Saturday, August 24, 2024

Beings of Reason (Re-Post)

 A re-post from 2022.

*****

 An ens rationis or 'being of reason' is the traditional name for what is conceived on the model of a being but cannot actually exist as such. An obvious example of such a being of reason is a hole. Holes are things we conceived on the model of beings -- we count them as if they were beings, we can talk about them interacting as if they were beings -- but a hole, as such, is not an actually existing thing. The example of a hole gives us an important aspect of the concept that often throws people off. To say that something is a being of reason is not to say that it is illusory or simply nonexistent; quite the contrary, we treat beings of reason as existing, and we need to do so. Whether or not there is a hole in your roof is not entirely in the mind, nor is the hole an illusion, nor can it be dismissed as just nonexistent at all. You can point to holes. You can use holes. You can manipulate holes. They change the way actually existing things work. But you can also understand me entirely if I say that the hole in your roof is real but that a hole is not an actually existing thing.

Another example would be a crack. You can point to cracks, you can manipulate cracks, you can use cracks to perform some activity. There is even a branch of physics that studies the dynamics of cracks; as it happens, the physics of the motion of the leading edge of a crack in a substance is very similar to the physics of the motion of particles through a medium. But you can also make perfect sense of saying that a crack just doesn't and can't exist in the same way that the medium in which it is found exists.

Since beings of reason are conceived on the model of beings, some kind of being has to be the start of any conception of being of reason we might have. What makes these conceptions different from conceptions of the beings themselves is that beings of reason are organized by negations and rational relations. If I say, "There is a hole in the wall," I conceive the hole on the model of a section of wall, but instead of simply doing so (which would be incorrect, since a hole in a wall is not the substance of the wall), I conceived it under a negation: a section of the wall is not there, the hole is the not-section. In addition, we can think of the hole by relation to both the surrounding wall and to things that can pass through it -- it's not a bare lack-of-section-of-wall, but a lack-of-section-of-wall-such-that-through-it-something-can-pass. The wall really can have a hole in it, but the hole itself is identifiable only by negation of something (part of the wall) and by relation to other things (like the rest of the wall and moving objects).

Shadows are another example of how this works. A shadow is conceived as a shadow by relation to something -- a shadow is a shadow of something -- and by negation -- of the surrounding light. Actually, a shadow is conceived in relation to three different things -- a light source, a light-blocker, and a surface to which the shadow is attributed. A shadow is thus a negation on a surface of light from a light source due to something that intervenes between the light source and the surface. But we can point to shadows, and we can use them (as when find shade), and we can manipulate them (as when we do shadow-puppets). They are in some sense real, and you cannot develop an accurate understanding of the world without understanding them to be in some sense real. But they are beings of reason, things conceived with negations and relations on the model of beings that nonetheless cannot be actual things existing in their own right.

This is easily missed because as a matter of technical terms, the opposite of 'being of reason' is 'real being'; but the 'real' here means 'as a thing in its own right', and not real in a more expansive sense. Beings of reason are broadly real, but they are not things in their own right -- indeed, they couldn't be, because they always inherently involve negations of and relations to other things. At the level of objects of understanding, however, there is no fundamental difference between beings of reason and real beings. As noted above, we can do a physics of particle trajectories or a physics of crack movements in much the same way; that particles (understood a certain way) are real beings and leading edges of cracks are beings of reason doesn't actually affect much, beyond the fact that a leading edge of a crack can only ever be understood in terms of negations and relations. A hole or a center of gravity is a being of reason, but it has objective reality. 

In fact, beings of reason end up being quite important because a vast portion of our understanding of the world is based on them. Indeed, I think one can argue that physicists, for instance, almost exclusively study beings of reason. This does not imply idealism or anything like it; it mostly just indicates that physicists spend a lot of their investigations studying things wholly insofar as they are related to other things. And physicists are not particularly shy about use of beings of reasons; they will explain behavior of actual systems by idealized models that can't exist as such in the actual world, for instance. The ideal structures that are doing the explaining are beings of reason. But physics is in no way unique here. Objective reality is not as straightforward as one might have thought.

Sonnet Variations XXIV

 Shakespearean Variation: Sonnet 87

Farewell! thou art too dear for my possessing,
insurance costs I cannot estimate;
but 'till the day of my heart's releasing
I will be paying debts determinate.
You were never one for freely granting,
nor gracing those with great deeds deserving;
instead you leave all in endless wanting,
never from your own interests swerving.
Perhaps I am better for the knowing;
we all may learn from foolish mistaking;
yet this feels like ruin, not like growing,
a lesson too costly in the making.
-- But hope of return my thoughts still flatter,
and if you did, I would, debts no matter.

Friday, August 23, 2024

Extraordinary Mortifications

 Today is the feast of St. Rose of Lima, a Third Order Dominican who was the first person from the Americas to be canonized. She was born Isabel Flores de Oliva in Lima, in the Viceroyalty of Peru, in 1586. She was known most of her life, however, by her nickname, 'Rosa', which she also took as her confirmation name.

The General Calendar has many, many saints, and it is inevitable that patterns arise among them allowing us to give some loose classification to them; obviously there are Martyrs, Virgins, Doctors, and Widows, which are all old categories that go back pretty much to the beginning of sanctoral commemoration. But there are other categories that noticeably begin to show up as history has proceeded. St. Rose is often unsettling to many today, because of the class of saint to which she belongs. She is a saint whose life was a life of what is called Extraordinary Mortification. From a very early age, and consistently through her entire life, she engaged in extreme, and sometimes life-threatening ascetic disciplines. As a girl, she began fasting three times a week and stopped eating meat. She was extremely pretty, and once, having overheard people commenting on the fact, she cut off her hair and rubbed her face with pepper juice until it blistered. For long periods she would only sleep two hours a night, spending the rest of the night in prayer. She had a crown made with spikes that would bite into the flesh of her head. She died in 1617, thirty-one years of age, after a long illness probably in part caused by malnutrition from her fasting practices.

There are a number of saints in the calendar who practiced Extraordinary Mortification, which is interesting in and of itself, because the Catholic Church discourages such practices, and always has. Ascetic practices are good insofar as they aid in cultivation of virtue, but merely increasing the intensity of them does little toward that end, and most Catholic saints who were spiritual directors and advisors have counseled moderation when it comes to them. This goes back to Christ, who criticized the Pharisees for substituting strict practices in place of substantively good actions. And there have been many who have practiced Extraordinary Mortifications who have been condemned for it rather than being placed on the calendar of saints. And yet saints like Rose of Lima are found scattered throughout the calendar.

It is easy to think of the calendar of saints as a list of people to admire and imitate, and this is not entirely wrong, but we naturally tend to understand this in a way that certainly is wrong. Any serious look at the lives of saints will uncover many who would have been utterly exasperating to deal with, and whose lives are simply not of a kind that one would ever choose to hold them up for direct imitation. In reality, people don't end up commemorated at the altar because we like them, or even because we want to be like them. They are commemorated because their lives are lives of manifest victories in seeking to follow Christ. Some of the saints were quite flawed and rough-and-tumble; some were failures, whose lives were nothing but failure; some chose very strange hills to die on; some almost seem to have fallen into sainthood by sheer accident of happening to do one right thing at one right time; some spent their entire lives making life harder for other saints; some seem frankly to have been completely lacking in basic common sense. None of this is admirable or imitable, as such. To be sure, we like our saints flawed, for the same reasons we like heroes in stories to have flaws, but this is irrelevant to the calendar of saints, beyond perhaps capturing the old adage that it takes all kinds to make a Heaven. The one thing all the saints of the calendar have in common is that they wholeheartedly sought to follow Christ, and in some public and obvious way greatly succeeded. We do not put the saints on the calendar because we admire them and want to imitate them. They end up on the calendar because they were publicly victorious; we give them credit for it and seek their intercession, and it is the victoriousness in following Christ that we admire and seek to imitate, not the human, and sometimes all too human, details of it.

Why are there saints like St. Rosa of Lima on the calendar? She is not purely there for Extraordinary Mortification -- she worked extensively with the poor for about a decade, for instance. But there's no doubt whatsoever that Extraordinary Mortification is one of the reasons for it. But she practiced Extraordinary Mortification in such a way as is appropriate to a saint -- however extreme she was at it, she always tried to do it for Christ, and she succeeded at that. That would be enough of an answer. But I think we can also say that it is salutary for such saints to be on the calendar. We all have to engage in some kinds of ascetic practice, some kinds of special, deliberate self-discipline, because developing virtue and cultivating a resistance to temptation requires such things. It is often very difficult. But then you look at St. Rose of Lima. You aren't called to Extraordinary Mortification, but the thing about it is, if St. Rose can go to extraordinary extreme, you can certainly go to moderation. The saints who practiced Extraordinary Mortifications show how far we could actually go, and it is they -- more than any other saints -- who make clear to us how small the obstacles are that we ourselves have to face. They are the saints that show us that the things we have to overcome are hills, not mountains. What could possibly show us better that we have only a little hill to climb, one that is well within our power, than someone who chose to climb a mountain that boggles the mind, not out of necessity but because it was there to be climbed? We are not called to be Rosa de Lima; but Rosa de Lima shows us that we can surely by the grace of God rise to anything that our own call may require of us.

We all are inclined to turn goodness into a flat, saccharine sweetness; everyone, including even moral philosophers and theologians, are tempted to that very grave error. The result is that we consistently underestimate the varied nature of the moral life, and the sheer extremes that moral lives often display, and, trying to fit everything into a small, convenient box, we lose our sense of the actual moral capabilities of a human being. You only maintain the latter by seeing the extremes, all of them, the utter boundaries of what we really can do. People don't want to do that because the extremes are often not pretty. But prettiness is not a moral standard. And one of the great virtues of saints like St. Rose is that if you ever start thinking that the life of a saint is a life of prettiness, she is a saint who does not hesitate to bring out the pepper juice, applied blisteringly to her own life, to disabuse you of such a ridiculous and harmful notion.

Sonnet Variations XXIII

 Sonnet Variation: Alfred Austin's "Here, Where the Vine and Fig Bask Hand in Hand"

Here, where the vine and fig bask hand in hand
and luxury vines across the stone wall,
where rain of a sudden makes its fall
and nothing in earth or heaven is bland,
the days are self-building, and are not planned,
and as the bright insects here and there crawl,
we here and there move in our ways withal
across the face of the verdant land.
The sun peeks through trees in its morning rise,
no cloud to mar the cerulean blue,
no crowd to block out the light from my eyes,
yet none is more bright than brightness of you.
-- With you and the sun to lighten my skies,
my morn is as fresh as new-fallen dew.

Thursday, August 22, 2024

Links of Note

 * Elizabeth Jackson, Pascal's Wager for Christianity (PDF)

* Stephen D'Arcy, Frege's Ambiguous Legacy, a guest post at "Daily Nous"

* Leona Mollica, The Logic of Action and Control (PDF)

* Jason T. Eberl, Defining and Determining Human Death, at "APABlog"

* Adam Hogan, Leibniz Did Not State Leibniz's Law (PDF)

* Cynthia L. Haven, C. S. Lewis's advice to writers, at "The Book Haven" (Added Later: link corrected)

* Andreas Brekke Carlsson, Debt and Desert (PDF)

* Connie Goddard, Manual Training for All, at "The Front Porch Republic"

* Chris Dorst & Marc Lange, The Necessity of Accidents (PDF)

* Stella Sandford, Seeing plants anew, at "Aeon"

* Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez, Galileo's Ship and the Relativity Principle (PDF)

* Jonathan Marc Gribetz, The Origins of Anti-Zionism, at "Tablet"

* Miguel García-Valdecasas & Terrence W. Deacon, Origins of Biological Teleology: How Constraints Represent Ends (PDF)

Sonnet Variations XXII

 Shakespearean Variation: Sonnet 53

What is your substance, whereof are you made,
that by magnetic force I to you tend?
With what subtle fluid cast you a shade
that I by my heart from your heart lend,
not by simulacrum or counterfeit,
but truly something that is wholly you?
As the wax by the signet ring is set,
my form by your form is informed a-new.
Nor does its shape fade by day or by year,
but forever something of you does show,
and a hundred years hence will still appear,
as in the soul appear the things we know.
-- Whatever the way, I take from you part
and carry forever you in my heart.

Wednesday, August 21, 2024

Sonnet Variations XXI

 Shakespearean Variation: Sonnet 38

How can my Muse want subject to invent
when words themselves burst up in nearly-verse?
Though some are poor, yet some are excellent;
some excellences need me to rehearse,
but some like sudden breezes come to me.
Yet there are glories hidden to the sight,
just like the spirit hidden inside thee,
and poetry is tasked with bringing light
to things of purer depths and higher worth.
Thus, Muses, words I lift to invocate;
let gates of heaven, flooding, issue forth
with graces lasting beyond ev'ry date.
-- And, as for me, my soul shall spend its days
in giving to each glory rightful praise.