Bill Vallicella notes Richard Dawkins's review of Swinburne's Is There a God? It's yet another sad case of Dawkins not knowing his limitations; or, rather, it would be sad if it weren't mildly entertaining. I have vivid memories of a page in The Blind Watchmaker in which, in the course of a single argument, Dawkins manages to equivocate among three completely different meanings of 'simplicity' (material simplicity, causal simplicity, and theoretical simplicity). Dawkins is always interesting, and sometimes makes good arguments, but the man also sometimes seems to have about as much ability to build a good rational argument as I have the ability to build a living cat. This unfortunately seems to be a case of the latter, as The Maverick Philosopher shows. I'll only add to Vallicella's excellent points that the review suggests to me that Dawkins is still muddled about the sort of simplicity relevant to good explanation; this seems to be why he completely misses Swinburne's point about the smallest number of brute facts. Dawkins keeps trying to treat all simplicity of explanation as merely the reduction of an object or event to simple constituents, so he tends to make odd assumptions when it comes to other kinds of explanation.
I'm not really convinced that Swinburne's approach is a particularly good one. But it, at least, has rational merit; at least enough to take more seriously than Dawkins's critique.
Saturday, August 27, 2005
Religious Language
Macht has pointed the way to a paper by Roy Clouser on religious language, called "Religious Language: A New Look at an Old Problem" (PDF). In it Clouser rejects the the theory of analogy. This is his reason:
But this is merely confused. Let us take divine and creaturely goodness. That there is something the same about the two is blatantly obvious; they are both such that they can be called goodness. But the theory of analogy doesn't deny this at all. What it denies is that this predicate is predicated of the two in the same way. And the reason for this is obvious: in every thing that God and creatures share, creatures will not share as equals, but as creatures: God is good without qualification, creatures are good with the qualifications that come with being a creature. That they are both alike truly good doesn't change anything; all that means is that they both have "reference to some one thing," which is the whole point of the theory of analogy. What distinguishes the theory of analogy is not a denial that God and creatures share something in common, in some sense; it is the denial that any such commonality is properly generic, i.e., that it suffices to put God in the same genus as creatures. This is why analogy theorists deny that the terms applied are exactly the same, and why they deny that the terms applied are completely different, viz., they aren't exactly the same, and they aren't completely different. Contrary to what Clouser later claims, it is the univocity theorist, not the analogy theorist, who holds that creatures have uncreated properties. The analogy theorist denies it, and quite plausibly. Certainly nothing Clouser says cuts against the reasons for denying it.
Indeed, Clouser's so-called new solution is just a weirdly formulated theory of analogy. This is obscured by the fact that Clouser formulates his solution in terms of the ambiguous and unclear term 'property' rather than in the clearer terms of the theory of analogy, which talks in terms of names, not properties -- rightly, because it is a theory of divine names, not a theory of divine properties. But it very clearly is a theory of analogy. When Clouser talks about 'created divine properties', this is just a clumsy and unfortunate way of saying what analogy theorists would say in clearer and cleaner terms like the following:
In other words, the only sense (relevant to religious language) in which God "takes on created properties" is the sense that, having created creatures, God can now be 'named by us from creatures'. The property-talk is unfortunate, since Clouser forgets that he's supposed to be giving a theory of religious language and not a theory of divine being, but if one regards it strictly as relevant to language, Clouser has said nothing new. And his saying that our religious language is just ordinary language is nothing new, either; analogical predication is a standard part of ordinary language, albeit one difficult to characterize clearly in rigorously philosophical terms. One doesn't need to know the theory of analogy in order to predicate analogically any more than one needs to know the theory of gravity in order to walk; which is a good thing, because a lot of ordinary language is analogical. Or consider when Clouser says:
This is exactly what an analogy theorist would say (in fact, it is what Aquinas actually says, allowing for the fact that 'ordinarily mean' in the last sentence is ambiguous between 'what we ordinarily signify' and 'the ordinary way in which we signify what we signify'; the distinction is necessary to allow for even straightforward and common cases of religious language like "None but God is good"). Much of what Clouser says is hampered by the unfortunate attempt to charaterize language in terms of properties, which is unnecessary, and which is a pointless endeavor anyway without an appeal to a well-constructed theory of properties to prevent equivocations. But he really hasn't produced anything new as far as religious language goes; he has just re-invented in garbled form a theory that has been more cleanly stated before. The one significant deviation Clouser makes, is treating 'being' as equivocal; traditional analogy theory takes 'being' as a pre-eminent example of analogy. But this is very clearly just due to Clouser's equivocation between 'property' in the sense of that which a predicate supposes, and 'property' in some ontological sense that he never makes entirely clear. But we don't need an ontological theory of God to have a viable theory of how our language about God works; so 'property' in the latter sense is not even relevant. (And, indeed, Clouser's own 'limiting idea' exception clearly shows that whether we share properties with God in this unclear ontological sense is simply irrelevant to whether we can name God.)
For one thing, A, to be like another thing, B, they must have some element in common which is exactly the same for each. (And I do not merely mean that they have in common the property of being like one another.) There must be some respect in which they are alike. If A is red and B is green they are alike in being colors; neither is more truly a color than the other. If A is small and B is large, they are alike in having size; neither is more fully a size, or possesses the quality of size in a better way, than the other. It is simply impossible to conceive of two things being like one another, if it is supposed to be true that they have no property in common univocally. For that to be true, two things would have to be “alike’ although there is no respect in which they are the “same.” And, in fact, the analogy theory does not accomplish such a trick either.
But this is merely confused. Let us take divine and creaturely goodness. That there is something the same about the two is blatantly obvious; they are both such that they can be called goodness. But the theory of analogy doesn't deny this at all. What it denies is that this predicate is predicated of the two in the same way. And the reason for this is obvious: in every thing that God and creatures share, creatures will not share as equals, but as creatures: God is good without qualification, creatures are good with the qualifications that come with being a creature. That they are both alike truly good doesn't change anything; all that means is that they both have "reference to some one thing," which is the whole point of the theory of analogy. What distinguishes the theory of analogy is not a denial that God and creatures share something in common, in some sense; it is the denial that any such commonality is properly generic, i.e., that it suffices to put God in the same genus as creatures. This is why analogy theorists deny that the terms applied are exactly the same, and why they deny that the terms applied are completely different, viz., they aren't exactly the same, and they aren't completely different. Contrary to what Clouser later claims, it is the univocity theorist, not the analogy theorist, who holds that creatures have uncreated properties. The analogy theorist denies it, and quite plausibly. Certainly nothing Clouser says cuts against the reasons for denying it.
Indeed, Clouser's so-called new solution is just a weirdly formulated theory of analogy. This is obscured by the fact that Clouser formulates his solution in terms of the ambiguous and unclear term 'property' rather than in the clearer terms of the theory of analogy, which talks in terms of names, not properties -- rightly, because it is a theory of divine names, not a theory of divine properties. But it very clearly is a theory of analogy. When Clouser talks about 'created divine properties', this is just a clumsy and unfortunate way of saying what analogy theorists would say in clearer and cleaner terms like the following:
We know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself.
In other words, the only sense (relevant to religious language) in which God "takes on created properties" is the sense that, having created creatures, God can now be 'named by us from creatures'. The property-talk is unfortunate, since Clouser forgets that he's supposed to be giving a theory of religious language and not a theory of divine being, but if one regards it strictly as relevant to language, Clouser has said nothing new. And his saying that our religious language is just ordinary language is nothing new, either; analogical predication is a standard part of ordinary language, albeit one difficult to characterize clearly in rigorously philosophical terms. One doesn't need to know the theory of analogy in order to predicate analogically any more than one needs to know the theory of gravity in order to walk; which is a good thing, because a lot of ordinary language is analogical. Or consider when Clouser says:
This is not to say that God possesses these characteristics with the same incompleteness, inconsistency, or other faults that people do. His love and wisdom are complete and faultless. But they are still what we mean by love and wisdom in ordinary language. We would not say that God’s love is unlike what we ordinarily mean by “love” because his mode of loving is so extraordinary we cannot imagine it.
This is exactly what an analogy theorist would say (in fact, it is what Aquinas actually says, allowing for the fact that 'ordinarily mean' in the last sentence is ambiguous between 'what we ordinarily signify' and 'the ordinary way in which we signify what we signify'; the distinction is necessary to allow for even straightforward and common cases of religious language like "None but God is good"). Much of what Clouser says is hampered by the unfortunate attempt to charaterize language in terms of properties, which is unnecessary, and which is a pointless endeavor anyway without an appeal to a well-constructed theory of properties to prevent equivocations. But he really hasn't produced anything new as far as religious language goes; he has just re-invented in garbled form a theory that has been more cleanly stated before. The one significant deviation Clouser makes, is treating 'being' as equivocal; traditional analogy theory takes 'being' as a pre-eminent example of analogy. But this is very clearly just due to Clouser's equivocation between 'property' in the sense of that which a predicate supposes, and 'property' in some ontological sense that he never makes entirely clear. But we don't need an ontological theory of God to have a viable theory of how our language about God works; so 'property' in the latter sense is not even relevant. (And, indeed, Clouser's own 'limiting idea' exception clearly shows that whether we share properties with God in this unclear ontological sense is simply irrelevant to whether we can name God.)
Friday, August 26, 2005
Various
* Last night I happened to be near Harbourfront and was able to catch a bit of the National Ballet of Canada doing a free sample performance to promote their upcoming season. Unfortunately, I missed about two-thirds of it, but they had an excellent performance of Theme and Variations (choreography by Balanchine and music by Tchaikovsky). There really needs to be more free and low-cost ballet of this sort; ballet has a lot of potential appeal (more than one would think) but how often is ballet really made accessible (local and relatively inexpensive) to ordinary people? Not often. That's a ticket for eventual disaster, I think, a problem that plagues opera, as well. Maintaining a fine art requires casting a wide net to find the sort of people in all walks of life who might be interested in it if they actually had a chance to see it in person. When an art begins to be of interest only to the relatively wealthy, as a sign of luxury, it has begun to die.
* Thanks to everyone who contributed to the science fiction discussion; it was quite fun, and my reading list has bulged with science fiction works that were highly recommended that I had never read before (some of which I had never even heard of before). I've already begun to read some of them; Steven Riddle had recommended some of the works of James Blish; I had heard of him, I think but I had never read him. Having read Black Easter and A Case for Conscience in the past few days, I'm hooked. I'm still looking for The Day after Judgment; in the meantime I'll be reading They Shall Have the Stars. I also went back and re-read some Stapledon, and I confess I'm wavering on whether I really should have chosen Sirius over Odd John. The reasons I gave for choosing Odd John still stand, but Sirius is such a good story. Putting aside my doubts about that, when I look over the list in light of the comments, I think I chose very well. Here and there it was entirely a judgment call, but I think these were for the most part cases that would be a judgment call for everyone (e.g. Verne). The most controversial choices I made, I think, were the particular selections for Heinlein and Dick -- both authors deserve the mention, but I'm a bit weak on both. The big weakness for the list is that it virtually stops at 1969: from 1970 to the present I have only one work (Ender's Game). It's interesting to consider how the list might change if the focus were shifted from novels to short stories; several commenters recommended very good short story anthologies, and from my list Miller and Sturgeon are actually brilliant short story writers who each managed to put out one stunningly good novel. A number of authors would drop off completely, while a number of authors we don't normally classify as SF (Jack London, for instance, who wrote several interesting short stories in the genre) might come up for consideration.
* Additional Links: Fr. Jim Tucker has a good post up in which he clarifies what is actually meant by a vow of celibacy (it's not quite what you probably think it is).
"Deeper Thought" considers how normative the experience of the early church should be for Evangelicals (HT: Jollyblogger).
The Jollyblogger discusses Reformed Eschatology, always an interesting topic. Despite finding it interesting, I always approach these distinctions as an outsider; I'm frankly a moralist in my interpretation of the book of Revelation. That is, while I don't deny that there's likely to be more to it than this, I think an interpretation of Revelation has gone wrong if it is not primarily (even overwhelmingly) about how we are to live our lives now. Also, an approach to Revelation that I wish were more common is that of Austin Farrer (The Glass of Vision; A Rebirth of Images; The Revelation of St. John the Divine). But I liked this post quite a bit.
At "Thinking Deeply" there is an interesting post arguing against Hick's religious pluralism.
* From H. Rider Haggard's She:
* Thanks to everyone who contributed to the science fiction discussion; it was quite fun, and my reading list has bulged with science fiction works that were highly recommended that I had never read before (some of which I had never even heard of before). I've already begun to read some of them; Steven Riddle had recommended some of the works of James Blish; I had heard of him, I think but I had never read him. Having read Black Easter and A Case for Conscience in the past few days, I'm hooked. I'm still looking for The Day after Judgment; in the meantime I'll be reading They Shall Have the Stars. I also went back and re-read some Stapledon, and I confess I'm wavering on whether I really should have chosen Sirius over Odd John. The reasons I gave for choosing Odd John still stand, but Sirius is such a good story. Putting aside my doubts about that, when I look over the list in light of the comments, I think I chose very well. Here and there it was entirely a judgment call, but I think these were for the most part cases that would be a judgment call for everyone (e.g. Verne). The most controversial choices I made, I think, were the particular selections for Heinlein and Dick -- both authors deserve the mention, but I'm a bit weak on both. The big weakness for the list is that it virtually stops at 1969: from 1970 to the present I have only one work (Ender's Game). It's interesting to consider how the list might change if the focus were shifted from novels to short stories; several commenters recommended very good short story anthologies, and from my list Miller and Sturgeon are actually brilliant short story writers who each managed to put out one stunningly good novel. A number of authors would drop off completely, while a number of authors we don't normally classify as SF (Jack London, for instance, who wrote several interesting short stories in the genre) might come up for consideration.
* Additional Links: Fr. Jim Tucker has a good post up in which he clarifies what is actually meant by a vow of celibacy (it's not quite what you probably think it is).
"Deeper Thought" considers how normative the experience of the early church should be for Evangelicals (HT: Jollyblogger).
The Jollyblogger discusses Reformed Eschatology, always an interesting topic. Despite finding it interesting, I always approach these distinctions as an outsider; I'm frankly a moralist in my interpretation of the book of Revelation. That is, while I don't deny that there's likely to be more to it than this, I think an interpretation of Revelation has gone wrong if it is not primarily (even overwhelmingly) about how we are to live our lives now. Also, an approach to Revelation that I wish were more common is that of Austin Farrer (The Glass of Vision; A Rebirth of Images; The Revelation of St. John the Divine). But I liked this post quite a bit.
At "Thinking Deeply" there is an interesting post arguing against Hick's religious pluralism.
* From H. Rider Haggard's She:
"Is there no man that will draw my veil and look upon my face, for it is very fair? Unto him who draws my veil shall I be, and peace will I give him, and sweet children of knowledge and good works."
And a voice cried, "Though all those who seek after thee desire thee, behold! Virgin art thou, and Virgin shalt thou go till Time be done. No man is there born of woman who may draw thy veil and live, nor shall be. By Death only can thy veil be drawn, oh Truth!"
And Truth stretched out her arms and wept, because those who sought her might not find her, nor look upon her face to face.
"Thou seest," said Ayesha, when she had finished translating, "Truth was the Goddess of the people of old Kôr, and to her they built their shrines, and her they sought; knowing that they should never find, still sought they."
"And so," I added sadly, "do men seek to this very hour, but they do not find out; and, as this Scripture saith, nor shall they; for in Death only is Truth found."
Poem Drafts
Peniel
at some d i s t a n t Peniel face to face
dimmed by shadows to our present sight
we perhaps shall come to see
after dark and muttered wrestlings
the riddle faith has heard
our syntax and letters reordering
with the WORD's splendor's shining
to lay bare the Enigma of Ages
A Bit of Revolt
Who shall say choirs did not sing
when Thomas overtopped a king,
or that Julian's visions do not prove
the power of the Cross to move?
Or yet that blessed Steno's sight
was not sparked by glory's light,
or that there was no work divine
in the vivid vision of the sign
that moved an Empire to believe?
But some will say they are deceived,
that all the patient, pious crowds
are seeing shapes in moving clouds,
and that went forth a hysteric girl
from Avila to save the world,
or a schizophrenic to inspire
all of France to one desire,
and boasting their love of evidence
mock the one good inference.
Triratna
Three are the Jewels that shine in my Crown;
First is the Word leaping from Heaven,
Doctrine is first, the Sword of two edges;
He who has seen it discovers all things!
One is the Crown that shines full of stars:
The Anointed of God is the Doctrine of Heaven.
Three are the Jewels that shine in my Crown;
Next is the Teacher teaching new ways,
Enlightening all men who enter the world,
Showing salvation to children of men!
One is the Crown that shines full of stars:
The Anointed of God is the true Son of Man.
Three are the Jewels that shine in my Crown;
Third is the Church, in labor for all,
The Body that prays with the Spirit Most Holy,
The Temple, the Truth, the Life, and the Way!
One is the Crown that shines full of stars:
The Anointed of God is the Communion of Heaven.
at some d i s t a n t Peniel face to face
dimmed by shadows to our present sight
we perhaps shall come to see
after dark and muttered wrestlings
the riddle faith has heard
our syntax and letters reordering
with the WORD's splendor's shining
to lay bare the Enigma of Ages
A Bit of Revolt
Who shall say choirs did not sing
when Thomas overtopped a king,
or that Julian's visions do not prove
the power of the Cross to move?
Or yet that blessed Steno's sight
was not sparked by glory's light,
or that there was no work divine
in the vivid vision of the sign
that moved an Empire to believe?
But some will say they are deceived,
that all the patient, pious crowds
are seeing shapes in moving clouds,
and that went forth a hysteric girl
from Avila to save the world,
or a schizophrenic to inspire
all of France to one desire,
and boasting their love of evidence
mock the one good inference.
Triratna
Three are the Jewels that shine in my Crown;
First is the Word leaping from Heaven,
Doctrine is first, the Sword of two edges;
He who has seen it discovers all things!
One is the Crown that shines full of stars:
The Anointed of God is the Doctrine of Heaven.
Three are the Jewels that shine in my Crown;
Next is the Teacher teaching new ways,
Enlightening all men who enter the world,
Showing salvation to children of men!
One is the Crown that shines full of stars:
The Anointed of God is the true Son of Man.
Three are the Jewels that shine in my Crown;
Third is the Church, in labor for all,
The Body that prays with the Spirit Most Holy,
The Temple, the Truth, the Life, and the Way!
One is the Crown that shines full of stars:
The Anointed of God is the Communion of Heaven.
Dashed Off
As I've said before, I'm something of a compulsive note-jotter. Here is a random selection of some of my recent jottings.
"The proper sphere of philosophy, no less than of art, is the whole civilised public. This is the body in which it is to circulate, and to which its action must be applied." Schlegel Philosophy of Language, lecture 1
Fools may more quickly deny than any sage can prove.
"To see the invisible benefactor face to face is the most ardent desire of love." Feuerbach
The historian holds a mirror to the scientist and says, Now you may see yourself.
Father Brown & remorse beforehand
continuous approximation to a perpetual peace
a science fiction story about mnemic causation (perhaps Borges-like)
ancien regime -> nouveaux riches; old aristocracy -> new money; counterculture chic -> yuppie popularity
'What ought to be' makes no sense unless there is something making it so that it is what ought to be.
The assent of faith is not intrinsically founded on congeries of probabilities.
A sign is a motive of credibility.
Museums falsify; but they introduce, & that, done well, redeems it all.
Osiander is right -- if we can't attain to true causes.
philosophari in Maria
German Idealism was neo-Joachimist.
As a regulative principle it is worthwhile to treat peace as the norm and war as the exception.
Qui facit veritatem venit ad lucem.
Compassion requires an infrastructure.
the sentiment of rationality (the feeling of scurity from cognitive dissonance)
philosophical millenarianism (Kant)
virtues -> offices -> cases
Collective responsibility is a form of personal responsibility; it is not responsiblity of a group as such but of persons insofar as they are united in a group. (Trying to pin responsibility on a group w/o trying to understand how it is a matter of responsiblity for persons-in-a-group is, as HD Lewis says, barbarous.)
->something similar must be said of solidarity
-> We cannot, as a matter of fact, avoid holding people collectively responsible in some way; the only question is whether we will do so rationally and justly.
"But even the power of vision, though the eyes be now healed, has not force to turn them to the light, unless these three things abide. Faith, whereby the soul believes that thing, to which she is asked to turn her gaze, is of such sort, that being seen it will give beatitude; hope, whereby the mind judges that if she looks attentively, she will see; charity, whereby she desires to see and be filled with enjoyment of the sight." Augustine Solil. 1.12
"The proper sphere of philosophy, no less than of art, is the whole civilised public. This is the body in which it is to circulate, and to which its action must be applied." Schlegel Philosophy of Language, lecture 1
Fools may more quickly deny than any sage can prove.
"To see the invisible benefactor face to face is the most ardent desire of love." Feuerbach
The historian holds a mirror to the scientist and says, Now you may see yourself.
Father Brown & remorse beforehand
continuous approximation to a perpetual peace
a science fiction story about mnemic causation (perhaps Borges-like)
ancien regime -> nouveaux riches; old aristocracy -> new money; counterculture chic -> yuppie popularity
'What ought to be' makes no sense unless there is something making it so that it is what ought to be.
The assent of faith is not intrinsically founded on congeries of probabilities.
A sign is a motive of credibility.
Museums falsify; but they introduce, & that, done well, redeems it all.
Osiander is right -- if we can't attain to true causes.
philosophari in Maria
German Idealism was neo-Joachimist.
As a regulative principle it is worthwhile to treat peace as the norm and war as the exception.
Qui facit veritatem venit ad lucem.
Compassion requires an infrastructure.
the sentiment of rationality (the feeling of scurity from cognitive dissonance)
philosophical millenarianism (Kant)
virtues -> offices -> cases
Collective responsibility is a form of personal responsibility; it is not responsiblity of a group as such but of persons insofar as they are united in a group. (Trying to pin responsibility on a group w/o trying to understand how it is a matter of responsiblity for persons-in-a-group is, as HD Lewis says, barbarous.)
->something similar must be said of solidarity
-> We cannot, as a matter of fact, avoid holding people collectively responsible in some way; the only question is whether we will do so rationally and justly.
"But even the power of vision, though the eyes be now healed, has not force to turn them to the light, unless these three things abide. Faith, whereby the soul believes that thing, to which she is asked to turn her gaze, is of such sort, that being seen it will give beatitude; hope, whereby the mind judges that if she looks attentively, she will see; charity, whereby she desires to see and be filled with enjoyment of the sight." Augustine Solil. 1.12
Link to Think
* An article on Thomas More at NRO. This article touched off some discussion in "The Corner" here, here, here, here, here, and here.
* The Maverick Philosopher discusses the definition of naturalism in Quentin Smith's Metaphilosophy of Naturalism paper.
* The Salisbury Project (HT: E^2)
* A good summary at the Christianity Today weblog on the reasons why Pat Robertson is able to ignore criticism. He has managed to give himself the superpower of indestructibility. (I honestly wouldn't have any problem with Robertson myself if he would stop always trying to wiggle out of having to acknowledge his mistakes.) Caleb also has an interesting discussion of Robertson. [In fairness, Robertson has issued an apology for the comment about assassinating Hugo Chavez. I haven't yet been able to figure out the point of giving Bonhoeffer (who conspired to assassinate Hitler) as an example (of waging war against one person? Of legitimate assassination attempts? I don't know). The clarification is not very clear, but he does apologize for the statement.]
* A small controversy has erupted over the pope's granting of special indulgences to those participating in World Youth Day. I'm not sure I see the problem. Contrary to the common perception, indulgences are remissions of consequences for sin, not remissions of sin; the idea is that even when sin is forgiven, we have to deal with its consequences, and indulgences are given as ways of eliminating some kinds of consequences. Part of genuine repentance is reformation of behavior, and the point of indulgences is to take into account special efforts to reform one's behavior. Ultimately, the real issue is not indulgences but Purgatory; given Purgatory, indulgences make considerable sense as one more means whereby God graciously shows mercy to the human race. It is not surprising that people who don't believe in Purgatory would look askance at indulgences (although their real point of disagreement is with the doctrine of Purgatory), but Catholics certainly have no reason to do the same. For more information on indulgences, see Jimmy Akin's useful article summarizing the Catholic theology of indulgences. Luther's 95 theses is the locus for informed Protestant criticism of indulgences; Luther gets the basic characterization of indulgences right, but rejects the idea that the Pope's ability to remit penalties by indulgences can extend outside canonical punishment (i.e., punishment required by canon law). And that's the only reasonable basis even for Protestant criticism of the doctrine; too many people who think they are following Luther are really just massively bungling. Luther also criticizes mischaracterizations of indulgences, of course; but that's not a point of disagreement between Luther and Rome. Some of Luther's theses are such that Rome would officially have agreed with them even in Luther's day -- they deal not with the theology of indulgences but with deviations from it. Some, on the other hand, are with the theology of indulgences itself. I wish people would make more of an effort to get this sort of thing; matters are difficult enough without making them worse by refusing to characterize the problem correctly.
* On a similar but unrelated note, Miriam Burnstein discusses 18th & 19th century Catholic-Protestant relations at "Cliopatria".
* The Maverick Philosopher discusses the definition of naturalism in Quentin Smith's Metaphilosophy of Naturalism paper.
* The Salisbury Project (HT: E^2)
* A good summary at the Christianity Today weblog on the reasons why Pat Robertson is able to ignore criticism. He has managed to give himself the superpower of indestructibility. (I honestly wouldn't have any problem with Robertson myself if he would stop always trying to wiggle out of having to acknowledge his mistakes.) Caleb also has an interesting discussion of Robertson. [In fairness, Robertson has issued an apology for the comment about assassinating Hugo Chavez. I haven't yet been able to figure out the point of giving Bonhoeffer (who conspired to assassinate Hitler) as an example (of waging war against one person? Of legitimate assassination attempts? I don't know). The clarification is not very clear, but he does apologize for the statement.]
* A small controversy has erupted over the pope's granting of special indulgences to those participating in World Youth Day. I'm not sure I see the problem. Contrary to the common perception, indulgences are remissions of consequences for sin, not remissions of sin; the idea is that even when sin is forgiven, we have to deal with its consequences, and indulgences are given as ways of eliminating some kinds of consequences. Part of genuine repentance is reformation of behavior, and the point of indulgences is to take into account special efforts to reform one's behavior. Ultimately, the real issue is not indulgences but Purgatory; given Purgatory, indulgences make considerable sense as one more means whereby God graciously shows mercy to the human race. It is not surprising that people who don't believe in Purgatory would look askance at indulgences (although their real point of disagreement is with the doctrine of Purgatory), but Catholics certainly have no reason to do the same. For more information on indulgences, see Jimmy Akin's useful article summarizing the Catholic theology of indulgences. Luther's 95 theses is the locus for informed Protestant criticism of indulgences; Luther gets the basic characterization of indulgences right, but rejects the idea that the Pope's ability to remit penalties by indulgences can extend outside canonical punishment (i.e., punishment required by canon law). And that's the only reasonable basis even for Protestant criticism of the doctrine; too many people who think they are following Luther are really just massively bungling. Luther also criticizes mischaracterizations of indulgences, of course; but that's not a point of disagreement between Luther and Rome. Some of Luther's theses are such that Rome would officially have agreed with them even in Luther's day -- they deal not with the theology of indulgences but with deviations from it. Some, on the other hand, are with the theology of indulgences itself. I wish people would make more of an effort to get this sort of thing; matters are difficult enough without making them worse by refusing to characterize the problem correctly.
* On a similar but unrelated note, Miriam Burnstein discusses 18th & 19th century Catholic-Protestant relations at "Cliopatria".
Thursday, August 25, 2005
Aquinas on Ideas in God (I)
I'm doing something on divine ideas in Malebranche and the scholastics, so I thought I'd practice my patchy Latin a bit by translating what Aquinas says on the matter. The following is ST 1.15.1. The Latin is here; the Dominican Fathers translation is here; Freddoso's translation is here (PDF). As always, this translation is rough.
***
After consideration of God's knowledge, it remains to consider ideas. And on this three things are asked. First, if there are ideas. Second, whether they are many or only one. Third, whether there are ideas of all things known by God.
We proceed to the first in this way.
[1] It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 7) that God does not know a thing according to an idea. But ideas are not posited for anything but to be that throuch which a thing is known. Therefore there are not ideas.
[2] Further, God knows all things in Himself, as is said above. But He does not know Himself by idea. Therefore nothing else either.
[3] Further, an idea is posited as a principle of knowing and acting. But the divine esence suffices the principle of knowing and acting on all things. Therefore it is not necessary to posit ideas.
But to the contrary is what Augustine says (Quaest. LXXXIII), "Such is the power constituting ideas, that, unless they are understood, nobody is able to be wise."
I respond that it must be said that it is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek 'idea' is called 'form' in Latin; hence by 'ideas' is understood the forms of all things, existing apart from things themselves. But the form of anything existing apart from it can be for two things: Either as being the exemplar of the thing of which it is called the form, or as the principle of knowing it [principium cognitionis ipsius], according to which the form of the knowable is said to be in the knower. In either way it is necessary to posit ideas, which is clear in this way: It is necesary for the form to be the end of any generation whatsoever in all thinsg that are not generated by chance [a casu]. But an agent does not act according to a form, save inasmuch as a similitude of the form is in him, which may occur in two ways [quod quidem contingit dupliciter]. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to natural being, as in those that act by nature, as when man generates man and fire fire; in some it is instead according to intelligible being, as in those that act by understanding [per intellectum], as when the similitude of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this can be called the idea of the house, because the artificer intends to assimilate the house to the form which the mind conceives. Since, therefore, the world is not made by chance [casu], but is made by God through active understanding [per intellectum agente], as is seen below, it is necessary that there be in the divine mind forms, to the likeness of which the world is made. In this consists the nature [ratio] of an idea.
Therefore to the first it must be said that God does not understand the thing according to an idea existing outside himself. Thus Aristotle refutes the opinion of Plato on ideas, who posited them as existing per se, not in the understanding.
To the second it must be said that, although God by essence knows Himself and all things, His essence is the operative principle of other things, but not Himself, and it therefore has the nature of an idea with respect to others, but not with respect to God Himself.
To the third it must be said that God according to His essence is the similitude of all things. Hence an idea in God is nothing other than the essence of God.
***
After consideration of God's knowledge, it remains to consider ideas. And on this three things are asked. First, if there are ideas. Second, whether they are many or only one. Third, whether there are ideas of all things known by God.
We proceed to the first in this way.
[1] It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 7) that God does not know a thing according to an idea. But ideas are not posited for anything but to be that throuch which a thing is known. Therefore there are not ideas.
[2] Further, God knows all things in Himself, as is said above. But He does not know Himself by idea. Therefore nothing else either.
[3] Further, an idea is posited as a principle of knowing and acting. But the divine esence suffices the principle of knowing and acting on all things. Therefore it is not necessary to posit ideas.
But to the contrary is what Augustine says (Quaest. LXXXIII), "Such is the power constituting ideas, that, unless they are understood, nobody is able to be wise."
I respond that it must be said that it is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek 'idea' is called 'form' in Latin; hence by 'ideas' is understood the forms of all things, existing apart from things themselves. But the form of anything existing apart from it can be for two things: Either as being the exemplar of the thing of which it is called the form, or as the principle of knowing it [principium cognitionis ipsius], according to which the form of the knowable is said to be in the knower. In either way it is necessary to posit ideas, which is clear in this way: It is necesary for the form to be the end of any generation whatsoever in all thinsg that are not generated by chance [a casu]. But an agent does not act according to a form, save inasmuch as a similitude of the form is in him, which may occur in two ways [quod quidem contingit dupliciter]. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to natural being, as in those that act by nature, as when man generates man and fire fire; in some it is instead according to intelligible being, as in those that act by understanding [per intellectum], as when the similitude of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this can be called the idea of the house, because the artificer intends to assimilate the house to the form which the mind conceives. Since, therefore, the world is not made by chance [casu], but is made by God through active understanding [per intellectum agente], as is seen below, it is necessary that there be in the divine mind forms, to the likeness of which the world is made. In this consists the nature [ratio] of an idea.
Therefore to the first it must be said that God does not understand the thing according to an idea existing outside himself. Thus Aristotle refutes the opinion of Plato on ideas, who posited them as existing per se, not in the understanding.
To the second it must be said that, although God by essence knows Himself and all things, His essence is the operative principle of other things, but not Himself, and it therefore has the nature of an idea with respect to others, but not with respect to God Himself.
To the third it must be said that God according to His essence is the similitude of all things. Hence an idea in God is nothing other than the essence of God.
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