Cardinal McElroy has an interview on the Iran conflict and just war theory in his archdiocesan newsletter; it's quite reasonable and clear, and since I am very harsh with bishops who unnecessarily muddy doctrinal waters, it's only fair that I note when they are doing the opposite. There are a few quibbles I could make (like most people, for instance McElroy treats 'right intention' much too narrowly, taking 'intention' in the colloquial English sense rather than the original scholastic sense), but in the context of an interview, and with respect to the purpose of the interview, I don't think it necessary to stand on them. It also gives a nice occasion for thinking about just war theory in a real-world context.
McElroy sees the current conflict as violating the principles of just war in at least three particular respects:
(E1) Just cause: McElroy argues that just cause was not met because we were not responding to "an existing or imminent and objectively verifiable attack by Iran", and preventative war is not just.
(E2) Right intention: We lack "clear intention", as shown in the sheer variety of proposed goals, explanations, and reaons that the Trump administration has offered.
(E3) Expectation of good: It's unclear that the war's benefits will outweigh its harms.
Thus, His Eminence concludes, the war is not morally legitimate.
It's interesting to compare this to Ed Feser's recent discussion of how just war principles apply to the Iran conflict. He also argues that the current conflict violates the principles of just war on (if I understand how his argument is structured) at least two points:
(F1) Just cause: Feser goes through some of the goals that have been proposed -- eliminating imminent threats, destroying Iran's nuclear capability, possible future threats, liberation of the Iranian people, and argues that none of these are plausible. Like Cardina McElroy, he notes that preventative war is not just.
(F2) Lawful authority: Warmaking authority in the United States ultimately rests with Congress. While Congress has given the President certain war powers and emergency powers, they require Congressional oversight, which the Trump administration has not done much to obtain -- indeed, has apparently deliberately not bothered to obtain.
It's possible to read him as also suggesting (F3) Reasonable possibility of success as a third, depending on which goal discussed in (F1) we take to be dominant.
Fundamentally, just action of any kind is rightful authority rightly disposed to righteous ends, and genuine just war criteria are always applications of this to the specialized work of warring; as I've noted before, you can always derive them from general practical considerations about the things done in war. We have to be wary, however, of a common ambiguity in talking about justice, namely, that it has both a moral sense and a legal or juridical sense, related to each other but distinct. And we see this ambiguity all the time in just war theory; St. Thomas Aquinas's account of just war is specifically an account of how a prince's warring can be an act of the virtue of justice (the moral sense), but later scholastics often are considering war juridically in terms of whether the overall conduct of war is in accordance with natural law and jus gentium. Both are important, but it is possible to have a just war in the juridical sense in which some of the people involved are participating with unjust intentions or goals, and, equally, it is possible to have a war that is juridically unjust but in which some of the people involved are being just in their participation. Indeed, given human failings, every just war (juridical) that has ever been has had some unjust warring (moral) in it. Distinguishing these is usually not a problem if we are considering common soldiers, but it can get very tricky when we are looking at the level of generals or the commander-in-chief, who, in addition to being individual participants are also principal agents organizing the juridical situation.
One weakness in both McElroy's and Ed's arguments is the assumption that hostilities with Iran have recently begun. I don't think this is an accurate assessment of the situation. The United States has been in a state of cold-and-hot hostilities with Iran since 1979, and while military confrontation has not always been direct, when it has not been so, it has been going on by proxy fights, deliberate subversion, economic and diplomatic sanction, assassination attempts, bombing campaigns, and the like. This is not a recent conflict; this is an already existing cold war becoming a hot war. That it has been until now a mostly slow-motion conflict does not make it any less a conflict. What is more, Iran is not an innocent actor in any of this; it has consistently positioned itself as an enemy of the United States and its allies, and attempts to persuade it to take a more moderate posture have repeatedly failed. There is also a reason why our Arabic allies have been remarkably sanguine and nonobstructive despite the fact that the American campaign has resulted in a large number of missiles being shot at them and their civilians; there are very few countries in the region for which Iran has not funded and armed coup attempts, and there are very few whom Iran has not threatened militarily and economically in an attempt to get its way on any number of things. In this sense, the question of whether and under what conditions Iran can be attacked is much like the question of whether and under what conditions the Barbary States could be attacked.
It's worth recognizing that this does not change the framework -- that's one reason I pointed out that it derives from general practical principles, namely, it covers everything -- but I think it does complicate the just cause arguments given by both McElroy and Feser. In fact, I am highly skeptical of both if they are intended juridically. Just cause is the most important component determining whether war is just or not, mostly because it is the reference point for understanding how to apply all the other criteria, but it is not (alas) not usually a difficult one to meet, and it is actually quite easy to meet it in the context of Iran. Ed looks at various goals that have been proposed, and is right that they cannot of themselves justify a standalone war; but they are each entirely reasonable goals to have for particular operations in an already ongoing state of hostilities. This, of course, is a distinct question from whether President Trump, or any other officials or commanders involved are themselves operating with a just cause in their own actions in this war.
To be sure, I would blame no one for going along with the idea that the campaign is morally illegitimate for just cause reasons, since if Cardinal McElroy and Dr. Feser agree on a point of moral theology and philosophy, then it is at least reasonably safe and Catholic. Nonetheless, I don't think those particular arguments work on rational grounds.
I also don't think Cardinal McElroy's argument on expectation of good, at least as it stands, works; Ed rightly notes that the mere fact that something could turn out well is not enough to make it just, but it's also true, for much the same reason, that the mere fact that something could go very wrong is not enough to make it unjust. That is, unless we are moral rigorists, which I can hardly imagine Cardinal McElroy intends. War is uncertain, unpredictable, and cannot be done according to a strict plan; and people who forecast wars are virtually always wrong. Further, the idea that we should not act in a way that would create greater harm than the harm we are addressing is concerned specifically with grave evils and disorders directly associated with the use of arms and its natural aftermath. Broader ripples and unpleasant consequences are not the concern here. (The argument also has an inconvenient result for His Eminence's position in that it implies the United States also cannot justly withdraw from the conflict until we can do so in a way that would guarantee that the withdrawal would not gravely harm our allies in the region. This is probably close to true, but it is not, I think, what the Cardinal is intending to suggest.)
I remember Ed having some sympathy with the idea that the Iraq War met just war criteria, when I was skeptical of that. It's interesting here that Ed regards the current Iran campaign as manifestly unjust whereas I am at least much more sympathetic to the general possibility of its being just. Nonetheless, I think, McElroy is quite right that, in terms of what has actually been done there are serious concerns with right intention, and particularly with clear intent or purpose, which is only one part of right intention, but nonetheless one that is seomtiems quite important. And Ed's argument on lawful authority is, I think, likewise a matter of serious concern in this particular case.
