To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that intellectual virtue is able to be without moral virtue. For the completion of the prior does not depend on the completion of the posterior. But reason is prior to sensory striving [appetitu sensitivo] and changes [movens] it. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is the completion of reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is the completion of the striving part. Therefore it is able to be without it.
Further, moral things [moralia] are the matter of prudence, as makeables are the matter of craft. But craft is able to be without its own material, as the smith [faber] can be without iron. Therefore prudence is also able to be without moral virtues, though it seems of all intellectual virtues to be most conjoined with moral things.
Further, prudence is the being-counseled-well virtue [virtus bene consiliativa], as is said in Ethic. VI. But many are counseled well but lack moral virtues. Therefore prudence is able to be without moral virtue.
But contrariwise, to wish to do evil is directly contrary to moral virtue, but it is not opposed to something that can be without moral virtue. Yet it is opposed to prudence to sin willingly, as is said in Ethic. VI. Therefore prudence is not able to be without moral virtue.
I respond that it must be said that other intellectual virtues are able to be without moral virtue, but prudence without moral virtue is not able to be. The reason for which is that prudence is right reason of enactables, not only in the universal, but in the particular in which there are actions. But right reason pre-requires the sources [principia] from which reason proceeds. And reason about particulars should proceed not only from universal sources but from particular sources as well. Indeed, about universal sources of enactables, a human being rightly has himself [se habet] through natural intellection of sources [naturalem intellectum principiorum], through which the human being cognizes that nothing bad is to be enacted, or even through some practical knowledge [scientiam practicam]. But this does not suffice for reasoning rightly about particulars. For it happens sometimes that this kind of universal source cognized through intellection or knowledge is deteriorated [corrumpitur] in the particular through some passion, such as craving [concupiscenti], for when craving conquers, what is craved seems good, even if it is against the universal judgment of reason. And therefore just as the human being is disposed to rightly having himself [se habendum] with respect to universal sources, through natural intellection or through the habitude of knowledge, so also in order that one hold oneself [se habeat] rightly with respect to particular sources of enactables, which are ends, it should be that one is completed through some habitudes according to which it becomes in some way connatural to the human being to judge rightly of the end. And this is done through moral virtue, for the virtuous one rightly judges of the end of virtue, because as each one is, so the end seems to him, as is said in Ethic. III. And thus for right reason of enactables, which is prudence, it is required that the human being have moral virtue.
To the first therefore it must be said that reason, so far as it grasps the end [apprehensiva finis], preceds striving for the end, but striving for the end precedes reason as reasoning in choosing those things that are for the end, which pertains to prudence. So likewise in reflective matters, understanding of sources is the source of reason as deducing.
To the second it must be said that the sources of things of craft [artificialium] are not judged by us well or badly according to the disposition of our striving, as with ends, which are sources of moral things, but only through consideration of reason. Therefore craft does not require virtue perfecting striving, as prudence requires.
To the third it must be said that prudence is not only being counseled well [bene consiliativa] but also judging well [bene judicativa] and regulating well [bene praeceptiva], which is not able to be unless there be removed passional impediments corrupting the judgment and regulation of prudence, and this by moral virtue.
[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.58.5, my translation. The Latin is found here, the Dominican Fathers translation is found here.]
Most of the discussion of virtues as habitudes has not been too difficult, but this was a bit more of a challenge than I expected, particularly given that I am trying to do a fairly close (perhaps some woodenly so) translation that does not rely too much on the usual jargon (however useful it may be elsewhere) to carry the meaning.
There are several -iva words here that, if just transliterated, might make for odd and sometimes misleading claims. 'Consiliativa' is particularly difficult; it means advising or counseling, but it can be used for being advised and being counseled, and also can mean deliberating, and in the context of prudence, it can mean any of those things. Essentially, for Aquinas, both giving and receiving advice are extensions of deliberation, so for him they are basically all one thing, except that advice involves another person (or, if you prefer, deliberation is giving advice to yourself). There is no one word in English whatsoever that fits that. Possibly it would be better to translate it by 'deliberate' words here; thus 'prudence is the virtue of deliberating well, but many deliberate well but lack moral virtues' and 'prudence is not only of deliberating well but also of judging well and of commanding well', which is all true. That would perhaps work more smoothly. But it's also all true, and a correct translation, if we put it in advice and counsel terms. We split them up almost completely; St. Thomas does not really split them up at all, and indeed it's clear elsewhere that this is not an inadvertence -- he deliberately doesn't, although well aware that you can in particular cases distinguish them.
I very much like the triadic aspect of prudence (bene consiliativa, bene judicativa, bene praeceptiva), and think it probably should be emphasized more in discussing the virtue. As is clear from the reply to the third objection, the fact that prudence unites these three does some important work for understanding how prudence relates to other virtues.
Between this article and the last, what we have learned is that moral virtue does not require sapience, science, or art (which is not to say that these might not sometimes be helpful to it), but it does require intellection and prudence. Moral virtue requires intellection, or cultivated understanding of principles, because it needs to be structured according to principles of practical reason. However, these principles, which are universal, need to be applied to particulars, which is what prudence does. And prudence itself is in the Aristotelian definition of moral virtue, i.e., that moral virtue is an operative elective habitude consisting in a relative mean determined by prudent reason. Prudence is what makes it possible for us reliably to hit the balance-point in different situations.
In the reverse direction, sapience, science, intellection, and art do not require moral virtue. Prudence, however, does, and this is related to what we previously learned about prudence, namely, that while it is properly an intellectual virtue, its field of action is the field of action of moral virtue, which is why it is counted as a moral virtue as well. The reply to the third objection seems to suggest that prudence as deliberative/consiliative might not require moral virtue, while prudence as judicative or as preceptive does, but I don't think that this can be quite right when one looks at how prudence and its adjunct virtues ('potential parts') work. Rather, I think it's more that the role of moral virtue is less direct in the consiliative work of prudence than it is in the judicative and preceptive work, so St. Thomas just focuses on the latter two as the easy cases.
In effect, prudence thinks through and governs and determines and organizes the moral virtues, but it does so by developing the moral virtues. Prudence gets good at determining the mean because it cultivates virtues that hit the mean. Thus to develop prudence, one must also simultaneously develop moral virtue, and working to develop any moral virtue requires also simultaneously working to develop prudence with respect to that area of moral life. This is what St. Thomas thinks Socrates, claiming that virtue is knowledge, gets right: moral virtue requires intellectual virtue, both understanding and prudence, and both prudence and moral virtue co-develop. Moral virtues are constitutively dependent on prudence and prudence thinks through moral matters partly by way of the moral virtues themselves.
This is noteworthy, in terms of habitude generally, in that we see here that habitudes can be instrumental to and (so to speak) continuations of other habitudes. That is, holding yourself [se habendum] in one way with respect to something can explain or be explained by, and can facilitate and further, holding yourself another way with respect to something else, and much of the meaningful structure of human life is ultimately based upon this. This has been implied in some of the examples and particular arguments that Aquinas has used, but it is here in virtue, where it plays such a fundamentally important role, that we see it most clearly and obviously. And, indeed, St. Thomas will structure his entire discussion of virtue on the basis of this organizational aspect of habitude, i.e., habitudes organizing and causing habitudes in various ways.
