* Jonathan Dresner on Marco Polo
* Richard Brown discusses Aristotle on pleasure
* Mikhail Emilianov on how to fake your way through Spinoza
* A website collecting earliest uses of common mathematical symbols. Unsurprisingly, a large portion of our current logical symbolisms comes from Peano. But it's always interesting to see how relatively recent some of these symbolisms are.
* John Fabian Witt clears up a common confusion about the history of the status of corporations as persons at "Balkinization".
* Sarah Avery discusses an Introduction to Mythology class that she once taught, which turned out quite well and which she will probably never be allowed to teach again:
The Once and Probably Not Future Mythology Class
Hazards of Teaching Cool Stuff You Love in a Classroom
* Michael Pakaluk has an excellent discussion of formal cooperation.
I am grading, grading, grading, grading, and grading, so things will be fairly sparse this week.
Tuesday, October 16, 2012
Monday, October 15, 2012
Watering the Garden
Today is the feast-day of St. Teresa of Avila, Doctor of the Church. From her Life, which is one of the pre-eminent spiritual autobiographies:
A beginner must look upon himself as making a garden, wherein our Lord may take His delight, but in a soil unfruitful, and abounding in weeds. His Majesty roots up the weeds, and has to plant good herbs. Let us, then, take for granted that this is already done when a soul is determined to give itself to prayer, and has begun the practice of it. We have, then, as good gardeners, by the help of God, to see that the plants grow, to water them carefully, that they may not die, but produce blossoms, which shall send forth much fragrance, refreshing to our Lord, so that He may come often for His pleasure into this garden, and delight Himself in the midst of these virtues.
Let us now see how this garden is to be watered, that we may understand what we have to do: how much trouble it will cost us, whether the gain be greater than the trouble, or how long a time it will take us. It seems to me that the garden may be watered in four ways: by water taken out of a well, which is very laborious; or with water raised by means of an engine and buckets, drawn by a windlass--I have drawn it this way sometimes--it is a less troublesome way than the first, and gives more water; or by a stream or brook, whereby the garden is watered in a much better way--for the soil is more thoroughly saturated, and there is no necessity to water it so often, and the labour of the gardener is much less; or by showers of rain, when our Lord Himself waters it, without labour on our part--and this way is incomparably better than all the others of which I have spoken.
Sunday, October 14, 2012
A Brief Introduction to Natural Law Theory II
Part I
Natural law theory is, as noted in the previous part, a theory of practical reason; but what gives its name is that it is a theory of practical reason that is also a theory of law, a theory of practical reason qua law. Thus an adequate discussion of natural law theory requires a discussion of the account of law it gives, and to this we now turn.
II. Law
While he is certainly not the first to say something that might be construed as suggesting the idea of natural law, a fairly reasonable starting point for the history of natural law theory in Western civilization is Cicero. In De Re Publica he gives what clearly has all the elements of a natural law theory, which is to say, an account of human practical reason based on principles natural to it that is also an account of law. It forms one of the key elements of Cicero's theory of a republic or commonwealth. Cicero notes that human beings are in some sense at a disadvantage in the world at large -- in his notable phrase, Nature has treated us more like a stepmother than like a mother; if it were not for one thing, we would be outmatched by our environment, and that one thing is understanding or reason. By this we are able to write and study the stars, and to develop philosophy and thus civilization, that is, civil society. While we are not thrown into civil society, it is in some sense natural for us to build such civil societies. And as civil societies are constituted by justice and laws, any discussion of civil society must consider what justice and laws are. In the course of the dialogue, one of Cicero's characters, Laelius, argues that expediency is not the foundation of justice or law, and thus not the foundation of a genuine republic or commonwealth. Rather, there is a more fundamental foundation for both that, transcending any utility one might gain from either, still has purchase on us, because it is based on that very reason or understanding that makes civilized life possible in the first place. This is a true law, which is the same as right reason and is in accordance with our nature. Unlike human law it is universal and immutable, and (as it is that law which enjoins upon us morality itself) there is no field of genuinely human action that is outside its jurisdiction. No senate and no popular will can override it, for any attempted dispensation is unjust and unreasonable; it stands above human action in the sense that all human action is judged by it. It is promulgated by the God, and anyone who disobeys it does violence to his own nature. Laelius's account is applauded and supported by Scipio, another major character in the dialogue; and the agreement of the two is a clear sign of Cicero's own good favor toward this account. Much of this comes from the Stoics, but we see it come together here in a shape that will be quite familiar through the centuries. St. Ambrose and St. Augustine both show the clear influence of it, but, of course, the most famous exposition of this view is that of St. Thomas Aquinas.
In the first question of the Treatise on Law in the Summa Theologiae, which is question 90 of the First Part of the Second Part, Aquinas gives a general definition of law: Law is "nothing other than a certain promulgated ordering of reason to common good by one who has the care for what is common" or, as it is often translated, "nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated". There are four basic elements of this definition.
Law has to do with reason. Law regulates and measures human action in such a way that action is encouraged or restrained. This is a rational function: all genuinely human action is measured and regulated on the basis of reason, so that reason can in some way be said to be its source; thus law has to do with reason, either immediately or derivatively.
Law is an ordering to common good. Reason organizes and regulates action according to means and ends, as we noted in the discussion of practical reason. The most general end with which reason deals is the totality of good in a good life, and this does not exclude (and, indeed, requires) that reason consider what is good for everyone. Law clearly has to do with human beings in society, and therefore must consider precisely this: what is good for everyone in common. Thus law is an ordering to common good. It is worth pointing out, I think, that this common good is not, as Aquinas understands it, an overarching collective good separate from all individual good. It is instead the kind of good people share, literally good in common, by virtue of their living in society. It is also worth being wary of assumptions that tend to get imported by the translation "the common good". There is no one common good; there are many common goods, as many common goods as there are communities. Some common goods are more inclusive than others, but it is impossible to talk about any common good without having established what society or community one is considering.
Law is from one to whom it belongs to care for what is common. Ordering to common good typically depends on a whole community working as a whole: it is the whole community working together that has natural and primary responsibility to order itself to the relevant common good. However, practically speaking (and with law we are always speaking practically) it is often not feasible for the community to work as a unitary authority. To get around this problem, assuming there is no natural caretaker for the whole community, the whole community chooses someone to act for the whole community. Since law is an ordering to common good, its source has to be someone who is in some way caretaker of what is common to everyone.
Law is promulgated. Laws exist in order to regulate and measure human action, but they must be applied to action in order for this to happen. Since human action has its source in reason, the way in which laws are applied to human action must accordingly be rational. That is, law must be communicated in a rational way to the people to whom it applies, so that their reason can take it into account. This can happen in many different ways, but it must happen.
If any of these four is lacking, we may have something that looks a lot like a law but is not actually a law, and has no force as a law; a point which will be of some importance. There are, however, many different kinds of laws.
One of these kinds of law is natural law, which is the law constituted by the basic principles of practical reason. Obviously these principles are rational. They concern how things are ordered to good as such, which means that they are concerned with both private good and common good; insofar as they concern common good, they fit that part of the definition of law. They are also clearly promulgated, that is, our reason is notified of them, because they are intrinsic to reason, and without them we cannot reason practically at all. Therefore that leaves simply the source to whom it belongs to care for what is common.
This gets into an interesting issue. Aquinas himself is quite clear that the source of natural law is God, on whom human beings depends; and because the whole human community depends on God, God is the natural caretaker of what is common to the whole human community. As he puts it, natural law is the human participation of the eternal law of God by which God providentially orders the whole universe; it is, so to speak, a parceling out of eternal law in human form specifically for human beings. However, the language of participation is much more intimate in its suggestion than merely God imposing a law on us. Aquinas is equally clear that human beings don't just have their specifically human parcel of the eternal law of divine providence; divine providence itself is parceled out to us, again in a specifically human form specifically concerned with human life. Each human being, as rational, is in a sense part of divine providence itself. We all have a share in divine providence so that we, as rational creatures, are in Aquinas's phrase, "provident for ourselves and others". Only creatures with reason and understanding can have this subordinate providentiality, this active participation in the very providence of God. Thus there is a definite sense -- a derivative sense, but still a definite sense -- in which each and every human being, as a rational person, is caretaker for what is common to all human beings.
The participatory authority of each human being accounts for a feature of natural law theory that often confuses people, namely, the fact that sometimes natural law theorists talk as if natural law theory crucially depended on recognizing the existence of God's eternal law and thus the existence of divine providence, but that sometimes natural law theorists talk as if natural law does not depend on any specific belief about God, even the belief that God exists, so that one can recognize the precepts of natural law as such even if one does not believe God exists. In actuality, both can be true. Any natural law theory that is genuinely Ciceronian, or Augustinian, or Thomistic in inspiration cannot be complete without taking into account the fact that natural law is a sharing of the eternal law. However, precisely because this is not a mere imposition but a participation, we can recognize that the precepts of natural law are laws simply from the naturally provident character of reason itself. Full understanding of this providential character, and the corresponding force of law, requires placing natural law in the context of God's providence, because human beings are secondary and not primary caretakers of human good; but human beings are each themselves, by virtue of their own reason, caretakers of human common good. Aquinas does not develop this point at great length, so it is difficult to say exactly how much emphasis should be placed on this; some Thomistically inspired natural law theorists prefer to emphasize the importance of putting natural law in the context of eternal law, while others prefer to emphasize the intrinsically legal character of the principles of practical reason. Both have foundation in Aquinas. It is also important to understand that from a strictly Thomistic perspective this is a purely epistemological question of whether one can recognize natural law as law if one does not believe in divine providence; Aquinas affirms principles that imply that one can, and this has some confirmation in actual human behavior. But even if it weren't so, principles of practical reason have the force of law, because God exists and is caretaker of human common good, indeed all common good; and, likewise, even though it is so, any complete explanation of why the principles of practical reason can have the force of law will ultimately trace back to the fact that divine providence has the force of law, or to put the same matter in different terms, that human beings are subordinate caretakers of human common good sharing in the primary caretaking of God. This parallels the way Aquinas understands God's causal activity generally, and the parallel is not accidental.
This gives us the general understanding of what natural law is, but we need to look at features that are specific natural law, and then look at how natural law relates to another important kind of law, human or positive law.
Part IIIa
Natural law theory is, as noted in the previous part, a theory of practical reason; but what gives its name is that it is a theory of practical reason that is also a theory of law, a theory of practical reason qua law. Thus an adequate discussion of natural law theory requires a discussion of the account of law it gives, and to this we now turn.
II. Law
While he is certainly not the first to say something that might be construed as suggesting the idea of natural law, a fairly reasonable starting point for the history of natural law theory in Western civilization is Cicero. In De Re Publica he gives what clearly has all the elements of a natural law theory, which is to say, an account of human practical reason based on principles natural to it that is also an account of law. It forms one of the key elements of Cicero's theory of a republic or commonwealth. Cicero notes that human beings are in some sense at a disadvantage in the world at large -- in his notable phrase, Nature has treated us more like a stepmother than like a mother; if it were not for one thing, we would be outmatched by our environment, and that one thing is understanding or reason. By this we are able to write and study the stars, and to develop philosophy and thus civilization, that is, civil society. While we are not thrown into civil society, it is in some sense natural for us to build such civil societies. And as civil societies are constituted by justice and laws, any discussion of civil society must consider what justice and laws are. In the course of the dialogue, one of Cicero's characters, Laelius, argues that expediency is not the foundation of justice or law, and thus not the foundation of a genuine republic or commonwealth. Rather, there is a more fundamental foundation for both that, transcending any utility one might gain from either, still has purchase on us, because it is based on that very reason or understanding that makes civilized life possible in the first place. This is a true law, which is the same as right reason and is in accordance with our nature. Unlike human law it is universal and immutable, and (as it is that law which enjoins upon us morality itself) there is no field of genuinely human action that is outside its jurisdiction. No senate and no popular will can override it, for any attempted dispensation is unjust and unreasonable; it stands above human action in the sense that all human action is judged by it. It is promulgated by the God, and anyone who disobeys it does violence to his own nature. Laelius's account is applauded and supported by Scipio, another major character in the dialogue; and the agreement of the two is a clear sign of Cicero's own good favor toward this account. Much of this comes from the Stoics, but we see it come together here in a shape that will be quite familiar through the centuries. St. Ambrose and St. Augustine both show the clear influence of it, but, of course, the most famous exposition of this view is that of St. Thomas Aquinas.
In the first question of the Treatise on Law in the Summa Theologiae, which is question 90 of the First Part of the Second Part, Aquinas gives a general definition of law: Law is "nothing other than a certain promulgated ordering of reason to common good by one who has the care for what is common" or, as it is often translated, "nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated". There are four basic elements of this definition.
Law has to do with reason. Law regulates and measures human action in such a way that action is encouraged or restrained. This is a rational function: all genuinely human action is measured and regulated on the basis of reason, so that reason can in some way be said to be its source; thus law has to do with reason, either immediately or derivatively.
Law is an ordering to common good. Reason organizes and regulates action according to means and ends, as we noted in the discussion of practical reason. The most general end with which reason deals is the totality of good in a good life, and this does not exclude (and, indeed, requires) that reason consider what is good for everyone. Law clearly has to do with human beings in society, and therefore must consider precisely this: what is good for everyone in common. Thus law is an ordering to common good. It is worth pointing out, I think, that this common good is not, as Aquinas understands it, an overarching collective good separate from all individual good. It is instead the kind of good people share, literally good in common, by virtue of their living in society. It is also worth being wary of assumptions that tend to get imported by the translation "the common good". There is no one common good; there are many common goods, as many common goods as there are communities. Some common goods are more inclusive than others, but it is impossible to talk about any common good without having established what society or community one is considering.
Law is from one to whom it belongs to care for what is common. Ordering to common good typically depends on a whole community working as a whole: it is the whole community working together that has natural and primary responsibility to order itself to the relevant common good. However, practically speaking (and with law we are always speaking practically) it is often not feasible for the community to work as a unitary authority. To get around this problem, assuming there is no natural caretaker for the whole community, the whole community chooses someone to act for the whole community. Since law is an ordering to common good, its source has to be someone who is in some way caretaker of what is common to everyone.
Law is promulgated. Laws exist in order to regulate and measure human action, but they must be applied to action in order for this to happen. Since human action has its source in reason, the way in which laws are applied to human action must accordingly be rational. That is, law must be communicated in a rational way to the people to whom it applies, so that their reason can take it into account. This can happen in many different ways, but it must happen.
If any of these four is lacking, we may have something that looks a lot like a law but is not actually a law, and has no force as a law; a point which will be of some importance. There are, however, many different kinds of laws.
One of these kinds of law is natural law, which is the law constituted by the basic principles of practical reason. Obviously these principles are rational. They concern how things are ordered to good as such, which means that they are concerned with both private good and common good; insofar as they concern common good, they fit that part of the definition of law. They are also clearly promulgated, that is, our reason is notified of them, because they are intrinsic to reason, and without them we cannot reason practically at all. Therefore that leaves simply the source to whom it belongs to care for what is common.
This gets into an interesting issue. Aquinas himself is quite clear that the source of natural law is God, on whom human beings depends; and because the whole human community depends on God, God is the natural caretaker of what is common to the whole human community. As he puts it, natural law is the human participation of the eternal law of God by which God providentially orders the whole universe; it is, so to speak, a parceling out of eternal law in human form specifically for human beings. However, the language of participation is much more intimate in its suggestion than merely God imposing a law on us. Aquinas is equally clear that human beings don't just have their specifically human parcel of the eternal law of divine providence; divine providence itself is parceled out to us, again in a specifically human form specifically concerned with human life. Each human being, as rational, is in a sense part of divine providence itself. We all have a share in divine providence so that we, as rational creatures, are in Aquinas's phrase, "provident for ourselves and others". Only creatures with reason and understanding can have this subordinate providentiality, this active participation in the very providence of God. Thus there is a definite sense -- a derivative sense, but still a definite sense -- in which each and every human being, as a rational person, is caretaker for what is common to all human beings.
The participatory authority of each human being accounts for a feature of natural law theory that often confuses people, namely, the fact that sometimes natural law theorists talk as if natural law theory crucially depended on recognizing the existence of God's eternal law and thus the existence of divine providence, but that sometimes natural law theorists talk as if natural law does not depend on any specific belief about God, even the belief that God exists, so that one can recognize the precepts of natural law as such even if one does not believe God exists. In actuality, both can be true. Any natural law theory that is genuinely Ciceronian, or Augustinian, or Thomistic in inspiration cannot be complete without taking into account the fact that natural law is a sharing of the eternal law. However, precisely because this is not a mere imposition but a participation, we can recognize that the precepts of natural law are laws simply from the naturally provident character of reason itself. Full understanding of this providential character, and the corresponding force of law, requires placing natural law in the context of God's providence, because human beings are secondary and not primary caretakers of human good; but human beings are each themselves, by virtue of their own reason, caretakers of human common good. Aquinas does not develop this point at great length, so it is difficult to say exactly how much emphasis should be placed on this; some Thomistically inspired natural law theorists prefer to emphasize the importance of putting natural law in the context of eternal law, while others prefer to emphasize the intrinsically legal character of the principles of practical reason. Both have foundation in Aquinas. It is also important to understand that from a strictly Thomistic perspective this is a purely epistemological question of whether one can recognize natural law as law if one does not believe in divine providence; Aquinas affirms principles that imply that one can, and this has some confirmation in actual human behavior. But even if it weren't so, principles of practical reason have the force of law, because God exists and is caretaker of human common good, indeed all common good; and, likewise, even though it is so, any complete explanation of why the principles of practical reason can have the force of law will ultimately trace back to the fact that divine providence has the force of law, or to put the same matter in different terms, that human beings are subordinate caretakers of human common good sharing in the primary caretaking of God. This parallels the way Aquinas understands God's causal activity generally, and the parallel is not accidental.
This gives us the general understanding of what natural law is, but we need to look at features that are specific natural law, and then look at how natural law relates to another important kind of law, human or positive law.
Part IIIa
Fortnightly Book, 14 October
I will be quite busy this week, and possibly also the next, so it was pretty clear that the next fortnightly book needed to be a re-read or quite short, preferably the former, since it is sometimes the case that reading short books properly is much more time-consuming than reading long books properly -- a verse novella may well take as long to read as a prose tome with ten times its word count. And as I was thinking this, my eye fell on a book I haven't read for several years, although I had read it many times before and liked it. So the fortnightly book is Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold, by C. S. Lewis.
The original Cupid and Psyche story comes from Lucius Apuleius's The Golden Ass, which is, for lack of a better term, an ancient novel, that is, an extended prose narrative following the adventures of a single hero. Its actual name is the Metamorphoses, which hints at Ovid in the background, but it is often called The Golden Ass, or Asinus Aureus, because it was the name given to it by St. Augustine, who knew it quite well; the name comes from the fact that the main character manages to get himself turned into an ass for a considerable portion of the narrative. Much of the story is extraordinarily lewd, with all sorts of sexual shenanigans, but it occasionally slips into the philosophical, using physical transformation as a symbol of moral transformation; and throughout the story there are digressions in which people tell other stories each of which still touches on the underlying theme of transformation. This format, which may or may not have originated with Apuleius himself, influence much of later storytelling, of course. Of these secondary stories, the tale of Cupid and Psyche stands out because it is so radically different from the rest of the work -- whereas other secondary stories, and, indeed, much of the rest of the novel revels in sexual buffoonery and farce, here the theme of transformation takes on a different tone entirely. It's not that the sexual element is missing: Cupid is, after all, the god of erotic love, and there is sexual humor of a somewhat subtler sort (e.g., Cupid goes on strike, and everyone starts complaining about how boring things have become), and the daughter of Cupid and Psyche is Voluptas, who is the goddess of sexual pleasure. But the story itself is strikingly high-toned and lacking in buffoonery, with the allegorical overtones carried by this sort of myth (psyche is, after all, the Greek word for 'soul', what makes you a living thing; and eros, desire, has a long philosophical history, as anyone knows who has read Plato's Symposium). What is more, this is almost certainly deliberate: the story occurs right in the middle of The Golden Ass, and in a sense anticipates the religious character of the final book, in which the protagonist, Lucius, begins to be inititated into the rites of the goddess Isis.
Lewis had long been toying with the idea of a version of the Cupid and Psyche tale told through the eyes of Psyche's elder sister; she is in some ways the villain of the story, since she pesters Psyche to do things she shouldn't do, and which result in a great deal of suffering. He could very well have gotten the idea in part from William Morris's telling of the story in The Earthly Paradise; and the young Jack Lewis shows an interest elsewhere in retelling myths from the perspective of the villains and monsters, the sort connected with Promethean Romanticism. He dabbled in some poetic attempts, but not much came of it until he actually started working on a prose story in the 1950s, which he titled Bareface. He could not convince the publishers that this was a good title for a book (they said it sounded like it was a Western!), and eventually went instead with Till We Have Faces, from the single most important line in the book, which Orual says of the gods: "How can we meet them face to face till we have faces?" The book explores the theme of love, of course, both pure love and love that has become sick and devouring; and it explores the intersection of reason, cool and clear and bright as water, and imagination, warm and dark and earthy as blood; and it explores the agonies of religion, with its blood and dark places and terrible events that the gods rule but for which they never answer; and it is about self-knowledge and the lies, and truths, of reason and imagination alike, that is, it is about human faces; and it is about betrayal and death and reconciliation.
One of the things that has always intrigued me is Lewis's epitaph for the work: Love is too young to know what conscience is. It comes from Shakespeare's Sonnet 151:
It, like the original Cupid and Psyche story, is a poem that can be read in a bawdy or non-bawdy way, as you please. But I suspect the connection here is chiefly that posited between conscience and love in the first two lines: love must find fruition in conscience, but conscience cannot be had unless we first love.
The original Cupid and Psyche story comes from Lucius Apuleius's The Golden Ass, which is, for lack of a better term, an ancient novel, that is, an extended prose narrative following the adventures of a single hero. Its actual name is the Metamorphoses, which hints at Ovid in the background, but it is often called The Golden Ass, or Asinus Aureus, because it was the name given to it by St. Augustine, who knew it quite well; the name comes from the fact that the main character manages to get himself turned into an ass for a considerable portion of the narrative. Much of the story is extraordinarily lewd, with all sorts of sexual shenanigans, but it occasionally slips into the philosophical, using physical transformation as a symbol of moral transformation; and throughout the story there are digressions in which people tell other stories each of which still touches on the underlying theme of transformation. This format, which may or may not have originated with Apuleius himself, influence much of later storytelling, of course. Of these secondary stories, the tale of Cupid and Psyche stands out because it is so radically different from the rest of the work -- whereas other secondary stories, and, indeed, much of the rest of the novel revels in sexual buffoonery and farce, here the theme of transformation takes on a different tone entirely. It's not that the sexual element is missing: Cupid is, after all, the god of erotic love, and there is sexual humor of a somewhat subtler sort (e.g., Cupid goes on strike, and everyone starts complaining about how boring things have become), and the daughter of Cupid and Psyche is Voluptas, who is the goddess of sexual pleasure. But the story itself is strikingly high-toned and lacking in buffoonery, with the allegorical overtones carried by this sort of myth (psyche is, after all, the Greek word for 'soul', what makes you a living thing; and eros, desire, has a long philosophical history, as anyone knows who has read Plato's Symposium). What is more, this is almost certainly deliberate: the story occurs right in the middle of The Golden Ass, and in a sense anticipates the religious character of the final book, in which the protagonist, Lucius, begins to be inititated into the rites of the goddess Isis.
Lewis had long been toying with the idea of a version of the Cupid and Psyche tale told through the eyes of Psyche's elder sister; she is in some ways the villain of the story, since she pesters Psyche to do things she shouldn't do, and which result in a great deal of suffering. He could very well have gotten the idea in part from William Morris's telling of the story in The Earthly Paradise; and the young Jack Lewis shows an interest elsewhere in retelling myths from the perspective of the villains and monsters, the sort connected with Promethean Romanticism. He dabbled in some poetic attempts, but not much came of it until he actually started working on a prose story in the 1950s, which he titled Bareface. He could not convince the publishers that this was a good title for a book (they said it sounded like it was a Western!), and eventually went instead with Till We Have Faces, from the single most important line in the book, which Orual says of the gods: "How can we meet them face to face till we have faces?" The book explores the theme of love, of course, both pure love and love that has become sick and devouring; and it explores the intersection of reason, cool and clear and bright as water, and imagination, warm and dark and earthy as blood; and it explores the agonies of religion, with its blood and dark places and terrible events that the gods rule but for which they never answer; and it is about self-knowledge and the lies, and truths, of reason and imagination alike, that is, it is about human faces; and it is about betrayal and death and reconciliation.
One of the things that has always intrigued me is Lewis's epitaph for the work: Love is too young to know what conscience is. It comes from Shakespeare's Sonnet 151:
Love is too young to know what conscience is,
Yet who knows not conscience is born of love?
Then, gentle cheater, urge not my amiss,
Lest guilty of my faults thy sweet self prove.
For, thou betraying me, I do betray
My nobler part to my gross body's treason;
My soul doth tell my body that he may
Triumph in love; flesh stays no farther reason,
But rising at thy name doth point out thee
As his triumphant prize; proud of this pride,
He is contented thy poor drudge to be,
To stand in thy affairs, fall by thy side.
No want of conscience hold it that I call
Her ‘love’ for whose dear love I rise and fall.
It, like the original Cupid and Psyche story, is a poem that can be read in a bawdy or non-bawdy way, as you please. But I suspect the connection here is chiefly that posited between conscience and love in the first two lines: love must find fruition in conscience, but conscience cannot be had unless we first love.
Saturday, October 13, 2012
Kenneth Dodson, Away All Boats
Introduction
Opening Passage:
Summary: Away All Boats is the story of the Belinda, a World War II attack transport. She represents a new kind of warfare, a highly maneuverable invasion-by-sea force packaged into one ship, and she and her sister ships will play an utterly important role in the island-hopping campaign of the Pacific -- a role perhaps second only to, perhaps in some ways even more than, the role of the aircraft carrier in importance. And since she was written by Dodson to represent all such attack transports everywhere, she sees the full gamut of action, from her shake-down cruise, to practice dry-runs, to minor island invasion, to assault on Okinawa.
The book is quite realistic, as one might expect from the fact that the author himself served aboard an attack transport. There are some grisly scenes, although they are told quite well, and we get an excellent sense of the psychology of the U.S. Navy -- all the petty rivalries and competitions, the complications of having to work around the personal quirks of one's captain, the strange obsessions that come from being stuck on a ship all the time, the cracks that start to show under stress and strain, but also the camaraderie, the sense of being bound together in an important cause that transcends one's likes and dislikes, the famous sense of Navy accomplishment (the difficult is done immediately, the impossible just takes some time). There are lots of little details that bring the Belinda to life. One of the ones that caught my eye was the importance of the chaplain, who is not in any of the main action, and who is not a major character in the book, but who ends up playing a role again and again. Some of it is the obvious, of course -- there are men dying in sickbay who need someone to talk to, and the doctors, much as they might wish otherwise, have far too much to do. But much of it is the sort of thing that would only be obvious to someone who actually had served at a ship at sea. The chaplain, for instance, is in practice a back-up supply officer, because he is the one who receives and keeps track of donations that do not come through the logistical supply chain -- all sorts of odds-and-ends trumpets, or bottles of red ink, or boxes of tissue. It is the chaplain whose phonograph and records play what is in effect the background song for much of the book: "Red Sails in the Sunset". But we get these glancing bits about many others in the crew: the self-important and widely detested Ensign Twitchell, the spiffy but unpracticed executive officer Quigley, the original captain, Gedley, and the captain who succeeds him, Hawks, and many others. Although MacDougall will be our guideline character, the book often swings away from him: the protagonist of the book is the Belinda herself, and all these sailors aboard her just express different facets of her personality.
Favorite Passage:
Recommendation: You probably can skip it otherwise (or watch the 1956 movie instead), but if you have any interest in naval history, this is an interesting and at times gripping fictional account of what it was like actually to be there in the Pacific.
Opening Passage:
The first time MacDougall saw the Belinda was the night before her launching. He was master in the Roamer then, his ship in Moore's dry dock at Alameda after a voyage to the Coral Sea. It was late at night; restlessly waiting for word from Nadine, who was coming by train from Seattle, he was alone in his cabin. Near midnight, he went down into the floating dry dock and walked along the bilge chocks, looking up at sea grass and barnacles on the Roamer's bottom, and checking her propeller for nicks. One of the workmen down there mentioned a new Navy ship to be launched next day.
"A cruiser?" he had asked.
"No, one of these new attack transports."
Summary: Away All Boats is the story of the Belinda, a World War II attack transport. She represents a new kind of warfare, a highly maneuverable invasion-by-sea force packaged into one ship, and she and her sister ships will play an utterly important role in the island-hopping campaign of the Pacific -- a role perhaps second only to, perhaps in some ways even more than, the role of the aircraft carrier in importance. And since she was written by Dodson to represent all such attack transports everywhere, she sees the full gamut of action, from her shake-down cruise, to practice dry-runs, to minor island invasion, to assault on Okinawa.
The book is quite realistic, as one might expect from the fact that the author himself served aboard an attack transport. There are some grisly scenes, although they are told quite well, and we get an excellent sense of the psychology of the U.S. Navy -- all the petty rivalries and competitions, the complications of having to work around the personal quirks of one's captain, the strange obsessions that come from being stuck on a ship all the time, the cracks that start to show under stress and strain, but also the camaraderie, the sense of being bound together in an important cause that transcends one's likes and dislikes, the famous sense of Navy accomplishment (the difficult is done immediately, the impossible just takes some time). There are lots of little details that bring the Belinda to life. One of the ones that caught my eye was the importance of the chaplain, who is not in any of the main action, and who is not a major character in the book, but who ends up playing a role again and again. Some of it is the obvious, of course -- there are men dying in sickbay who need someone to talk to, and the doctors, much as they might wish otherwise, have far too much to do. But much of it is the sort of thing that would only be obvious to someone who actually had served at a ship at sea. The chaplain, for instance, is in practice a back-up supply officer, because he is the one who receives and keeps track of donations that do not come through the logistical supply chain -- all sorts of odds-and-ends trumpets, or bottles of red ink, or boxes of tissue. It is the chaplain whose phonograph and records play what is in effect the background song for much of the book: "Red Sails in the Sunset". But we get these glancing bits about many others in the crew: the self-important and widely detested Ensign Twitchell, the spiffy but unpracticed executive officer Quigley, the original captain, Gedley, and the captain who succeeds him, Hawks, and many others. Although MacDougall will be our guideline character, the book often swings away from him: the protagonist of the book is the Belinda herself, and all these sailors aboard her just express different facets of her personality.
Favorite Passage:
MacDougall had put his ear to her hull, cautiously at first, then, forgetting half dried anti-fouling paint, had held his cheek snug to the bilge. Sound there all right: rustling of autumn leaves, distant surf, sounds she had never heard before, restless whisperings, voices in pain, voices thrilling with eagerness, mixed chattering in some unknown tongue, calling to far off places. MacDougall knew what it was; could explain these sounds in cold, scientific terms; why then was his spine tingling? He took his ear away and looked down at the old man, who was carefullly refolding a yellow telegram. "Those are locked-in stresses working out. They come out slowly in a part-welded hull."
"I know, son. Each part is trying to be free again, but they'll soon settle together; she's going to be a good ship, I tell you."
Recommendation: You probably can skip it otherwise (or watch the 1956 movie instead), but if you have any interest in naval history, this is an interesting and at times gripping fictional account of what it was like actually to be there in the Pacific.
Friday, October 12, 2012
Traditional EC vs. NPV
I keep an eye out every election-cycle in the U.S. for attacks on the Electoral College; this time around things have been rather quiet, but Steve Chapman recently had a column criticizing the Electoral College and advocating the National Popular Vote plan. Now, his criticisms of the EC have no cogency, but his advocacy of the NPV -- which is not to be confused with an actual national popular vote, which the plan does not provide -- is especially egregious.
(1) Chapman brings up the argument, which one gets every single time, that the EC is to blame for the fact that candidates focus on only battleground states. This is manifestly not true -- non-EC election systems do not avoid the battleground problem because it arises not from the election system but from the way campaigning works, so the most one could do is shift the emphasis from states to geographical regions. In a nation the size of the United States it will never be economical or even possible to campaign everywhere; people will campaign strategically. In the United States it is most natural to campaign by state anyway -- state boundaries are quite clear and fixed, it is relatively easy to get information about states as a whole, and political organizations, including parties, most naturally work at the state level -- but even if this were not so, active campaigning is necessarily confined to relatively few areas, leaving the rest to passive campaigning (national television appearance, local party organizations, etc.). This is, again, a necessary structural feature of campaigning, and this is intensified by the demand to campaign nationally in one of the world's largest countries -- fourth largest by area and third largest by population. We are by every metric huge -- there are too many people spread over too much of the globe for any evenhandedness to be genuinely viable at that level.
(2) Chapman also makes the common mistake in this area: he assumes we have actual national popular vote numbers. We do not. When people put together a 'popular vote', they are going on what states have turned in. But there is no standardized way of counting votes from state to state -- for instance, felons can vote in some states but not in others, some states use vote-gathering methods that are not accepted in other states, etc. This becomes relevant to the whole NPV idea: in order to have a genuine national popular vote you have to have a genuinely national way of collecting and counting them, so that what makes you eligible to vote in one place makes you eligible in another and that what counts as a legitimate vote in one place counts as a legitimate vote in another. The national numbers for the popular vote depend on treating the numbers turned in by the states as all commensurable, which they are not. We can know state popular vote totals; but we cannot compare across state lines except in a highly approximate way.
(3) Chapman: "Only for the most important office does that custom get cast aside — in favor of an antiquated system that the framers created without a clue how it would function." Since the Electoral College is less 'antiquated' than straight popular vote, and since the Framers actually had a pretty good idea how it would work (it was an adaptation of election systems that they knew quite well; the main sources of uncertainty were simply whether it could be made sustainable from election to election in the context of a republic), this is all empty rhetoric.
(4) And then we get to the National Popular Vote idea, which, again, is not a national popular vote. It is, in fact, just a form of the Electoral College system in which state election laws have gone insane. On the NPV system, states would be committing themselves in the Electoral College to preferring votes elsewhere to those cast by their own citizens. If State A doesn't allow felons to vote and State B does for civil rights reasons, then on the NPV plan, State A is committed to accepting as legitimate felons voting in in State B despite the fact that people in A exactly like those in B don't get to vote, and State B is committed to accepting as legitimate the election numbers coming out of State A, despite knowing quite well that the numbers are derived in part on what people in State B regard as a civil rights violation, and that there are potential voters in A whose votes are not getting counted despite the fact that they would count in B. This is an absurd situation. Moreover, NPV guarantees that states with well-thought-out election laws and well-run election systems are held hostage to those without. When, for instance, we had the problems with the Bush v. Gore election, the problems were all with the popular vote count of Florida. It only affected the Electoral College because Florida's own method of determining Electors is tied to its own popular vote count. Numbers can't be established for a 'national popular vote' (even one based on a fiction) under a state-by-state system like ours unless all the states have their act together. We know for a fact that this can't be guaranteed, and that a state can make a complete mess of things by poor collection methods, inconsistent vote-counting, and loopholes for voting fraud. And we also know for a fact that nobody can actually fix these problems except citizens of that state.
The point, in short, is that the only rational alternative to an Electoral College system -- which is highly effective as a state-by-state method of election -- is a genuine national popular vote system, which in our case requires taking election law out of the hands of the states and putting it entirely into the hands of a Federal agency. Bastardized systems like NPV are just not a serious option: they are EC reforms that fail to reform anything significant because they simply don't consider the actual logic of the system they claim to reform, elaborate symbolic gestures that talk about the importance of a national popular vote and do nothing to get one.
UPDATE: And in the comments below we see another reason to despise NPV advocates, beyond their complete inability to grasp basic facts about electoral process; as you can see in the comments, advocates just spam long passages of prepared text without serious regard for any actual argument. This is a tactic they've been trying for years now: boilerplate slimed over every post they can find that mentions the Electoral College or the National Popular Vote. Virtually all of the boilerplate, of course, is irrelevant to the argument given here (indeed, most of it is not even particularly relevant to election reform today), and much of the rest makes precisely the mistakes noted above. There is an additional mistake added: precisely the whole point of the Electoral College is that it is an aggregator that converts distinct state policies into commensurable Electoral votes -- Electoral College votes are commensurable because the Electoral College is structurally designed to make them so -- how they are arrived at is no more relevant than whether voters in the voting booth pick their candidates by deliberation or by coin-flipping. State popular votes are only structurally designed to be commensurable within a given state, and therefore any treatment of the additive sum of those vote totals as a 'national popular vote' is artificial and, as noted in (4) above, requires states to give preference to the laws of other states over their own. As I said: NPV doesn't fix anything in the Electoral College; it's just the Electoral College with insane state election laws.
Nonetheless, I'm glad the NPV spammers showed up: they show exactly what NPV is (which is why I'm not erasing it). It is a spammer's con, and has as much to do with serious election reform as Viagra spam has to do with serious health care reform.
(1) Chapman brings up the argument, which one gets every single time, that the EC is to blame for the fact that candidates focus on only battleground states. This is manifestly not true -- non-EC election systems do not avoid the battleground problem because it arises not from the election system but from the way campaigning works, so the most one could do is shift the emphasis from states to geographical regions. In a nation the size of the United States it will never be economical or even possible to campaign everywhere; people will campaign strategically. In the United States it is most natural to campaign by state anyway -- state boundaries are quite clear and fixed, it is relatively easy to get information about states as a whole, and political organizations, including parties, most naturally work at the state level -- but even if this were not so, active campaigning is necessarily confined to relatively few areas, leaving the rest to passive campaigning (national television appearance, local party organizations, etc.). This is, again, a necessary structural feature of campaigning, and this is intensified by the demand to campaign nationally in one of the world's largest countries -- fourth largest by area and third largest by population. We are by every metric huge -- there are too many people spread over too much of the globe for any evenhandedness to be genuinely viable at that level.
(2) Chapman also makes the common mistake in this area: he assumes we have actual national popular vote numbers. We do not. When people put together a 'popular vote', they are going on what states have turned in. But there is no standardized way of counting votes from state to state -- for instance, felons can vote in some states but not in others, some states use vote-gathering methods that are not accepted in other states, etc. This becomes relevant to the whole NPV idea: in order to have a genuine national popular vote you have to have a genuinely national way of collecting and counting them, so that what makes you eligible to vote in one place makes you eligible in another and that what counts as a legitimate vote in one place counts as a legitimate vote in another. The national numbers for the popular vote depend on treating the numbers turned in by the states as all commensurable, which they are not. We can know state popular vote totals; but we cannot compare across state lines except in a highly approximate way.
(3) Chapman: "Only for the most important office does that custom get cast aside — in favor of an antiquated system that the framers created without a clue how it would function." Since the Electoral College is less 'antiquated' than straight popular vote, and since the Framers actually had a pretty good idea how it would work (it was an adaptation of election systems that they knew quite well; the main sources of uncertainty were simply whether it could be made sustainable from election to election in the context of a republic), this is all empty rhetoric.
(4) And then we get to the National Popular Vote idea, which, again, is not a national popular vote. It is, in fact, just a form of the Electoral College system in which state election laws have gone insane. On the NPV system, states would be committing themselves in the Electoral College to preferring votes elsewhere to those cast by their own citizens. If State A doesn't allow felons to vote and State B does for civil rights reasons, then on the NPV plan, State A is committed to accepting as legitimate felons voting in in State B despite the fact that people in A exactly like those in B don't get to vote, and State B is committed to accepting as legitimate the election numbers coming out of State A, despite knowing quite well that the numbers are derived in part on what people in State B regard as a civil rights violation, and that there are potential voters in A whose votes are not getting counted despite the fact that they would count in B. This is an absurd situation. Moreover, NPV guarantees that states with well-thought-out election laws and well-run election systems are held hostage to those without. When, for instance, we had the problems with the Bush v. Gore election, the problems were all with the popular vote count of Florida. It only affected the Electoral College because Florida's own method of determining Electors is tied to its own popular vote count. Numbers can't be established for a 'national popular vote' (even one based on a fiction) under a state-by-state system like ours unless all the states have their act together. We know for a fact that this can't be guaranteed, and that a state can make a complete mess of things by poor collection methods, inconsistent vote-counting, and loopholes for voting fraud. And we also know for a fact that nobody can actually fix these problems except citizens of that state.
The point, in short, is that the only rational alternative to an Electoral College system -- which is highly effective as a state-by-state method of election -- is a genuine national popular vote system, which in our case requires taking election law out of the hands of the states and putting it entirely into the hands of a Federal agency. Bastardized systems like NPV are just not a serious option: they are EC reforms that fail to reform anything significant because they simply don't consider the actual logic of the system they claim to reform, elaborate symbolic gestures that talk about the importance of a national popular vote and do nothing to get one.
UPDATE: And in the comments below we see another reason to despise NPV advocates, beyond their complete inability to grasp basic facts about electoral process; as you can see in the comments, advocates just spam long passages of prepared text without serious regard for any actual argument. This is a tactic they've been trying for years now: boilerplate slimed over every post they can find that mentions the Electoral College or the National Popular Vote. Virtually all of the boilerplate, of course, is irrelevant to the argument given here (indeed, most of it is not even particularly relevant to election reform today), and much of the rest makes precisely the mistakes noted above. There is an additional mistake added: precisely the whole point of the Electoral College is that it is an aggregator that converts distinct state policies into commensurable Electoral votes -- Electoral College votes are commensurable because the Electoral College is structurally designed to make them so -- how they are arrived at is no more relevant than whether voters in the voting booth pick their candidates by deliberation or by coin-flipping. State popular votes are only structurally designed to be commensurable within a given state, and therefore any treatment of the additive sum of those vote totals as a 'national popular vote' is artificial and, as noted in (4) above, requires states to give preference to the laws of other states over their own. As I said: NPV doesn't fix anything in the Electoral College; it's just the Electoral College with insane state election laws.
Nonetheless, I'm glad the NPV spammers showed up: they show exactly what NPV is (which is why I'm not erasing it). It is a spammer's con, and has as much to do with serious election reform as Viagra spam has to do with serious health care reform.
The Lustre as of Olives
Helen
by Hilda Doolittle (H.D.)
All Greece hates
the still eyes in the white face,
the lustre as of olives
where she stands,
and the white hands.
All Greece reviles
the wan face when she smiles,
hating it deeper still
when it grows wan and white,
remembering past enchantments
and past ills.
Greece sees, unmoved,
God's daughter, born of love,
the beauty of cool feet
and slenderest knees,
could love indeed the maid,
only if she were laid,
white ash amid funereal cypresses.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)