Sunday, January 11, 2015

God's Socratic Method

It seems as if Infinite Wisdom delighted in adopting with human beings the process known as the Socratic Method, by which the most difficult truths are easily elicited from the lips of illiterate persons and of children; the secret simply consisting of a few interrogatives skilfully arranged in a certain order. In this way, I believe, does God act towards His creatures. He ordains that things which are marvellous, and wholly at variance with their modes of thinking, should happen before the eyes of men, that being struck with wonder at the novelty, they may feel prompted to direct their attention to investigating the hidden causes of things. He does not wish to say everything Himself, because, being good, He does not wish His beloved creature, man, to remain idle and inert, or to be deprived of the noble gratification and merit which he can gain by instructing himself in many things. To this end, He has endowed man with the faculty of knowing, that he may enjoy the honest pleasure of developing knowledge for himself, of being in part his own teacher.

Antonio Rosmini, Theodicy, volume 1, page 7.

Saturday, January 10, 2015

Chimes at Midnight and Columbia Presents Henry IV

It became pretty clear at the beginning of this week that the 'fortnight' for the Fortnightly Book will be three weeks this time around; ten Shakespearean plays is a pretty big chunk to bite off, particularly since I am finishing up other things this week. So that will be up next Saturday. But in the course of my reading I also watched Orson Welles' classic film, Chimes at Midnight (1966), and listened to the Columbia Presents Shakespeare version of Henry IV (1937). So I thought I would say something about them now.

Chimes at Midnight is a mish-mash of Shakespeare, drawing from Holinshead's Chronicles (one of Shakespeare's sources), Richard II, the two parts of Henry IV, Henry V, and the Merry Wives of Windsor. It is essentially the story of Falstaff. Orson Welles, who plays Falstaff, regarded the character as Shakespeare's greatest, and he has an interesting take on him. He doesn't regard him, or play him, as a comic character. Witty, yes, merry, yes, but not comic. This seems to have thrown some of the early reviewers of the movie for a loop; they had difficulty making sense of the character. But part of it is that Welles thought of Falstaff as a thoroughly admirable person, with roguish foibles but no harmful failings. That's not an obvious reading of the Shakespearean character at all (indeed, the crimes of Falstaff make a rather serious list that cannot be wiped out by his joking charm), but it makes Welles's version of Falstaff a very good Falstaff: the Falstaff played by Welles is exactly the kind of Falstaff a Falstaff would be. Sir John Falstaff doesn't think of himself as in the wrong. He doesn't see himself as dragging Prince Hal down. He thinks of himself as the partisan of common sense in a crowd of silly people, as the person who sees things as they really are, as the one who knows how to live. And everything that happens confirms this to him: all these noble people with their high sense of honor do little but drag sensible men like himself into a war where he could die, killing people for a word, and what has Sir John done but liberate some coin from people who would not enjoy it as much as he, and spend it prodigally? It's not a sustainable view in the context of the two parts of Henry IV, since he is a symptom of a number of things that are wrong with the England of his day, but it's a view that Falstaff would have of Falstaff.

The result of this larger-than-life and heroic Falstaff, though, is a diminished Prince Hal (played by Keith Baxter), who is moody and unstable, who enjoys the joke but is ashamed of his company, and repudiates Falstaff in the end with something approaching cruelty. The Shakespearean idea that Hal cannot become Henry V except by outgrowing Falstaff is not thrown out. There's an interesting scene in which Falstaff monologues on how honor is but a word. In the movie he's talking to Hal. But Hal is clearly only partly listening: he spends most of the time looking out over the battlefield, because Hal, of course, does not think that honor is only a word. For Hal, honor is his true nature, what he is called to; the Falstaffian life he is leading is one he has always regarded as a dishonorable one, one in which he is not his own proper self, a life to be thrown off eventually. But all of this recedes into the background here; Hal comes across as something of a hypocrite.

Mistress Quickly, played by none other than Margaret Rutherford, is worth mentioning as well; she puts a lot into the character.

Columbia Presents Shakespeare was a summer radio series in 1937 that did about eight plays in total, I think, One of them was a one-hour presentation of Henry IV, combining both parts. What this means is that it is quite condensed; I would guess that only about fifteen minutes of the hour are actually from Part 2. Since this is radio in the 1930s, it has all-star cast: Walter Huston, Dame May Whitty, Brian Aherne, Walter Connolly, and Humphrey Bogart just before his glory years with The Maltese Falcon and Casablanca. (Bogart plays Hotspur, in a solid although not stunning performance.) Prince Hal's dabbling in dissolution is played as a boys-will-be-boys, high-spirits-in-need-of-suitable-outlet way, which works as far as it goes.

One of the oddities of the radio performance is that the styles of acting don't mesh all that well. This is a danger in radio: you are usually reading a script, and you have to communicate everything by voice alone, which means that everyone basically does whatever they have to do to articulate and carry the emotion and meaning. This is particularly important with sound quality in the 1930s. It often works -- you can get a much richer range of potential interpretation of a scene than you can in film, where so much is carried visually, and in good 1930s play the sound fuzziness can even add a bit of character -- but the result here is a very traditionally 'Shakesperean' Henry IV and Falstaff interacting with a rather casual Prince Hal and Hotspur. Each part on its own is done well, but it doesn't quite come together as a whole.

Prima Facie Gratuitous Evil

A phrase one often comes across in analytic philosophy of religion is "prima facie gratuitous evil". 'Prima facie', of course, means that we are going on first appearance, 'what things look like at first glance', as we often say. Sometimes instead of "prima facie gratuitous evil" we get "seemingly gratuitous evil"; I take these to be synonymous expressions. 'Gratuitous evil' is usually glossed, when people bother to gloss it at all, as something like 'evil such that even for God there is no adequate reason, based on what good can come from it or what bad can be avoided because of it, for permitting it'.

This is a rather bizarre notion. In talking about "prima facie gratuitous evil" we are talking about evil that appears to be what omniscient omnipotence could find no reason for permitting. How does something that's not intrinsically contradictory appear to be beyond the capacity of omniscient omnipotence to have a reason for? What does 'actual thing too irrational for omniscient omnipotence' actually look like? If we're talking about 'evil that appears to be gratuitous', how would one distinguish that in appearance from 'non-gratuitous evil that appears to require just more intelligence than any human being to have adequate reason for'?

The question here is not whether there is gratuitous evil or not, nor whether gratuitous evil is possible or not, nor whether we can establish that there is gratuitous evil or not. The question is this: What does it even mean in the first place for an evil to seem at first glance to be gratuitous? Perhaps someone somewhere does so, but I have never seen anyone justify describing any evil as appearing this way; the closest one gets is a few gestures that an evil is such that there is no obvious reason for it. But not immediately appearing to have a reason, or appearing in such a way that a reason is not obvious, is not appearing to be such that even omniscient omnipotence could have no reason for it. It is not even clear what the latter would mean.

It seems to me that the 'prima facie' is in this case sheer laziness. When we say that something is 'prima facie' X, this effectively sets the default to X; it can be presumed X unless there is some good reason not to do so. It makes one side of the argument easier. But if 'prima facie' is legitimately used here, there should be precise reasons, based on appearance alone, to take the evil to be apparently beyond the capacity of even omniscient omnipotence to find reason for rather than, say, apparently what nothing less than a being a hundred million tor a trillion times wiser and more powerful than any human being could find reason for. And there is nothing that I can think of that could possibly show up in mere appearance to a human being that would be able to distinguish them. One could perhaps distinguish them by very abstract and difficult metaphysical reasoning involving what is contradictory and what is not, but just prima facie? No. One might as well talk about the prima facie difference between the absolutely impossible and the humanly inconceivable; whatever difference there might be, it's not going to be discernible in the way things look like at first glance, but only at the end of a rather painstaking analysis.

Assuming that someone is not being merely lazy or deliberately trying to rig the argument, the only other cause I can see for this bizarre expression is a confusion between 'evidential' and 'prima facie'; and, indeed, one occasionally finds the 'evidential problem of evil' mischaracterized in terms of 'prima facie gratuitous evil'. But this is not a legitimate conflation; if there is any evidential problem of evil worth taking seriously, it is not going to be based on the 'prima facie' but on serious evidential analysis.

Wish to Believe

"...Suppose there are signs of the existence of a hitherto undiscovered planet. He at once follows up the clue, not with a mere wish to know the truth in the abstract, but with a very strong wish to find more clues, and ultimately to find convincing reasons for believing that the planet exists. His love of truth is directed to a hope for discovery in this particular matter. This it is which stimulates his efforts. And this is, as I say, the wish to believe if reasonable belief is possible—a wish for conviction that what seems probable is true. The only reason why the wish to believe has ever been opposed to the wish for truth is because it is so frequently an insincere wish—a wish to maintain or hold a thing, and not the wish to know it to be true—that we are unaccustomed to think of it in this latter aspect. It is in reality the concrete form which the abstract wish for truth constantly takes."

Wilfrid Philip Ward, "The Wish to Believe", Witnesses to the Unseen, and Other Essays, p. 268. Walton, the character speaking, soon after amends 'wish for truth' to 'wish for knowledge' in the hope that it will be less misleading.

Friday, January 09, 2015

The Key to Mill's Utilitarianism

I saw a comment the other day by someone saying that he didn't think a coherent utilitarianism could be derived from John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism. This seems a common sentiment. If it were true, I would say that it's so much the worse for utilitarianism, since my own view is that only Mill-style utilitarians are even serious contenders. But it is not, I think, true. The problem people have with Mill's account is that they read it with false assumptions about utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism is often characterized so as to suggest that we have an obligation to take that option which contributes to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The key to understanding the coherence of Mill's utilitarianism is that Mill denies this. On Mill's account, we do not have an obligation to conform to the greatest happiness principle.

There are a number of reasons for this. Perhaps the simplest to grasp is that Mill is a positivist about obligation: on his account of obligation, obligations have to be created by imposing sanction. If there is no sanction imposed, there is no obligation. Short of affirming a divine command theory, however, which Mill certainly does not, this means that there are no natural obligations at all. We make our own obligations by education (cultivating conscience) or by public opinion or by law.

For Mill, the greatest happiness principle or principle of utility is not primarily concerned with obligation but practical reason. You can fail to conform to the greatest happiness principle without violating any obligations at all. The greatest happiness principle simply determines what is most reasonable. Failures to conform to the greatest happiness principle are less reasonable than they could be. Some such actions are unreasonable (or in the case of things we contemplate aesthetically, ugly, but this isn't discussed much in Utilitarianism), which is to say, there are lots of obvious options that would bring us closer to fulfilling the greatest happiness principle. But, of course, Mill has no interest in saying that stupidity is immoral. The greatest happiness principle is the primary standard for whether any of our plans are any good; but merely following a bad plan doesn't automatically make you morally wrong. In order to get to moral wrongness, he thinks we need to introduce sanction. Those things are morally wrong that are so unreasonable (according to the greatest happiness principle, as far as we can see that it applies) that it would be reasonable (according to the greatest happiness principle, as far as we can see that it applies) for us to punish those who did them, leading us actually to punish those who did them (by guilt, shaming, or legal punishment).

This has a number of implications for Mill's system. It's why our typical moral rules need to be respected (Mill places an immense amount of importance on doing one's duty), but also why they can be improved upon. It's why we can have conflicting duties (since the obligation derives not from the principle of utility itself but from how we go about sanctioning it, and in particular cases, even if we are being purely reasonable, what we are sanctioning in one way might interfere with what we are sanctioning in a different way). It's why he sometimes sounds like a rule utilitarian and sometimes like an act utilitarian -- one of the reasons why, anyway. It's why he thinks the principle of utility hardly needs much defense at all, since he thinks we all implicitly appeal to it whenever we make any plans or decisions at all. It is a significant factor in his divergence from Bentham, and is part of why Mill can hold that Bentham is right as far as he goes and yet also fatally incomplete. It goes part of the way to giving us an answer of why Mill thinks the principle of utility is consistent with the principle of harm he gives in On Liberty. And it is a necessary precondition for the Art of Life that he lays out in System of Logic.

This is not to say that there aren't issues that could be raised when it comes to Mill's utilitarianism. But the basic structure is quite coherent when you realize that we aren't morally required to conform to the greatest happiness principle itself.

Thursday, January 08, 2015

Music on My Mind



Kat Krazy ft. Elkka, "Siren (Acoustic Version)".

Shallow and Abstruse

The greater part of mankind may be divided into two classes; that of shallow thinkers, who fall short of the truth; and that of abstruse thinkers, who go beyond it. The latter class are by far the most rare: and I may add, by far the most useful and valuable. They suggest hints, at least, and start difficulties, which they want, perhaps, skill to pursue; but which may produce fine discoveries, when handled by men who have a more just way of thinking. At worst, what they say is uncommon; and if it should cost some pains to comprehend it, one has, however, the pleasure of hearing something that is new. An author is little to be valued, who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-house conversation.

All people of shallow thought are apt to decry even those of solid understanding, as abstruse thinkers, and metaphysicians, and refiners; and never will allow any thing to be just which is beyond their own weak conceptions.

David Hume, "Of Commerce".