Still under the weather. But I thought I'd put up something noting that today is the feast-day for a number of interesting saints: St. Simon Stock, St. Brendan the Navigator, and St. John Stone.
St. Brendan is the best known of the three; from the fifth century, he is one of the Twelve Apostles of Ireland and is the subject of a very famous legend cycle, The Voyage of St. Brendan.
St. Simon Stock is also known as Simon Anglus or Simon the Englishman. He was born circa 1165 and died in 1265, and became the general of the Carmelites at the late age of 82, a very taxing office that he nonetheless fulfilled with vigor. He is fairly important for the history of the university, since under his generalship the Carmelites founded houses in close relationship with the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, Paris, and Bologna. The hymn Flos Carmeli is usually attributed to him. The Carmelites were at a very delicate position when he became their leader; they were a Holy Land religious order and it was commonly thought that their rule was not suitable for European lands. But under St. Simon they managed to adapt their Rule, please the powers that be, and establish a steady foundation for the extraordinarily important religious order the Carmelites would eventually become.
St. John Stone was an English Augustinian friar in Canterbury who got in trouble for denouncing King Henry VIII from the pulpit and refusing to accept the Act of Supremacy. He was hanged, drawn, and quartered, with his head and body displayed at the gates, as was the custom for those convicted of treason.
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
Monday, May 14, 2012
Music on My Mind
I hoped to have more Kierkegaard, but have come down with something fairly nasty, thus putting me behind on everything, including grading. So of course the mind turns to comic song:
Flanders & Swann, "Have Some Madeira, M'Dear". With the classic lines, of course:
Flanders & Swann, "Have Some Madeira, M'Dear". With the classic lines, of course:
She lowered her standards by raising her glass,
Her courage, her eyes -- and his hopes
Sunday, May 13, 2012
Book a Week, May 13
I have a lot of books. I've read most of them, but some of them (particularly among those that were inherited) I have not yet read, and some of them I only read quite a long time ago. So one thing I've been thinking of doing is a book-a-week feature here, in which I'll pick out a book on Sunday that either I have not managed to read before, or that I haven't read in quite a while, and then blog something about it. I have difficulty maintaining series here, but the reading this requires is not great -- I already read more than one book a week even in busy weeks, so this is just a matter of picking out a particular book beforehand and blogging something about it afterward. We'll see how it goes.
My first book in the series is a re-read: The Diary of a Young Lady of Fashion in the Year 1764-1765. According to the title-page, it is the diary of one Cleone Knox, as "Edited by her KINSMAN, Alexander Blacker Kerr," and it is often listed in this way, but the title-page is sheer fiction. Neither Knox nor Kerr ever existed. The whole diary is a work of fiction. It was published in 1925 but it had been written a couple of years before by a nineteen-year-old girl, Magdalen King-Hall, who was an aspiring author. Her sister suggested that she write a historical novel in eighteenth-century diary form, so King-Hall spent a short bit of time reading up on the period in the library and within a few weeks came out with The Diary of a Young Lady. It was an instant hit -- in the U.S. alone it went through nine editions in two months. People were taken in by it; there was a brief period where reviewers thought it really was a recently discovered eighteenth-century diary, and when some months after publication it came out that it was fictional, there was a scandal of sorts. King-Hall went on to become quite a widely read historical novelist. Her most famous novel was The Wicked Lady, about Barbara Skelton, which was made into a movie.
As I recall, the book is a fairly light read, but quite charming, so it seems a good start.
My first book in the series is a re-read: The Diary of a Young Lady of Fashion in the Year 1764-1765. According to the title-page, it is the diary of one Cleone Knox, as "Edited by her KINSMAN, Alexander Blacker Kerr," and it is often listed in this way, but the title-page is sheer fiction. Neither Knox nor Kerr ever existed. The whole diary is a work of fiction. It was published in 1925 but it had been written a couple of years before by a nineteen-year-old girl, Magdalen King-Hall, who was an aspiring author. Her sister suggested that she write a historical novel in eighteenth-century diary form, so King-Hall spent a short bit of time reading up on the period in the library and within a few weeks came out with The Diary of a Young Lady. It was an instant hit -- in the U.S. alone it went through nine editions in two months. People were taken in by it; there was a brief period where reviewers thought it really was a recently discovered eighteenth-century diary, and when some months after publication it came out that it was fictional, there was a scandal of sorts. King-Hall went on to become quite a widely read historical novelist. Her most famous novel was The Wicked Lady, about Barbara Skelton, which was made into a movie.
As I recall, the book is a fairly light read, but quite charming, so it seems a good start.
Saturday, May 12, 2012
The Fiction of Burden of Proof
QualiaSoup often has some interesting YouTube episodes on critical thinking; this one was on burden of proof:
Burden of proof in the sense used here is mythical, however. The basic idea here is that 'claim-making' gives an automatic obligation to give supporting arguments. This is not, in fact, something that anyone accepts as a matter of practice, and it is noticeable that in the above video the narrator makes a number of claims for which no supporting evidence is given. Indeed, it is logically impossible for a human being to fulfill an obligation of this sort because every supporting argument multiplies claims. The position that claim-making automatically gives an obligation to give supporting arguments for the claim implies that anyone who makes a claim has an obligation to make infinitely many claims. Since this is impossible, any supposed obligation with such an implication is obviously an absurd candidate for being an obligation. (Infinity could be prevented by allowing self-evident or properly basic claims that require no other claims as support. This would imply one of two things. Either there would be claims requiring no support, and thus bearing no burden of proof, or there would be claims whose burden of proof is met by something other than an argument -- direct experience, for instance. Either route would require a very different account of burden of proof than is given in the above video. And each one creates problems of its own, which I won't go into here.)
Claim-making, therefore, does not create any burden of proof; the burden of proof is not magically created when we assert things. Nor has it ever been plausible that mere claim-making generates obligations in this way. Further, when we look at rational interactions, we find that the whole "burden of proof is automatically on anyone who makes an assertion" falls apart completely. We get the problem that's never properly addressed in the video above that expressions of denial, doubt, skepticism, and criticism all admit of assertion. To handle this, people often fudge by talking about existence and nonexistence. This gives us the account of burden of proof (found here, for instance) in which claims that something exists automatically have the burden of proof. Virtually nobody ever bothers to prove that the burden of proof exists in such cases, even though this is clearly an existence claim and therefore would have the burden of proof. And when people do give arguments they are nonsense like the following (from the same source):
It can clearly be seen that (1) this would apply equally to claims about nonexistence, or, indeed, any claims at all, and thus requires the more general position that claim-making on its own generates a burden of proof, and carry all the corresponding problems; and (2) this makes the absurd assumption that burden of proof is the only way to prevent oneself from "accepting anything and everything that people claim to be so" when it is in fact obvious that you could just judge in terms of your own assessment of the evidence instead of always demanding that other people do your rational work for you.
In general, the assumption that there is a burden of proof, and that it favors one side, is usually smuggled into the argument. This is often quite clear with more sophisticated arguments like 'epistemic modesty' arguments (of the sort discussed here). OK, so suppose a claim is more 'epistemically immodest' (or whatever you want to substitute for it). It's still an open question whether it imposes any obligation; we need an account linking the two, and this is generally lacking. All the most plausible attempts to give a good account of this sort of general and philosophical burden of proof essentially make it a matter of presumptive reasoning of some kind; but the same problem arises here: your presumptions don't obligate anyone else. Indeed, this could be the slogan for any kind of counter-response to accounts like the above accounts: they are attempts to give high ground to preferred positions by a hocus-pocus conjuration of nonexistent obligations. Moreover, people who propose such accounts are in constant performative contradiction with their own account: they never give their own account of burden of proof the kind of support that would be required if their account were true.
When we look at plausibly rational appeals to burden of proof in real life, we find a mess, and the better accounts recognize this. We get this sort of point from Nizkor:
We have a form of the existence claim here, completely unsupported, but in general this description is properly hedged so that it applies to reality. It doesn't claim more than that burden of proof is found "in many situations," it recognizes that there is often a considerable amount of dispute as to who actually has burden of proof, and it notes that burden of proof is in some cases "set by the situation," which is the most notable fact about burden of proof and yet somehow not sufficiently remarked. But it's clear that these are merely the phenomena of burden of proof; they do not constitute an account, and, indeed, the constant need to hedge makes clear that accounts of the sort identified above, which can't account for all the anomalous situations that require the hedges, simply will not do.
Obviously there are cases where a burden of proof does exist. And there is a fairly obvious account that handles all the phenomena without falling into either absurdity or handwaving, and that is that the obligation of burden of proof is not something that accrues automatically. It is created, constructed, made, either by some competent authority or by the agreement of parties, or, in other words: by rules, laws, or decisions legitimately imposed by legitimate authorities, or by contract. I've talked about this before. This position has all the strength of presumptive reasoning accounts, but evades their problems by recognizing that the presumptions in question must be shared, and looks at how shared presumptions come about (i.e., by authority or by agreement). We see from this why it is so messy.
We also get from this why people spend such an extraordinary amount of time talking about burden of proof rather than giving arguments: they are negotiating their obligations to other people, not, as they often pretend (as part of their negotiation), merely identifying obvious facts. The reason people argue so much about burden of proof is the same reason that people argue so much about what they will put into a contract or treaty or agreement. But there is no way around the fact that, when there is no authoritative imposition, this negotiation is necessary for any obligation to arise -- and that the negotiation is two-way.
Burden of proof in the sense used here is mythical, however. The basic idea here is that 'claim-making' gives an automatic obligation to give supporting arguments. This is not, in fact, something that anyone accepts as a matter of practice, and it is noticeable that in the above video the narrator makes a number of claims for which no supporting evidence is given. Indeed, it is logically impossible for a human being to fulfill an obligation of this sort because every supporting argument multiplies claims. The position that claim-making automatically gives an obligation to give supporting arguments for the claim implies that anyone who makes a claim has an obligation to make infinitely many claims. Since this is impossible, any supposed obligation with such an implication is obviously an absurd candidate for being an obligation. (Infinity could be prevented by allowing self-evident or properly basic claims that require no other claims as support. This would imply one of two things. Either there would be claims requiring no support, and thus bearing no burden of proof, or there would be claims whose burden of proof is met by something other than an argument -- direct experience, for instance. Either route would require a very different account of burden of proof than is given in the above video. And each one creates problems of its own, which I won't go into here.)
Claim-making, therefore, does not create any burden of proof; the burden of proof is not magically created when we assert things. Nor has it ever been plausible that mere claim-making generates obligations in this way. Further, when we look at rational interactions, we find that the whole "burden of proof is automatically on anyone who makes an assertion" falls apart completely. We get the problem that's never properly addressed in the video above that expressions of denial, doubt, skepticism, and criticism all admit of assertion. To handle this, people often fudge by talking about existence and nonexistence. This gives us the account of burden of proof (found here, for instance) in which claims that something exists automatically have the burden of proof. Virtually nobody ever bothers to prove that the burden of proof exists in such cases, even though this is clearly an existence claim and therefore would have the burden of proof. And when people do give arguments they are nonsense like the following (from the same source):
Well think whether or not it is a better way to proceed through life to accept anything and everything that people claim to be so. Experience should instruct every thinking human that there is a high probability that not everything that people claim to be true is actually true. Some claims might be made with the claimant aware that the claim is not true and some claims might be made with the claimant thinking that they are true but being mistaken. As it is for most humans not a very good idea to proceed through life based on beliefs that are false and thinking things to be true when they are not, most humans and those who would use reason to guide them will want some evidence and reasoning to support a claim being asserted to be true. So the burden is on those who make claims to offer reason and evidence in support of those claims.
It can clearly be seen that (1) this would apply equally to claims about nonexistence, or, indeed, any claims at all, and thus requires the more general position that claim-making on its own generates a burden of proof, and carry all the corresponding problems; and (2) this makes the absurd assumption that burden of proof is the only way to prevent oneself from "accepting anything and everything that people claim to be so" when it is in fact obvious that you could just judge in terms of your own assessment of the evidence instead of always demanding that other people do your rational work for you.
In general, the assumption that there is a burden of proof, and that it favors one side, is usually smuggled into the argument. This is often quite clear with more sophisticated arguments like 'epistemic modesty' arguments (of the sort discussed here). OK, so suppose a claim is more 'epistemically immodest' (or whatever you want to substitute for it). It's still an open question whether it imposes any obligation; we need an account linking the two, and this is generally lacking. All the most plausible attempts to give a good account of this sort of general and philosophical burden of proof essentially make it a matter of presumptive reasoning of some kind; but the same problem arises here: your presumptions don't obligate anyone else. Indeed, this could be the slogan for any kind of counter-response to accounts like the above accounts: they are attempts to give high ground to preferred positions by a hocus-pocus conjuration of nonexistent obligations. Moreover, people who propose such accounts are in constant performative contradiction with their own account: they never give their own account of burden of proof the kind of support that would be required if their account were true.
When we look at plausibly rational appeals to burden of proof in real life, we find a mess, and the better accounts recognize this. We get this sort of point from Nizkor:
In many situations, one side has the burden of proof resting on it. This side is obligated to provide evidence for its position. The claim of the other side, the one that does not bear the burden of proof, is assumed to be true unless proven otherwise. The difficulty in such cases is determining which side, if any, the burden of proof rests on. In many cases, settling this issue can be a matter of significant debate. In some cases the burden of proof is set by the situation. For example, in American law a person is assumed to be innocent until proven guilty (hence the burden of proof is on the prosecution). As another example, in debate the burden of proof is placed on the affirmative team. As a final example, in most cases the burden of proof rests on those who claim something exists (such as Bigfoot, psychic powers, universals, and sense data).
We have a form of the existence claim here, completely unsupported, but in general this description is properly hedged so that it applies to reality. It doesn't claim more than that burden of proof is found "in many situations," it recognizes that there is often a considerable amount of dispute as to who actually has burden of proof, and it notes that burden of proof is in some cases "set by the situation," which is the most notable fact about burden of proof and yet somehow not sufficiently remarked. But it's clear that these are merely the phenomena of burden of proof; they do not constitute an account, and, indeed, the constant need to hedge makes clear that accounts of the sort identified above, which can't account for all the anomalous situations that require the hedges, simply will not do.
Obviously there are cases where a burden of proof does exist. And there is a fairly obvious account that handles all the phenomena without falling into either absurdity or handwaving, and that is that the obligation of burden of proof is not something that accrues automatically. It is created, constructed, made, either by some competent authority or by the agreement of parties, or, in other words: by rules, laws, or decisions legitimately imposed by legitimate authorities, or by contract. I've talked about this before. This position has all the strength of presumptive reasoning accounts, but evades their problems by recognizing that the presumptions in question must be shared, and looks at how shared presumptions come about (i.e., by authority or by agreement). We see from this why it is so messy.
We also get from this why people spend such an extraordinary amount of time talking about burden of proof rather than giving arguments: they are negotiating their obligations to other people, not, as they often pretend (as part of their negotiation), merely identifying obvious facts. The reason people argue so much about burden of proof is the same reason that people argue so much about what they will put into a contract or treaty or agreement. But there is no way around the fact that, when there is no authoritative imposition, this negotiation is necessary for any obligation to arise -- and that the negotiation is two-way.
Make Haste to be Undone
Caged Rats
by Ebenezer Elliott
Ye coop us up, and tax our bread,
And wonder why we pine;
But ye are fat, and round, and red,
And fill'd with tax-bought wine.
Thus, twelve rats starve while three
rats thrive,
(Like you on mine and me,)
When fifteen rats are caged alive,
With food for nine and three.
Haste! havoc's torch begins to glow,
The ending is begun;
Make haste; destruction thinks ye slow;
Make haste to be undone!
Why are ye call'd 'my lord,' and 'quire,'
While fed by mine and me,
And wringing food, and clothes and fire
From bread-tax'd misery?
Make haste, slow rogues! prohibit trade,
Prohibit honest gain;
Turn all the good that God hath made
To fear, and hate, and pain;
Till beggars all, assassins all,
All cannibals we be,
And death shall have no funeral
From shipless sea to sea.
And another Elliott, because you just can't get more striking than talented and genuine poetic rage.
Friday, May 11, 2012
All in the Forest Blythe
The Woodman's Song
by Thomas Cooper
I would not be a crownèd king,
For all his gaudy gear;
I would not be that pampered thing,
His gew-gaw gold to wear:
But I would be where I can sing
Right merrily, all the year;
Where forest treen,
All gay and green,
Full blythely do me cheer.
I would not be a gentleman,
For all his hawks and hounds,—
For fear the hungry poor should ban
My halls and wide-parked grounds:
But I would be a merry man,
Among the wild wood sounds,—
Where free birds sing,
And echoes ring
While my axe from the oak rebounds.
I would not be a shaven priest,
For all his sloth-won tythe:
But while to me this breath is leased,
And these old limbs are lithe,—
Ere Death hath marked me for his feast,
And felled me with his scythe,—
I'll troll my song,
The leaves among,
All in the forest blythe.
Thursday, May 10, 2012
Hildegard von Bingen News
Some notable news for those who are interested in St. Hildegard von Bingen:
St. Hildegard was already listed as a saint in the Roman Martyrology, which is one of the official listings, so (contrary, for instance, to what Wikipedia now says) this is not a canonization in the proper sense. However, like a number of other saints in the Martyrology, she was not on the universal calendar, which gave her a somewhat ambiguous liturgical status, since she could only be liturgically commemorated when it would be appropriate to use the Roman Martyrology, or when an approved local calendar allowed it, rather than in a regular way by the whole Church with the usual Mass or Office. The Pope has changed this by extending her cultus to the universal church -- her feast is now open to liturgical commemoration everywhere (assuming, of course, it is not superceded by Sunday or some other major feast). That is, there is now a universal Feast of St. Hildegard, on September 17.
There have been rumors that the Pope plans to give Hildegard the liturgical title, "Doctor of the Church," at some point this year; and this would indeed be the first step to doing so, so there is almost certainly something to it.
The Holy Father today received in audience Cardinal Angelo Amato S.D.B., prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints. During the audience he extended the liturgical cult of St. Hildegard of Bingen (1089-1179) to the universal Church, inscribing her in the catalogue of saints.
St. Hildegard was already listed as a saint in the Roman Martyrology, which is one of the official listings, so (contrary, for instance, to what Wikipedia now says) this is not a canonization in the proper sense. However, like a number of other saints in the Martyrology, she was not on the universal calendar, which gave her a somewhat ambiguous liturgical status, since she could only be liturgically commemorated when it would be appropriate to use the Roman Martyrology, or when an approved local calendar allowed it, rather than in a regular way by the whole Church with the usual Mass or Office. The Pope has changed this by extending her cultus to the universal church -- her feast is now open to liturgical commemoration everywhere (assuming, of course, it is not superceded by Sunday or some other major feast). That is, there is now a universal Feast of St. Hildegard, on September 17.
There have been rumors that the Pope plans to give Hildegard the liturgical title, "Doctor of the Church," at some point this year; and this would indeed be the first step to doing so, so there is almost certainly something to it.
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