Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Lent XII

And Christ again says, "Go and sell that you have, and give to the poor...and come and follow Me." Do you see that the commandment was given that he might be induced to follow Him? For as riches are an impediment, therefore he commands them to be given to the poor, instructing the soul to be pitiful and merciful, to despise wealth, and to flee from covetousness. For he who has learned to give to him that needs, will in time learn not to receive from those who have to give. This makes men like God. Yet virginity, and fasting, and lying on the ground, are more difficult than this, but nothing is so strong and powerful to extinguish the fire of our sins as almsgiving. It is greater than all other virtues. It places the lovers of it by the side of the King Himself, and justly. For the effect of virginity, of fasting, of lying on the ground, is confined to those who practice them, and no other is saved thereby. But almsgiving extends to all, and embraces the members of Christ, and actions that extend their effects to many are far greater than those which are confined to one.

For almsgiving is the mother of love, of that love, which is the characteristic of Christianity, which is greater than all miracles, by which the disciples of Christ are manifested. It is the medicine of our sins, the cleansing of the filth of our souls, the ladder fixed to heaven; it binds together the body of Christ.

St. John Chrysostom, Homily 6 on Titus

Monday, February 25, 2013

Skill and Magic

There are recurring patterns in how magic is handled in fantastic tales; magic (assuming it is handled consistently) can only enter into a tale if it is emblematic of, or correlative to, something else. Depending on whether the magic in question is something out of human hands or under human control, magic will serve as emblem or correlate either of a numinal/religious order, a providence, so to speak, or of specialized skill. However it is conceived as to details, magic has to be either something in the order of things or something people are capable of doing. The latter is perhaps the more common. Magic as usually conceived in a story or narrative is a subjective causation of marvelous objective effects; and the subjective causation of objective effects that is best known in our natural, ordinary, everyday experience is technical skill. Some specialized skills, in fact, seem at their best to border on this, anyway. Lots of the different 'flavors' of fantasy arise from the particular kind of skill that is used as the correlate. Thus Tolkien's Elves and Dwarves do magic; their magic is in general an idealized artistry. (Tolkien is quite explicit about this, but it could have been inferred anyway from the kind of things they can do.) This is very different from the kind of magic represented in, say, The Dresden Files, which is correlative not to art but to skills related to forensic investigation. In principle, any technical skill that already seems, at its height, to border on the marvelous or amazing can easily serve as a model for a kind of magic, and any context for such a skill can easily be 'fantasticized'. Metalwork, dancing, singing, hunting, reading and writing, computer programming, have all at some point or other been treated in this way.

The reverse is true, as well, though; it's not just a matter of human storytelling. Just as we build tales of magic or fantastic deeds on the model of real skills and crafts, so, too, we talk about real skills and crafts in magical terms. This has always been the case and will certainly always be the case.

This latter point can complicate our understanding of history. People's assumptions about the way alchemy or astrology was practiced, for instance, are a mish-mash of different elements. Some of the things people assume were obviously true about medieval or Renaissance alchemy were outright inventions, mere literary tropes that arose because they sounded good in a particular context, and that continued to be used because they made for striking effects in stories. Others have a connection to real alchemical practice, but may be filtered through various literary and artistic symbolisms. Yet others may have their first origin in outright fabrication and counterfeit, as if advertisements and frauds about 'fractal water' or 'health through quantum effects' were, three hundred years from now, taken as obviously the sort of thing twentieth century physicists were normally trying to do. You can imagine people half a millenium from now just taking it as obvious that forensic investigation in our day had such-and-such features that were in fact pieces variously derived from police reports, news outlets including the tabloids, Basil Rathbone movies, CSI, Nero Wolfe, and The Dresden Files. It would obviously have a connection of some sort to real criminal investigation, but it will have been filtered through any number of other outlets. This is pretty much what most people's view of alchemy is: a mish-mash thrown together from various fragments of genuine alchemical practice, literary use of alchemy as a symbol, and confidence games involving alchemical terminology, treated as if it were an accurate rendering of what alchemists did or attempted to do.

When this happens on a major scale, historical investigation becomes very difficult; it requires a very careful regard for which kind of alchemy, which image of alchemy, and which use of alchemical ideas and terminology are relevant at a given time. The actual skills and crafts used by most alchemists may have no natural connection with later images of them, and when they do, it may not be straightforward. The lives of alchemists in general were less involved in attempting 'magical' things than we often assume. This doesn't mean that it wasn't there, but it does mean that we should be careful about how we treat the question, because, again, people talk of ordinary skills in magical terms for any number of reasons. If you take an extensive survey of how people talk about the sciences today, you would find exactly the same kind of talk; sometimes as figures of speech for talking about excellence or ideals in the field, sometimes as rhetoric to play up frauds or to win arguments, sometimes as symbolism for something else, sometimes as striking effects in science-fiction stories. Think about how mixed a group that is, and how strange the science of our day will look several centuries from now when people (other than historians of science) are no longer making a clear distinction among these different discourses. How benighted and foolish we will look!

A People Groaning from Ambiguities

Cardinal Zen has some sharp words (for him) about Rome's handling of matters concerned with the Church in China:

I have said and I repeat: his work was wasted by others close to him, who did not follow his line. I'm not here to judge consciences: it is likely that these his advisers thought that maybe he did not know enough about the situation, he was unable to pursue the right strategy. In any case, these people have not implemented what Benedict XVI has established as the guidelines for the Church in China.

Saying "others" I mean people in the Vatican, but also those outside who, without the help of the Holy See, would not have done so much damage.

Lent XI

An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous [honestum] [Cf. 145, 1] good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose.

First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 6:5-6): "In fasting, in chastity," since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there," that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink.

Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Daniel 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks.

Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning." The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore)]): "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity."

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2-2.147.1

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Fortnightly Book, February 24

So having done modernist business-like, we now move to Romantic art and philosophy. The next fortnightly book is one I've been meaning to read for a while, but which I never managed to get around to: Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, the second novel of the inimitable Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. What can be said of Goethe? Nothing that does justice to the man, who made Renaissance men look like underachievers. He had a father who, unable to achieves his life's dream, poured everything he could into his children's educations so that they might have more options than he had. Thus the young Goethe studied six languages (not counting German, of course), learned fencing, riding, and drawing. He went into law and hated it, beginning instead to take an interest in poetry, which began to take fire not long after he became friends with Herder. At twenty-five he wrote his first novel, The Sorrows of Young Werther, which was an instant success and made him famous. He had an interest in just about everything, and never stopped studying. His two great interests were science and theatre.

The love of theatre is especially relevant to Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, the story of a young man he tries to succeed in the theatrical life; over the course of time he changes from being a youthful dreamer to an integrated man, someone with his life in balance. The book, however, is like Goethe: it contains too much for any summary to do justice to it. And it does seem to elude serious summary; at least, even bold critics balk at giving one. So we'll just have to take it as it comes.

I will be using the Heritage Press edition, so the translation is that of Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle, of course, is a Scottish philosopher who also had broad interests that defy easy summary. He was perhaps the most important conduit for Romantic thought moving from Germany to Britain, and his translation of this work is certainly part of this.

This edition of the work has illustrations, both lithograph and line drawing, by William Sharp. Sharp is interesting in his own right. He was actually born Leon Schleifer in an area of Austria that is now part of either the Ukraine or Poland (I have found conflicting answers here); he studied at the University of Berlin but fled Germany at the rise of the Nazis because he was Jewish. He was a sort of jack-of-all-trades artist, having started out in the design of stained glass windows and expanded from there into engraving and other kinds of illustration; in the day he was probably most famous for his courtroom drawings and his political cartoons.

A Poem Draft

Melancholia

The garden hidden off the way
was glistening in the dewy day
as sun, new-wakened, rose to play
in blue, unburdened sky.
A threefold wall laid thick with vine
was raised around it, ivy twined
upon the gate in tendrilled vine
through which the breezes sighed.

Within, in centermost estate,
a fountain rose in joy elate;
it rose and did not dissipate,
but lived with laughing smile.
Beside its pool, where lilies slept
a mournful maiden softly wept;
she hid her face but tears surrept
fell gently down the while.

A song she sang of sorrow's dreams,
of griefs revived where sadness teemed:
how sad it sounded in the gleams
that morning cast on dew!
I saw her eyes once; softest green,
not emerald but ocean-sheen
before the gray grows sharp and keen,
leaped out with wisdom true.

Long grief indeed will make one wise.
I saw that wisdom in her eyes,
the memory that never dies
but gives the heart a weight.
They saw, but did not see, my face,
attention by her grief erased;
tear on tear with hurry raced,
on pool-glass to abate.

She turned away, and yet my thought
has by her been enchanted, caught;
I found her, though I had not sought.
She haunts my inner mind.
And like an illness sorrow spread
to tinge her image in my head;
at times I stare as were I dead
and weep with eyes turned blind.

Saturday, February 23, 2013

Kant, God, and Disjunctive Judgment

It is an insufficiently remarked feature of Kant's discussion of God in the Critique of Pure Reason that the idea of God follows directly from our ability to make disjunctive judgments and reason using disjunctive syllogisms (or eliminative arguments). Deleuze talks about it somewhere (Logic of Sense, I'm thinking), and people will mention it when summarizing the Critique closely, but that's about it. I find this curious, because it is the foundation of Kant's entire discussion of the arguments for the existence of God, which is perhaps the most widely discussed portion of the Critique; and it's also a pity, because I think it's easier to understand what Kant's saying if you emphasize this aspect of Kant's discussion rather than passing over it quickly.

Some basic background: Kant holds that there are three basic kinds of judgment, each indicating a different kind of relation. There are categorical judgments, hypothetical or conditional judgments, and disjunctive judgments. These play a major role in CPR. For instance, Kant's discussion of substance is actually about predication (the relation in categorical judgments, which say that an attribute is in something); his discussion of causation is actually about ground and consequence (the relation in hypothetical or conditional judgments, which say that one thing follows from another), and his discussion of coexistence or reciprocity is actually about composition (the relation in disjunctive judgments, which say that a whole is divided into things that are opposed to but united with each other). One can easily misinterpret Kant if one ignores this.

Each of these judgments is associated with a particular kind of synthesis or unification that reason can exercise. In categorical judgment, reason thinks of things as belonging to a subject; in hypothetical judgment, reason thinks of things as belonging to a series; and in disjunctive judgment, reason thinks of things as belonging to a system. Likewise, each kind of judgment can be used as the major premise of a syllogism, giving three kinds of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Disjunctive syllogisms are what we usually think of as eliminative arguments: We take a 'sphere of cognition', to use Kant's term, divide it up into options, and then limit or restrict the options in order to get a conclusion. The two functions, synthesis and syllogism, are necessarily related; it is our ability to form judgments that make possible both the interpretation of experience (as we might call it) and reasoning about experience, and by linking the two, Kant argues that he has established that our interpretation or synthesis of experience has a necessary foundation in human reason itself.

From our ability to make each of these three kinds of judgment come what Kant calls the transcendental ideas -- transcendental ideas are concepts of reason that have no sensible object (indeed, cannot possibly be an object of sense) but which provide a sort of ultimate or unconditional unity to our experience. We could only form such ideas by one of the three judgments, and so there are three key transcendental ideas. The first such idea is that of a subject that is never a predicate; the second is that of a ground or presupposition that requires no further ground or presupposition; and the third is that of a totality of distinct possibilities that requires nothing further in order to include all distinct possibilities. Each of these follows directly from our ability to make one of the kinds of judgment and reason using one of the kinds of syllogism. But when we look more closely at these three transcendental ideas, it becomes clear that they are quite familiar, and Kant's entire argument is that these familiar non-empirical concepts of reason are inevitable given our ability to form judgments and to reason. The transcendental idea that follows from our ability to form categorical judgments and reason with categorical syllogisms is, when represented as being something particular, that of thinking substance, the I or Ego, the undivided individual, the unifier of all experience. The transcendental idea that follows from our ability to form hypothetical judgments is (when represented as being something particular) that of freedom, the kind of thing that determines other things but requires nothing to determine it, the unconditional condition: a unifier of series that depends on no prior conditions. And the transcendental idea that follows from our ability to form disjunctive judgments is (when represented as being something particular) that of God, a being of beings, an undivided individual unifier of the entire system of possibilities.

Think of a disjunctive syllogism:

A or B
Not A
Therefore B.

The major premise here is the disjunction, A or B. A or B could be anything, and it can be as long as we please. What happens, however, when we push it to its limit, so that A, B, etc. include all possibilities? The ultimate major premise would be the whole system of possibility. If we posit a principle capable of unifying such a system we get a most-real being, an ens realissimum, whose possibility makes possible (so to speak) all other possibility, and whose possibility includes such a richness that other possibilities can be said only to approximate it. This is God considered transcendentally. He is the ideal (the hypostasis or ground) of the idea of a system of all possible being, which comes directly from the disjunctive judgment taken to its limit.

Kant being Kant, of course, he insists that this is only the idea and the ideal, not anything that can be asserted to be real. Disjunctive judgments according to Kant are only problematic; they cannot of themselves be assertoric. That is to say, disjunctive judgment only gives you possibility. What is more, in achieving the transcendental idea we are not even establishing the possibility of God, properly speaking: we are establishing that reason can formulate the idea of the possibility of an unconditional unifier of possibility, and can represent it as an ideal for reason's task of synthesizing experience, which reason increasingly approximates but which reason can never actually reach; this ideal is God. All we've reached is a principle organizing our concepts, not an object of a concept. And Kant is very insistent that we can only take things as real or actual when they are given to our sensibility, i.e., when we are actually affected by them. Because of this, Kant calls the representation of the idea in this particular principle, God, a 'dialectical illusion'; which is to say, that it depends entirely on the subjective tendency of our mind rather than any objective foundation. ('Illusion' here does not indicate that it is 'illusory' in our usual sense, but only that it is based not on our experience but on reason's natural progress in connecting things. That is, it's due not to any experience of God's actuality, but solely to the fact that if reason keeps doing what it does, God is the ideal limit of that.) We could put Kant's point another way. The concept of God is a need of reason, not a necessity of experience. But as a need of reason, it is inevitable, if reason is given its due and not arbitrarily or accidentally prevented from following out the implications of its task.

This is all presupposed in Kant's discussion of the arguments for the existence of God. Were it just a matter of heuristic supposition, human beings would not (necessarily) put much weight on it, but there are other relevant factors. We have what might be called a restlessness to get to this end-of-the-road for reason's task, and therefore, on the basis of actual experience, we tend to try to get to find something in experience that will be both necessary and a ground for all these disjunctive possibilities. This leads to something like the cosmological argument, which attempts to argue on the basis of experience of the contingent for some necessary being. Once this necessary something-or-other is established, reason has to find some concept that fits it, and it does so by elimination, ruling out all concepts that are inappropriate for a necessary being. This is why Kant insists that we have to show that the necessary being is the ens realissimum; every argument for the existence of God requires a two-step process: an argument to something and an identification of that something with ens realissimum, the being of beings. Thus the argument is guided by this prior ideal of reason. The ontological argument is the argument that attempts to argue that because we have this ideal of reason, it must have some corresponding object; however, this argument won't work for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. The reason Kant argues that the cosmological argument (from contingency) and physico-theological argument (from design) presuppose the ontological argument is that their improvements over the ontological argument consist entirely in the first step of the argument, to something's being necessary. Whether this is God, however, depends entirely on whether it is also the object of the idea of ens realissimum; but we have only reached necessary being conceptually as the possible completion of the task of reason, which means that we haven't actually reached an object that is the necessary being; so in order to come to an object that is necessary being and thus ens realissimum, we must get to the object by way of concluding that the idea of the ens realissimum requires that its object be the necessary being -- which is just the ontological argument. Neither the cosmological nor the physico-theological argument, on this account, can get around the fact that it cannot prove that the ideal of reason is anything more than just a supposed possible completion of reason's task, except by the ontological argument (which concludes directly from the ideal to positing its object).

The idea of God is implicit in reason itself, namely, in its ability to form disjunctive judgments, thereby making it possible for us to think of a being of beings as grounding the limit case of these judgments. The very fact that we are capable of reasoning with disjunctive syllogisms or eliminative arguments guarantees our ability to have this idea, and, indeed, the necessity of developing it if we are taking reason seriously. But we can never reach an object of this idea. In a sense, it's the very absoluteness of the idea, its position as the goal and end of the capacity to make disjunctive judgments, that guarantees the failure of all speculative arguments for the existence of God. The idea is the posited expectation, so to speak, of the end of the road of looking at the world in terms of systems, the one that would ground the system of all possibilities; but this is the limit of an ongoing task of reason that can never be completed by experience, which supplies objects for our concepts; and therefore the only way of getting an object for this idea of God, and thus saying that God exists, is by assuming somewhere that you are at some point allowed to get the object immediately from the ideal.

The moral argument, on the other hand, is able to escape this problem because it does not rely entirely on the same task of reason as the ontological argument, but depends on an entirely different tendency of reason. This is the only kind of argument Kant allows. This does not mean -- and it is important to understand this -- that every other argument for God's existence is useless; it does mean that the most it could ever serve is a heuristic function. It also does not mean that the atheist is better off than the theist, even if we ignore moral arguments; given Kant's argument, the atheist can no more prove that God does not exist with speculative arguments than the theist can prove that God does, but the theist at least has the excuse that reason's overeagerness to conclude that God exists is based on a natural illusion. This illusion arises directly from the natural ability of reason to judge and reason with disjunctions, combined with the natural tendency of reason to try to achieve the greatest unity it can in understanding the world. It is, if you will allow the expression, a reasonable illusion; the ideal of God is itself something that must be posited by anyone who genuinely takes reason seriously. It is rationally faultless, and has to be, because it is just the positing as an ideal of the limit case of reason's own task. We just can't find anything that can genuinely guarantee that it has an object, at least if we are dealing with pure reason or proofs that lead to knowledge.

Such is Kant, anyway. There are obviously a number of questions that this account raises, but it's an interesting one that hangs well together. (My own view, in case you are wondering, is that it's sound in terms of its structural principles; any problems lie with Kant's assumptions about the nature of experience, which I think are often problematic and sometimes egregiously wrong. But that's a complicated issue.)