In a camp not far from the cursed second stream on the right I huddled over Rozanov's journal, trying to make sense of it. Rozanov's writing was terse and cryptic, and the book had been water-damaged to the point of being largely illegible in places. Nonetheless, some of it could still be made out. Easiest to make out were the drawings, each clearly done by someone with an eye simultaneously artistic and scientific. There was a sketch of one of the great spider-webs, stretching from tree to tree, from soil to canopy, of the sort that little spiders spin near the rivers and streams. In another, a large black crocodile kept a wary eye on the explorations of her young. Others traced plants, insects, and snakes. Then, largest of all, taking up a full spread of the book, there was a beautiful flower, somewhat like an orchid. After that the journal itself, as a description of Rozanov's travels, stopped. There were many more pages, however, and every single one of them was covered with drawings of that same flower, obsessively done over and over again, two or three to a page. I could find nothing else, except a single word that was written here and there in a tremulous, excited hand: bessmertie. Immortality.
As I drifted to sleep, I turned over the events of the day in my head, and they blurred together in my dreams. I dreamed that I was back in the city, back in the room of the gray men, but instead of talking to them, I was talking to Rozanov. On the table lay the corpse of Rozanov's guide, covered with the strange flowers depicted in Rozanov's journal. I talked without interruption for what seemed forever, and then Rozanov opened his mouth and said one word: "Immortality."
Quin and I set out early in the morning, heartened by the sure signs that we were on the right trail, but made wary by the memory of the skeleton. At one point we were forced by a turn in the river to move west; shortly into this Quin stopped suddenly.
"What is it?" I asked.
"Trim, that is a path," he said pointing.
I looked to where he was pointing, and, sure enough, it was a path. Trails can quickly become overgrown in the jungle, and someone with eyes less sharp than Quin's could easily have missed it, but a straight trail had been cut through the underbrush recently enough that it had not been completely covered over. On closer inspection it was clear that someone had been through with a machete.
After ten minutes of following the trail we suddenly came into a large clearing.
If you have never been in the jungle, I cannot convey to you how startling this is. In a realm in which every plant, every animal, every insect is in a constant competition for survival, open spaces do not remain. These forests have been known to swallow entire cities; if a village neglects cutting and clearing, it can vanish completely in a matter of weeks. But here we were, in a large clearing, apparently consisting of nothing but rocky, sandy soil, sparse grass, and, in the center, a solitary flowering bush.
Quin hung back a bit, uncertain what to make of this, but I moved forward, rifle ready. A little way in I stumbled slightly on something sticking out of the earth. At first I thought it was a rock, but closer inspection showed it to be a bone, probably belonging to a great cat of some kind. A little further into the clearing it became clear that the bone was not the only one; they littered the ground everywhere: femurs and skulls half-covered with sand, tiny, indescript bones like pebbles, clearly from hundreds of different animals. They increased as I came closer to the plant in the middle, whose flowers were now recognizably the same as that in Rozanov's journal. They filled the air with an intense, drowsy sweetness, a sweetness partly like honeysuckle and jasmine and partly like rotting fruit. The bush had gray leaves that moved in the breeze like flickering fingers.
A sudden movement from the other side of the bush forced me back suddenly. A figure staggered up, as if from sleep, dirty and ape-like. It wore clothes, however. They hung as tattered rags from an emaciated frame.
"Rozanov!" I said softly. It was more of an exclamation than a greeting.
The figure came slowly, but with a nervous jitteriness, around the bush, without saying anything. It was a far cry from the suave, athletic person I remembered from the Embassy dinner in London years ago; but it was clearly Rozanov.
"Rozanov," I said again, "I have come to bring you back so that you may account for your absence. If you do not comply, I have been authorized to kill you."
The figure showed no signs of comprehension. I could see its eyes now. They glimmered with anger and fear like a savage beast's, but they watered and the pupils were large.
"Rozanov!" I said again. "Do you understand me?"
What happened next took only a few moments, but it remains in my memory as if it had occurred with painstaking slowness. The thing-that-once-was-Rozanov stopped suddenly, gathered itself, and rushed at me. I shot it in the chest. Twice. It kept coming. As it knocked my rifle down and away I managed a third shot, to the stomach, which did not even slow it down. The gun flew far out of my reach, I was thrown back, and the beast was on top of me, grabbing at my throat.
I struggled, but to no avail. Emaciated the thing may have been, but it had a strength like I had never felt. I am sure it could have crushed my throat immediately, but before it squeezed, it bent down toward my face, its breath stinking of the rotten sweetness of the flowers. "Bessmertie," it hissed. I prepared my soul to die.
A shot rang out, and a puzzled look came over the thing's face. There was another shot and it fell over heavily. Panting, I pushed it off me and sat up, Quin was some distance away, rifle still up. The thing beside me lay dead with two shots in its head. Rozanov was no more.
Quin came over and helped me to my feet. "We should leave, Trim," he said. "This is a bad place." Still panting, I agreed.
I will not return to Europe. There is nowhere there I could go to elude the gray men in their immaculate suits, and I will not bring them back the information they wished me to bring back. I have suspicions about what it is they wanted with the flower that had so come to obsess Rozanov, filling him with sick dreams. That they wished to know if it existed and where it was - that much is clear. But no one can know of it.
They will send others to find it. With Rozanov dead and myself out of their reach, they will not be as likely to succeed. But what if they do? I have arranged for a Portuguese trader to give this manuscript to a journalist I know in Lisbon, who will find a way to publish it as fiction under a pseudonym. No one can find the place based on the details I have allowed here; some of them are false or deliberately misleading. Few will even take the story as fact; but I hope that they will learn the lesson of it.
As for me, I go with Quin in his journey home. He has been mercy itself to me on many a quest; the least I can do is try to return the favor. Rozanov and the lotus I have chosen to forget. When I put aside this manuscript, I will speak of it no more. It will not be so easy to get it out of my dreams.
Saturday, February 26, 2005
Honderich on Philosophy and Science
As it seems to me, the virtue of philosophy is that it is logically more hard-headed than science. The virtue of science is that it knows a lot more about the empirical nitty-gritty of the world and the ways it works. That philosophy is logically more hard-headed has nothing to do with Formal Logic. Philosophy is somewhat better at keeping its eye on the ball. When it is good, it also does not beg questions or operate with circular or elusive notions. It is not subjective in an ordinary sense, doesn't run things together, separates things from the relations they are in, is explicit, is intolerant of nonsense, attends closely to making all of its propositions consistent, and so on and so forth.
Ted Honderich, "Consciousness and Inner Tubes".
Ted Honderich, "Consciousness and Inner Tubes".
Atheism and Nihilism
Richard has a post at Philosophy, etc. asking theists some questions:
I can never tell what people are getting at when they talk about anything giving their lives meaning; when it means anything, it seems to vary considerably. And I don't tend to think of ethics in terms of values. My own theism I hold because I think it is rationally required both as a conclusion and as an element in a full explanation of things (as I've said before, I think God's existence has been demonstrated by e.g., Scotus's triple primacy argument, and even if it weren't, there are several other reasons to think that God exists). So, not being among the theists Richard is questioning, I don't quite know what they would say. But it strikes me that there's a fairly obvious way in which theism would make a difference; namely, given that God exists and given the plausible additional supposition that if God exists we have ethical obligations/responsibilities/whatever with regard to God, it follows that any naturalistic account of value will necessarily be incomplete (again, if God exists). Needless to say, the atheist will reject the antecedent; but it suggests one reason why theists tend to see the move from theism to atheism as an ethical downgrade. An additional reason is that theists necessarily take elements central to ethics (personality, intention, etc.) and make them more fundamental to their worldview than the atheist can.
Besides, the person who is perhaps the foremost atheistic philosopher of religion at present, Quentin Smith, draws a connection between moral nihilism and atheism: namely, that if moral nihilism is true, necessarily God does not exist; while if God does exist (theism is true), necessarily moral nihilism is false. Further, if Smith's argument is sound, I think we would have to allow that for an atheist who is a moral realist (which Richard, I think, is) and holds an 'aggregative value theory' (which Richard certainly does), the entailment would have to go the other way, as well. (I have no commitment as to whether the argument does have force; I'm fairly sure, for instance, that 'aggregative value theory' is false. I don't, for instance, think treating 'is more valuable than' as a qualitative relation requires treating it as an approximative quantitative relation, as Smith claims it does. Intension and remission of qualities can be treated as analogous to addition and subtraction of (approximate) quantities, but there's no reason to think the latter completely captures the former; and, indeed, there's plenty of reason to deny it. But I haven't had a chance to look closely enough at the issue.)
There are other ways one might go. For instance, if one holds that acting morally requires positing that God exists (as Kant argues), then some sort of moral nihilism follows from atheism by a kind of modus tollens. And this would be true even if (as is certainly true on Kant's view) moral principles are more obviously true than the claim that God exists.
But my point here, as noted above, is just to give some possible reasons why theists might say what Richard attributes them. If you have a better response, then mosey on over and leave a comment on Richard's post.
UPDATE: Corrected the Kant paragraph. Accurately summarizing Kant's "ethico-theology" in a single sentence is hard!
Opponents of naturalism often claim that God grounds values and gives life meaning. My previous post on God-given Value disputes this, and I still haven't heard any satisfactory response. What difference does God make? What makes doing God's bidding any more meaningful than doing your own, or someone else's? Why obey divine commands at all?
...
My questions aren't rhetorical - I'd genuinely like to hear theists' answers, if they have any. We hear a lot about how God gives your lives meaning, but how is that? What meaning or value does God provide that we would otherwise lack? I just don't see it.
I can never tell what people are getting at when they talk about anything giving their lives meaning; when it means anything, it seems to vary considerably. And I don't tend to think of ethics in terms of values. My own theism I hold because I think it is rationally required both as a conclusion and as an element in a full explanation of things (as I've said before, I think God's existence has been demonstrated by e.g., Scotus's triple primacy argument, and even if it weren't, there are several other reasons to think that God exists). So, not being among the theists Richard is questioning, I don't quite know what they would say. But it strikes me that there's a fairly obvious way in which theism would make a difference; namely, given that God exists and given the plausible additional supposition that if God exists we have ethical obligations/responsibilities/whatever with regard to God, it follows that any naturalistic account of value will necessarily be incomplete (again, if God exists). Needless to say, the atheist will reject the antecedent; but it suggests one reason why theists tend to see the move from theism to atheism as an ethical downgrade. An additional reason is that theists necessarily take elements central to ethics (personality, intention, etc.) and make them more fundamental to their worldview than the atheist can.
Besides, the person who is perhaps the foremost atheistic philosopher of religion at present, Quentin Smith, draws a connection between moral nihilism and atheism: namely, that if moral nihilism is true, necessarily God does not exist; while if God does exist (theism is true), necessarily moral nihilism is false. Further, if Smith's argument is sound, I think we would have to allow that for an atheist who is a moral realist (which Richard, I think, is) and holds an 'aggregative value theory' (which Richard certainly does), the entailment would have to go the other way, as well. (I have no commitment as to whether the argument does have force; I'm fairly sure, for instance, that 'aggregative value theory' is false. I don't, for instance, think treating 'is more valuable than' as a qualitative relation requires treating it as an approximative quantitative relation, as Smith claims it does. Intension and remission of qualities can be treated as analogous to addition and subtraction of (approximate) quantities, but there's no reason to think the latter completely captures the former; and, indeed, there's plenty of reason to deny it. But I haven't had a chance to look closely enough at the issue.)
There are other ways one might go. For instance, if one holds that acting morally requires positing that God exists (as Kant argues), then some sort of moral nihilism follows from atheism by a kind of modus tollens. And this would be true even if (as is certainly true on Kant's view) moral principles are more obviously true than the claim that God exists.
But my point here, as noted above, is just to give some possible reasons why theists might say what Richard attributes them. If you have a better response, then mosey on over and leave a comment on Richard's post.
UPDATE: Corrected the Kant paragraph. Accurately summarizing Kant's "ethico-theology" in a single sentence is hard!
Butler on the Approaches to Moral Philosophy
There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things: the other from a matter of fact, namely what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things: in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own nature. Thus they both lead us to the same thing, our obligations to the practice of virtue; and thus they exceedingly strengthen and enforce each other. The first seems the most direct formal proof, and in some respects the least liable to cavil and dispute: the latter is in a peculiar manner adapted to satisfy a fair mind; and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances in life.
From Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Preface.
From Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Preface.
Friday, February 25, 2005
Third History Carnival
The Third History Carnival is up, with some excellent posts on everything from the Dresden bombing to the work of transcribing speeches to the issue of Shakespearean authorship.
The Myth of Hume's Compatibilism
Another interesting Pacific APA paper: The Myth of Hume's Compatibilism (PDF) by William E. Morris.
I argued for this position, very briefly, in Point #2 in my series on free will. Which series I will complete, along with putting up the third part of "The Lotus" soon. I promise (again).
I argued for this position, very briefly, in Point #2 in my series on free will. Which series I will complete, along with putting up the third part of "The Lotus" soon. I promise (again).
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