Thursday, March 14, 2024

Bonaventure for Lent XXVI

 The eager desire for discipline gives birth to love. Hence the proper attention to discipline is love. For if you love discipline, you love virtue in yourself and in others and in its very Source. Discipline, however, does not have to be servile: it may be free, so that it loves the one who imposes it, and acts out of love, not out of fear. 

[St. Bonaventure, Collations on the Six Days (2.4), in The Works of Bonaventure: Cardinal, Seraphic Doctor, and Saint, Volume 5, De Vinck, tr., St. Anthony Guild Press (Paterson, NJ: 1960) p. 17.]

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

Bonaventure for Lent XXV

 It is in Christ's merit, then, that all of our merits are rooted, both those that satisfy punishment or those that merit eternal life. For we are unworthy to be absolved from any offense against the supreme Good, nor do we deserve to be rewarded with the immensity of the eternal reward that is God's own self, except through the merit of the God-man. Of him we can and should say, Lord, all we have done, you have done for us. And he indeed is the Lord of whom the prophet spoke: I say to the Lord, "You are my God, for you have no need of my goods."

[Bonaventure, Breviloquium (4.7.7), Monti, tr., Franciscan Institute Publications (St. Bonaventure, NY: 2005), p. 156.]

Tuesday, March 12, 2024

"Let's See You Do Better!"

 Patrick Todd, Let's See You Do Better: An Essay on the Standing to Criticize, argues for the 'be better norm of criticism', which he formulates as follows:

One must: criticize x with respect to standard s only if one is better than x with respect to standard s.

Part of his attempt to motivate this is based on "Let's see you do better" cases, i.e., cases in which people respond to criticism by saying "Let's see you do better!" The whole argument is quite interesting. However, the 'be better norm' is, I think, obviously absurd and untenable, since it would require people not to criticize in cases in which we have good independent reason to think that people have a moral responsibility to criticize. For instance, you don't actually have to be better at politics than someone to criticize their political abuses, and any attempt to suggest the 'be better' norm in such cases would (I say) miss the point of such criticisms and, more importantly, the moral obligations that sometimes require that we make such criticisms.

It is true that people often try to evade criticism by pointing to hypocrisies and failings in their critics, but this cannot be regarded as good and rational behavior; it is often flailing and only really works to the extent that it appears to suggest that the criticism is a lying criticism. But the problem with a hypocrite pointing out your moral failings, if they really are moral failings, is not the criticism but the failure to apply it to themselves, as well.

In "Let's see you do better" cases, I don't think it's reasonable to see these as implying anything like the 'be better norm'; rather, the point is usually that the criticism fails to do justice to the difficulty of the task. In general, in fact, to a certain extent, "Let's see you do better!" acknowledges the criticism as to content; you don't say it if you can just point out that the critic is wrong. You do say it when you think the critic is underestimating the difficulty or complexity of the task being criticized, because difficulty and complexity are things that everyone thinks should be taken into account in evaluation. It's not the criticism but the glibness of it that "Let's see you do better!" highlights. This is the real reason for one of the features that Todd discusses, the fact that you can give the response on behalf of someone else.

I've sometimes commented on something like this with regard to 'mediocre' poets. Some people like to criticize poets like Alfred Austin as 'mediocre'. Austin is arguably not mediocre at all, and just labors under the difficulty of having been Poet Laureate immediately after Wordsworth and Tennyson, but even if he were, it's absurd to treat this as a serious criticism. The reason people make such criticisms is that they generally do not grasp the difficulty of poetry. To be even a mediocre poet is an extraordinary achievement; very few people make it so far, and a mediocre poet is going to achieve some very good work even if not consistently or with noticeable weaknesses. Thus if someone is being dismissed for being a 'mediocre poet', it's entirely reasonable to say to such a person, "Let's see you do better!" Underestimating the difficulty of the task being criticized is a common problem, in fact, in literary and artistic criticism, and it leads to distortions of judgment. Since literature and art are matters of skill, difficulty matters an immense amount in any reasonable assessment. Dante's Inferno is occasionally marred by pettiness and obscurity; this is definitely true, but let's see you do better.

When this is taken into account, I think it's clear that there's really no such thing as a standing of criticism, except in the metaphorical sense that if you criticize you should know what you are talking about; while it sometimes gets used loosely, 'standing' is really only relevant in matters dealing with harm, and honest and reasonable criticism is never a harm even when wrong.

Bonaventure for Lent XXIV

 Now we come to Christ either through faith or the sacrament of faith. Since faith in Christ is the same in past, present, and future, it follows that Christ's influencing power must reach all people -- those who went before him, those who were his contemporaries, and those who were yet to come; all who believe in him and who are reborn in him; all who are bound to him in faith and who, through an inpouring of grace become members of Christ and temples of the Holy Spirit, and thus children of God the Father, joined to one another by the unbreakable bond of love. Just as distance does not divide us, so we are not separated by the passing of time. Thus all the just, wherever they might be, whenever they might live, constitute one mystical body of Christ, receiving sense and motion from the one head that influences them, through the fontal, radical, and original fullness of all grace that dwells in Christ the fountainhead.

[Bonaventure, Breviloquium (4.5.6), Monti, tr., Franciscan Institute Publications (St. Bonaventure, NY: 2005) p. 149.]

Monday, March 11, 2024

Not Where I Breathe, but Where I Love, I Live

 I Dye Alive
by St. Robert Southwell

O life! what letts thee from a quicke decease?
 O death! what drawes thee from a present praye?
 My feast is done, my soule would be at ease,
 My grace is saide; O death! come take awaye. 

 I live, but such a life as ever dyes;
 I dye, but such a death as never endes;
My death to end my dying life denyes,
 And life my living death no whitt amends. 

 Thus still I dye, yet still I do revive;
 My living death by dying life is fedd;
Grace more then nature kepes my hart alive,
 Whose idle hopes and vayne desires are deade. 

 Not where I breath, but where I love, I live;
 Not where I love, but where I am, I dye;
 The life I wish, must future glory give,
 The deaths I feele in present daungers lye.

Bonaventure for Lent XXIII

 For the method of reasoning or inquiring is good for promoting faith. And it does so in three ways directed to three types of humans: some are adversaries of the faith; others are weak in their faith; while the faith of others is complete. 

 In the first place, the method of inquiry works to confound the adversaries of the faith. Consequently, Augustine says in On the Trinity: “Against loquacious quibblers, whose self-esteem outstrips their abilities, make use of Catholic arguments and like arguments that are suitable, in order to defend and assert the faith.” 

In the second place, the method of inquiry works to strengthen those who are weak in their faith. Just as God strengthens charity in the weak through temporal benefits, so he strengthens the faith of the weak through arguments using proof: for if the weak were to see that there are no arguments using proof for the faith, but that opposing arguments abound, none of them would persist in the faith.

 In the third place, the method of inquiry works to bring delight to those whose faith is complete. For in a wonderful way the soul delights in understanding what it already believes with complete faith. Consequently, Bernard says: “There is nothing we understand with more pleasure than what we already believe through faith.”

[Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences: Philosophy of God (Topic 1: Book 1, Prologue, Question 2), Houser and Noone, trs., Franciscan Institute Publications (St. Bonaventure, NY: 2013).]

Sunday, March 10, 2024

Links of Note

 * Helen De Cruz, Curtain tune for academic philosophy, at "Wondering Freely"

* Andrew Chignell, Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being (PDF)

* Michael Strand, Why We Don't Believe in Free Will, at "Front Porch Republic"

* José David García Cruz, A Modal Logic to Reason about Analogical Proportion (PDF)

* Kieran Setiya, Josiah Carberry Day, at "Under the Net"

* Gary Hatfield, The history of philosophy as philosophy (PDF)

* Andrew Klavan, Words, Words, Words, at "The New Jerusalem"

* Sebastian Gäb, Mystical Ineffability (PDF)

* Paul Krause, The Augustinian Imperative: Saint Augustine and the Discovery of the Self, at "Discourses on Minerva"

* Joel Katzav, Revisiting Grace de Laguna's critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism (PDF)

* Jamie Boulding, Intellectual Friendship: Why It Matters, at "Public Discourse"

* Maité Cruz, Shepherd's Case for the Demonstrability of Causal Principles.  This is interesting, although I'm skeptical of the idea that Shepherd herself takes substance-accident metaphysics to be a central concern. But I also don't think Fantl's objection a serious problem for Shepherd (it's based on an assumption about beginning to exist, that it is entirely in terms of existence and nonexistence at times, which I think Shepherd would regard as obviously absurd and, even if not, irrelevant to the cases she is explicitly considering, and I think she would be correct if she did so regard it), so I don't think it makes sense to take response to it as central to interpretation of her argument. Nonetheless I think the substance-accident approach is a viable one in itself and that Shepherd perhaps could have taken it.

* Troy Wellington Smith, From Enthusiasm to Irony: Kierkegaard's Reception of Norse Mythology and Literature (PDF) 

* Helen Rauner, Dust to Dust, on W. H. Auden, at "Commonweal"

* Eric Solis, Curable and Incurable Vice in Aristotle (PDF)

* Laura K. Field, Liberal morality needs liberal mythology, at "hypertext"