Wednesday, March 09, 2022

On Mahoney on 'Protestant Christian Supremacy'

 Jon Mahoney has a forthcoming article, Protestant Christian Supremacy and Status Inequality, that is interesting, not so much because it is any good but because I suspect that it is an example of a genre of which we will likely see a great deal in the future. Mahoney says:

Protestant Christian identity confers status privileges; it correlates with opportunities to serve in public office, especially at the national level; it serves as the paradigm for religious identity against which other religious identities are compared and judged; it is a significant source of exclusionary immigration policy; and it renders white supremacy, patriarchy, and anti-LGBTQ prejudices and policies more impactful.

The argument for everything in this paragraph is rather handwavy. For instance, Mahoney notes that nearly half of all Presidents have been Episcopalian or Presbyterian, but gives no indication of how this establishes such a thing as "Protestant Christian identity"; he claims that Protestant Christian identity is "at the core of how many Americans imagine their nationality", but gives no particular reason why we should think so. Protestants are an extremely diverse group, by nature; he says nothing about how a Southern Baptist and an Episcopalian are supposed to have a single identity that would work in a plausibly causal way to do these things. At one point he tries to argue that court cases exhibit Protestant Christian bias by pointing to claims by Justice Scalia, who was famously not Protestant and on a court that famously has been tipping Catholic and Jewish for some time now. Such is par for the course; Mahoney is not actually doing serious analysis, but trying to do social philosophy with cartoon caricatures. This is, I say, something that seems to be increasingly common.

But the thing that really puzzles me is the practical upshot. Most of Mahoney's examples are not particularly great examples of what he claims, but we can find a case that one could very well interpret as "Protestant Christian supremacy", namely, the rise of government-funded schools in the United States. In at least many states, support for this move was due to fears about Catholic schools. Many local communities were largely Protestant, but Catholic schooling was expanding and also had a reputation for quality, much like it does today, and there were worries about how this put Protestants at disadvantage. This gave a great deal of impetus to supporters of public schools, and basically the schooling system we often got was a public school that accommodated Protestant practices but not Catholic or Jewish, or that accommodated the former directly but the latter only by special exemptions, or any number of minor variations on these. In addition, Blaine Amendments were passed and made part of state constitutions primarily in order to prevent state educational funds from flowing to Catholic schools. A general result is that Catholic (and other religious) schooling became more expensive, because Catholic schools had to compete with public schools that are funded out of vast tax revenues and because it creates a situation in which states can impose regulations on schools while both giving public schools additional aid to comply and denying any such aid to religious private schools, a large percentage of which are Catholic. All of this was done fairly explicitly in some parts of the country, you don't need to read between the lines, just look at the political campaigns, legislative debates, and other various shenanigans associated with the development of the public school system. It was by no means the only factor, but saving Protestant America was definitely one factor.

So let us assume for the sake of argument that this all gives us a good reason to attribute the public school system to "Protestant Christian supremacy".  And, whether one wishes to attribute it to "Protestant Christian supremacy" or not, and despite the fact that our culture is much less Protestant than it used to be, it's pretty clear that the ethics, view of society, etc., that is taught in a typical public school is even today much closer to liberal Protestantism than to Catholicism. What then? What are we supposed to do with this? Are we to conclude that the public school system needs to be dismantled, so that we return to a mix of homeschooling, apprenticeship, and schoolhouses supported by sectarian or community associations? Mahoney gives us no answers -- the entire practical advice he gives about this supposed problem is that we need to make it part of the discussion. So we've made it part of the discussion. What then? 

Public schools are not explicitly Protestant; as time has gone by, they have slowly done a better job at accommodating Catholics, or Mormons, or Jews, or Muslims, or Jehovah's Witnesses, or what have you. There are communities that are not very Protestant at all, being dominantly Catholic or Mormon, that use the public school system without any problem. Protestants did use public schools as an indirect way to cause problems for Catholics (and explicitly), but it's not as if Catholics have received no benefits from the existence of public schools. So one could argue that perhaps the inequality is not severe enough given the overall benefits to require dismantling the whole thing. But then we'd still need to know what to do about it. What possible practical policy could you implement to get you the result that the practices and curricula of your public schools were at some hypothetical equilibrium point in the midst of all the possible sects in the whole nation, giving none of them any advantage over the others?

Perhaps, though, this is just tied to my difficulties with understanding how the egalitarianism is supposed to work at all. We seem to be required to have a democratic society in which the direction of the society is determined neither by consensus (since practically speaking we can only very rarely get that) nor by majority (since this creates biases in favor of the majority) nor by the more politically active demographics (since this creates biases in favor of the politically active subpopulations) at all. I don't even know what that would be. Even in a very smoothly functioning society, in which majorities and active subpopulations make extensive concessions to minorities and less active subpopulations, the tenor of the society is still going to have majority-aligned biases and active-subpopulation-aligned biases, and you'll still get inertia in which society still functions in a groove laid down by a no-longer-majority or no-longer-active group because it's a lot of work and agony to make new grooves all the time. These discussions always want to talk about the case-by-case inequalities; but they propose alleged explanatory factors that are necessarily society-wide, without ever telling us what a society without any such factors would look like. 

One worries, indeed, that the purpose of a concept like "Protestant Christian supremacy" is not to give any explanation at all, but to give a justification for attacking Protestants. In practice it sometimes seems to work that way. But in this case, perhaps not. I've noted before that, while individual academics can be creative, academia gets its results not by creativity but by being a combinatorial machine that runs through huge numbers of variations of ideas in both parallel and series. Fashion and precedent feed in the inputs, and the whole system just explores different variations on them by going through the possible combinations. 'White supremacy' has had some fashionable purchase, so it's perhaps inevitable that the combinatorial wheels will roll, and we get endless explorations of an 'X supremacy' sort. Perhaps someone has somewhere started writing a paper on right-handed supremacy. Eventually you might even find some excellent ideas. But you also get a lot of unhelpful things.

Tuesday, March 08, 2022

And in My Very Life Your Colours Live

March, 1879
by Constance Naden

Ye little birds, that chant your love so loud,
Your careless hearts are not so glad as mine,
For he who sings because the sun doth shine
Is robbed of joy by every murky cloud;
And ye, sweet heralds of the summer crowd
Of unremembered flowers, whose tints combine
To light the meadows—ye grow pale and pine,
When by cold winds your radiant heads are bowed. 

From you, from all fair creatures of the earth,
I do but gain the beauty that I give;
Your form, your music, in my soul have birth,
And in my very life your colours live;
And when the sunlight fades, and ye depart,
I hold your joy within my secret heart.

Monday, March 07, 2022

Petition and Beatitude

 In his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount (Book 2, Section 11), St. Augustine gives a correspondence between the petitions of the Lord's Prayer and the Beatitudes, one which St. Thomas accepts (ST 2-2.83.9 ad 3).

PetitionBeatitude
Hallowed be Thy NameBlessed are the poor in spirit...
Thy Kingdom comeBlessed are the meek...
Thy will be done...Blessed are those who mourn...
Give us this day our daily breadBlessed are those who hunger and thirst after righteousness...
Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtorsBlessed are the merciful...
Lead us not into temptationBlessed are the pure in heart....
Deliver us from evilBlessed are the peacemakers...

This is actually a reasonably tight fit, for each one. Mourn and Meek are switched in order; I don't know if anything particularly hinges on that, but since the meek inherit the earth, I think one could argue that it would in fact make more sense to associate Meek with Will ('on earth as it is in heaven').  The correspondence between Daily Bread and Hunger-and-Thirst is very nice, as is the correspondence between Forgive and Merciful, and, more subtly, Temptation and Pure-in-Heart.

Two Poem Drafts

 Evening Tea

I drink my tea on a silent evening
as stars come out in a rhythm slow.
One by one they shyly gather
and greet the friends that with them glow.
Nocturnal children of the darkness,
like bats they sleep in burning day
then flit about as the twilight blushes
and on the ebon pathways play.
I drink my tea on a quiet evening;
the moon, perhaps, will be rising soon.
I almost think I hear it coming,
humming a thinly argent tune.
I sit, but inside my heart is dancing
as steam is rising from my cup.
Soon I shall see the lunar rising
and wake the lonely midnight up.
The ballet of the hallowed heavens
I echo in my heart and soul.
I drink my tea on a silent evening;
above me endless circles roll.

Kobzar

The wind speaks quietly of you, Taras;
it kindly recalls your name's great story.
East and West, all of us are kith and kin,
born from sorrowful Adam, sharing fates,
one family, the household of free souls,
though some there be who wish to forget it.
Yet still again the memory returns
when the slave unchained, wind on his bright face,
rises and undoes the tyrant's cold rule.
For all of us are before God's throne,
and in that high throneroom hope of freedom
never dies but always has a new life.
On earth below the wheatlands are stained red;
alas, it is the blood of innocents
but the wind remembers an old promise
that the tyrant's throat will be slit.
The wind speaks quietly of you, Taras;
it blows across the Dnipro waterway.
On the far side of its depths there is hope.
The gilded fields of wheat still grow upward.
The steppes are still unending in their scope.
On monk's hill your relic was buried,
that the airs of your homeland might keep you.
The wind speaks quietly of you, Taras.
There is hope where freedom is well planted,
and there is freedom where poets still hope.

Sunday, March 06, 2022

Links of Note

 * Carlo Rovelli, Back to Reichenbach (PDF), on philosophy of time

* Nathanael Stein, Imagination, expectation and "thoughts entangled in metaphors" (PDF)

* Michael Walschots, Hutcheson's Theory of Obligation (PDF)

* Liam Kofi Bright, Our Time Comprehended in Thought, on philosophy of culture

* Katherine Blunt, America's Power Grid Is Increasingly Unreliable

* Dominic Legge, Do Thomists Have Rights?, argues that (contrary to a lot of claims, including by Thomists) Aquinas has a reasonably clear conception of 'subjective rights'.

* Taylor Patrick O'Neill, Vatican II and the Lasting Influence of Garrigou-Lagrange's Mystical Theology

* Timothy Yenter, What Hume Didn't Notice about Divine Causation (PDF)

* Jozef Muller, Hate and Happiness in Aristotle (PDF)

* Zee Perry, On Mereology and Metricality (PDF)

Friday, March 04, 2022

On Francione on Veganism

 Gary Francione has an article at Aeon arguing that it is immoral to own animals and morally necessary to be a vegan. It's long an assertion and short on argument, but what argument there is, has a number of problems. A few points.

Francione says:

The Western view was that we could have moral and legal obligations that concerned animals but were not owed to them. To the extent that the cruel treatment of animals was thought to present a moral problem, it was only because it made us more likely to be cruel to other humans. But any obligation to be kind to animals merely concerned animals; the obligation of kind treatment was owed only to other humans. This was the view of Immanuel Kant, Thomas Aquinas and others.

This is not really true of Kant. On Kant's view, we owe other human beings not qua individuals but qua rational; that is, our duties are duties to humanity in the sense of 'rational nature'. But for Kant this grounding of duty on humanity applies to animals as well; we owe other animals certain actions insofar as they are analogues of humanity. Kant is quite explicit that we have duties to animals; they are just more indirect than those to human beings. Something broadly similar can be said of Aquinas. What makes compassion a virtue is its relation to human beings, but animals are naturally objects of compassion because their afflictions stir up the same feelings as the afflictions of human beings, and we are obligated to be compassionate in any appropriate situation. Thus exactly the same obligation covers both man and beast, it just does so for different reasons, and, because it does so for different reasons, that obligation is not always going to be satisfied in the same way for both.

Part of Francione's mistake (which is a common one) is that he assumes there is a very sharp distinction between an obligation that are about someone and an obligation 'to' them and puts all the emphasis on the latter. But the content of our obligations comes from the former, not the latter, which really concerns the reasons for the obligation rather than the content. (Of course, in colloquial speech we often don't distinguish them at all, since in many simple cases, obligations are 'about' those 'to' whom we have them.)

Likewise, Francione says, "Animals supposedly were not rational, self-aware or able to use concepts, and this was thought to justify our treating them as having no moral value." But that animals should be treated as having no moral value has never been in any way the common Western view Francione claims; indeed, I suspect you could not find any definite statement of this at all before the last two hundred years.

While he does later on get Bentham's position roughly right, he notably doesn't look at why Bentham takes the position he does. Bentham thinks that enjoyment and suffering are the only foundations for moral concern in any case. Thus he would entirely reject the distinction Francione makes between 'persons' and 'quasi-persons'; Bentham wouldn't think the category of person has much relevance here, and he is advocating treating animals in exactly the same way as human beings. He doesn't think our interest in continuing to live is relevant, either, except insofar as it expands our enjoyment or suffering.

When Francione gets away from history and to the present, his argument doesn't much improve:

Is any of this animal use necessary? Putting aside instances where people are stranded on lifeboats or desert islands, or otherwise facing imminent starvation, it is not necessary for humans to eat animals or animal products. Indeed, for several decades, a growing number of mainstream healthcare professionals have been telling us that animal foods are not only not necessary for, but are actually detrimental to, human health. 

This is a baffling argument. It is in fact necessary for humans to eat animal products. We are omnivores who have been eating animal products for our entire discernible evolutionary history, and our bodies have a dependency on them. There are things that we need that no plants make at all. In the long term, you can literally damage your brain by imposing a vegan lifestyle without proper planning. Now, it is true that we live in an age of wonders, and we can synthesize these missing elements, either chemically or indirectly by cultivating non-plant organisms (algae or various kinds of bacterial colonies) so as to produce them. This is why generally serious vegans are big on things like spirulina (although spirulina is not itself a particularly great source). Even when we can get the nutrient from plants, it's not necessarily easy to get it in adequate quantities from those sources. And it would be entirely false to claim that we are currently in a position to make up synthetically all the inadequacies of an all-plant diet for the entire population of the earth.

Strict veganism, as opposed to alternatives like vegetarianism, pescetarianism, or 'loose veganism' (i.e., mostly vegan, with some limited concessions to some very occasional animal products), is a luxury lifestyle that at present can only be safely practiced by people with access to large-scale agricultural transportation and nutritional specialists. Vegetarianism, pescetarianism, and loose veganism do have problems that have to be compensated for if practiced at a large-scale, but they are much more manageable as patterns for an entire society. (India is probably the large society that actually comes closest to what Francione would consider the ideal. There's an extremely good reason why so much of Indian life has been associated with the milk cow -- a vast quantity of milk products is the only thing that makes such a society possible.)

Thursday, March 03, 2022

External World

 [Another handout.]

*******

External World 

Problem: How do we know that there is a world outside the mind? 

 I. Bishop George Berkeley: Immaterialism/Idealism 

 What do we really mean by ‘outside the mind’? 

 Isn’t the simplest way to answer the question to say that, strictly speaking, there is nothing outside the mind – everything is either a mind or something in a mind? (Get rid of ‘material substance’, the ‘unknown something’.) A reason to think this: primary and secondary qualities. 

 Bodies are then sensible ideas that our mind treats as going together. Note that this still means that bodies exist. Esse est percipi: To be is to be perceived. 

 But we take the world to be shared and independent of us in some way. How can it just be in our mind? Because it is coordinated by a higher mind. Divine language. 

 II. David Hume: Skepticism 

 It’s pointless to ask, “Whether bodies exist?” We all believe that they do. The question is, “Why do we believe they exist?” We will need to distinguish the causes of believing that bodies exist even when we don’t sense them (continued existence) and the causes of believing that they are distinct from perception (distinct or independent existence). They are connected, but it’s easier to see how they work if they are separated. 

 For the objects of perception to exist when we don’t perceive them is a contradiction (as Berkeley had noted). The senses can give us no notion of either distinct or continued existence. If our belief was based on reasoning, the reasoning would be too difficult. So it must be imagination that is the source of our belief. 

 All objects to which we attribute a continued existence have constancy and coherence. 

 The imagination attributes continued existence to uniform objects due to a mistake – it treats the perceptions as continuing to exist even when we aren’t perceiving because perceptions before and after the gap are so similar. With changing objects, it has a natural tendency to extrapolate (galley effect or mental inertia) to make our experience as regular as possible, and supposes that they continue to exist unperceived in order to do so. 

 Given continued existence, we naturally assume distinct existence. However, we can do experiments to show that perceptions can’t exist independently (we can modify them with our sense organs in such a way that we can’t tell which perceptions should be said to exist). Philosophers try to get around this by distinguishing perceptions and objects (the perceptions are interrupted but the objects continue); but the only reason why you would do so would be to save the assumption of continued and distinct existence, which we only believe because of the mistakes give above. Everyone, therefore, even philosophers, can do no more than oscillate between these two conflicting views. 

 III. Lady Mary Shepherd: Materialism 

 The problem really boils down to three things: external existence, continued existence, and independent existence. These are known by causal reasoning, not imagination. 

The world ‘mixes’ with us; because this mixing introduces differences in us, we recognize that it is an effect. Therefore there must be a cause besides ourselves giving these sensations. Thus independent existence. 

 We get continued existence by discovering that these effects are ready to appear. 

 We get external existence by moving around, and therefore adding the idea of relation to motion. 

 We don’t know exactly what these external, independent, continued existences are, only that there must be something about them that gives the variety we experience. 

 Other Minds 

 The problem of other minds is very similar to that of the problem of the external world: How do we know that other minds exist? 

 Descartes’s answer: We know it because we find bodies exhibiting behavior (language and problem-solving) that can only be due to something capable of recognizing its own thinking (e.g., engaging in Cartesian meditation and reaching the cogito). A key question is whether this is adequate as an answer. It does seem to require rationalism rather than empiricism. 

 Another common answer (e.g., Bertrand Russell): We know in our own case that thinking causes certain behaviors. Sometimes we see the behaviors without the cause; therefore we infer that there is (probably) thinking we do not observe. (Argument from analogy.) An empiricist could easily accept this. One potential issue: analogy is a sliding scale, and the inference described here seems very ‘patchy’ and tentative compared to our actual views on other minds. 

One question that comes up often, and gets answered in different ways: do we first know that other minds exist, or do we first know that external bodies exist? Which is more basic?