Butler's Influence on Newman

I found this interesting inasmuch as it shows the strong influence of Butler and 18th-century issues well into the 19th-century. From Apologia Pro Vita Sua ("History of My Religious Opinions up to 1833"):

It was about this date [1823], I suppose, that I read Bishop Butler's Analogy; the study of which has been to so many, as it was to me, an era in their religious opinions. Its inculcation of a visible Church, the oracle of truth and a pattern of sanctity, of the duties of external religion, and of the historical character Revelation, are characteristics of this great work which strike the reader at once; for myself, if I may attempt to determine what I most gained from it, it lay in two points, which I shall have an opportunity of dwelling on in the sequel; they are the underlying principles of a great portion of my teaching. First, the very idea of an analogy between separate works of God leads to the conclusion that the system which is of less importance is economically or sacramentally connected with the more momentous, and of this conclusion the theory, to which I was inclined as a boy, viz. the unreality of material phenomena, is an ultimate resolution. At this time I did not make the distinction between matter itself and its phenomena, which is so necessary and so obvious in discussing the subject. Secondly, Butler's doctrine that Probability is the guide of life, led me, at least under the teaching to which a few years later I was introduced, to the question of the logical cogency of Faith, on which I have written so much. Thus to Butler I trace those two principles of my teaching, which have led to a charge against me both of fancifulness and of scepticism.

The last sentence, I think, is a sort of defensive argument. The Apologia Pro Vita Sua is an apology in the old sense, i.e., a defense; and by tracing his view to Butler, certainly someone that no one could reasonably consider either fanciful or skeptical, he effectively defangs these charges against himself.

Later, in discussing Keble's The Christian Year, which had an immense influence on the religious atmosphere of the time, he says,

Butler teaches us that probability is the guide of life. The danger of this doctrine, in the case of many minds, is, its tendency to destroy in them absolute certainty, leading them to consider every conclusion a doubtful, and resolving truth into an opinion, which it is safe to obey or to profess, but not possible to embrace with full internal assent. If this were to be allowed, then the celebrated saying, "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul!" would be the highest measure of devotion:--but who can really pray to a Being, about whose existence he is seriously in doubt?

This problem certainly who cannot be laid at the door of Butler, who insists that probability is only one consideration among many; but Newman seems clearly to recognize that this is not a Butlerian problem, but a problem that has arisen "in the case of many minds" when they have taken up emphasizing probability as the guide of life.

What is interesting, however, is how Newman goes on to fuse Butler with Keble:

I considered that Mr. Keble met this difficulty by ascribing the firmness of assent which we give to religious doctrine, not to the probabilities which introduced it, but to the living power of faith and love which accepted it. In matters of religion, he seemed to say, it is not merely probability which makes us intellectually certain, but probability as it is put to account by faith and love. It is faith and love which give to probability a force which it has not in itself. Faith and love are directed towards an Object; in the vision of that Object they live; it is that Object, received in faith and love, which renders it reasonable to take probability as sufficent for internal conviction. Thus the argument about Probability, in the matter of religion, became an argument from Personality, which in fact is one form of the argument from Authority.

This move, if it could be made, would be an immensely important one; but Newman recognized that there were unresolved issues brought up by it (as he says, "It was beautiful and religious, but it did not even profess to be logical"), so he began to try to work it out more rigorously in his University Sermons, Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles, and Essay on Development of Doctrine, in other words, the major works of his late Anglican period that led up to his conversion to Catholicism. Although he doesn't say so here, this line of thought still seems to me to be prominent in his Catholic period, e.g., in the brilliant Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. (I hope at some point in the future to look at this work and the critique of it in H. H. Price's interesting Gifford Lectures, Belief, and put up thoughts on it on this weblog.)

Logres XI

 continuing Book II

Chapter 4

After the end of the tournament, Epiphany Eve having arrived, there gathered together all the great men of from around about, whether of the lay orders of knight and king or the holy orders of priest and bishop, for a trial of the sword. After the singing of Te Deum Laudamus, many barons and lords tried their hand, and all failed, until Arthur stepped up to the sword and drew it easy, giving it over to Bishop Bedwin. Then the house of Sir Ector, the houses of Duke Corneus and Sir Don, the houses of Sir Ulfius and of Sir Brastias, and all their supporters, as well as all the common people, stood with Arthur, but the other lords and barons were in great shock and disbelief, and then in great anger, saying that no one of such low degree was deserving to be king.

"Shall we be overgoverned by a boy of no blood?" they said to each other in wrath. "This is surely some trick."

But Bishop Bedwin said, with great hardness in his voice, "Though he were even a shepherd-boy, younger than his brothers, the Lord might raise him up, and what man is there who could gainsay it? But I shall show you. Arthur, take the sword and return it to the stone."

Arthur did as he was told. The barons and lords again tried to take it from the stone, but found it as fastly bound as it had been. Arthur, however, again drew it easily.

"Will you then be against the Lord's will?" said the bishop to the barons.

The barons and the lords were for the most part not moved, but wary of the influence of Sir Ector and of Duke Corneus, and not wanting to defy the Church directly in the presence of the common people, they said, "Good sir, we are not against the Lord's will, but surely the boy is not old enough yet."

To this, Bishop Bedwin replied, "The one who has chosen him knows who he is." But still the barons demanded that another trial be held at Candlemas. And some of the more clever among them added that by this means the trial could be witnessed by men from more distant lands. This was then agreed, and it was agreed as well that until then, ten knights should guard the sword, so that, day or night, there should always be five guarding it.

After all of this, Sir Don came to Bishop Bedwin and Sir Ector, saying, "We must take great care, or the boy may meet with a mishap that is not a mishap." From that moment on, Sir Kay, Sir Lucan, or Sir Bedivere was with Arthur, no matter the time and no matter the place. The three were the first of the Companions of Arthur.

Thus at Candlemas the trial was held again, with men coming from every part of every realm around. Again the barons and the lords attempted to draw the sword, and again Arthur drew it easily. The prelates and the common folk all shouted acclamation, saying, "Who shall deny that Arthur is the choice of the Lord?" 

But the barons and the lords replied, "Surely we must be sure that there is no better. Let the trial be held again, this time at Pascha, that any man who wishes to try may try it."

Bishop Bedwin said in response, "If we hold a trial yet again at Pascha, will you accept the choice?" And when they affirmed this, he granted their request.

Thus the trial was held again on Easter Eve, and again Arthur alone drew the sword. Bishop Bedwin spoke at length of the sobriety and prudence he found in Arthur. Then the barons and lords consulted among themselves and came to the bishop.

"What impediment to the Lord's choice do you bring this time? Surely the boy should already be crowned," the bishop said.

"We do not impede it at all," said the representatives of the lords, "but you have seen his character and we have not. Thus let him be crowned, if it be the Lord's will, but let it wait until Pentecost, that we may ourselves behold his character, and may also spend the time in prayer."

Thus Bishop Bedwin, having taken counsel with Arthur and Sir Ector, agreed that Arthur's crowning and sacring would be delayed until Pentecost. Then the barons and lords brought fine gifts to Arthur as tokens of good faith; but in reality, they wished to see if he could bought and bribed. However, all that they gave him, Arthur at the advice of Sir Ector gave away. Horses and fine tapestries he gave to knights, and jewels to merchants and their wives, and gold and silver to the poor, and his fame among the common people grew. And indeed, some of the lords and barons were won over by this, either because they themselves received gifts, or because they found him to be a noble young man in heart, or because they did not wish to cross directly one who was increasingly well liked.

Chapter 5

Thus all things continued until Whitsuntide. Again on Whitsun Eve, the sword was tried, and again only Arthur could draw it from the stone. But this time the Bishop Bedwin had ready the crown and the scepter and holy oil. In the view of the people and with the consent of the barons, he knighted Arthur. Then he adorned Sir Arthur with royal vestments, and bringing him before all, he said, "Here is the man God has chosen to be your king. But if any of you have reason why he should not be made king, let him now speak or else hold his peace." But none dared speak.

Then Bishop Bedwin, showing the sword to Sir Arthur, said,  "This is the sword with which you will keep justice in defense of the holy Church and to maintain right and the Christian faith. If you will, here before all the orders of Christendom, swear to God, and to our Lady, Saint Mary, and to Saint Peter and to all the saints, to save and uphold truth and peace in the land, and to use your power to keep justice, come forth and take this sword of your election by God."

Then Sir Arthur and many of the people were greatly affected and wept as Sir Arthur took the sword. He said, "As truly as God is Lord over all, may he grant grace and power to do as you have said." Then he was led to the altar and laid it thereon. Bishop Bedwin crowned and anointed him with the same rite that Bishop Fastidius had used for King Uther Pendragon. Then High Mass was sung, the first Mass of the reign of King Arthur.

When the people left the church, they marveled, because there was nothing where the stone of the sword had been.

Then King Arthur held court, and lords and barons and knights came to give their service. Many complaints were also brought to King Arthur of wrongs that had been done since the death of King Uther Pendragon, for many knights and ladies had been bereft of their lands. The king gave judgment in all such cases, and he became known for his fairness and impartiality. He also created the officers of his household; Sir Kay was made seneschal and steward, Sir Ulfius was made chamberlain, Sir Lucan was made butler, Sir Bedivere was made constable, and Sir Brastias was made warden of the north. Then King Arthur began establishing his magistracy over all the counties and lordships around Londinium, and even into Cambrian lands.

All things went well until the middle of August.

Chapter 6

In the middle of August, King Arthur held a great feast and royal court at Caerleon, and invitations were sent far and wide. There came King Lot of Lothian, King Urien of Rheged and Gore, King Caradoc Strongarm of Stangore, known far and wide as the husband of Queen Tegau Goldenhearted, King Yder the Elder of Scotland, and the young King Anguish of Ireland. There also came a king named Malaguin or Maelgwn, but known more often as the Tall King or the King of a Hundred Knights; he was the king who is known elsewhere to have at first opposed St. Padarn and St. Tydecho, but who eventually gave them lands and became a great supporter to them. And each of these kings came with their knights.

When they were all assembled, King Arthur showered gifts upon them and invited them to a great feast. But the kings, regarding him as being a beardless boy of low birth and not a suitable king for such a realm as Logres, held all that he gave them and all that he did in disdain. They refused his gifts, saying that they came instead to give him gifts, namely, a sharp sword between the neck and the shoulders. Then King Arthur withdrew to a strong tower in Caerleon and they besieged him. With King Arthur were five hundred good men. But with the six kings there were twenty-seven hundred knights.

For fifteen days the six kings besieged King Arthur, for the tower to which he had withdrawn was well victualed. And on the fifteenth day, Merlin came, showing himself with wonders and marvels in the town, so that rumor of him spread like fire all around. Hearing of this, the kings at the advice of King Urien sent for him. They met him at a palace on the banks of the river outside the town, in a tower that overlooked the water and had a view in the distance of the walls of Caerleon.

"What do you think of this beardless boy," asked King Urien, "whom the bishop of Trinovant has crowned a king without our license and without the assent of the people of the land? What do you propose as our best means of dealing with him?"

But Merlin replied, "Bishop Bedwin has done well, and could not have done better than he did."

The kings in turn responded, "How can it possibly be as you say? Many there are who are of higher lineage or of greater experience, many who are stronger or wiser. No man knows whence this boy comes, for Sir Ector is merely his foster father."

"You say what you wish were true," said Merlin, "but his lineage is higher than any of yours."

King Lot replied, "You have gone mad."

"This boy Arthur," said Merlin, "is the son of Uther Pendragon by Igraine of Tintagel."

"You are saying he is a bastard," the kings replied.

"Not so," said Merlin. "He was begotten after Gorlois had died and he was born in wedlock after Uther had married Igraine. I will tell you more than this. Those who oppose him, he will defeat. Even to his dying day, no one who rises against him shall have victory against him, though they had many more men, and much better men, than any that you are able to bring. He is, by right, the King of Britain."

Then some of the kings, such as King Urien and the King of a Hundred Knights, were disturbed. But King Lot, laughing in scorn, said to them all, "He lies. Is he not often said to be the Devil's son? Like his father, he lies."

Nonetheless, Merlin persuaded the kings that an embassy should be received under truce so that the matter might be discussed. Thus he went to the tower, where he was received joyfully by Sir Ulfius and brought to the king. 

Merlin told them all that had happened, and said, "Do not fear, my king. The days before you are difficult, but you will triumph. Go forth boldly, as a king and not as a supplicant, and answer them in all things as their lord and chieftain. For they will kneel before you, whether they will or nill."

to be continued

Prayers Written by Philosophers II

Joseph Butler (1692-1752) is one of the great moral philosophers. He was an Anglican (he actually converted to Anglicanism from Presbyterianism) and became a priest, quickly becoming trusted with important offices. He became chaplain to Queen Caroline, then was appointed Bishop of Bristol, and eventually Bishop of Durham. It is even said, although it's probably just a story, that he turned down the chance to be Archbishop of Canterbury. His most important work is Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel in which he gives an important argument for the nature and authority of conscience, argues against Hobbes and Locke, and develops notable philosophical analyses of love, compassion, and self-deception. (His sermon on self-deception is still one of the major philosophical texts on the subject.) Butler heavily influenced David Hume, who actually revised and sent his Treatise to Butler, hoping to get his approval and support (he didn't get it); Butler also became standard reading in British universities in the nineteenth century. The following evening prayer is a fragment from Butler's papers, never published in his lifetime.

Almighty God, whose continued providence ordereth all things both in Heaven and Earth; Who never slumberest nor sleepest; but hast divided the light from the darkness, and made the day for employment and the night for rest to Thy creatures the inhabitants of the earth: we acknowledge with all thankfulness Thy merciful preservation of us this day, by which we are brought in safety to the evening of it. We implore Thy forgiveness of all the offences which we have been guilty of in it, whether in thought, word, or deed; and desire to have a due sense of Thy goodness in keeping us out of the way of those temptations by which we might have fallen into greater sins, and in preserving us from those misfortunes and sad accidents, common to every day, and which must have befallen many others. We humbly commit ourselves to the same good providence this night, that we may sleep in quiet under Thy protection, and wake, if it be Thy will, in the morning in renewed life and strength. And we beg the assistance of Thy grace to live in such a manner, that when the few days and nights which thou shalt allot us in this world be passed away, we may die in peace, and finally obtain the resurrection unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.

The Idea of a Course

I was thinking recently about an underappreciated philosophical genre: the philosophy course syllabus. Real-life syllabi, of course, have a lot of things in them that are required by the administration, or that are included to reduce the work of the instructor, but the essential core of a syllabus is to give the Idea of a Course -- and, since what we mean by a 'course' is a preliminary course of study, that is the same as to say the Idea of a Preliminary Study of a Topic. Most philosophical genres are concerned with an end result, but there's obviously a value with looking at how one might begin; one finds that similar genres -- lists of favorite books and 'what I'm reading' blogposts -- have a real value to people. So one can imagine a pure syllabus -- all the administrative overlay and encrustation removed, a guide for the student more than a protection for the instructor. It's like the relation between a composer's Mass and a liturgical Mass: the composer's Mass focuses wholly on the musical aspect, and will accomplish the result even if it does not follow the exact liturgical rubrics, or if the rubrics the composer had in mind are out of date, although in principle a properly done composer's Mass could, all things being considered and those things changed that needed to be changed, be adapted to a liturgical Mass, since it is in some sense subordinate to the latter. A great deal of the modern course is a concession to rules that don't have much to do with the topic, although they may sometimes be genuinely necessary or important for practice. Actually teaching a course is more important than some idealized Idea of the Course, but this doesn't mean that the latter is irrelevant; it can serve as a sketch for lines of inquiry.

About five years back I was asked to come up with a course on Jane Austen as a moral philosopher. The course ended up falling through -- a combination of insufficient enrollment and poor administration -- but I did get far enough to start sketching out the first thoughts about how it might work. Perhaps it is worth dusting it off and putting into a bit more shape. Here was my very, very first sketch of possibilities for readings:

***

Introductory

FIRST DAY OF CLASS

Basics of Jane Austen
James Austen-Leigh, A Memoir of Jane Austen, Chapter V
Susan Morgan, “Why There’s No Sex in Jane Austen’s Novels”
(need plot summary handouts)

Why Moral Philosopher
Collingwood?
Gilbert Ryle, “Jane Austen and the Moralists”
Philip Drew, “Jane Austen and Bishop Butler”
Thomas Rodham, “Reading Jane Austen as a Moral Philosopher”

Why Revolutionary Aristotelianism
David Gallop, “Jane Austen and the Aristotelian Ethic”
Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Nature of Virtue”

{summary and comparison sheets for: Aristotle, Shaftesbury, Butler, Hume}
Something on novel itself as philosophical?
nb. the role of reading itself in moral education in Austen
MacIntyre on characters?

I. Lady Susan

Virtue, Vice, and Moral Education

Self-Deceit
Butler??

Reading Lady Susan as an Argument: The Roots of Social Disintegration and Revolutionary Aristotelianism

II. Sense and Sensibility

Selections from Gilpin on Picturesque Beauty
Dadlez, “Aesthetics and Humean Aesthetic Norms in the Novels of Jane Austen” ??

Phronesis, Prudence, Sense

Kearney, “Jane Austen and the Reason-Feeling Debate” ??
Clyde Ray, "Uncommon Prudence in Sense and Sensibility" ??

Reading Sense and Sensibility as an Argument: The Nature of Happiness
Sarah Emsley, “Sense and Sensibility: ‘Know Your Own Happiness’”
Selections from Aristotle on eudaimonia
Claudia Martin, "Austen's Assimilation of Lockean Ideals"


III. Mansfield Park

Virtue and the Moral Picturesque
Selections from Repton?
Selections from Cowper's "The Task"?

Andreia, Fortitude, Constancy
{need something noting importance of fact that Aristotle's is 'manliness' while Austen, as seen in Anne's comments in Persuasion, associates 'constancy' with women}

Reading Mansfield Park as an Argument: Limits of Sociability as a Foundation for Ethics

Practices and Institutions in Mansfield Park

****

The references to "Revolutionary" I would drop -- they were a concession to other parties who wanted a more exciting course title than I had originally come up with. The course, being limited by time to a single term, could not cover the full oeuvre. But a pure syllabus doesn't have that problem. So it could be expanded to include the other major works -- Pride and Prejudice, Emma, Persuasion, Northanger Abbey. I had forgotten completely aobut it, but I like the idea (for a preliminary course of study) of the abstract structure (which needn't always be chronological), Introduction to X + "Reading X as an Argument" + Relating X to Other Philosophical Discussions. Looking at the first sketch here, I would certainly not have sketched out all the same possibilities were I doing it today. I think the overall Introduction should have its own section on Picturesque Theory, which is probably the most obvious point on which Austen directly relates to actual philosophical discussions; perhaps also a section on Theory of Sensibility, which is another point, recurring through the novels, on which Austen directly engages larger philosophical questions. Discussing the course at the time with Mrs. Darwin, she had made a suggestion of distinguishing philosophical novels from didactic novels, and this seems like a good thing for the introductory as well. (Of course, the introductory material need not all be at the beginning of the course, since some of it might be more appropriate leading into particular novels.) It's also certainly the case that some of the possible candidates, while relevant, would not be best suited to this particular preliminary course of study and have to be culled in favor of focusing on the more valuable materials. While relation to other philosophical discussions is important, it is also important not to collapse the course into mining Austen for things relevant to Aristotle/Hume/Shaftesbury rather than making it a course about Austen's own philosophical work.

I haven't looked recently at whether there is any more recent scholarship relevant to the philosophical content of Austen's courses, but as it's a slow-moving field, I wouldn't expect that it would require much updating. Of course there have been a few potentially useful things -- Whit Stillman's Love and Friendship, which of course is an adaptation of Lady Susan, to take just one example. And not long after all of this was being planned, Sarah Emsley did her online conference on Mansfield Park, any of the material for which might be relevant.

Of course a course should have some kind of project -- not just reading things, but doing something with the readings. One idea idea I had was some kind of guided project on Austen's unfinished work, Sanditon -- essentially, analyze the fragment, write scenes that could be part of a continuation and analyze how they might tie into the argument that she seems to be developing (about moral hypochondria). Another, and one to which I was leaning at the time, was to have them look in some way at one of the major works that was not covered. Obviously this would not in itself be relevant to a course that covered them all, but then you can just open the field and have a project using any of the works. Another suggestion of the Darwins that I liked was to focus the project on the heroes rather than the heroines -- particularly since the obvious route for the readings is to focus on the heroines, which leaves the heroes as an opportunity for exploration. I never got far enough to work out any precise guidelines for such a project; I tend to like highly structure projects, so I would certainly have a project with several stages.

Lots of work that would still be needed to get a finalized pure syllabus; but I think one can see what I mean from the example.

Hazlitt on Coleridge on Hume, Berkeley, and Butler

He spoke slightingly of Hume (whose Essay on Miracles he said was stolen from an objection started in one of South's sermons -- Credat Judeaus Apella!) I was not very much pleased at this account of Hume, for I had just been reading, with infinite relish, that completest of all metaphysical choke-pears, his Treatise on Human Nature, to which the Essays, in point of scholastic subtility and close reasoning are mere elegant trifling, light summer reading. Coleridge even denied the excellence of Hume's general style, which I think betrayed a want of taste or candour. He however, made me amends by the manner in which he spoke of Berkeley. He dwelt particularly on his Essay on Vision as a masterpiece of analytical reasoning. So it undoubtedly is. He was exceedingly angry with Dr Johnson for striking the stone with his foot, in allusion to this author's Theory of Matter and Spirit, and saying "Thus I confute him, Sir." Coleridge drew a parallel (I don't know how he brought about the connexion) between Bishop Berkeley and Tom Paine. He said the one was an instance of a subtle, the other of an acute mind, than which no two things could be more distinct. The one was a shop-boy's quality, the other the characteristic of a philosopher. He considered Bishop Butler as a true philosopher, a profound and conscientious thinker, a genuine reader of nature and his own mind. He did not speak of his Analogy, but of his Sermons at the Rolls' Chapel, of which I had never heard. Coleridge somehow always contrived to prefer the unknown to the known.

William Hazlitt, "My First Acquaintance with Poets"

Thursday Virtue: Clemency

The major text of ancient philosophy on the virtue of clemency is Seneca's De Clementia, which is, in one of those priceless historical ironies, dedicated to the young emperor Nero. Clemency is there depicted as "restraint of mind [temperantia animi] in when it has the power to avenge, or the leniency of a superior towards an inferior in fixing punishment." The argument of the treatise is divided into three parts, although the treatise itself it is quite digressive and, as we have it, incomplete. The first part deals with remission of punishment, which is the characteristic act of clemency; the second with its relation to other virtues and vices; and the third with how it is obtained.

Seneca considers the argument that clemency enables wicked people, and replies that while excessive pardoning of faults is vicious, nonetheless we should regard clemency itself as a medicinal virtue. The healthy do not despise medicine, but recognize its value. And nobody is so healthy as to be able to rule out that they might need medicine some day. Clemency works very much the same way. One does not give out medicine indiscriminately; one carefully proportions the medicinal treatment to the sickness at hand. In addition, clemency is not all about saving the guilty from punishment; it saves the innocent from punishment, as well. What is more, clemency is desirable simply in itself, since it is perhaps the most human virtue, in part because it is one we tend to admire, and in part because it is highly concerned with common good. One alleviates punishment and penalty because it is sometimes, perhaps often, good for us all. Without it governments would seem harsh and demanding; with it, they are, as we say, humanized. And this is true quite broadly. Seneca points out that while gods are gods regardless of what we think of them, nobody wants gods who are inclement, and he urges the young Nero to treat his subjects with at least the clemency he wishes the gods to show him.

A prince inflicts punishment for one of two reasons, to avenge himself or to avenge another, and vengeance or vindication serves as either a compensation or a deterrent. Because of anger, it is more difficult to be clement in punishing on one's own behalf, which is why it is the standard for clemency. The clement person remits punishment even where the harm was committed against himself. Princes in particular should forego punishing another for compensation on their own behalf; and clemency may sometimes itself do as much good for future security as deterrent punishment. This brings us to punishment on the behalf of others:

Let us, pass now to the injuries done to others, in the punishment of which these three aims, which the law has had in view, should be kept in view also by the prince: either to reform the man that is punished, or by punishing him to make the rest better, or by removing bad men to let the rest live in greater security. You will more easily reform the culprits themselves by the lighter form of punishment; for he will live more guardedly who has something left to lose. No one is sparing of a ruined reputation; it brings a sort of exemption from punishment to have no room left for punishment. The morals of the state, moreover, are better mended by the sparing use of punitive measures; for sin becomes familiar from the multitude of those who sin, and the official stigma is less weighty if its force is weakened by the very number that it condemns, and severity, which provides the best corrective, loses its potency by repeated application. Good morals are established in the state and vice is wiped out if a prince is patient with vice, not as if he approved of it, but as if unwillingly and with great pain he had resort to chastisement.

Thus reform and general deterrence are often best served by a clement approach to punishment. One of Seneca's additional arguments is interesting. People who break the law or do something unjust are quite common. One of the things a state must do is to make sure it is entirely unclear how common it is. If you mark off the lawbreakers too sharply, everyone can start to count their number, and once it becomes clear from the punishment that large numbers of people are breaking the law, people who otherwise would not break the law will start to do so. If nobody's guilt is pardoned, this does not, contrary to what we might expect, make people obey the law; it makes people think that, since there's a good chance they will be punished for the inevitable slip-up, no matter how good they are the rest of the time, they might as well not worry about what the law says, and instead see what they can actually get away with.

The opposite of clementia is crudelitas, that is, cruelty, "inclination of the mind toward the side of harshness [atrocitas]". Cruelty is the most inhuman of vices; it transgresses not just ordinary bounds of human decency, but humanity itself, since it begins to search for ways to torture and begins to take delight in the suffering of others. We fall into cruelty by mistaking it for strictness. Likewise, we fall into compassion [misericordia], which Seneca as a Stoic regards as a vice, by mistaking it for clemency. As he puts it, misericordia regards only the (mis)fortune and distress, not the cause of it; whereas clementia must be rational. He recognizes that people tend not to like this teaching of the Stoic school, but insists that this is because they confuse feeling sorrow for another, which merely spreads the distress around, with actually doing something about it: the Stoic sage is motivated not by the distress of others but by the opportunity genuinely to help them. Because of this, Seneca insists that clemency is not concerned with pardon, because pardon [venia] is remission of punishment that is deserved [poenae meritae remissio].

Aquinas, when he considers clemency (ST 2-2.157), links it with the virtue of meekness. The two are distinct, but they are related in that meekness restrains the desire to vindicate while clemency restrains the external expression of it. Both are potential parts of temperance; that is, they are temperance in a broad sense, but they are distinct from temperance strictly speaking. The association with temperance is explicitly derived from Seneca, who is Aquinas's most quoted authority on the subject. It distinguishes clemency from equity, which also mitigates punishment, because equity mitigates punishment in order to preserve justice, whereas clemency does so out of "sweetness of soul". The reason clemency is a virtue is because moral virtues are simply the ordering of desire by reason, and, as Seneca says, clemency in mitigating punishment is rational.

For purely Christian reasons, however, Aquinas has to seriously consider the possibility that meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues. He ends up denying that they are in any strict sense, because both are concerned with mitigating evil, and the greatest virtues need to be concerned with positive good. However, among virtues that mitigate and restrain evil, they are the most excellent. As Aquinas says, charity is the greatest of all possible virtues, but clemency of all moral virtues concerned with mitigation of evil seems to be most charity-like, because it is most concerned with the good of others, on the sides both of punishment and restraint.

There is nothing in Aquinas, of course, about the vice of misericordia; misericordia is obviously a virtue for Aquinas, because it is associated with charity, the greatest Christian virtue. Both misericordia and clementia could be translated as 'mercy', but they are different, albeit analogous. Misericordia is the positive counterpart of clementia; as clementia is the greatest moral virtue concerned with mitigation of punishment, misericordia is the greatest moral virtue concerned with actively aiding our neighbor. However, being more concerned with positive good means that misericordia is the greater virtue, as the one that both resembles charity most and is more closely associated with it (since it includes within its scope external acts of charity). However, the two are enough alike that the words used to describe one are often used to describe the other, and in the same way the mercilessness that opposes misericordia is often conflated with cruelty.

In the modern period, clemency tends to not to be discussed directly; it is in the context of its major opposing vice of defect, cruelty, that it usually gets treated. This is an interesting switch, since medieval philosophy seems rarely to discuss cruelty except as a side issue in discussing clemency or mercy. Much of the modern discussion of cruelty is directly or indirectly Senecan in origin. Hume, like Seneca and Aquinas before him, takes cruelty to be associated with anger, and with a rather Senecan argument points out that it is widely despised (Treatise 3.3.3): "Where these angry passions rise up to cruelty, they form the most detested of all vices. All the pity and concern which we have for the miserable sufferers by this vice, turns against the person guilty of it, and produces a stronger hatred than we are sensible of on any other occasion." As in Seneca, cruelty is mostly associated in Hume with government action. This is not uncommon. Further, 'cruelty' has become a catch-all term; it would be difficult to make Aquinas's distinction between mercilessness and cruelty, for instance, in purely modern terms, and cruelty is often not treated as a vice, but more as an ambience created by a system.

One of the more interesting discussions that could be related to clemency is found in Bishop Butler's Fifteen Sermons; Sermons VIII and IX are devoted to resentment and forgiveness of injury, which certainly brings us very close to the matters with which clemency is concerned. Resentment or indignation, according to Butler, is the natural passion that, when sudden and hasty, we call anger, and, when deliberate and settled, we call by a variety of other names (most are associated with vice, but, as Butler notes, the passion is not itself a vice). God has given us this passion in its hasty form so that we "might be better qualified to prevent, and likewise (or perhaps chiefly) to resist and defeat sudden force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as such, and without regard to the fault or demerit of him who is the author of them." Deliberate resentment, however, is for resisting and defeating wickedness, cruelty, and the like: " It is to be considered as a weapon put into our hands by nature, against injury, injustice and cruelty." We all recognize the good that comes to society because of resentment, because people are kept in line by fear of the resentment of others.

However, we need to distinguish resentment properly deployed as a weapon against injustice from vengefulness. Resentment is medicinal, but it is a painful remedy, hard on society, and therefore should not be used unless we carefully proportion it to the case to produce greater good. In particular, it must be constrained by general benevolence, and this general benevolence must be taken so far as to include love of our enemies, who are people who have injured us. This admits of a very Stoic reading so far, but Butler, as a Christian moral philosopher, also wishes to emphasize the importance of compassion:

Though injury, injustice and oppression, the baseness of ingratitude, are the natural objects of indignation, or, if you please, of resentment, as before explained; yet they are likewise the objects of compassion, as they are their own punishment, and without repentance will for ever be so. No one ever did a designed injury to another, but at the same time he did a much greater to himself. If therefore we would consider things justly, such a one is, according to the natural course of affections, an object of compassion, as well as of displeasure: and to be affected really in this manner, I say really, in opposition to show and pretence, argues the true greatness of mind. We have an example of forgiveness in this way in its utmost perfection, and which indeed includes in it all that is good, in that prayer of our blessed Saviour on the cross: "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do!"

Default and Circumscription and Search

An important type of reasoning that is often neglected is the search among possibilities. The primary problem with a rational search is that possibilities are infinite, and of infinitely many kinds. To make rational searches manageable, therefore, we make use of circumscription conditions and default assumptions.

I've already said something about circumscription conditions here. We develop circumscription conditions because there are too many things to think about; so we simply don't consider some possibilities because they are a waste of our time. To do this without being completely arbitrary, we formulate or presuppose a circumscription condition. A case of a circumscription condition would be something like this: the objects that can be shown to have a certain property P (e.g., flight) by reasoning from certain facts A (e.g., the possession of wings) are all the objects that satisfy P (in other words, to find flying things, we ignore anything that does not have wings).

A default assumption is an assumption about what is typically true. For instance, we take it to be typically true that birds can fly. Therefore our default assumption is that when Tweetie is a bird, and we know of nothing that makes it unable to fly, Tweetie can fly. If some new fact comes along suggesting that Tweetie is unable to fly (Tweetie's wings are clipped, or too short, or whatever else) this makes us revise our inference, but our default remains the same. Likewise, we take it to be typically true that animals that fly that are not insects are birds. There are other things that fly that are not insects (bats, for instance), but if something is an animal the flies, and we have reason to think it is not an insect, it is a reasonable (albeit defeasible) conclusion that it is a bird. An example of a type of default assumption very important for rational searches is a closed world assumption. Closed world assumptions basically say that what is not recognizably true (in some way) is false. A closed world assumption is essential for one of the most important types of rational searches, the negation-as-failure search. In a negation-as-failure search, failure to find something is taken as proof that it does not exist. Is there a cat on the desk in front of me? I haven't run every possible test to determine whether there is, but I don't see one. I have a default assumption that if something is a cat, it is visible; given this, I form a plausible circumscription condition that the only cats that can be said to exist are those that can be seen. I perform a search by viewing the desk. I can't see a cat. Therefore there is no cat on the desk in front of me. It's not impossible that there's an invisible cat (an exception to the typical case) on the desk in front of me; it's not impossible that the reason I can't see a cat on the desk is not that there isn't one, and not that it's invisible, but that there's something wrong with my vision. But it's entirely reasonable to conclude that there's no cat on the desk if I can't see one, because the default assumption and the circumscription condition are both good ones. So this is a good, reasonable negation-as-failure search.

Philosophy is full of negation-as-failure searches, put in one form or another; a good example is to be had in Berkeley (Principles 10):

But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable.

This is a challenge: perform a rational search (by reflecting) for the ability to conceive extension without other sensible qualities among all abilities to frame ideas; if your search fails, the reasonable conclusion is that you have no such ability. Indeed, on the basis of his own search, Berkeley says that he sees evidently, i.e., clearly, that he has no such ability. Of course, this reasoning makes perfect sense in a framework based on a closed world assumption (namely, that if you aren't able to recognize your possession of an ability simply by reflecting, you don't have that ability).

Another philosophical example of a negation-as-failure search is found in the problem of evil. The problem of evil, as usually presented, is effectively based on a challenge like Berkeley's, but with different parameters. The challenge is this: Perform a rational search among possible reasons for allowing the existence of such-and-such evils. If you can't find one, we can presume that none exists (negation as failure). Then, typically, one goes on to use this result (no reason exists) to challenge the existence of God (on the assumption that there would have to be a reason, given that God is good and wise).

Several classical responses to the problem of evil focus on the challenge. An example is the omniscience objection. (The omniscience objection is based on the point that the challenger has to show not merely that we wouldn't have a reason, but that an omniscience, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being wouldn't have a reason. In other words, we have to search all possible reasons that are available to an omniscient, omnipotent being.) The search among all possible reasons is an immense one. When we are dealing with finite creatures like human beings, we can circumscribe this search using assumptions about human beings. When we are talking about an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being, however, we can't use those circumscription conditions. Someone who puts forward the omniscience objection in a sense regards the challenge stage of the problem of evil as a bluff: the challenger says, "If we run a rational search, we find no reason"; the omniscience objector says, "You have not run the relevant rational search, because you are assuming circumscription conditions that are not relevant to this problem, and the circumscription conditions that are relevant are not sufficient to make the search manageable." Another (related, but different) sort of response is the ignorance response, which attacks the closed world assumption itself. One form of the ignorance response, the skeptical form, simply denies that we have any reason to think that a negation-as-failure would yield a correct answer in this sort of case. Another form, that associated with Bishop Butler, takes a different route. Butler argues not from skepticism about our ability to know but from our knowledge about what we don't know: the claim is that we know that we don't know a lot of things that are relevant to the success of the search. Of course, not every formulation of the problem of evil that implicitly makes use of a rational search uses the same assumptions and conditions; so it does not follow from a given response's being successful against one formulation that it will be successful against every such formulation. And we need not assume that every formulation of the problem of evil makes use of a rational search (although all the most common ones seem to do so). But a review of formulations of the problem of evil will easily turn up formulations that fall to objections like these, because the search to which they appeal is not of the right sort, or is improperly formulated, or whatever else.

There are lots of other cases where these points are relevant. (Of course, there has been some fascinating work recently on circumscription and default logics, particularly with regard to artificial intelligence; obviously the above is related to these, but it should be kept in mind that the focus of such research is formal systems, which is a much narrower focus than anything I am discussing above.)

Butler on Compassion

This constitution of nature, namely, that it is so much more in our power to occasion, and likewise to lessen misery, than to promote positive happiness, plainly required a particular affection, to hinder us from abusing, and to incline us to make a right use of the former powers, i. e. the powers both to occasion and to lessen misery; over and above what was necessary to induce us to make aright use of the latter power, that of promoting positive happiness. The power we have over the misery of our fellow creatures, to occasion or lessen it, being a more important trust than the power we have of promoting their positive happiness: the former requires, and has a further, an additional security and guard against its being violated, beyond, and over and above what the latter has. The social nature of man, and general good will to his species, equally prevent him from doing evil, incline him to relieve the distressed, and to promote the positive happiness of his fellow creatures: but compassion only restrains from the first, and carries him to the second; it hath nothing to do with the third.

The final causes then of compassion are, to prevent and to relieve misery.

The Right Reverend Doctor Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham, in his sermon VI, on compassion, from the Rolls Chapel sermons. Butler, one of the greatest moral philosophers of his day, was born May 18, 1692.

Links for Reading

* Early Modern Carnivalesque is up at Cliopatria. My post at Houyhnhnm Land on The Horizontal Moon is in it. Jonathan Dresner did a great job of organizing it! The next Carnivalesque will be the Ancient/Medieval edition.

* The Camel's Nose Is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes by Mario Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman (HT: Agoraphilia)

* In Carly Simon's 1973 hit song, "You're So Vain," Simon has the lines, "You're so vain, you probably think this song is about you." Glen Whitman at Agoraphilia suggests that the song is about several men, so that "You probably think this song is about you" means "You probably think this song is about you in particular." I think this is close; but the supposition of several men is unnecessary. Actually, Simon's song is paralleled by (I'd imagine) hundreds and maybe thousands of arguments between couples every day. She starts talking about herself; she mentions him prominently because she's in a relationship with him (with all the problems and issues that raises); being a self-centered jerk, he assumes that the mentions mean that he's the topic of the day. So it is here: he can't see that the song is about her, and merely mentions him. There's actually a lot in the song that supports this latter supposition. And it's an important distinction; the fact that the song has lines that are about him doesn't mean that the song itself is about him.

* Brush Up on Butler is the best place on the web to find resources on early modern moral philosopher, Joseph Butler. I find that I've been put up as a link, which is nice. I haven't done much on Butler in the last two or three months, but I've been meaning to return to the good Bishop of Durham. And I certainly will now.

* An Argument Against Doubt at "Mumblings and Grumblings" is interesting; I think Descartes deals with this sort of argument in the Replies to the Seventh Objections.

Alice Gardner on Butler

Butler's "plain, honest man " has formed the theme of much ethical controversy. His very existence has been questioned by some, though not improbably many of us may have known him personally or met with him in books. But I am inclined to think that the great bishop, being an eminently reasonable man himself, hardly realised how unreasonable were most of his fellow-mortals.

Alice Gardner, The Conflict of Duties, and Other Essays (1903), p. 5.

Pop Quiz

How well do you know your early modern philosophers?

True or False:

1. George Berkeley on one of his trips to the continent took a detour to study tarantulas.

2. David Hume once received Last Rites from a Catholic priest.

3. When Napoleon attributed the heavens to the work of a Creator, Laplace said, "I have no need of that hypothesis."

4. George Berkeley wrote a book advocating tar-water as a universal medicine.

5. Leibniz thought that Chinese hexagrams were a form of binary mathematics.

6. Thomas Reid held that animals, like humans, have immaterial souls.

7. Cardinal Gerdil, a Malebranchean, missed becoming pope by two votes.

8. Joseph Butler was Bishop of Durham.

9. Diderot tells us that David Hume once said he had never met an atheist.

10. Kant wrote a book on the moral interpretation of the Christian religion.


Answers:
(If I've done this right, you should be able to run your cursor over this section, selecting the text, to see the answers to all the questions.)

1. True; we learn this from his Italian journals (strictly speaking he took the detour to study the folklore about both the 'tarantella' and the tarantula).
2. True; however, he was delirious with fever.
3. False; the saying is part of a late fictionalization of a real event.
4. True; it was called Siris.
5. True; he wrote an article about it.
6. True; see Thomas Reid on the Animate Creation, Paul Wood (ed.)
7. False; he missed it by one vote.
8. True; although he was Bishop of Bristol longer.
9. True; Hume said it to d'Holbach, the famous French atheist.
10. True; it is called Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.

From Tar-Water to the Trinity

As some of my readers know, Siris takes its name from a work by Bishop George Berkeley, Siris. However, the subheading I use, "A Golden Chain from Tar-Water to the Trinity, With Thoughts Relating to Philosophy, Christian Theology, and the Universe Generally," is not the subtitle of the book. The subtitle of Berkeley's Siris is "A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water and Diverse Other Subjects Connected Together and Arising One from Another." The "with Thoughts," etc. is simply a description of the content of the weblog. The "from tar-water to the Trinity" does describe Berkeley's work, though; it is due to Horace Walpole. While searching for something else I came across a quotation of Walpole's full statement in Balfour's Essays and Addresses; I paste it here for those who are interested.


Essays and Addresses By Arthur James Balfour

We shouldn't, by the way, take Walpole's comment about women too much at face value; it is not the only disparagement of the intelligence of women that is attributed to him. As Balfour says for a different case (Queen Caroline's love of Butler's Analogy), "Walpole and his set would certainly be unwilling to believe that anyone, much less any woman,...could find a meaning in abstract arguments which they themselves had never taken the trouble to understand" (p. 92).

Dashed Off XII

 God uses our mortality to transcend our mortality, and our variability to transcend our variability.

Justice springs from love and knowledge.

orders of angels and facets of wisdom

'the pious people who do penance for their own sins by putting other people into sackcloth'

Foucault often seems on the strongest ground if you treat his historical arguments less as historical arguments and more as well-fleshed-out analogical arguments.

Republics collapse into oligarchies of wealth or oligarchies of family.

In politics we should oppose anything done without a willingness to make distinctions, no matter the intentions.

Deliberate doubt always favors prejudices.

Shankara in Upadesa Sahsri: Brahman and Atman are related like face and reflection of face in a mirror; we are reflections of Brahman, distinguishable yet in some way not different.

A 'view' is as much about where you are standing as about what you see.

"It is authority alone which moves fools to hasten to wisdom." Augustine

mercy -> forgiveness -> life

active wit vs. modish conversation

'reading, that richest, highest, and noblest source of intellectual enjoyment'

exercitium sacrae scripturae: lectio, disputatio, praedicatio

All reasoning from from conceiving and to conceiving.

Jacobine: Mt Jas Jd
Petrine: Mk 1Pt 2Pt
Pauline: Lk Acts Pauline Letters
Johannine: Jn Rv Johannine Letters
--Hb is traditionally associated with Pauline; it is very Jewish like Jacobine, but Hellenistic Jewish like some of Johannine.

-- Clement is the earliest source to use Hb (1 Clem 34:2-5 uses Hb 1:3-4, and some probable allusions elsewhere); as both 2 Clem & Hermas seem to know it, this suggests it was sent to Rome.
-- Clement Al is the first extant person to hypothesize that Hb is Pauline; he attributes the idea to "the blessed Presbyter", probably Pantaenus (Eusebius HE 6.24). He suggests in particular Paul + Luke. The attraction is that there are affinities to Luke-Acts, but some of this is probably due to common use of LXX and both having a higher literary style of Koine.
-- Tertullian (de pudicitia) attributes to Barnabas; he quotes Hb 6:1-8)
-- Its association may also be due in part to mention of Timothy (13:23)

The bishop exists to further the unifying love of the Church, the priest that the faithful may better know their God, the deacon that the works of the Church may be well-ordered.

unintelligible propositions
-- due to knower
-- due to proposition
-- -- contradictory simply
-- -- contradictory in a certain sense

'the exercise of charity, the search of knowledge, and the enjoyment of quiet'

That which is more invariant is more real.

Leibniz Equivalence
Norton: Diffeomorphic models represent the same physical situation.
Jacobs (2021): Symmetry-related models are physically equivalent.
Greaves & Wallace (2014): Two states of affairs related by a symmetry transformation are really just the same state of affairs different described.
-- the negation of LE is 'model literalism' (distinct models represent distinct states of affairs even when symmetry-related)

"That mankind is a community, that we all stand in relation to each other, that there is a public end and interest of society which each particular is obliged to promote, is the sum of morals." Butler

Forgiveness arises from good will, not lack of resentment. The latter is an effect of forgiveness, sometimes with the aid of time.

'those only can be properly liberal, who are just and oeconomical'

the cartography of possibility

"Every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, resistance, dsire." Aristotle (Rhetoric 1369a)

INTERNAL
-- nature
-- -- steady
-- -- -- nature proper
-- -- -- reasoning
-- -- occasional
-- -- -- resistance
-- -- -- desire
-- second nature
EXTERNAL
-- chance
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL
-- compulsion

"Punishment is inflicted for the sake of the punisher." Aristotle (Rhetoric 1369b)
"the object of wonder is an object of desire" (1371a)
"It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole thing thereupon becomes our own work." (1371b)

pathological pursuit of proof of being good
(1) when pathology is in excess in the pursuit
(2) when pathology is in the type of proof
-- -- (2a) bad social proof
-- -- (2b) bad material proof
(3) when pathology is in the conception of being good

Opposition presupposes some sameness of general kind.

liberality vs magnificence of mind

Pursuit alone vests no property right.

Ancient thinkers often treat time-measurements less as measurements and more as classifications (i.e., less like dating devices and more like curricular or period designations).

the Third Way and God as transcending the genera of necessary existents

(1) Altruism is not of itself moral
(2) Restrictive norms are not of themselves moral.
(3) Sympathy is not of itself moral.
(4) There are combinations of these that are not moral.

Claims in contingent matter are capable of functioning as implicit arguments.

"Men do not reflect and act upon collections of meaningless symbols or nonsense rhymes." Margaret MacDonald

To say that a legal system is not just is to say there is a *jus* higher than what is found in that legal system.

What determines what you can do, determines what you must do.

The end of the human race is living as human beings.

It is pointless to try to clarify a field by asking whether its propositions are tautologies, empirical generalizations, value statements, etc., because every field necessarily uses all of these.

causation, remotion, and eminence as the foundation of every realism

The pseudodemos is constructed in and by public opinion.

instruments of pleasure vs sources of happiness

(1) that the cosmos can be conceived as a unified change
(2) that the cosmos can be conceived as a unified composite
(3) that the cosmos can be conceived as a limited durable
(4) that the cosmos can be conceived as a hierarchy of being
(5) that the cosmos can be conceived as an ordered system of causes

efficient causes
(1) bringing about form: perfective (perficiens)
(2) preparing matter: dispositive (praeparens seu disponens)
(3) operates for the end of another: assisting (adjuvans)
(4) proposes form for another to use: advising (consiliens)

four tasks of medicine (Engelland)
(1) safeguard integrity and existence of the whole body
(2) treat patient's experience of inordinate pain
(3) restore functioning of inoperable parts
(4) promote long-term functioning of whole and parts

medicine more concerned with our natality than our mortality (Engelland)

Most television series are structured on the pattern of procedurals, in part because they are very popular (so most writers learn to write scripts from them) and because their success depends on a relatively clear episodic structure, so they set a standard for structure to which others refer.

A pattern of aggressive retaliations is always a sign of deep misery.

By faith we recognize created being as an expression and triumph of love.

Mary as united with Jesus by connection of dignity, authority, and power

All the sacraments exhibit 'physical causality' and 'moral causality', but in some the latter is more important and in some less. Really, though, the physical/moral distinction here is based on an analogy (to nature and will as causes) and nothing else, and the analogy seems to break down at times in this context.

sacraments as
signs: extrinsic formal
medicaments: efficient dispositive
armaments: efficient dispositive
containing and conferring grace: efficient instrumental

donatists of argument

archive -> kinds of problem -> philosophical questions -> philosophical arguments

"Proverbs are, as has been said, one form of evidence." Aristotle (Rhetoric 1376a)
"Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our sake and not for some other reason." (1381b)
shame as "a mental picture of disgrace" (1384a)

elements of ceremonial rites
(1) combination of incidents
(2) signs of moral purpose
(3) form of expression
(4) accessories of language (e.g., music)
(5) thought appropriate to context
(6) appearance to others

Genesis: preparation for Israel
Exodus: formation of Israel as Elect
Leviticus: cultic structuring of Israel
Numbers: administrative structuring of Israel
Deuteronomy: suzerainty covenant with Israel
Joshua, Judges, Ruth: preparation for Israel as kingdom

postulate : practical :: opinion : theoretical

Dashed Off V

Locke's four grounds for internal/external distinction
(1) causal reasoning about sense organs
(2) differences between sensations and memory
(3) differences between sensation and pleasure & pain
(4) testimonial assistance

Theology remits the errors of philosophy, integrates it into a greater body of truths, and transfigures it by use and association.

appropriate poetic expressions of rational arguments

Taking conscience seriously requires taking moral advice and moral education seriously.

The pope's full, supreme, and universal power of jurisdiction is a power whose end is the protection of the faith and the preservation of peace among the churches.

The philosophy of law in Marsilius of Padua's Defensor Pacis is quite clearly positivist.

law as cooperative assistance

The primary, essential, and efficient source of law is reason regarding common good.

A people legislating must consider not just their goods or wishes but also the true good of non-citizens among them.

As the good of the Church is a sacred good, the members of the Church have from that good a great authority to preserve and protect both it and their share in it, an authority which cannot be given limits except in light of that sacred good itself; and to the special guardians of that sacred good this authority must especially be attributed.

limits on papal power
(1) personal: baptismal, confirmational, ordinational
(2) official: patriarchal responsibility, unity and harmony of the churches
(3) divine: natural law, divine positive law, responsibility to Christ (stewardship)

Note Marsilius's attack on the Peter-Rome connection & his argument that Paul was the first bishop of Rome.

Note Ockham's argument for participation of women in general councils. (It follows pretty straightforwardly from his assumption that general councils are simply representative bodies.)

The authority of an ecumenical council is sacramental in its root.

"One of the greatest difficulties confronting a government which has entered on a wrong track is to retrace its steps and once more strike the right road." Ludwig von Pastor

One should fight on the fronts valuable to oneself, not taking the enemy's tastes as one's measure of a worthwhile fight.

By cultivating the incipient goodnesses of human nature, one may attain to good character. Good character begins to take from; taking form, it manifests itself; manifesting itself, it becomes splendid; being splendid, others are moved by it as the beloved moves the lover; moving others, it transforms them and enriches their lives. This enrichment of others is only found in the completion of good character. Good character is not merely the completing of one's nature; by means of it others are aided in becoming complete.

The Christian in charity honors both his nature an the grace that joins him to Christ. He achieves breadth and greatness of scope;he achieves subtlety and intensive precision. He attains to the sublime and splendid, and pursues the mean that endures. He draws from the old and learns the new, and devoted to mercy he esteems the liturgy. Given authority, he is not proud; under authority he is not seditious. Where the Christian faith prevails, he is rewarded; where it is persecuted, he endures. Although gentle as a dove, he is as cunning as a serpent.
For he is joined to Christ, and in Christ all grace is perfect. Through the grace of Christ he is able to set all social relations in order, to establish the human virtues, and know the first and fundamental things. On what else does he need to rely?
The excellence of charity does not cease; never ceasing, it endures; ever enduring, it pours forth as light; radiating as light, it extends far; extending far, it diffuses everywhere; diffusing everywhere, it is sublime and splendid. Because it is self-diffusive, it encompasses all things. Because it is sublime and splendid, it protects all things. Because it is far-extending and ever-enduring, it perfects all things. In its diffusiveness it equals the whole visible universe; in its sublimity and splendor, it equals the whole invisible world. Far-extending and ever-enduring, it is infinite. From its nature it radiates as light without showiness, it moves without moving, it perfects without effort. The Christian way can be expressed wholly in this word, charity, for the Christian way is Christ Himself, and Christ is broad, deep, sublime, splendid, far-extending, and ever-enduring. Great indeed is He! Abundantly, He produces and sustains all things. In His greatness He reaches Heaven. The requirements of goodness are endless; only in Him can they be achieved
The Christian in charity, wishing himself to be established in God, establishes others, and, wishing heavenly glory for himself, works for the heavenly glory of others. He learns widely, but is guided by liturgy and sacrament. Who does this will not turn his back on Christ the Way. He is neither anxious nor fearful, for in him is nothing wrong, and he is not a person of one virtue.

the cheng of transfigured nature, the cheng appropriate to grace

the relation of Christian as minister to Christ as King; as child of God to God the Father; as younger sibling to Christ as Firstborn; to Christ as friend to friend; of the Church as Bride of Christ to Christ as Groom

foundation, vocation, perfection

the virtual mortality of all human action

Combining the Silver Rule with our responsibilities to and under God yields the Golden Rule.

tradition as a kind of counsel

part of how matrimony functions as a school of charity is that it trains one to see others as sacred signs

In filial piety as children of God and fraternal respect toward our Christian brothers and sisters we learn to practice charity; the Christian in charity cares for these things.

To practice charity requires repentance and sacrament.

Butler's natural providence & Locke's comments on pleasure and pain

evidential tendency // function
as regular historical association // etiological
as probabilistic // survival-enhancement
as role in rational system // causal role

philosophical systematizing // architecture as art of organizing design solutions
(obviously it's not surprising that architectonic philosophy is analogous to architecture, but it's worthwhile to think about the analogy in terms of various philosophical accounts of architecture)

x is a part of y since t
x is a part of y until t

diagrams as analogies

The Initiated receive the robe of glory (Hoosoyo for Sundays of Epiphany; Maronite Rite of Chrismation) which is itself the robe of glory of the Church (Qolo for the Commons of Prophets, the Just, and Confessors).

scale-differences between analogues
field-of-inquiry-differences between analogues

the credible marvelous as a subject of poetry

Doxastic logic as usually developed is better interpreted as being about belief norms than about beliefs.

'temporal logic' for inward/outward; upward downward
'above' as some T in that which is covered by Box-up; 'below' as some T in all that covered by Box-down
in: boundary + inward
inward, outward boundary, contact, upward, downward, leftward, rightward

Shehtman & Goldblatt: the modal logic for relativistic spacetime is S4.2, i.e., S4 with confluence [Diamond][Box] -> [Box][Diamond].

Evidence suggests what ought to be the case.

justified true belief // permitted satisfied desire

analogy vs. representation of analogue by analogue

temperance & moral neatness/messiness

impartial spectator & the moral picturesque

neatness/messiness of argument

the morally gratifying and the morally beautiful

neatness and messiness of means to ends
fit of means to ends

isomorphism, contact, dependence

charity working in us, charity linking persons, charity unifying communities

causation, remotion, & eminence in each sacrament (sacrament as instrument, as beyond nature, as inexhaustible mystery)

natural filiation, adopted filiation, metaphorical filiation

asceticism : remotion :: devotion : eminence

the sympathy-like tending and approximation to that which exceeds what we can sympathize with

human ultra-sociality
note that this is not something merely in hand; it is something arising from the human ability to develop institutions and customs that over great lengths of time can be linked to other institutions & customs in new ways with new features

Market exchange depends on informal practices and customs -- for trust, reputation, customs of available quick solutions to common problems -- these affect transaction costs and the kinds of transaction even available.

Strong rule of law blocks the effects of people inclined to disrupt social connections.

Commonplaces as forms of relevance.

The Church on earth is actively and spiritually linked to the Church that has passed through death by two great works of charity: intercession and purgatorial suffrage.

doing good works for the dead
doing good works in the name of the dead
doing good works with the dead

'I am a worm, and no man': I am cut off from the things required to live a human life of reason and friendship and the like' I am reduced to devoting everything to preservation of the body, which I am powerless to guarantee or even make likely, to attending only to surviving this very moment, and the next, and the next, until I fail.

possibility, relevance, probability

Different ethical approaches loosely converge because they all have to be developed by reason.

The entire Part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise can be tollensed into an argument that cogitative-imaginative accounts of mind do not suffice, that there is need of an intellect capable of abstracting in order to account for human life and reason.

facets of tradition
(1) memorative
(2) recollective
(3) experiential
(4) anticipatory
(5) divinatory