Sunday, November 23, 2008

Quas Primas

This kingdom is spiritual and is concerned with spiritual things. That this is so the above quotations from Scripture amply prove, and Christ by his own action confirms it. On many occasions, when the Jews and even the Apostles wrongly supposed that the Messiah would restore the liberties and the kingdom of Israel, he repelled and denied such a suggestion. When the populace thronged around him in admiration and would have acclaimed him King, he shrank from the honor and sought safety in flight. Before the Roman magistrate he declared that his kingdom was not of this world. The gospels present this kingdom as one which men prepare to enter by penance, and cannot actually enter except by faith and by baptism, which, though an external rite, signifies and produces an interior regeneration. This kingdom is opposed to none other than to that of Satan and to the power of darkness. It demands of its subjects a spirit of detachment from riches and earthly things, and a spirit of gentleness. They must hunger and thirst after justice, and more than this, they must deny themselves and carry the cross.


From Quas Primas; on this day the Feast of Christ the King in the year of our Lord 2008.

Children's Classics

Jody Bottum has an essay at First Things on children's classics. I find much of the argument mystifying, a sign that Bottum and I have very different tastes and standards in this area. (It is an interesting question, though, why, of all the many Robinsonades, The Swiss Family Robinson has done so well. And I think in this regard it has benefited from the fact that it was not written to be published, and therefore was not written to fit any expectations about what it should involve. Jules Verne, a much better writer in general than Wyss, wrote several Robinsonades; despite his ingenuity, they pale in comparison, because The Swiss Family Robinson is not just a Robinsonade: it subtly combines realism with sheer fantasy. Verne writes his Robinsonades to underline the engineering ability of the human mind; but Wyss's family finds a way to use sea turtles as boat motors. In Verne you get people who overcome a real wilderness. You get the idea of what Wyss's wilderness is from the fact that the family is greeted to the island by penguins and flamingoes, and this is one of the least improbable conjunctions in the book.)

Bottum argues that we are living in a golden age of children's literature:

J.K. Rowling’s success doesn’t just give us a recent series to add as an incidental to the received canon. It also gives us a chance to rewrite the entire list of classic children’s books we’re all supposed to know—for Rowling makes visible the fact that we are actually living now in a golden age of children’s ­literature.


This strikes me as a immensely improbable. There are certainly some good, readable works around; but in the majority of cases it is difficult to say whether this is because they are good works or because they fit our tastes well. A golden age for children's literature is measured by its classics -- and a classic is something that can be read over and over again, even while the tastes of society change. Our era is good at producing books sufficiently to people's taste that they can be read over and over again; but whether they can survive changes in taste is another question. Whether we are really producing any children's classics is a question that will only be settled for sure long after any of us are dead. But the odds are rather considerably against us to begin with, and our ships of the line exhibit failings that may eventually founder them: Rowling is fun, but much of the fun has to do with her playing on features of contemporary life that may change; Pullman is striking, but he has a taste for moral themes whose appeal may well require a very peculiar sort of culture, one very much like ours; Lemony Snicket is clever, but the cleverness, like Rowling's fun, plays on features of our life and culture. Of course we find ourselves charming, and there have been some excellent writers to display ourselves to ourselves in the most charming lights. But whether or not we produce any real children's classics will depend heavily on whether other people can find us charming. It is not so very clear that they will.

Saturday, November 22, 2008

Of Fundamentalist Platypodes

In jumping around from link to link in an idle moment, I came upon The Skeptic's Annotated Bible. I had known it had existed before, but I hadn't really bothered to read any part of it before; it turns out I was missing out on an interesting specimen of the quirks of human thought. Here, for instance, is what the SAB says about "What the Bible Says about Non-Christians":

They are without God.

"Whosoever ... abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, hath not God." -- 2 John 9

They are all antichrists.

"For many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an antichrist." -- 2 John 7

They should be shunned. Neither marry nor be friends with them.

"Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel? ... Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord." -- 2 Cor.6:14-17

They should be killed.

"If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers; Namely, of the gods of the people which are round about you ... Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him: But thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people. And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die." -- Dt.13:6-10


Never mind, of course, that the people discussed in II John are specifically people claiming to be Christians -- hence the warning about people who 'confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh'. The letter, like all of the Johannine epistles, is about distinguishing what merely claims to be Christian from what really is. There is no suggestion that all non-Christians are antichrists; nor, in fact, would this fit with the probable meaning of the term 'antichrist' in this context. The real claim is that some who claim to teach Christian doctrine are antichrists, i.e., people who are setting themselves up in the place Christ alone should stand. Never mind, again, that the Deuteronomy passage isn't about non-Christians at all. Never mind, yet again, that the separation in II Corinthians is explicitly about behavior linked to pagan, and particularly idolatrous, practice.

I'm not really interested in criticism here, which I imagine would be pointless. It is interesting, however, as a specimen. What this is, of course, is not a skeptical reading of the Bible; rather, it is an uncritical collecting together of various fundamentalist and fundamentalist-like readings of passages without regard for the actual context of the passages, either the immediate context or the context of the whole work, in order to reject the interpretation that arises from this sort of approach. This fits with the thrust of the work, a counterattack on fundamentalists that is based on the assumption that only fundamentalists read the Bible correctly:

I don't insist on a literal interpretation, but only that all of the Bible be taken seriously and that none of it be ignored. It seems to me that most non-fundamentalist Christians don't really believe in the Bible; they only pretend to do so. Some don't even pretend -- yet all claim to base their beliefs upon it. This seems dishonest to me.


Thus the SAB is a fundamentalist interpretation of the text; the only difference between itself and the fundamentalists it opposes is that whereas the latter assume a posture of deference, the former assumes a posture of defiance. In that sense it serves as a sort of platypus of order Fundamentalista: entirely within the order as to the essential matter, the manner of reading, despite the possession of features that deviate sharply from quotidian expectations.

Notes on the Incantatory Use of the Word 'Truth'

A general form of argument I've seen a number of times in the past year: The difference between my opponent and myself is that whereas my opponent is concerned with (some practical thing, like consolation, charity, fairness, etc.), I'm interested in the truth. This appeal to truth is incantatory: it is not an argument but a rhetorical ploy that usually involves a false dichotomy. By ritually displaying one's 'interest in the truth' in contrast with someone else's interest in something else, one simultaneously paints oneself as in possession of the truth and the other person as compromising the truth in favor of something else; when, of course, it is entirely possible that their concern with whatever it may be is itself a form of interest in the truth. Certainly, nothing says that you can't simultaneously be interested in the truth and interested in other good things as well; and there is no reason to think that truth excludes every other good thing there may be.

It is also ironic, in that someone who appeals to truth this way is usually showing that they do, in fact, have other interests; one of which is to be superior to their opponents when it comes to the reputation for the truth. There are no doubt innocent uses of the argument. But usually you can almost guarantee that the person who uses it is merely posturing to win an argument; they may be generally interested in truth, but they are gunning for a victory

Except in rare cases we can assume that everyone is interested in the truth. But interests in truth pave the road to irrationality in much the same way good intentions pave the road to hell. Indeed, wanting to do good and wanting to find truth are closely related; and the same thing can be said of both. Interest in the truth is pointless without the rightly ordered pursuit of truth. That is not a formula you say but a way you go about things, and the fundamental irrationality in arguments like the above is that someone acts as if you could show that you pursue truth well by saying you pursue it, and this is as absurd as thinking you could show that you are virtuous by insisting that you are virtuous in public. (Since the right sort of interest in truth is a virtue, it is in fact the same thing.) That way lies hypocrisy, not virtue.

There are other incantatory uses of the word 'truth'. Are any of them rational? Perhaps when they are deployed like Socrates's rhetoric -- to hold oneself to a standard and to encourage oneself to do better. But is there any other case where it would be rational?

Friday, November 21, 2008

Complex Things Using a Lot of Concepts

This blog is:

INTP - The Thinkers

The logical and analytical type. They are especialy attuned to difficult creative and intellectual challenges and always look for something more complex to dig into. They are great at finding subtle connections between things and imagine far-reaching implications.

They enjoy working with complex things using a lot of concepts and imaginative models of reality. Since they are not very good at seeing and understanding the needs of other people, they might come across as arrogant, impatient and insensitive to people that need some time to understand what they are talking about.


(Typealyzer)

Thursday, November 20, 2008

Plagiarism and Humiliation

Janet has mentions an instructor who, to deter plagiarism, put the following in his syllabus:

No form of dishonesty is acceptable. I will promptly and publicly fail and humiliate anyone caught lying, cheating, or stealing. That includes academic dishonesty, copyright violations, software piracy, or any other form of dishonesty.


When he found six students plagiarizing on an assignment, he followed through. The university fired him. I'm with those who say that, as a matter of university policy, it was obviously right for them to do so (but see below, because it is not merely a matter of university policy); it was a pretty clear violation of FERPA regulations as they are usually understood, particularly without a hearing being called, and universities simply cannot overlook something like that, however unfortunate the results. (Even setting FERPA aside, it is a violation of professional academic ethics. Public humiliation is not something that can be called back. If you give a student a zero for cheating, the student has means of appeal, and can make a case for guaranteeing that the zero does not appear on the record, no harm to the student. But if you humiliate a student in public, you are giving a punishment that cannot be undone before a student has the means to see that his or her case has been reviewed and rights protected. You could later apologize, but that's not undoing the punishment. In any case (not that I'd expect most people to be moved by the point), things like this also come dangerously near the sin of detraction. Deliberately damaging someone's good name, even for something you are fairly sure is true, is not a minor matter; it is one of the most serious punishments you can inflict on an individual. It is a massive harm in itself, and its effects are extremely difficult to predict; and it should be treated accordingly, like the dangerous weapon it is. And this is particularly important for people in academia, since in our hands it can be even more dangerous. Not every case of public humiliation is detraction, but there must be safeguards in place to prevent it from becoming so. There are reasons that students are protected from this.)

But I don't actually blame the adjunct professor here. Just from what I've read about and by him, he seems like someone who was genuinely trying to build the best course he could. It's important to note that he had never taught before and is not a professional academic: he was a qualified professional asked by the department to teach a course in his area of expertise, and who agreed because he thought it an opportunity to give back to the community. His syllabus was reviewed by the department chair, who did not catch the ethical risk in the provision. Befor posting the grades, he gave the university forewarning and was not corrected. It's unfortunate that someone who, to all appearances, had an enthusiasm for the course and a genuine interest in giving his students the best course he could was put in this position. I hope that this doesn't discourage him from continuing to take an interest in education, since we could use more of him; I don't think there was anything else the university could have done, but he seems to have been put in a very unfortunate and ethically risky situation through no fault of his own. You can get his side of the story here, and his argument that plagiarism should be brought out into the open in the same place.

Actually, I'm not convinced that even academics are given what they need to fulfill their professional ethical responsibilities. Before anyone is allowed near a classroom, they should be made to sit in a class and learn, quite clearly, all principles governing the professional ethical issues that are involved in being a modern instructor: ADA, sexual harrassment, FERPA, student rights, academic rights, university policies, &c. A lot of schools get part of this in already with their professional development requirements; but doing it that way guarantees that it is piecemeal.

'a phantom to be slain, a rock to be dashed against'

There has been some excellent discussion of women in science around the science blogs recently, in which Zuska and a few others are setting out to try to kill another Angel in the House. As Zuska says (in the post below):

The problem, you see, is that women aren't really allowed to be ANYTHING in science. If you are a hot goddess then you are Not Serious and Not A Real Scientist and you are Ruining Science For Other Women Who Are More Serious and so on. If you are just a regular goddess (like Zuska) then you are an ugly hairy-legged man-hating feminazi who needs to get laid and Not A Real Scientist and Ruining Science For Other Women Who Are More Reasonable. The mythical More Serious, More Reasonable, non-hairy-legged, non-high heels-wearing Real Scientist woman has, alas, rarely, if ever, been seen. Because women can't be Real Scientists, no matter how Reasonable and Serious they are.


Notable posts:

On the Need for Women to Defend Women in Science.... (On Becoming a Domestic and Laboratory Goddess)
The Proper Way to be a Woman in Science (Thus Spake Zuska)
Women, Scientists, and Ordinary Human Beings (Adventures in Ethics and Science)