To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that prudence is not another virtue from craft, for craft is right reason for some works. But different kinds of works do not make it so that something lacks the notion of craft, since there are different crafts about works that are widely different. Since prudence therefore is also a sort of right reason for works, it seems that it too ought to be called craft.
Further, prudence converges more with craft than reflective habitudes, for they are both about contingents having themselves [se habere] otherwise, as is said in Ethic. VI. But some reflective habitudes are called crafts. therefore much more prudence ought to be called craft.
Further, it pertains to prudence to take counsel well, as is said in Ethic. VI. But it also happens that one takes counsel in some crafts, as is said in Ethic. III, as in the military, governing, and medicinal crafts. Therefore prudence is not distinguished from craft.
But contrariwise the Philosopher distinguishes prudence from craft in Ethic. VI.
I reply that it must be said that, where a different notion of virtue is found, there virtues should be distinguished. And it was said above that some habitudes have the notion of virtue from making an aptness [facultatem] for good work, while others from making not only the aptness for good work, but also the use. Now craft makes only the aptness for good work, because it does not regard striving [appetitum]. But prudence not only makes the aptness for good work, but also the use, for it regards striving, as presupposing rightness of striving. The reason for which is that craft is right reason for makeables, but prudence is right reason for doables. But to make and to do differ because, as is said in Metaphys. IX, making is act passing into external material, such as building, cutting, and the like, but acting is act enduring in the doer, as seeing, willing, and the like.
So therefore in this way prudence has itself toward such human acts, which are uses of powers and habitudes, just as craft has itself toward external makings, because both are complete reason with respect to that to which they are compared. But completeness and rightness of reason in reflective matters [speculativi] depend on sources from which reason deduces, as it was said that knowledge depends on and presupposes intellection, which is habitude of sources. But human acts have themselves to ends, as sources in reflective matters, as is said in Ethic. VII. And therefore for prudence, which is right reason for doables, it is required that the human being be well disposed about ends, which is through right striving, and therefore for prudence, moral virtue is required, through which striving is made right. But good for the crafted is not good for human striving, but good for the crafted works themselves, and therefore craft does not presuppose right striving. And thus it is that a craftsman is more praised who fails [peccat] willingly than who fails unwillingly, but it is more contrary to prudence to fail willingly than to fail unwillingly, because rightness of will belongs to the notion of prudence, but not to the notion of craft. So therefore it is obvious that prudence is a virtue distinct from craft.
To the first it therefore must be said that all different kinds of crafted things are outside the human being, and so the notion of virtue is not differentiated. But prudence is right reason of human acts themselves. Wherefore it differentiates the notion of virtue, as was said.
To the second it must be said that prudence converges more with craft than with reflective habitudes in subject and material, for they are both in the opinionative part of the soul, and about contingents having themselves otherwise. But craft converges more with reflective habitude than with prudence in the notion of virtue, as is obvious from what was said.
To the third it must be said that prudence is taking counsel well about what pertains to the whole of human life and to the ultimate end of human life. But in some crafts there is counsel taken that pertains to the ends proper to that craft. Wherefore some, insofar as they are taking counsel well in matters of warfare or seamanship, are said to be prudent generals or navigators, but not simply prudent, for this is only those who take counsel well about what refers to the whole of life.
[St. Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.57.4, my translation. The Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation is here. The word for 'fail' here, of course, also means to sin: to sin, to fail, to miss, to err, are all correct translations of it.]
