Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Matters of Tone

Frege famously distinguished the meaning of a proposition or sentence into its sense, its force, and its tone. Crudely and roughly, force is what distinguishes (for example) a statement from a question; sense is the thought or content expressed and thus what makes it possible to talk of true and false for the sentence; and tone is whatever else is involved in the meaning. Actually, we should say that Michael Dummett distinguished meaning in this way. 'Tone', for instance, is Dummett's coinage; Frege uses Färbung, coloring, and Beleuchtung, illumination or shading. In any case, this tends to be taken for granted. I am skeptical of the idea that we can draw the line between force and content very clearly at all (partly for reasons discussed by P. W. Hanks here in PDF). But I also think 'tone' is a problematic category, as well.

Consider the most common example of difference in tone: 'and' and 'but'. 'And' and 'but' are both truth-functionally conjunctions -- 'but' doesn't handle true and false any differently than 'and' does -- and thus the difference between them is only a matter of tone. But it is clear that this is not always true of 'but'; sometimes 'but' is not truth-functionally equivalent to 'and'. For instance, sometimes if I say, A but B, whatever the letters stand for, I am saying that B is actually a defeater of some sort for A. In this case 'but' is not a logical conjunction (by definition). Thus the example really boils down to saying that a logical conjunction maintains its properties regardless of whatever the rest of the meaning is. This is undeniably true, and is important. But it doesn't tell us much about conjunction and it doesn't tell us anything about the tone or rest of the meaning. It is entirely consistent with the possibility that 'tone' and 'sense' are unstable, so that the very same thing that is sometimes 'sense' will at other times be 'tone', and vice versa.

Consider another example, which is sometimes used: 'cur' and 'dog'. Suppose I were to say, "There's a cur at the back door." You go out and find a well-behaved, well-groomed, pure-bred spaniel. There are only two ways of taking my claim, assuming that I knew what I was talking about. In one way, my claim is simply false: what is at the back door is not a cur. But I could just be the sort of crotchety person who hates dogs and so can't talk about them without insulting them, in which case we can say that my claim is true, although insultingly expressed. But this appears to depend entirely on what parts of the meaning I take to be 'sense' (i.e., to be relevant to the actual truth and falsehood) and which I take to be 'tone' (i.e., independent of actual truth and falsehood).

This is all a consequence of the way 'tone' is characterized: it's just the residue, whatever happens to be left when you've taken everything you need in order to determine truth values. But there's no reason thus far to think that there's anything that counts as tone that always counts as tone. Fregean examples are very disparate. So, for instance, Frege takes the difference between active and passive voice to be one of tone. This is unsurprising, since his logical system can't distinguish the two, but it's unclear that active and passive voice are consistently irrelevant to whether a claim is true or false. Active and passive voice do at least two things: indicate the complementary aspects of one action and indicate attempt and success in an action. The former guarantees that active and passive voice stand or fall together, but the latter splits their fortunes. Roxane loves Christian, but it does not follow immediately that Christian is loved by Roxane or vice versa, and much of the story of Cyrano de Bergerac builds on the tension between the complementarity of loving and being loved and its disparity with attempt-success understandings of how love works. Even in the former case, there are cases in which the complementarity between the active and passive might break down -- God, on some theological views, for instance, or spontaneous uncaused actions, on other views. If these can even be formulated coherently, there is no way to hold that the active/passive distinction is always a matter of tone.

In any case, I was thinking about tone today, and considering the question of how one might analyze this residue of meaning. Analytic philosophers are next door to useless for getting any idea about it. But I had an idea for how one might have something like Laban Effort graphs (typically used to represent the force and control of movements in dance) to represent tonal differences. The graphic results would not be easy to put here, but a textual proxy certainly can. Suppose we have a (nonexhaustive) list of common (alleged examples of) tonal contrasts, and give them symbols. For instance:

^ light
| serious

x contrastive
~ conformal

< passive/nonactive
> active

, unordered
; ordered

! sure/certain
? unsure/uncertain

+ positive-valued/good
- negative-valued/bad

We could then represent different kinds of conjunction. & [|~<,!] would be something like our usual 'and', whereas & [|x<,!] would be more like 'but', and & [|~>;!] would indicate that we are taking 'and' to mean adding something to something already there.

Likewise, we can get subtle variations. Take the sentence, "He believes in a bearded man in the sky." In ordinary conversation this could have many subtleties. The following would indicate a plain statement of (at least supposed) fact:

He believes in a {bearded man in the sky [|!]}.

But this would be contrasted with the non-literal and more derisive:

He believes in a {bearded man in the sky [^!-]}.

Which in turn would be contrasted with the more baffled (but still non-literal):

He believes in a {bearded man in the sky [^?-]}.

Which in turn is different from the mere puzzled literal statement:

He believes in a {bearded man in the sky [|?]}.

These sorts of things do make a difference. (I do not claim, however, that the 'tone' here necessarily does not affect truth-values; rather, these are just things that are often not taken into account when analyzing statements even though they are analyzable in some sense -- by contrast, if nothing else.)

Lent VI

Penance
by Bl. John Henry Newman


Mortal! if e'er thy spirits faint,
By grief or pain opprest,
Seek not vain hope, or sour complaint,
To cheer or ease thy breast:

But view thy bitterest pangs as sent
A shadow of that doom,
Which is the soul's just punishment
In its own guilt's true home.

Be thine own judge; hate thy proud heart;
And while the sad drops flow,
E'en let thy will attend the smart,
And sanctify thy woe.

Monday, February 18, 2013

Gerard on Taste and Genius III: The Psychology of Taste

Having discussed the sources of taste itself and the cultivation of good taste, Gerard continues his Essay on Taste with a discussion of the ways in which taste is related to various other principles of the mind. This is partly in order to clarify the nature of taste even further, but looking at how taste affects and is affected by other aspects of our mental life also serves to show the extraordinary importance of developing good taste.

I. Relation of Taste to Imagination. Taste is usually associated with imagination, which is usually understood as something midway between external senses and our rational and moral abilities. Gerard is not inclined to put much weight on this usual understanding of what taste or imagination are; while our mental operations are present to us, he thinks they are hard to pin down -- they appear and disappear swiftly and seem to blend into each other. He does think, however, that this common understanding captures something genuine. There are two basic elements of this.

The first is that taste is a kind of sensation. It is an original source of ideas that cannot be reduced to other senses or to the mere act of reflection; it makes us aware of features and qualities of objects, both internal and external, but does so in a way distinct from the way in which this is done by external senses or the mere consciousness of our own thoughts. The perceptions of taste are as simple, immediate, and regular as any other sensations, and have the same kinds of effects as any other sensations. For instance, in general, when an object of sense comes before our minds, "the mind conforms itself to its nature and appearance, feels an emotion, and is put in a frame suitable and analogous" (ET 149). Our mind adapts itself to the objects of taste, like novelty, sublimity, and beauty, in the same way that it adapts itself to the objects of the external senses.

On the other hand, taste involves imaginative association. It has layers to it that are not found in the external senses, and these are built up by the ordinary operations associated with the imagination. Many of the rules and regularities governing taste are nothing other than these associative regularities of imagination; Gerard lists resemblance, contrarieity, and vicinity, as well as custom, co-existence, causation, and order (as in design or organization). This associative structure gives a complexity to taste that is lacking to the external senses. For instance, because imaginative associations, especially when close, allow the mind to move very quickly from one idea to another, this associative character of all but the most basic kinds of taste means that taste can link radically different things as if they went naturally together, or even as if they were one thing. This gives taste some of its je ne sais quoi character -- something may be beautiful, for instance, but the full account of this beauty might require extraordinary analytic precision combined with an ability to perceive accurately how a large number of features are related to each other. The full force of its beauty might be obvious to the mind rushing along associative tracks, but it might well take philosophers an immense amount of study to unravel exactly why it has this force of beauty. Likewise, this associative character is the reason why so much of our art is concerned with metaphor and symbolism.

II. Relation of Taste to Genius. Of all the questions of how taste fits into broader human psychology, the relation of taste to genius is perhaps the most interesting. Taste observes beauties; genius makes them. Is there a relation between the two that goes beyond that connection? For instance, is (to use James Beattie's terms) taste a kind of passive genius and genius a kind of active taste, so that they are complementaries? Or might it be the case that genius is just a particular kind of taste ("talent is taste exercised," as I think James McCosh will say later)? Gerard gives two very different roles to genius and taste.

The key feature of genius is its inventiveness, which Gerard links to imaginative association: "from a confused heap of materials, collected by fancy, genius, after repeated reviews and transpositions, designs a regular and well-proportioned whole" (ET 164). When we are dealing with genius in the fine arts, we need to add to this an ability to express this imaginative construct in appropriate materials. This is why poetic genius and pictorial genius can be distinguished, however; they can have a close similarity at the imaginative level, but the results are appropriate to very different kinds of materials.

Genius builds, forms, makes. Taste, however, is needed in order to impose the proper restraints on genius:

Thus genius is the grand architect that not only chuses the materials, but disposes them into a regular structure. But it is not able to finish it by itself. It needs the assistance of taste, to guide and moderate its exertions. Though the different relations of the parts, in some measure, determine the form and position of each, we acquire much ampler assurance of its rectitude, when taste has reviewed and examined both the design and the execution. It serves as a check on mere fancy; it interposes its judgment, either approving or condemning; and rejects many things which unassisted genius would have allowed. (ET 166-167)

We might put it this way: Genius is the drafting power; taste is the revising power. They both are rooted in the imagination, but they are different expressions of the same imaginative principles. You can't have one without something of the other, because they operate on the same associative principles and are cultivated in at least some of the same ways, but at the same time a given person may have more of one than the other. Bold genius might accompany poor taste; excellent taste might go with mediocre genius. In a sense, every artist is in pursuit of the perfect blending of the two, powerful genius with a taste adequate to it, and it is something that is very difficult to achieve. At the same time, it is something well worth achieving: "Taste, united to genius, renders the effects of the latter like to diamonds, which have as great solidity as splendour" (ET 168). Nonetheless, we can have good taste even where genius is lacking, because even if we do not have the dazzling spontaneous ability to order a massive number of imaginative connections into a tightly unified whole, we may still have some narrower or weaker analogue of this ability. I think we can see what Gerard has in mind here by thinking of a common experience in reading. When reading one of the great authors, like Dante, or Shakespeare, or Austen, people regularly find that they discover more every time they go back to read -- that is one of the reasons why such authors endure. The reader may not be able to grasp all the imaginative connections in a work by Austen in a way that makes for a perfectly unified experience, a sort of sheer contemplation of the whole of (say) Emma all at once, with all its parts and their appropriateness seen together, but he or she may well be able to take in (and enjoy!) a portion of them at one time, and the richness of the experience will be linked to the ability to take in all these associations together, in something at least analogous to the way in which Austen herself arranged them.

III. Relation of Taste to Criticism. Taste is the completion of the work of the artist, artisan, or author; it is the starting-point of the critic, and in the critic it must be completed by reflective judgment. As Gerard puts it, the critic must not only feel but accurately reflect so as to be able to identify the feelings and explain them. We can, in a sense, think of criticism as the opposing complement of art, since art starts with genius and improves it by taste, whereas criticism starts with taste and improves it by genius. The particular genius required for criticism is a philosophical genius, able to take a mass of thing and "subject these materials to a regular induction, reduce them into classes, and determine the general rules which govern them" (ET 171). The great critic does not merely appreciate; he or she classifies, sets in order, identifies the underlying principles, and, more than that, with extraordinary ingenuity finds ways to go beyond the obvious in doing these things. As Gerard says (ET 174),

If taste is wanting, our conclusions must be defective, faulty, or precarious; if philosophical genius, our observations will be trifling, superficial, unconnected, and perplexed with too great particularity.

Gerard has some very harsh things to say about critics through the ages on this point, so he obviously regards the relevant philosophical genius as rare. People try to substitute mechanical systems or simplistic rules for true critical genius. Real critics, however, plumb the depths of human life, tracing back the entire aesthetic experience, just as it really is, to its fundamental roots in human nature.

IV. Relation of Taste to the Provinces of Life. Gerard suggests that taste can be looked at in a very different light. How does taste relate to major areas of human life, like nature, art, and science?

With regard to nature, which is the common subject of the other two, taste and reason are employed in conjunction. In art, taste is the ultimate judge, and reason but its minister. In science, reason is supreme, but may sometimes reap advantage from using taste as an auxiliary. (ET 176)

Reason investigates the laws of nature, but taste uncovers the beauty of nature; both of them are essential features of our experience of the world. On the side of art, every art, however humble, has its own beauties and and excellences, and these are the primary point, reason serving in an instrumental capacity to taste, which sets the practical ends. And while matters of knowledge are primarily the province of reason, it is also obvious that taste plays a role. It would be foolish to draw conclusions solely on the basis of what is elegant or beautiful and take those conclusions to be certain; but it is clear that the elegance and beauty of conclusions is relevant to knowledge, when they are in their proper place. For one thing, while reason may discover, taste motivates us to discover. People are driven to understand because of the beauties they find when they do understand. Moreover, inquirers pursue not merely truths but beautiful truths -- people are dissatisfied with explanations that are clumsy and inelegant, for instance, thinking that they must at least be incomplete, whereas the beauty of a well-supported explanation strengthens our sense that it must be true. Gerard uses Newtonian physics as an example. It was accepted as it was because it was founded on good reasoning, yes; but the full explanation of why Newtonian physics was so satisfying to the understanding has to reckon with its aesthetic side, its excellence in terms of taste. It was elegant, beautiful, simple -- and on Gerard's reflex-sense account of taste, these aren't arbitrary judgments or mere expressions of preference but real properties that can actually be perceived in the system.

In these four areas Gerard has covered briefly the relation between taste and various aspects of human life. In later editions of the Essay on Taste he goes on to discuss the important question of the standard of taste. But before we look at that, I think we will take a detour and look more closely at Gerard's account of genius, as laid out in his (much later) Essay on Genius.

Lent V

From the earliest times down to this day, these weeks before Easter have been set apart every year, for the particular remembrance and confession of our sins. From the first age downward, not a year has passed but Christians have been exhorted to reflect how far they have let go their birthright, as a preparation for their claiming the blessing. At Christmas we are born again with Christ; at Easter we keep the Eucharistic Feast. In Lent, by penance, we join the two great sacraments together. Are you, my brethren, prepared to say,—is there any single Christian alive who will dare to profess,—that he has not in greater or less degree sinned against God's free mercies as bestowed on him in Baptism without, or rather against his deserts? Who will say that he has so improved his birthright that the blessing is his fit reward, without either sin to confess, or wrath to deprecate? See, then, the Church offers you this season for the purpose. "Now is the accepted time, now the day of salvation." Now it is that, God being your helper, you are to attempt to throw off from you the heavy burden of past transgression, to reconcile yourselves to Him who has once already imparted to you His atoning merits, and you have profaned them.

Bl. John Henry Newman, Life the Season of Repentance

Sunday, February 17, 2013

The Ends of Education

Adam Kotsko has an interesting post on views of what education is for:

I’m not sure that we really have an answer to that other than something like “personal enrichment” — which someone in a cynical mood could translate into economic terms by saying that we’re insisting that education contribute to leisure time as well as work time. If that’s the narrative, then I think we’re doomed to lose the argument, because then the non-work-oriented education becomes a bona fide luxury that is not going to be “worth the investment” for most people....

As I’ve been teaching Plato and Aristotle, I’m struck by how impoverished our best other answer — “responsible citizenship” — is than the classical ideal. For us, it seems that we’re thinking that people won’t be easily hoodwinked by politicians and will vote more “correctly” (presumably for Democrats). For them, education for citizenship meant being able to step in and govern, and that necessarily meant having a broad enough range of interest that governing wasn’t considered an end in itself....

Saturday, February 16, 2013

Notable Links

* "biblioklept" has a post on Flann O'Brien's At Swim-Two-Birds. I've always liked Flann O'Brien much more than James Joyce, with whom he is often compared (he's less pretentious and pompous, for one thing); his The Third Policeman was one of my favorite books in college ("biblioklept" had a post on that one a year ago).

If you want a very brief taste of what he's like, try his short-short story, An Insoluble Question, or read this very short passage from The Third Policeman.

* Sean D. Collins discusses instrumental causality

* Agatha Christie's brush with MI5, when she was investigated because they were worried she was leaking secret information.

* Alberto Vanzo notes the problem with glossing the empiricist/rationalist position in terms of innate ideas.

* Charts on Thomas Aquinas's account of the structure of the Pauline Corpus. I talked about Aquinas's view on this a long time ago.

* "Geographic Travels" looks at the 'non-European Popes', i.e., those who came from places we don't normally think of as Europe -- mostly the Levant and North Africa.

* A new SEP article on Adam Smith's Moral and Political Philosophy

* Pope Benedict XVI discusses Vatican II:

I would now like to add yet a third point: there was the Council of the Fathers - the true Council - but there was also the Council of the media. It was almost a Council in and of itself, and the world perceived the Council through them, through the media. So the immediately efficiently Council that got thorough to the people, was that of the media, not that of the Fathers....So while the whole council - as I said - moved within the faith, as fides quaerens intellectum, the Council of journalists did not, naturally, take place within the world of faith but within the categories of the media of today, that is outside of the faith, with different hermeneutics. It was a hermeneutic of politics. The media saw the Council as a political struggle, a struggle for power between different currents within the Church. It was obvious that the media would take the side of whatever faction best suited their world.

Lent IV

To that, however, which is objected, that the flesh is in our power; it must be said, that even if it is in our power according to the order of nature, yet on according to the perversity of concupiscence in many it both reigns as handmaid and serves as lady, and too much love for the flesh makes the belly be man’s god; and for that reason it is not in our power, until we are liberated from the power of this body, with the help of the grace of God through Christ Jesus Our Lord. For so great is the force of love, that it subjects in a certain manner the lover to the beloved. Wherefore even if a son is in the power of (his) father, yet it is not easy for the father to slay or afflict the son, but (rather) very difficult; so must it be understood in the proposed, because no one ever holds his own flesh in hatred, but he nourishes and keeps it warm.

St. Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, 2d21a2q3ad4. (The question is whether temptations of the flesh are more difficult to overcome than temptations of the devil; Bonaventure's response is that if we are considering the same sin, temptation of the flesh is the more difficult temptation.)