2008
Mill Against Bentham
I've been re-reading a lot of Mill lately, and one thing that jumped out of me this time was that a major element of Mill's rejection of Bentham is that he doesn't think Benthamite utilitarianism can function as an ethics. This is a repeated criticism in the essay on Bentham. I thought it might be interesting to collate some of the passages in which he points this out.
(1) Man is never recognized by him as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness. Even in the more limited form of conscience, this great fact in human nature escapes him. Nothing is more curious than the absence of recognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience, as a thing distinct from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and from self-interest in this world or in the next. There is a studied abstinence from any of the phrases which, in the mouths of others, import the acknowledgment of such a fact. If we find the words ``conscience'', ``principle'', ``moral rectitude'', ``moral duty'', in his ``Table of the Springs of Action'', it is among the synonymes of the ``love of reputation''; with an intimation as to the two former phrases, that they are also sometimes synonymous with the religious motive, or the motive of sympathy. The feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation properly so called, either towards ourselves or our fellow-creatures, he seems unaware of the existence of; and neither the word self-respect, nor the idea to which that word is appropriated, occurs even once, so far as our recollection serves us, in his whole writings.
(2) Morality consists of two parts. One of these is self-education; the training, by the human being himself, of his affections and will. That department is a blank in Bentham's system. The other and co-equal part, the regulation of his outward actions, must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first; for how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect even the worldly interests of ourselves or others, unless we take in, as part of the question, its influence on the regulation of our or their affections and desires? A moralist on Bentham's principles may get as far as this, that he ought not to slay, burn, or steal; but what will be his qualifications for regulating the nicer shades of human behaviour, or for laying down even the greater moralities as to those facts in human life which tend to influence the depths of the character quite independently of any influence on worldly circumstances,---such, for instance, as the sexual relations, or those of family in general, or any other social and sympathetic connexions of an intimate kind? The moralities of these questions depend essentially on considerations which Bentham never so much as took into the account; and when he happened to be in the right, it was always, and necessarily, on wrong or insufficient grounds.
(3) That which alone causes any material interests to exist, which alone enables any body of human beings to exist as a society, is national character: that it is, which causes one nation to succeed in what it attempts, another to fail; one nation to understand and aspire to elevated things, another to grovel in mean ones; which makes the greatness of one nation lasting, and dooms another to early and rapid decay. The true teacher of the fitting social arrangements for England, France, or America, is the one who can point out how the English, French or American character can be improved, and how it has been made what it is. A philosophy of laws and institutions, not founded on a philosophy of national character, is an absurdity. But what could Bentham's opinion be worth on national character? How could he, whose mind contained so few and so poor types of individual character, rise to that higher generalization? All he can do is but to indicate means by which, in any given state of the national mind, the material interests of society can be protected; saving the question, of which others must judge, whether the use of those means would have, on the national character, any injurious influence.
(4) In so far as Bentham's adoption of the principle of utility induced him to fix his attention upon the consequences of actions as the consideration determining their morality, so far he was indisputably in the right path: though to go far in it without wandering, there was needed a greater knowledge of the formation of character, and of the consequences of actions upon the agent's own frame of mind, than Bentham possessed. His want of power to estimate this class of consequences, together with his want of the degree of modest deference which, from those who have not competent experience of their own, is due to the experience of others on that part of the subject, greatly limit the value of his speculations on questions of practical ethics.
(5) He is chargeable also with another error, which it would be improper to pass over, because nothing has tended more to place him in opposition to the common feelings of mankind, and to give to his philosophy that cold, mechanical and ungenial air which characterizes the popular idea of a Benthamite. This error, or rather one-sidedness, belongs to him not as a utilitarian, but as a moralist by profession, and in common with almost all professed moralists, whether religious or philosophical: it is that of treating the moral view of actions and characters, which is unquestionably the first and most important mode of looking at them, as if it were the sole one: whereas it is only one of three, by all of which our sentiments towards the human being may be, ought to be, and without entirely crushing our own nature cannot but be, materially influenced. Every human action has three aspects,---its moral aspect, or that of its right and wrong. its aesthetic aspect, or that of its beauty; its sympathetic aspect, or that of its lovableness. The first addresses itself to our reason and conscience; the second to our imagination; the third to our human fellow-feeling. According to the first, we approve or disapprove; according to the second, we admire, or despise; according to the third, we love, pity or dislike. The morality of an action depends on its foreseeable consequences; its beauty, and its lovableness, or the reverse, depend on the qualities which it is evidence of. Thus, a lie is wrong, because its effect is to mislead, and because it tends to destroy the confidence of man in man; it is also mean, because it is cowardly; because it proceeds from not daring to face the consequences of telling the truth; or, at best, is evidence of want of that power to compass our ends by straightforward means, which is conceived as properly belonging to every person not deficient in energy or in understanding. The action of Brutus in sentencing his sons was right, because it was executing a law essential to the freedom of his country, against persons of whose guilt there was no doubt; it was admirable, because it evinced a rare degree of patriotism, courage and self-control: but there was nothing loveable in it; it affords either no presumption in regard to loveable qualities, or a presumption of their deficiency.
Some brief comments.
(1) We get some notion of the shape of ethics as Mill sees it: it accepts the existence of conscience, moral aspiration, self-respect, and duty as facts of human nature, and reasons accordingly.
(2) Self-education, as one might expect, plays an extremely important role in Mill; and, indeed, the whole of Mill's deviation from Bentham is arguably summed up in the second passage above: he regards it as essential to moral theory. If your moral theory says nothing about self-education, about cultivation of character, about training of will, it is not moral in the strictest sense at all, but something else; it is missing what is required for handling morality as such.
(3) I find the 'national character' bit interesting. This used to be quite the common concept. Whewell, Mill's rival in moral philosophy, talks about it; Hume has an essay on it in which he tries to pin down the best way to account for it. But it tends to be out of favor today, largely, I think, because it has always been used in an ambiguous way, as part descriptive and part normative. If I say 'candour', i.e., honest forthrightness, is part of the British national character, this needn't mean that I am saying that all of the British are candid, nor even that the majority are; rather, it probably means that candour is (so to speak) part of the goal of being British. It's a public standard, a shared value, a continual task being British gets you. But I could also use the phrase descriptively, and say, the British national character has deteriorated from the days when candour was the national virtue. Here, clearly, we are making a descriptive claim rather than a normative claim. But Mill gives what can be seen as a sort of account for the duality of the term: namely, the national character is a generalization of individual moral characters (it is unclear whether it is a generalization from all the individual characters, which seems unlikely, or, much more probably, a generalization from the characters of prominent individuals); a sort of moral fact about a society that emerges from considering the moral character of the people in it. Thus Mill's use is purely descriptive, in the way I would say, "Each person should work on what will improve their character."
(4) The three-aspect thesis is striking; and, ultimately, what it amounts to is that Mill recognizes that in addition to the standard moral ideas (obligation, etc.), it is necessary to have room for the cultivation of moral taste.
(1) Man is never recognized by him as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness. Even in the more limited form of conscience, this great fact in human nature escapes him. Nothing is more curious than the absence of recognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience, as a thing distinct from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and from self-interest in this world or in the next. There is a studied abstinence from any of the phrases which, in the mouths of others, import the acknowledgment of such a fact. If we find the words ``conscience'', ``principle'', ``moral rectitude'', ``moral duty'', in his ``Table of the Springs of Action'', it is among the synonymes of the ``love of reputation''; with an intimation as to the two former phrases, that they are also sometimes synonymous with the religious motive, or the motive of sympathy. The feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation properly so called, either towards ourselves or our fellow-creatures, he seems unaware of the existence of; and neither the word self-respect, nor the idea to which that word is appropriated, occurs even once, so far as our recollection serves us, in his whole writings.
(2) Morality consists of two parts. One of these is self-education; the training, by the human being himself, of his affections and will. That department is a blank in Bentham's system. The other and co-equal part, the regulation of his outward actions, must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first; for how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect even the worldly interests of ourselves or others, unless we take in, as part of the question, its influence on the regulation of our or their affections and desires? A moralist on Bentham's principles may get as far as this, that he ought not to slay, burn, or steal; but what will be his qualifications for regulating the nicer shades of human behaviour, or for laying down even the greater moralities as to those facts in human life which tend to influence the depths of the character quite independently of any influence on worldly circumstances,---such, for instance, as the sexual relations, or those of family in general, or any other social and sympathetic connexions of an intimate kind? The moralities of these questions depend essentially on considerations which Bentham never so much as took into the account; and when he happened to be in the right, it was always, and necessarily, on wrong or insufficient grounds.
(3) That which alone causes any material interests to exist, which alone enables any body of human beings to exist as a society, is national character: that it is, which causes one nation to succeed in what it attempts, another to fail; one nation to understand and aspire to elevated things, another to grovel in mean ones; which makes the greatness of one nation lasting, and dooms another to early and rapid decay. The true teacher of the fitting social arrangements for England, France, or America, is the one who can point out how the English, French or American character can be improved, and how it has been made what it is. A philosophy of laws and institutions, not founded on a philosophy of national character, is an absurdity. But what could Bentham's opinion be worth on national character? How could he, whose mind contained so few and so poor types of individual character, rise to that higher generalization? All he can do is but to indicate means by which, in any given state of the national mind, the material interests of society can be protected; saving the question, of which others must judge, whether the use of those means would have, on the national character, any injurious influence.
(4) In so far as Bentham's adoption of the principle of utility induced him to fix his attention upon the consequences of actions as the consideration determining their morality, so far he was indisputably in the right path: though to go far in it without wandering, there was needed a greater knowledge of the formation of character, and of the consequences of actions upon the agent's own frame of mind, than Bentham possessed. His want of power to estimate this class of consequences, together with his want of the degree of modest deference which, from those who have not competent experience of their own, is due to the experience of others on that part of the subject, greatly limit the value of his speculations on questions of practical ethics.
(5) He is chargeable also with another error, which it would be improper to pass over, because nothing has tended more to place him in opposition to the common feelings of mankind, and to give to his philosophy that cold, mechanical and ungenial air which characterizes the popular idea of a Benthamite. This error, or rather one-sidedness, belongs to him not as a utilitarian, but as a moralist by profession, and in common with almost all professed moralists, whether religious or philosophical: it is that of treating the moral view of actions and characters, which is unquestionably the first and most important mode of looking at them, as if it were the sole one: whereas it is only one of three, by all of which our sentiments towards the human being may be, ought to be, and without entirely crushing our own nature cannot but be, materially influenced. Every human action has three aspects,---its moral aspect, or that of its right and wrong. its aesthetic aspect, or that of its beauty; its sympathetic aspect, or that of its lovableness. The first addresses itself to our reason and conscience; the second to our imagination; the third to our human fellow-feeling. According to the first, we approve or disapprove; according to the second, we admire, or despise; according to the third, we love, pity or dislike. The morality of an action depends on its foreseeable consequences; its beauty, and its lovableness, or the reverse, depend on the qualities which it is evidence of. Thus, a lie is wrong, because its effect is to mislead, and because it tends to destroy the confidence of man in man; it is also mean, because it is cowardly; because it proceeds from not daring to face the consequences of telling the truth; or, at best, is evidence of want of that power to compass our ends by straightforward means, which is conceived as properly belonging to every person not deficient in energy or in understanding. The action of Brutus in sentencing his sons was right, because it was executing a law essential to the freedom of his country, against persons of whose guilt there was no doubt; it was admirable, because it evinced a rare degree of patriotism, courage and self-control: but there was nothing loveable in it; it affords either no presumption in regard to loveable qualities, or a presumption of their deficiency.
Some brief comments.
(1) We get some notion of the shape of ethics as Mill sees it: it accepts the existence of conscience, moral aspiration, self-respect, and duty as facts of human nature, and reasons accordingly.
(2) Self-education, as one might expect, plays an extremely important role in Mill; and, indeed, the whole of Mill's deviation from Bentham is arguably summed up in the second passage above: he regards it as essential to moral theory. If your moral theory says nothing about self-education, about cultivation of character, about training of will, it is not moral in the strictest sense at all, but something else; it is missing what is required for handling morality as such.
(3) I find the 'national character' bit interesting. This used to be quite the common concept. Whewell, Mill's rival in moral philosophy, talks about it; Hume has an essay on it in which he tries to pin down the best way to account for it. But it tends to be out of favor today, largely, I think, because it has always been used in an ambiguous way, as part descriptive and part normative. If I say 'candour', i.e., honest forthrightness, is part of the British national character, this needn't mean that I am saying that all of the British are candid, nor even that the majority are; rather, it probably means that candour is (so to speak) part of the goal of being British. It's a public standard, a shared value, a continual task being British gets you. But I could also use the phrase descriptively, and say, the British national character has deteriorated from the days when candour was the national virtue. Here, clearly, we are making a descriptive claim rather than a normative claim. But Mill gives what can be seen as a sort of account for the duality of the term: namely, the national character is a generalization of individual moral characters (it is unclear whether it is a generalization from all the individual characters, which seems unlikely, or, much more probably, a generalization from the characters of prominent individuals); a sort of moral fact about a society that emerges from considering the moral character of the people in it. Thus Mill's use is purely descriptive, in the way I would say, "Each person should work on what will improve their character."
(4) The three-aspect thesis is striking; and, ultimately, what it amounts to is that Mill recognizes that in addition to the standard moral ideas (obligation, etc.), it is necessary to have room for the cultivation of moral taste.
Public Land Management
Alex Tabarrok proposes selling federally-owned Western lands (there is discussion at Matthew Yglesias). The problem with the proposal is that it would be extraordinarily difficult to do. It is not, however, as many commenters have been suggesting, because the land is not valuable; rather, it is because the rather considerable value of the land is based in part on its being administered in a way that (at present) could hardly be done by anyone other than the government.
The clearest way to see this is to look at what the Bureau of Land Management actually does, because the BLM is far and away the major adminstrator. (The other big land administrators -- the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the General Services Administration -- are dwarfed by the BLM in this respect and, in any case, except for the GSA, which manages things like federal buildings, mostly deal with lands that could only seriously be sold with massive restrictions.) The BLM handles (on its own) about 260 million acres. (I say 'on its own' because it also tends to handle mineral rights for land managed by other agencies.) About 160 million acres of this is used as public rangeland; about 45 million is leased for oil and gas production; some is leased for coal, some for geothermal, some for wind and solar, some for wood; all save a small portion of this land is available for recreational activities like camping, horseback riding, hiking, hang gliding, etc. In addition, the BLM manages right-of-way licenses. Suppose you want to string a cable for some important reason across the West; the existence of public lands allows you to do so, by getting a permit, without having to buy or pay hundreds of private owners or push the state for eminent domain. And the uses multiply.
When we look at what the BLM does, we see part of the problem with selling off the land. The land, or much of it, at least, is genuinely valuable, contrary to what some have suggested; a rather hefty portion of the American economy is affected by the management of these lands. But the chief value of the land is precisely that it stays open for any sort of use that might reasonably come up: it gets used for grazing if you can use it for grazing; if its mineral estate suddenly becomes economically viable, it is available for use; if it is suitable for a certain form of outdoor recreation, it can be used for that; if you need it for right of way, it is there for that; if there's a byproduct of production (like helium from natural gas), you can make sure that this byproduct doesn't go to waste but is actually diverted to a useful market; if solar and wind require massive amounts of land, there's plenty of land to choose from; and so forth and so on. And precisely because it is managed to be public land it retains its general-use value, and functions as a land and resource reserve for anything that might come up. But much of this land could only be useful to private owners if they managed so much of it as to be doing, effectively, what the BLM does for it: using it for whatever seems a good use, and (if none seems available) setting it aside until some good use comes along (which it often does). People primarily buy land, however, not to add to their general land reserve, but to serve some very specific range of functions; and, while you can use Nevada desert for a lot, it's hard to see how it could possibly be economically viable for anyone to use it for just a few things. Thus most of the land is very difficult to sell to anyone who can't, in fact, do what the BLM alread does with it; and very few people can seriously do that.
Which is not to say that you couldn't sell some of it. Some of the land is reasonably well-suited to particular uses, and you could sell some grazing land to ranchers, some oil production land to oil companies, some forest land to lumber companies, etc. The land you'd be selling is often more difficult to develop than the kind that such companies would prefer, but it would be economically viable. However, it's not really clear what you'd gain from the sale. Managed by the BLM, such brings in an income of several billion a year; companies can make use of the resources more cheaply if they pay permits rather than own it; you encourage competition by making access to the resources generally available; you guarantee that the land is not bound up for a single use if it could be used for several things; etc. Most of this would be lost on sale.
The clearest way to see this is to look at what the Bureau of Land Management actually does, because the BLM is far and away the major adminstrator. (The other big land administrators -- the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the General Services Administration -- are dwarfed by the BLM in this respect and, in any case, except for the GSA, which manages things like federal buildings, mostly deal with lands that could only seriously be sold with massive restrictions.) The BLM handles (on its own) about 260 million acres. (I say 'on its own' because it also tends to handle mineral rights for land managed by other agencies.) About 160 million acres of this is used as public rangeland; about 45 million is leased for oil and gas production; some is leased for coal, some for geothermal, some for wind and solar, some for wood; all save a small portion of this land is available for recreational activities like camping, horseback riding, hiking, hang gliding, etc. In addition, the BLM manages right-of-way licenses. Suppose you want to string a cable for some important reason across the West; the existence of public lands allows you to do so, by getting a permit, without having to buy or pay hundreds of private owners or push the state for eminent domain. And the uses multiply.
When we look at what the BLM does, we see part of the problem with selling off the land. The land, or much of it, at least, is genuinely valuable, contrary to what some have suggested; a rather hefty portion of the American economy is affected by the management of these lands. But the chief value of the land is precisely that it stays open for any sort of use that might reasonably come up: it gets used for grazing if you can use it for grazing; if its mineral estate suddenly becomes economically viable, it is available for use; if it is suitable for a certain form of outdoor recreation, it can be used for that; if you need it for right of way, it is there for that; if there's a byproduct of production (like helium from natural gas), you can make sure that this byproduct doesn't go to waste but is actually diverted to a useful market; if solar and wind require massive amounts of land, there's plenty of land to choose from; and so forth and so on. And precisely because it is managed to be public land it retains its general-use value, and functions as a land and resource reserve for anything that might come up. But much of this land could only be useful to private owners if they managed so much of it as to be doing, effectively, what the BLM does for it: using it for whatever seems a good use, and (if none seems available) setting it aside until some good use comes along (which it often does). People primarily buy land, however, not to add to their general land reserve, but to serve some very specific range of functions; and, while you can use Nevada desert for a lot, it's hard to see how it could possibly be economically viable for anyone to use it for just a few things. Thus most of the land is very difficult to sell to anyone who can't, in fact, do what the BLM alread does with it; and very few people can seriously do that.
Which is not to say that you couldn't sell some of it. Some of the land is reasonably well-suited to particular uses, and you could sell some grazing land to ranchers, some oil production land to oil companies, some forest land to lumber companies, etc. The land you'd be selling is often more difficult to develop than the kind that such companies would prefer, but it would be economically viable. However, it's not really clear what you'd gain from the sale. Managed by the BLM, such brings in an income of several billion a year; companies can make use of the resources more cheaply if they pay permits rather than own it; you encourage competition by making access to the resources generally available; you guarantee that the land is not bound up for a single use if it could be used for several things; etc. Most of this would be lost on sale.
Devil's Hide and Seek
"Lack of character--" All too easily we confuse a fear of standing up for our beliefs, a tendency to be more influenced by the convictions of others than by our own, or simply a lack of conviction--with the need that the strong and mature feel to give full weight to the arguments of the other side. A game of hide-and-seek: when the Devil wishes to play on our lack of character, he calls it tolerance, and when he wants to stifle our first attempts to learn tolerance, he calls it lack of character.
Dag Hammerskjöld, Markings, Sjöberg & Auden, trs. Alfred A. Knopf (New York: 1964) p.64.
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