In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blamed or praised, and according to the present disposition of our mind. But these variations we regard not in our general decision, but still apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remained in one point of view. Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable. Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as represented in history; but we say not upon that account, that the former character is more laudable than the latter. We know, that were we to approach equally near to that renowned patriot, he would command a much higher degree of affection and admiration. Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses; and indeed it were impossible we could ever make use of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present situation.
Hume, Treatise 3.3.1. The point in the last sentence, I think, is an underappreciated point in philosophy of language; in communicating with others, we communicate not from our immediate point of view but from a projected 'steady and general point of view', what we might think of as an official or public point of view that detaches from the variations, foibles, quirks, gaps, and obscurities of our immediate and unofficial point of view. Communication, literally making common, begins with building, by inference or guess, a candidate for a common point of view.
