Wednesday, May 26, 2021

Poem a Day 26

Fantasy

In truth we live, and move, and have our being,
but not solely from reason born and bred;
imagination's grace makes truth eternal,
touching on what is beyond aeon,
in deathless towers rising above the land,
a citadel beautiful in life.

In that place we live lives other than our own;
with new vision our eyes open; 
the common is made strange, the old is made new,
the odd familiar, the distant near.

There we who sit as judges over the realm
are judged by the beauty of fruits reaped.

High rise the spires, the steeples in their glory,
where fantasy endows truth with grace,
where streets are paved with gold, of jade are the bricks,
the water in fountains leaps brightly,
and there, adorned with symbols in greatness,
truths rise like the dwellings of the gods.

Tuesday, May 25, 2021

The Virtue of Magnificence

 Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book IV) distinguishes two virtues concerned with money: liberality and magnificence (megaloprepeia). Liberality covers every aspect of wealth, magnificence covers only expenditure, which makes the latter like just an offshoot of the former, but, Aristotle says, magnificence greatly exceeds liberality in scale. He notes, however, that scale is necessarily relative when we are talking about money, so concludes that 'greatness of scale' is really determined by appropriateness to context: magnificence is spending greatly in doing great things. As he puts it, the magnificent man is like an artisan, seeing what is appropriate and spending on it what is in good taste, focusing on what would be beautiful rather than what it costs. It is between stinginess and vulgarity; the stingy will harm the beauty of the result to save money and the vulgar will harm it by focusing on showing off their wealth rather than the beauty of the result.

He gives a number of  examples of the kind of things he means:

sacred embassy
votive offerings, buildings, and sacrifices
religious services
equipping a chorus
equipping a trireme (which comes up more than once)
wedding
receiving a foreign dignitary
diplomatic gifts and counter-gifts
furnishing of house
beautiful ball or bottle (for a child)

It is famously difficult to make complete sense of Aristotle's comments on the virtue. The distinction between liberality and magnificence is hard to make out, since liberality covers all matters of money already, and Aristotle's few comments about the difference -- essentially that magnificence is concerned with greatness and beauty in a way that liberality is not -- are not particularly helpful. It seems like it's a virtue only rich people could have, and Aristotle in fact flatly says that the poor cannot be magnificent because they do not have the funds for spending a lot appropriately. But he repeatedly says that the greatness involved is relative to circumstances, and the example of the child's ball or bottle raises the question of why the poor could not in fact spend appropriately on 'small greatnesses' like that. 

Aquinas has some difficulty with this; he always wants to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, if he can, but being Christian he obviously cannot sign on to the notion that there is a special virtue for rich people. Aquinas handles things by splitting up liberality and magnificence -- instead of being related, as Aristotle, seems to treat them, liberality is associated with justice while magnificence is associated with fortitude. Magnificence involves a certain amount of sacrifice and risk. Since the greatness involved is relative, it is clear that the poor can risk or sacrifice in reasonable and appropriate ways to achieve relatively great things.

This is an ingenious solution (and it has a nice symmetry, since Aquinas does something similar with magnanimity, another troublesome greatness virtue). But, while it's dangerous to try to correct Aquinas on the subject of virtues, I think we have room here for a better solution. There are two things that I think provide the materials for a solution:

(1) With the possible exception of the child's ball and bottle (which doesn't seem to be a typical result of magnificence), every example Aristotle gives clearly relates to the good of the city, and Aristotle at several points emphasizes the public nature of these things, that the magnificent do what is publicly honorable, etc. For instance, he explains that the reason the magnificent man spends lavishly on furnishing his house is that houses are public ornaments.

(2) Aristotle clearly characterizes magnificence as a virtue that is concerned with getting a beautiful or fitting result.

A virtue being concerned with beauty and fitting results is generally a sign of a virtue in the temperance family of virtues. So Aquinas's idea of splitting up liberality and magnificence seems sound; but magnificence would on this proposal be a virtue adjacent to temperance, not fortitude. The key point is not risk or sacrifice but beautifying, doing a beautiful job. But more than this, magnificence is concerned specifically with common good in a way that liberality is not.

In ancient Athens, there were taxes, of course, but for particular important expenditures -- like equipping a trireme, or important civic ceremonies, which in the ancient Greek world were all religious -- what would generally happen is that the Assembly would ask the wealthy to pay for them out of their own pockets. And the wealthy would do it, in part because the Assembly is not something you lightly say no to, but also because it earned them respectability, honors, attention, and, of course, good publicity for business. The magnificent man would be someone who, in providing some good for the city, would spend lavishly so that it was well done, but would not make it about himself or his own wealth. It's in this sense, I think, that Aristotle really means that the poor cannot be magnificent (although it is still a weakness in his account): it's not about the bare quantity, it's that, while the rich will regularly have the duty to pay for celebrations and triremes and the like, the city will never expect the poor to pay for these things, and it would be rather absurd for them to try.

But we can be more generous in these matters than Aristotle. Even the poorest of the poor will often spend well, to the extent they can, on a wedding or on hospitality to important figures or on religious services. And these are contributing to common good in their case as much as it would in the case of the wealthy. The poor widow throwing her two mites into the Temple treasury was giving a magnificent gift, relative to her means, to exactly the sort of thing that the magnificent man would. In addition, human beings are social animals, and by pooling our resources can sometimes do impressive things together that none of us could have done individually. Here in Central Texas, there is a set of famous buildings, southeast of Austin near Schulenberg, mostly, called The Painted Churches. In the nineteenth century, there were a lot of Eastern European immigrants pouring into Texas through Galveston. They were tight-knit poor laborer-communities, from Moravia, Poland, eastern Germany, etc. They wanted churches like they had known back home, but were limited by the limits of workmen's wages. So they pooled their funds together and built churches, Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant as they happened to be. They were just ordinary wood and brick churches with steeples, like you find everywhere. But for the inside they hired wandering painters who were from Europe (and thus would know themselves what the inside of European churches were like) to paint and stencil them so that they looked like the great basilicas of Europe. The painters painted the inside of the churches on the inspiration of the European church interiors they remembered enjoying. The people couldn't afford the gold and silver, so they had wood painted in metallic paints; they couldn't afford fine marbles, so they had the woods painted in delicate pastels; wood and stone carving in any large quantity was prohibitively expensive, so they had the beams and panels painted to look like they were carved in intricate designs. Much of it is done so well that the eye cannot easily tell what is two-dimensional and what is three-dimensional. And they are magnificent.


Sanctuary of the Nativity of Mary, Blessed Virgin Catholic Church, also known as the St. Mary Catholic Church, in High Hill, a little community near Schulenburg in Fayette County, Texas LCCN2014631550

(Nativity of Mary Blessed Virgin Catholic Church, High Hill, Texas)

Aristotle notes in a number of places that wealth lies more in the using than the possessing, and it is here that the significance of all of this lies. The existence of the virtue of liberality establishes that part of the rationally necessary use of money is in giving to those in need (which, as it happens, could be our families, friends, and neighbors as well as anyone else). And the existence of the virtue of magnificence also implies something about the rational use of money: part of it concerns what we all have in common. Money well used will meet your own needs, yes, and the needs of others, as these things come up; but money well used will also lavish what is required on making the whole community more beautiful. And this is not a 'rich person thing'; it's part of the rational use of all money. This is what money is for: necessities, gifts, and community.

Poem a Day 25

Star of Bethlehem

My Cousin, God, and King,
my myrrh and frankincense
and gold I bring to give,

my treasure and worship
and human sympathy,
an offering complete.

With threefold gift I kneel,
with threefold heart I pray,
after too-long journey.

I looked for signs and saw
Your sign, drawing to You,
the language of heaven.

I asked for wise counsel,
consulted prophecies,
and so I came to You.

Reason and human aid
have lit the path like stars
that I may give my gifts,

until this rough stable,
this unexpected throne
of an ox's manger,

an end I had not thought,
and You, to whom I pray,
my Cousin, God, and King.

Monday, May 24, 2021

Deteriorations

Liam Kofi Bright has a nice post, The End of Analytic Philosophy, laying out a rough argument that analytic philosophy is in a state of deterioration and attempting to diagnose it. I am not wholly convinced by parts of the diagnosis, although some of it I think is surely in the vicinity.

We have some rough notion from history of the kinds of things that indicate a philosophical approach or movement in decline. Analytic philosophy has shown for some time the signs that typically indicate a philosophical approach in a state of deterioration. Thirteen years ago (!) here on the blog I argued that this was the case, and Bright's argument gives me an opportunity to review the argument:

...people who self-identify as analytic philosophers have a very bad habit of flattering themselves in the mirror: they are clear, they are rational, they are substantive, etc., etc. It is not exclusive to them, of course; but it does tend to increase the exasperation of others. I am sympathetic to this; I get exasperated by it myself. I also am inclined to think that it is all a sign, one of many, that "analytic philosophy" as a philosophical tradition is in the process of dissolving. None of the former views of analysis that allowed some sort of agreement in philosophical approach have panned out; none of the compromises for weak alliances between such views that have been attempted have particularly satisfied anybody; nothing now unites 'analytic philosophers' in a philosophical 'project' except some commonalities in how they were educated and a slowly shifting collection of texts that act more-or-less as common sources of vocabulary and rhetorical formats.

It has always been an analytic conceit that good philosophy has always been analytic; but when, for instance, A. J. Ayer said it, he meant something that could be pinned down precisely, subjected to rigorous examination, and seriously evaluated. Now you find defenses of the idea becoming more and more amorphous and subjective in nature. Such syncretistic moves usually are suggestive either of pressures to form alliances and increase general appeal (a sign of increasing weakness and incohesion), or an increasing disinterest in the original core projects that ground the family resemblances of participants (people try to get more and more of their pet interests characterized as legitimate or 'philosophically interesting' or 'substantive' by loosening the requirements and extending terms until there ceases to be a real unity under the verbal one), or both. My own guess is the second of these. We have, in the past forty years, seen an immense expansion in the topics considered by people considering themselves analytic philosophers; throughout a great deal of this time there has been a great pressure on people trying to publish on more marginal topics or figures to argue that their subject of discussion is 'philosophically relevant' or has some special link to some hot topic of the day. When a fad becomes hot, everyone tries to cash in on the craze, whatever their favored topic or approach; it's a matter of academic survival. And thus we have concept inflation: the unifying key words (analysis, simplicity, clarity, etc.) have to expand to cover so many different things that they no longer have clear meaning. From here there are really only two likely paths: either the whole thing will simply collapse, everyone leaping from the sinking ship in disgust, or there will be a reformation, a new rallying, or a series of rallyings, under a banner or two or three....

Some of this holds up, although I think some of it could have been explained better. The self-flattery which I indicated was a sign of deterioration is a result of the increasing amorphousness that I mention in the second paragraph, a more fundamental sign of deterioration, and the latter has certainly grown, although I think Bright is right that the self-flattery has been flipping to self-recrimination, the manic flipping over into the depressive. I still think my post was right that, of the two usual causes of this kind of thing, the probable cause of this is increasing disinterest in the original core projects rather than a need to form alliances. Contemporary analytic philosophy as a whole is much more like Baroque scholasticism (interests expanding far beyond the capacity to keep handling them all in one approach) than like Indian philosophy in early Neo-Hinduism (weakness from divisions requiring forming alliances with other, sometimes very different, approaches); as Liam quite rightly notes, analytic philosophy is not in a position of weakness within its own domain, and this is if anything even more true now than it was then.

What I did not identify thirteen years ago*, but which is certainly operative and which Liam mentions as part of his discussion, is the infrastructural problem. Analytic philosophy's strength is becoming a weakness, like armor that is weighing down a drowning man. It is heavily tied to, and highly suitable for, academic life in universities. But that infrastructure is itself deteriorating, for a large number of reasons -- overextension, immoderation in graduate school admissions, adjunctification, administrator multiplication, consumerist mentality, alienation of local communities, practical stupidity of academics in chasing after fads, multiplication of useless requirements that interfere with what academia does best (exploring), external causes like economic crunches and pandemics -- there is undeniably enough blame to go around several times over. But regardless, as a causal matter, the deterioration of the general infrastructure of academic life has been accelerating, and I think this has accelerated problems that were already showing.

There is in fact not cause for total pessimism; even an approach in deterioration can produce good work -- sometimes (although usually not consistently) even better than some of the classical work of its heyday. I mentioned thirteen years ago that sometimes deteriorating approaches undergo reforms that revitalize them; this seems less likely for analytical philosophy today than it did then, although there was a period where modal logic and metaphysics looked like it might bring such reform, and for all anyone can say, it perhaps still could. Sometimes local or cultural pride in an approach holds it together externally despite its internal deteriorations, although it's difficult to imagine that there are all that many people who are proud of analytic philosophy as a component of their cultural or local atmosphere, and I agree with Liam that the 'applied turn' is not likely to do much in giving analytic philosophy that kind of space to recuperate. Academics are not the kind of people who can do an applied turn effectively, nor are they in a position to do it effectively as long as they are academics; it would be different if analytic philosophy had a significant non-academic following that could then have its time to shine, but you can't bootstrap one into existence.

Philosophy as such, of course, is not under any threat. It has survived infrastructural collapses far more catastrophic than what would likely kill analytic philosophy in particular; analytic philosophy's position has been in great measure because it has been heavily subsidized through the universities of some of the richest nations in the world, but there many philosophical approaches that have survived without much subsidy of that sort. But Bright is right that there is no obvious successor, if analytic philosophy dwindles out. Things could go anywhere.

____

* Actually, I discovered after publishing the above that while I did not identify it thirteen years ago, I mentioned it twelve years ago:

My own view, by the way, not that anyone really cares, is that analytic philosophy is not in a healthy state, but is slowly collapsing, mostly due to serious inadequacies in the academic infrastructure that carries it, but partly also due to the fact that people are not really engaging in a cooperative venture -- people cannibalize and build on each other's work, but they do it mostly from scratch, again and again. There is simply not enough unity to have a collective anything; we are entering an era of Ten Thousand schools. And because of that, no one is really tracing out the ramifications of the detail-work people do (which in fact is only at the very top levels "more rigorous and detailed" than what people have been doing for decades now). This is precisely what would be avoided if philosophers took the trouble to have philosophies, and worked with those who had similar philosophies, but still specialized in particular areas; this is the only way I can think of in which the result McMahan is hoping for has ever actually come about: specialization inevitably collapses unless people have sufficient unity of opinion with each other to allow specializations to fit together and cross-fertilize. Moreover, I think a telltale sign is that what goes by the name of analytic philosophy has been steadily becoming more amorphous for decades now, with older terms -- like 'analysis' and 'analytic' themselves, to such a degree that it's difficult to say what 'analytic philosophy' is supposed to be -- being stretched farther and farther in a sort of concept inflation. This, too, has often been a bad sign in history, because it eventually reaches a point where all the major similarities and agreements are purely verbal and begin to be recognized as such. Of course, this is also often the very sign that people take to show that analytic philosophy is flourishing, using different words from 'amorphous' and 'concept inflation'; time will tell, I suppose. But at present it seems to me that such claims as the above have little more substance than a self-satisfied pat on one's own back.

Poem a Day 24

Dream

A dream is a curious thing;
it drives the pulse of night.
The day knows but its echo.
It drifts in strange, chaotic order,
it dies but lives again.
With deep currents it flows,
both downward and upward.
To dream is to see the world anew,
the differences of the same.

Sunday, May 23, 2021

Fortnightly Book, May 23

After the success of Evelina, Frances Burney set out to write a play, called "The Witlings", with a main character named Cecilia, which was supposed to be a satire; however, her father, Dr. Charles Burney, and her mentor, Samuel Crisp, forbade her to continue with it on the ground that it might offend real people, some of whom were quite important in terms of patronage. Discouraged, she set out to write her second novel, Cecilia, or Memoirs of an Heiress, about a young woman born into a great legacy which is frittered away by the greediness of the men in her life. It's perhaps not completely unsurprising that people have wondered if her disappointment over the play shaped some of the new tale. In any case, it was published in 1782 and is the next fortnightly book.

This is a doorstopper of a book, over 900 pages long in the Oxford World's Classics edition that I will be reading, so this may end up being a three-week 'fortnight'. My summer courses start a week after next, so I have a lot to do, but at the same time, it's usually a period in which I have here and there long stretches of time that aren't chopped up by other things the way they usually are, so we'll see how it goes. In any case, I greatly enjoyed Evelina, so I am interested in seeing how this darker and more satirical novel turns out.

Charles Dickens, Hard Times

Introduction

Opening Passage:

‘Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, sir!’

Summary: Coketown is an industrial town, large smokestacks generously bequeathing their smoke and ash everywhere, all the buildings choking themselves with their interchangeable industrial sameness, the whole of its citizenry bent toward work or making others work, its eighteen churches that are none of them churches of the workmen but always busybodily acting 'for' the workmen, to make them more upstanding citizens, which is to say, more wholly suited to bending their backs to labor for others. Mr. Gradgrind is a school superintendent in Coketown, and few fit the town better than he, because he absolutely insists that in his schools nothing will be taught but facts and figures, and seeks to extirpate any trace of that supremely unfactual faculty, the fancy. He raises his children, Tom and Louisa and Adam Smith and Malthus and Jane (only the first two will play a significant role in the story), on the same principles. He has a close friend, Mr. Bounderby, one of the richest businessmen in the city, who is a "Bully of humility", constantly beating people down by telling them (in any and every possible circumstance) how he has worked his way from rags to riches. Mr. Bounderby will eventually propose to Louisa, and, lacking much background in anything but facts and figures, Louisa will marry him.

Coketown is contrasted with the circus, a place that is, of course, concerned very little with facts and figures and almost wholly with fancy, and which, for all its many oddities, sees its own people not as statistics but as family. Mr. Gradgrind decides that Sissy Jupe, the daughter of a circus performer, is unsuitable to the school, and visits the circus to tell her father, but discovers that her father has abandoned her in the hope that she will have a better life than he could give her. So Mr. Gradgrind offers Sissy a choice to continue her education if she will work for Mrs. Gradgrind and never visit the circus again. She accepts. 

As a man sows, so shall he reap. Book I is called "Sowing" and Mr. Gradgrind has sown in a twofold way: first, he has sown by raising his children to be "model children" only concerned with facts and figures, and second, he has, despite himself, done one good deed, to the limited extent he knows how, in deciding to look after Sissy. Both shall bear fruit.

In Book II, "Reaping", Tom Gradgrind has become an employee at Mr. Bounderby's Bank. He has become cynical and surly, given to gambling and other wasteful activities. Louisa is weighed down by a marriage that offers her nothing. A well-dressed man, James Harthouse, comes into their lives. Mr. Harthouse is the perpetually bored man of the world, immaculate in his fashion, listless in his commitments, utterly amoral. Louisa's pretty face, however, breaks through his boredom, and he sets about seducing her by exploiting her one weakness, her affection for her brother, cultivating a friendship with Tom toward that end.

Stephen Blackpool, a "Hand" at one of the factories in town owned by Mr. Bounderby, finds himself in trouble when, to fulfill a promise to his friend Rachael, he refuses to join a union; as a result he is shunned by his fellow laborers. Mr. Bounderby, hearing of this, summons him to discuss matters, but when Stephen doggedly defends his fellow workers, Mr. Bounderby is infuriated and fires him. Shortly after this, the Bank is robbed, and as Stephen was seen in the vicinity of the Bank and then left town shortly after, he is the primary suspect.

Mr. Harthouse's seduction makes headway, and he professes love for her, arranging for them to run away together. Louisa by this point has begun to believe that her education had woefully failed to prepare her for the world and people like Mr. Harthouse; instead of going with Mr. Harthouse, she runs to her father, who is shaken by her story.

Book III is entitled, "Garnering", which literally means 'gathering into a granary', and is used in that sense here. Sissy tells Mr. Harthouse to leave and never come back, because Louisa will never run away with him, and she goes with Rachael to try to find where Stephen went; both are convinced that he is innocent, but his having vanished is a major part of the suspicion against him, and they can only defend him by discovering his own account. They do find Stephen, who has fallen into a chasm in old industrial ruins, called by the locals the "Old Hell Shaft". It becomes clear that the real culprit is Tom, who has also vanished. But Sissy knows where he is, and with the help of the circus she will help him escape. Louisa will live out the rest of her days encouraging fancy and imagination everywhere she can.

Hard Times is famously compressed, and given Dickens's standard way of making his characters and places symbolic of broader conditions and the fact that it occurs in an imaginary city, this gives the story very much the air and feel of an allegory. I suspect, in fact, that it is this that makes it one of the least popular Dickens novels; we have not lived in times with much of a taste for anything that suggests allegory. Perhaps people convince themselves that the 'facts and figures' of realism and Coketown-grittiness are more real than the 'fancy' of symbolism and allegory. But for all that Dickens can give the realistic, this is not a prejudice he shares. Perhaps, too, the compression works against some of Dickens's usual strengths as a novelist. Stephen Blackpool is an engaging character, but I am fairly sure that Dickens intended him to be much more engaging than he is, for instance. But I enjoyed the novel immensely. Dickens has always been an author whose technical ability I can admire much more than I can enjoy his storytelling, but that was not the case here.

Favorite Passage:

‘So you would carpet your room—or your husband’s room, if you were a grown woman, and had a husband—with representations of flowers, would you?’ said the gentleman. ‘Why would you?’

‘If you please, sir, I am very fond of flowers,’ returned the girl.

‘And is that why you would put tables and chairs upon them, and have people walking over them with heavy boots?’

‘It wouldn’t hurt them, sir. They wouldn’t crush and wither, if you please, sir. They would be the pictures of what was very pretty and pleasant, and I would fancy—’

‘Ay, ay, ay! But you mustn’t fancy,’ cried the gentleman, quite elated by coming so happily to his point. ‘That’s it! You are never to fancy.’

‘You are not, Cecilia Jupe,’ Thomas Gradgrind solemnly repeated, ‘to do anything of that kind.’

‘Fact, fact, fact!’ said the gentleman. And ‘Fact, fact, fact!’ repeated Thomas Gradgrind.

‘You are to be in all things regulated and governed,’ said the gentleman, ‘by fact. We hope to have, before long, a board of fact, composed of commissioners of fact, who will force the people to be a people of fact, and of nothing but fact. You must discard the word Fancy altogether. You have nothing to do with it. You are not to have, in any object of use or ornament, what would be a contradiction in fact. You don’t walk upon flowers in fact; you cannot be allowed to walk upon flowers in carpets. You don’t find that foreign birds and butterflies come and perch upon your crockery; you cannot be permitted to paint foreign birds and butterflies upon your crockery. You never meet with quadrupeds going up and down walls; you must not have quadrupeds represented upon walls. You must use,’ said the gentleman, ‘for all these purposes, combinations and modifications (in primary colours) of mathematical figures which are susceptible of proof and demonstration. This is the new discovery. This is fact. This is taste.’

Recommendation: Highly Recommended.