To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that no habitude is poured into human beings from God. For God has himself equally to all. If therefore He pours some habitudes into some, he would pour them into all, which is obviously false.
Further, God works in everything according to the way appropriate to its nature, because divine providence is for saving nature, as says Dionysius, De Div. Nom. ch. IV. But human habitudes are naturally caused by acts, as was said. Therefore God does not cause any habitudes in human beings apart from acts.
Further, if any habitude is poured out from God, through that habitude a human being is able to produce many acts. But from those acts a like habitude is cased, as is said in Ethic. II. It follows therefore that there are two acts of the same species in the same human being, one acquired, the other poured, which it seems is impossible, for two forms of one species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore no habitude is poured into a human being from God.
But contrariwise is what is said in Eccli. XV: The Lord filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding. But wisdom and understanding are sorts of habitudes. Therefore some human habitudes are poured out from God.
I reply that it must be said that some human habitudes are poured out from God for two reasons. The first reason is that there are some habitudes by which a human being is disposed well to an end exceeding the faculty of human nature, which is ultimate and complete human beatitude, as was said above. And because it is needful that habitudes be proportionate to that to which the human being is disposed according to them, it is also necessary that habitudes disposing in any way to such an end exceed the faculty of human nature. Thus such habitudes are not able to be in a human being save from divine pouring, as it is with all gratuitous virtues.
Another reason is because God is able to produce the effects of secondary causes apart from the secondary causes themselves, as was said at the first. Therefore, just as sometimes to show his force he produces health without the natural cause, so also sometimes to show his force he pours into man those habitudes that are able to be caused by natural force. So he gave to the apostles knowledge of scripture and of all languages, which human beings through study or custom are able to acquire, although not so completely.
To the first therefore it must be said that God, with respect to his nature, equally has himself to all, but according to the order of his wisdom, for a definite reason he grants to some what he does not grant to others.
To the second it must be said that God working in everything according to their ways, does not exclude God from working that which nature is not able to work, but it follows from this that nothing is worked contrary to what is appropriate to nature.
To the third it must be said that acts which are produced by a poured habitude do not cause any habitude, but confirm a pre-existing habitude, just medicinal remedies applied to a man healthy by nature do not cause any health but rather strengthen the prior habitude of health.
[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.51.4, my translation. The Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation is here.]
I have deliberately avoided the word 'infused'; it's a perfectly good word, but I think it's worth remembering the underlying metaphor. I've also translated with 'faculty' rather than a more generic term like 'capacity' because the technical meaning is operative here -- a faculty is a power or capacity that can be directly disposed by will, which then makes it possible for the power or capacity be disposed well or badly.
This short article has more going on than might meet the eye. It will, of course, be the foundation of some of the most important discussions of virtue in the Summa. We also have here the essential argument for a key Thomistic idea, that we have no natural habitude to our natural end, because the latter is our natural end in the sense that we have it as an end by nature, not in the sense that it is within the capability of human nature to achieve it. It is therefore natural to human beings to seek a higher power than our own. This idea would lead to argument in the nineteenth century, by the clumsy device of an imaginary 'pure state of nature', and then again in the twentieth century, over the natural desire to see God.
In addition, the response to the third objection is more important than it might look, because it identifies a principle that will play a significant role in the Thomistic account of infused virtue.
This article completes St. Thomas's tour of habitudes in light of their causes. We have
natural habitudes
acquired habitudes
infused habitudes
but we've also discovered that the boundaries among these are not quite so hard and fast as might be assumed. There are natural habitudes that also require human acts for their full specification, and thus are in a sense mediate between natural and acquired habitudes, and as God can infuse any habitude whatsoever, something's being a natural or an acquired habitude does not necessarily rule out its also being an infused habitude. There are, of course, infused habitudes that are definitely neither natural or acquired habitudes, but the mere fact that something is poured out on someone by God does not itself make it itself 'supernatural', as we might say today. Likewise, the fact that something is a natural or acquired habitude does not exclude the possibility that it is a direct gift from God.
