I'll be gone for a few days. I thought I'd point out a few places where I have been engaging in comments-box discussion, both on issues related to posts I've been preparing:
* Suspicious of Numbers: A Bias Against Probability at "Fides Quarens Intellectum" (I had already intended to say something about Fogelin's A Defense of Hume on Miracles when this discussion began)
* "The Doctrine" - Part 3 at "Trinities" (I want to say something about Tibbles and mereology)
Cheers,
Brandon
Friday, June 30, 2006
Some Notes on Catholic Excommunications
Since excommunication has recently come up in the news, due to Cardinal Trujillo's recent claim that stem cell researchers doing work that involves destruction of embryos are subject to excommunication. Since misinformation starts flying around once anyone mentions excommunication, I thought I would say a few things.
(1) Cardinal Trujillo does not have the authority to issue binding interpretations of canon law on this issue. He is not 'the Vatican', merely the head of the Pontifical Council for the Family. As Edward Peters notes on his canon law blog, there's a fairly good chance that the Vatican will at some point back him up more officially on this point, because for the purposes of canon law just about any deliberate killing of an embryo or fetus is treated as an abortion; but it's worth noting that we should never conflate 'the Vatican' with just one or two cardinals.
(2) Being excommunicated doesn't mean being 'expelled from the Church'. Abstracting from a few details, excommunication typically involves the following punishment: not being allowed to celebrate or receive the sacraments. The punishment is what is usually called 'medicinal'; i.e., it isn't generally supposed to be given in order to punish anyone, but to correct them, which means that it is forward-looking: excommunication is imposed in order that it may be lifted at some future point. Thus excommunication doesn't 'expel you from the Church'; on the contrary, it presupposes that you may continue to be Christian in a state of excommunication. On the Catholic view it's baptism that makes you Christian; and a legitimate baptism can't be effaced by any penalty the Church may impose. What excommunication does is shut off the sacramental blessings of the Church, and those consolations associated with them, from the baptized.
(3) Excommunication is usually ferendae sententiae, i.e., no matter what you do you aren't excommunicated until someone actually excommunicates you. On very rare occasions (only about nine or so in canon law) it is latae sententiae, i.e., you excommunicate yourself simply by committing the offense. As it happens procurement of abortion (and being an accomplice in it) is by canon 1398 currently treated as a latae sententiae offense. (The provision is not by any means new; the 1917 code of canon law had a similar provision; and similar provisions go back to the sixteenth century.) What this means is that those who procure an abortion (or assist those who do) are automatically considered not to be in the spiritual state required for receiving the sacraments, and continue to be in such a state until they confess and atone for it properly. It is certainly this canon that Trujillo has in mind. As with all cases of canon law, there are exemptions, e.g., not being of sound mind or being younger than sixteen, and mitigations, e.g., being a minor who is sixteen or older.
(1) Cardinal Trujillo does not have the authority to issue binding interpretations of canon law on this issue. He is not 'the Vatican', merely the head of the Pontifical Council for the Family. As Edward Peters notes on his canon law blog, there's a fairly good chance that the Vatican will at some point back him up more officially on this point, because for the purposes of canon law just about any deliberate killing of an embryo or fetus is treated as an abortion; but it's worth noting that we should never conflate 'the Vatican' with just one or two cardinals.
(2) Being excommunicated doesn't mean being 'expelled from the Church'. Abstracting from a few details, excommunication typically involves the following punishment: not being allowed to celebrate or receive the sacraments. The punishment is what is usually called 'medicinal'; i.e., it isn't generally supposed to be given in order to punish anyone, but to correct them, which means that it is forward-looking: excommunication is imposed in order that it may be lifted at some future point. Thus excommunication doesn't 'expel you from the Church'; on the contrary, it presupposes that you may continue to be Christian in a state of excommunication. On the Catholic view it's baptism that makes you Christian; and a legitimate baptism can't be effaced by any penalty the Church may impose. What excommunication does is shut off the sacramental blessings of the Church, and those consolations associated with them, from the baptized.
(3) Excommunication is usually ferendae sententiae, i.e., no matter what you do you aren't excommunicated until someone actually excommunicates you. On very rare occasions (only about nine or so in canon law) it is latae sententiae, i.e., you excommunicate yourself simply by committing the offense. As it happens procurement of abortion (and being an accomplice in it) is by canon 1398 currently treated as a latae sententiae offense. (The provision is not by any means new; the 1917 code of canon law had a similar provision; and similar provisions go back to the sixteenth century.) What this means is that those who procure an abortion (or assist those who do) are automatically considered not to be in the spiritual state required for receiving the sacraments, and continue to be in such a state until they confess and atone for it properly. It is certainly this canon that Trujillo has in mind. As with all cases of canon law, there are exemptions, e.g., not being of sound mind or being younger than sixteen, and mitigations, e.g., being a minor who is sixteen or older.
Thursday, June 29, 2006
Peter and Paul
It came to pass, after Paul went out of the island Gaudomeleta, that he came to Italy; and it was heard of by the Jews who were in Rome, the elder of the cities, that Paul demanded to come to Caesar. Having fallen, therefore, into great grief and much despondency, they said among themselves: It does not please him that he alone has afflicted all our brethren and parents in Judaea and Samaria, and in all Palestine; and he has not been pleased with these, but, behold, he comes here also, having through imposition asked Caesar to destroy us.
So begins The Acts of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, a sort of early sensationalistic fictionalization of the martyrdom of the two apostles. It seems fitting to link to it on their feast day, particularly given that the story is actually a fairly enjoyable light read.
So begins The Acts of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, a sort of early sensationalistic fictionalization of the martyrdom of the two apostles. It seems fitting to link to it on their feast day, particularly given that the story is actually a fairly enjoyable light read.
Brown on Hume's Philosophical Style
That Mr. Hume was an acute thinker in metaphysics, there are probably none, even of his most daring antagonists, who will venture to deny. That he was also a perspicuous metaphysical writer, has been generally admitted; but it has been admitted, chiefly as a consequence of the former praise, or from the remembrance of that power of style, which, in other respects, he unquestionably possessed. In his shorter details of historical reasoning, no defect is perceived; because these afford room for the display of acute conjecture, and of a happy combination of those loose circumstances, which to common observers appear altogether unconnected, rather than for regular consecutive demonstration. But, as a metaphysical writer, Mr. Hume is in no degree supereminent in those qualities, which the developement of an abstruse and complicated science peculiarly requires. He seizes a first principle, indeed, with singular rapidity; but, to us, he rather exhibits it gracefully at different distances, than brings it regularly and directly to the best point of vision: and though, in the separate views which he gives us of a subject, we are always struck with the acuteness of his discernment, and are often charmed with an ease of language and a pointedness of remark, which, without the levity of humour, have all its playful graces, still, when we consider him as the expositor of a theory, we are sensible of a want of strict methodical arrangmeent, for which subtlety of thought, and grace of composition, are not able fully to atone. We almost discover, that his mind had not been conversant with the close and continuous investigations of mathematical science; and we feel, that iti s the genius of his style, to illustrate, rather than to establish.
Thomas Brown, Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect. 2nd ed. Mundell and Son (Edinburgh: 1806) 37-38.
Thomas Brown, Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect. 2nd ed. Mundell and Son (Edinburgh: 1806) 37-38.
Tuesday, June 27, 2006
MacQueen on Hume on Superstition and Enthusiasm
Probably the first serious response to Hume's History of England (published after the first volume of the History came out in 1754) was Daniel MacQueen's Letters on Hume's History. MacQueen's book is a fairly thorough criticism of Hume's handling of the struggle between Protestants and Catholics. As a Presbyterian minister, MacQueen thinks Hume was far too hard on the Reformers and far too easy on the Catholics. This partisan slant has perhaps led to the book being overlooked a bit, which is unfortunate, because in the course of his attacks on Catholicism and laudings of Protestantism, MacQueen says some very intelligent and interesting things.
Perhaps the most important of these is his sharp criticism of Hume's distinction between superstition and enthusiasm, and of Hume's fairly extensive use of these concepts to explain historical events. Hume tends to treat superstition and enthusiasm as diametrically opposed: superstition likes rigid law, enthusiasm likes anarchic liberty; superstition involves excessive self-doubt and heteronomy, enthusiasm involves excessive self-confidence and autonomy; superstition is more society-friendly in the short run but leads to more violent excesses in the long run, while it is the reverse with enthusiasm; and so forth. But as MacQueen notes, it isn't clear why they are treated as mutually exclusive:
Not only can he imagine it, he's certain that it actually exists, in the Catholic Church; and much of MacQueen's argument is that Hume is wrong to identify Protestantism with enthusiasm and Catholicism with superstition. On the contrary, Protestantism is the golden mean between the two extremes of Catholicism and Catholicism!
But MacQueen goes on to argue that Hume's characterization of enthusiasm is ambiguous in a number of its features. For instance:
And:
In this passage I think MacQueen comes very close to seeing something I've noted before, namely, that Hume seems to be trying to make these concepts fill two roles, one psychological and one sociological, and it is difficult to see how they can do both, and this leads to occasional apparent contradictions in which enthusiasm in its psychological role (excessive confidence in one's link with God) makes alliance with superstition in its sociological role (priestcraft and rites and establishment religion), or superstition in its psychological role (excessive reliance on rigid principles) jumps together with enthusiasm in its sociological role (no authority); or when he apparently attributes the melancholy of superstition to enthusiasm; or some such. It isn't clear that these are actually self-contradictions; but they do seem to be signs that Hume isn't adequately clear in his use of these concepts to build historical explanations.
Perhaps the most important of these is his sharp criticism of Hume's distinction between superstition and enthusiasm, and of Hume's fairly extensive use of these concepts to explain historical events. Hume tends to treat superstition and enthusiasm as diametrically opposed: superstition likes rigid law, enthusiasm likes anarchic liberty; superstition involves excessive self-doubt and heteronomy, enthusiasm involves excessive self-confidence and autonomy; superstition is more society-friendly in the short run but leads to more violent excesses in the long run, while it is the reverse with enthusiasm; and so forth. But as MacQueen notes, it isn't clear why they are treated as mutually exclusive:
These two species of religion (to use his style) ar eevidently distinct the one from the other : but they do not appear to me to be "diametrically opposite." I can perceive no absurdity in supposing, that one may embrace the tenets, and practise the rites of superstition, who notwithstanding may be possessed of no inconsiderable portion of the fanatical spirit. Nay, I can easily imagine a plan of religion, which, in some of its doctrines and institutions, may be extremely favourable to superstition; in others again, to fanaticism. (p. 21)
Not only can he imagine it, he's certain that it actually exists, in the Catholic Church; and much of MacQueen's argument is that Hume is wrong to identify Protestantism with enthusiasm and Catholicism with superstition. On the contrary, Protestantism is the golden mean between the two extremes of Catholicism and Catholicism!
But MacQueen goes on to argue that Hume's characterization of enthusiasm is ambiguous in a number of its features. For instance:
Intrepidity of spirit is the concluding article of proof in the above paragraph; concerning which every one knows, that as it is grounded in the natural constitution, so it may be strengthened in different persons, by various principles and motives that are suited to affect them. A sense of duty, a sense of hnour, a sense of religion, each of these will, in its turn, confirm it. Where the cause is good, intrepidity of spirit in its defence is an honourable distinction. But boldness and intrepidity may be likewise exerted in a quite opposite cause, andi n prosecution of the worst purposes. In the concerns of religion it may be exerted by the inflamed bigot, and the wild enthusiast, as well as by the wise and worthy friends of truth. here then is another supposed mark of enthusiasm, which is in itself wholly ambiguous,a nd from which therefore no conclusion can be drawn. (67-68)
And:
But, you will say, was there nothing intemperate in their zeal, nothing irregular in the manner of their prosecuting the great ends they had in view? Who ever affirmed that there was not? They were men; consequently neither infallible nor impeccable. But then, my friend, intemperate zeal is not enthusiasm. They are no less distinct than effect and cause. Neither does the effect here follow necessarily from the cause; for we have many a time heard of harmless enthusiasts: nor is it an effect of this cause alone, as it may be at least equally derived from credulous and blind bigotry. Nay, I will venture to affirm that furious and desolating zeal hath been found in alliance with the superstitious principle more frequently than with the enthusiastic one; and that its ravages, when thus allied, have been more deplorable and dreadful. (72)
In this passage I think MacQueen comes very close to seeing something I've noted before, namely, that Hume seems to be trying to make these concepts fill two roles, one psychological and one sociological, and it is difficult to see how they can do both, and this leads to occasional apparent contradictions in which enthusiasm in its psychological role (excessive confidence in one's link with God) makes alliance with superstition in its sociological role (priestcraft and rites and establishment religion), or superstition in its psychological role (excessive reliance on rigid principles) jumps together with enthusiasm in its sociological role (no authority); or when he apparently attributes the melancholy of superstition to enthusiasm; or some such. It isn't clear that these are actually self-contradictions; but they do seem to be signs that Hume isn't adequately clear in his use of these concepts to build historical explanations.
Brentano
Chris at "Mixing Memory" has a post in which he talks a bit about Franz Brentano, so I thought I'd put up a few online links for those who are interested in being introduced to the awesomeness that is Brentano. For Brentano is lots of fun; I don't study him, but I've never read anything by him that was not well worth reading.
* The Marxist Psychology Archive has translations of the first two chapters of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
* The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a general article on Brentano and an article on his theory of judgment. Naturally, he also receives some mention in the articles on intentionality and on consciousness and intentionality.
* The Maverick Philosopher has some posts on Brentano. He also has an online article on Brentano on Existence.
* Barry Smith has a number of articles on Brentano's philosophy.
* Dallas Willard has an article reflecting on Brentano's invisibility.
ADDED LATER: Also, there's an examination of Brentano on the subject of 'existential import' at The Logic Museum.
* The Marxist Psychology Archive has translations of the first two chapters of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
* The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a general article on Brentano and an article on his theory of judgment. Naturally, he also receives some mention in the articles on intentionality and on consciousness and intentionality.
* The Maverick Philosopher has some posts on Brentano. He also has an online article on Brentano on Existence.
* Barry Smith has a number of articles on Brentano's philosophy.
* Dallas Willard has an article reflecting on Brentano's invisibility.
ADDED LATER: Also, there's an examination of Brentano on the subject of 'existential import' at The Logic Museum.
Salutaries and Notables
* Today is the memorial of Cyril of Alexandria, who arguably is second only to the Apostle Paul as the most influential theologian in Christian history. I have a post linking to resources here. From one of his letters to Nestorius:
* Tomorrow is the memorial of another Doctor of the Church, Irenaeus of Lyons. From his Demonstration:
* I missed it, but the 25th was the 476th anniversary of the presentation of the Augsburg Confession to the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V. The Augsburg Confession, of course, is an important Lutheran document.
* Fr. John Tucker has an excellent homily on being judgmental at "Dappled Things".
* Alejandro continues discussion of a paper by Pruss on naturalistic vs. theistic explanations at "Reality Conditions".
* The Carnival of Bad History is up at "Frog in a Well", with some excellent posts.
* Elie Wiesel reviews FEAR: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz. (HT: Cliopatria)
* ADDED: Janet Stemwedel has an interesting post called Reason, tradition, and scripture...in science?. The position taken reminds me of Duhem's Pascalian view of science.
Confessing the Word to be made one with the flesh according to substance, we adore one Son and Lord Jesus Christ: we do not divide the God from the man, nor separate him into parts, as though the two natures were mutually united in him only through a sharing of dignity and authority (for that is a novelty and nothing else), neither do we give separately to the Word of God the name Christ and the same name separately to a different one born of a woman; but we know only one Christ, the Word from God the Father with his own Flesh. For as man he was anointed with us, although it is he himself who gives the Spirit to those who are worthy and not in measure, according to the saying of the blessed Evangelist John.
* Tomorrow is the memorial of another Doctor of the Church, Irenaeus of Lyons. From his Demonstration:
This then is the order of the rule of our faith, and the foundation of the building, and the stability of our conversation: God, the Father, not made, not material, invisible; one God, the creator of all things: this is the first point of our faith. The second point is: The Word of God, Son of God, Christ Jesus our Lord, who was manifested to the prophets according to the form of their prophesying and according to the method of the dispensation of the Father: through whom all things were made; who also at the end of the times, to complete and gather up all things, was made man among men, visible and tangible, in order to abolish death and show forth life and produce a community of union between God and man. And the third point is: The Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied, and the fathers learned the things of God, and the righteous were led forth into the way of righteousness; and who in the end of the times was poured out in a new way a upon mankind in all the earth, renewing man unto God.
* I missed it, but the 25th was the 476th anniversary of the presentation of the Augsburg Confession to the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V. The Augsburg Confession, of course, is an important Lutheran document.
* Fr. John Tucker has an excellent homily on being judgmental at "Dappled Things".
* Alejandro continues discussion of a paper by Pruss on naturalistic vs. theistic explanations at "Reality Conditions".
* The Carnival of Bad History is up at "Frog in a Well", with some excellent posts.
* Elie Wiesel reviews FEAR: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz. (HT: Cliopatria)
* ADDED: Janet Stemwedel has an interesting post called Reason, tradition, and scripture...in science?. The position taken reminds me of Duhem's Pascalian view of science.
There's Texas, and Then There's Austin
A Texas joke that has been going around:
Once upon a time in the kingdom of Heaven, God was busy at work for six days. Michael the Archangel came upon him as he was resting on the seventh day.
He asked of God, "Where have you been?"
God sighed a deep sigh of satisfaction and proudly pointed downwards through the clouds, "Look, Michael. Look what I've made."
Archangel Michael looked puzzled and said, "What is it?"
"It's a planet," replied God, "and I've put Life on it. I'm going to call it Earth and it's going to be a great place of balance."
"Balance?" Inquired Michael, still confused.
God pointed to different parts of the earth. "I have made some lands abundant in water and other lands parched deserts. This one will be extremely hot and while this one will be very cold and covered in ice."
The Archangel, impressed by God's work, then pointed to a land mass and said, "What's that one?"
"Ah," said God. "That's Texas -- the most glorious place on earth. There are beautiful beaches, streams, hills, and forests. The people from Texas are going to be handsome, modest, intelligent and humorous and they are going to be found traveling the world. They will be extremely sociable, hardworking and high achieving, and they will be renowned throughout the world."
Michael gasped in wonder and admiration but then proclaimed, "What about balance, God? You said there would be balance!"
God replied wisely, "Wait until you see the people I put in Austin."
To understand just how funny the joke is, you have to know just how different Austin tends to be from the rest of Texas; it has a hippie reputation, due to things like Hippie Hollow (the only clothing-optional park in Texas) and Eeyore's Birthday Party and Spamarama, a profound obsession with Whole Foods, and the unofficial motto "Keep Austin Weird".
Once upon a time in the kingdom of Heaven, God was busy at work for six days. Michael the Archangel came upon him as he was resting on the seventh day.
He asked of God, "Where have you been?"
God sighed a deep sigh of satisfaction and proudly pointed downwards through the clouds, "Look, Michael. Look what I've made."
Archangel Michael looked puzzled and said, "What is it?"
"It's a planet," replied God, "and I've put Life on it. I'm going to call it Earth and it's going to be a great place of balance."
"Balance?" Inquired Michael, still confused.
God pointed to different parts of the earth. "I have made some lands abundant in water and other lands parched deserts. This one will be extremely hot and while this one will be very cold and covered in ice."
The Archangel, impressed by God's work, then pointed to a land mass and said, "What's that one?"
"Ah," said God. "That's Texas -- the most glorious place on earth. There are beautiful beaches, streams, hills, and forests. The people from Texas are going to be handsome, modest, intelligent and humorous and they are going to be found traveling the world. They will be extremely sociable, hardworking and high achieving, and they will be renowned throughout the world."
Michael gasped in wonder and admiration but then proclaimed, "What about balance, God? You said there would be balance!"
God replied wisely, "Wait until you see the people I put in Austin."
To understand just how funny the joke is, you have to know just how different Austin tends to be from the rest of Texas; it has a hippie reputation, due to things like Hippie Hollow (the only clothing-optional park in Texas) and Eeyore's Birthday Party and Spamarama, a profound obsession with Whole Foods, and the unofficial motto "Keep Austin Weird".
Black, White, Red
The commenters at Aetiology [Hmmm; I really blinked on this one; not only did I not put in a link, I attributed it to the wrong weblog. The right one is Living the Scientific Life.] are speculating on who will die in the last Harry Potter book. I find it interesting that several commenters think that Snape will die to save Harry, because (while I'd like that) I think it would be more interesting the other way around, i.e., if Harry dies to save Snape, finally reaching a genuine maturity by overcoming his hatred for him through sacrifice. Love restores balance by learning forgiveness even for the apparently unforgivable. It's noteworthy that while Snape has given reason for Harry to hate him, Harry's hate for Snape throughout the series has had relatively little connection to that (as can be seen by how easily Harry leaps to suspecting Snape for everything, and how different Harry's hatred of Snape is from that of others). In the greater series Dumbledore's death has to mean something (contrary to what some fans would like, I don't think Rowlings is bringing him back). I also think Hagrid will die, because I think John Granger is probably onto something in thinking that the basic frame of the plot is alchemical transformation, and that Rubeus Hagrid is the red stage of the work that follows the black (Sirius Black) and the white (Albus Dumbledore). I worry that Neville Longbottom might also die. Rowlings hasn't said how many people will die in the book (at least offstage), only that one character she originally intended to die won't, and two other characters that she didn't intend to die will.
Natural Limits
Aristotle gives good reasons--scientific and ethical reasons--why we ought to value other natural things more for their own ends than for what we can do with them. Sure enough, humans need to use natural substances, including other organisms, instrumentally. The development of techniques of hunting, agriculture, and animal husbandry is a clear manifestation of that need. But Aristotle argues that these techniques, like all technologies, have a natural limit, the transgression of which is contrary to nature and ignoble. That limit is what is necessary for our survival and functioning, in acordance with our own natural needs and functions (which, Aristotle holds, can be objectively determined for humans, just as it can for other animals).
We have overcome the Aristotelian view that the earth is at the center of the spatial universe, but we still need to come over to the Aristotelian view that humans are not at the center of the axiological universe. Thus I think that a study of Aristotelian teleology, in addition to benig an intrinsically valuable exercise, can be justified instrumentally on the grounds that it has something to show us about our relationship to nature.
Monte Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology. Clarendon (Oxford: 2005), p. 5. Monte's book is reviewed by T.K. Johansen here.
We have overcome the Aristotelian view that the earth is at the center of the spatial universe, but we still need to come over to the Aristotelian view that humans are not at the center of the axiological universe. Thus I think that a study of Aristotelian teleology, in addition to benig an intrinsically valuable exercise, can be justified instrumentally on the grounds that it has something to show us about our relationship to nature.
Monte Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology. Clarendon (Oxford: 2005), p. 5. Monte's book is reviewed by T.K. Johansen here.
Monday, June 26, 2006
Shepherd vs. Custom-Based Accounts of Causation
Lady Mary Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824), pp. 46-47:
This lovely little passage, in which Shepherd is attacking Hume's claim that our notions of causes and effects are due to custom or reasoning, summarizes a number of features of Shepherd's theory of causation.
(1) Objects can be treated as masses of 'qualities' or characteristics.
(2) The mixtures of these masses of qualities is causation.
(3) The effects are the objects that are masses of the mixed qualities.
(See here for a very rough, crude summary of what's involved in these claims.)
Further (although these are only seen clearly when this passage is looked at in its full context):
(4) Because of (1), (2), and (3) we can reason cogently that similar qualities in similar circumstances will have similar effects (i.e., we can provide a rational, and not merely customary basis, for the maxim that like causes have like effects), and thus of induction insofar as it involves this maxim.
(5) Using (1), (2), and (3) we can provide a rational basis for the maxim that everything that begins to exist must have a cause.
Of course, these are not the only problems that arise for a theory of causation, and Shepherd discusses a number of others. But I thought that this passage provides a neat little summary of some of her views.
Be prepared for lots more Shepherd in the coming weeks.
It is in vain to say that a habit of association of ideas from observing "contiguity in time, and place," between objects is all we know of power; a habit of the mind will not begin existence, will not introduce a quality. The really philosophical method of viewing the subject is this: that objects in relation to us, are nothing but masses of certain qualities, affecting certain of our senses; and which, when independent of our senses, are unknown powers or qualities in nature. These masses change their qualities by their mixture with any other mass, and then the corresponding qualities determined to the senses must of course also change. These changed qualities, are termed effects; or consequents; but are really no more than NEW QUALITIES arising from new objects, which have been formed by the junctions of other objects (previously formed) or might be considered as the unobserved qualities of existing objects; which shall be observed when properly exhibited.
If then an existence now in being, conjoined with any other, forms thereby a new nature, capable of exhibiting new qualities, these new qualities must enter into the definition of the objects; they become a part of their natures; and when by careful experiment, or judicious observation, no new prevening circumstances are supposed to make an alteration in the conjunction of the same bodies, the new qualities, that are named effects, are expected without a doubt to arise upon every such conjunction; because , they as much belong to this newly combined nature, as the original qualities did to each separate nature, before their conjunction.
This lovely little passage, in which Shepherd is attacking Hume's claim that our notions of causes and effects are due to custom or reasoning, summarizes a number of features of Shepherd's theory of causation.
(1) Objects can be treated as masses of 'qualities' or characteristics.
(2) The mixtures of these masses of qualities is causation.
(3) The effects are the objects that are masses of the mixed qualities.
(See here for a very rough, crude summary of what's involved in these claims.)
Further (although these are only seen clearly when this passage is looked at in its full context):
(4) Because of (1), (2), and (3) we can reason cogently that similar qualities in similar circumstances will have similar effects (i.e., we can provide a rational, and not merely customary basis, for the maxim that like causes have like effects), and thus of induction insofar as it involves this maxim.
(5) Using (1), (2), and (3) we can provide a rational basis for the maxim that everything that begins to exist must have a cause.
Of course, these are not the only problems that arise for a theory of causation, and Shepherd discusses a number of others. But I thought that this passage provides a neat little summary of some of her views.
Be prepared for lots more Shepherd in the coming weeks.
Sunday, June 25, 2006
Notes and Links
* This is rather cool. This to That tells you what glue to use to adhere different substances together. For instance, if you're trying to adhere styrofoam to ceramic and need a fast bond, use hot glue; but if you want the least toxic bond, use Weldbond. (HT: The Mechanical Philosopher)
* The Elfin Ethicist discusses an essay by Rorty on History of Philosophy. A sample:
* While I don't 'do' philosophy of law, it's a field I like to keep at least an occasional eye on, because issues often come up in it that are interested in other fields I'm interested in (philosophy of reasoning, for instance, which melds with my usual approach to HoP), and because (as long as it's combined with good will and common sense) even a clumsy, sketchy acquaintance with philosophy of law can enrich your view of society and politics. In any case, Brian Leiter has a nice post on American Legal Realism at his law school weblog, including a link to an essay on the subject.
* The Maverick Philosopher has a good post on an argument against divine simplicity.
* The Little Professor has a post explaining why Victorian Protestants argued that the Roman Catholic Church was 'novel' in comparison to the Church of England. The answer is, roughly, apostolicity, apostasy, and Joseph of Arimathea.
* Those who, like myself, have an interest in classic freethought, might be interested in the Freethought Archive.
* At The Chymistry of Isaac Newton website you can read Isaac Newton's most complete laboratory notebook, which gives some insight into his alchemical researches. One interesting feature of the notebook is that it suggests how Newton's research into light grew out of his interest in the alchemy of gems (since he opens the notebook reflecting on the color of gems and begins to look at color in general by experimenting with prisms).
* Chu-Carroll has a good introduction to information theory at "Good Math, Bad Math".
* The Elfin Ethicist discusses an essay by Rorty on History of Philosophy. A sample:
When we say that philosopher X was wrong about question Y, it is rarely wise to flatter ourselves with the notion that it was only because of ignorance of what we now know. Even if we do need such "reassurance," as Rorty says, I think we should resist the urge.
* While I don't 'do' philosophy of law, it's a field I like to keep at least an occasional eye on, because issues often come up in it that are interested in other fields I'm interested in (philosophy of reasoning, for instance, which melds with my usual approach to HoP), and because (as long as it's combined with good will and common sense) even a clumsy, sketchy acquaintance with philosophy of law can enrich your view of society and politics. In any case, Brian Leiter has a nice post on American Legal Realism at his law school weblog, including a link to an essay on the subject.
* The Maverick Philosopher has a good post on an argument against divine simplicity.
* The Little Professor has a post explaining why Victorian Protestants argued that the Roman Catholic Church was 'novel' in comparison to the Church of England. The answer is, roughly, apostolicity, apostasy, and Joseph of Arimathea.
* Those who, like myself, have an interest in classic freethought, might be interested in the Freethought Archive.
* At The Chymistry of Isaac Newton website you can read Isaac Newton's most complete laboratory notebook, which gives some insight into his alchemical researches. One interesting feature of the notebook is that it suggests how Newton's research into light grew out of his interest in the alchemy of gems (since he opens the notebook reflecting on the color of gems and begins to look at color in general by experimenting with prisms).
* Chu-Carroll has a good introduction to information theory at "Good Math, Bad Math".
Princess Elisabeth and the Determination Problem for Dualism
Suppose you are a Cartesian dualist, holding that (1) you have a mind; (2) you have a body; (3) your mind is an immaterial, unextended substance capable of existing on its own; (4) your body is a material, extended substance capable of existing on its own; (5) your mind and your body are united together somehow.
The fifth of these has troubled people for quite some time now.* In her correspondence with Descartes, Elisabeth von der Pfalz, the Princess Palatine, famously brought the problem up in her May 1643 letter:
This has usually been interpreted as an expression of the interaction problem. Roughly, the interaction problem is this. Given that the mind is an immaterial, unextended substance and the body is a material, extended substance, how is it that they interact at all?
Now, one of the problems with this problem is that it isn't clear how much of a problem it really is. Why, for example, should this be seen as a problem for the Cartesian rather than as a research project? There is, in fact, good reason for the Cartesian not to be too worried about the interaction problem; and the reason is that interaction is always a difficult question. Take bodies, for example. We know that bodies interact with other bodies; but finding a non-question-begging explanation of this interaction is another thing entirely. We simply don't have, right off, a good handle on what the interaction between bodies really is. Finding out, and properly formulating what we've found out, requires an immense amount of work. If you don't believe me, ask your friendly neighborhood physicist to explain to you precisely, accurately, and completely what gravity is, and note their reaction.
But we do know that bodies interact (somehow) because we can sense them doing so. And Descartes notes that we know (5) in much the same way. So the interaction problem shows that the Cartesian hasn't answered all questions about mind and body; but he didn't claim to do so. Some of those questions are for further study. This isn't problematic for mind-body dualism.
It's noteworthy, however, that Elisabeth does not actually frame her objection in terms of mere interaction, but in terms of determination; and the two are not the same. To see this, we need to take a little detour through Cartesian physics. Suppose you hit a ball with a racquet; it hits the ground and bounces upward at an angle. What is the explanation of the motion of the ball as it is traveling upward? Descartes distinguishes between explaining the (mere) motion and explaining the determination of the motion. If you want to explain the fact that the ball is in motion at all, with the speed it has, your explanation will primarily appeal to the racquet. Gravity, the ground, and air resistance have something to contribute to the explanation, but the racquet is the primary contributor here. However, if you want to explain the way the ball is moving, your explanation will primarily appeal to the ground (although other factors will have some role to play), because that explains the direction, the fact that the ball follows path A rather than another path. The determination of motion can change without the fact of motion changing; so the two are not the same.
If we generalize this slightly to talk about causation rather than just motion, we can see that the interactionist is asking for an ultimate explanation for the body's motion. Elisabeth, however, is asking for an explanation for the determination of its motion. The two problems are not the same. Elisabeth elsewhere suggests very strongly that she considers herself to be, more or less, a Cartesian dualist; it's just that she has qualms about how the body is influenced by the mind in particular ways, and so is willing to entertain possibilities a strict Cartesian wouldn't (e.g., that bodily extension is a secondary property of the mind). So for her there's no real worry about interaction; and if there were, Descartes's response that we know the interaction occurs due to sensation would be an adequate answer. But Descartes's response isn't an adequate answer to the determination problem.
Consider an action like writing my name. A Cartesian will hold that something like the following happens. The mind interacts with the animal spirits in the brain. The animal spirits travel down the nerves and activate the muscles, which write my name. Now here's the kicker: if the nerves are capable of carrying the information for writing my name, the body is capable of carrying information for intelligent action. If the body is capable of carrying information for intelligent action, however, it seems that the separate mind is superfluous (at least for the purposes of physical action). Is the Cartesian mind needed for an explanation of the determination of the body's motion? It doesn't seem so.
Elisabeth doesn't go quite this far, although she clearly recognizes the intelligent nerves problem. This is largely because her major concerns are always ethical: she's worried about what an inability to solve the determination problem does to ethics and to the possibility of busy people like her to engage in intellectual contemplation despite physical distractions. And the problem runs both ways; it's very important to ethics to have some idea of how mind determines body and body determines mind. She's also not looking for a problem for Cartesian dualism; she's just found one and is asking Descartes for advice on how this problem could be solved. (Descartes, like most people after him, seems to misinterpret her as proposing an interaction problem.) Nonetheless, she recognizes the problem, and it is a serious one -- certainly more serious than the interaction problem. Arguably, it's a question any dualism will have to face.
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* In some of what follows I am heavily influenced by Deborah Tollefsen's excellent paper, Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind-Body Interaction. There are one or two key differences between my presentation and Tollefsen's, however. (For instance, I take the determination problem to be more general than she does.) The passage from Elisabeth is quoted from her paper.
The fifth of these has troubled people for quite some time now.
For it seems every determination of movement happens from the impulsion of a thing moved, according to the manner in which it is pushed by that which moves it, or else, depends on the qualification and figures of the superficies of the latter. Contact is required for the first two conditions, extension is required for the third. You entirely exclude extension from your notion of the soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with an immaterial thing.
This has usually been interpreted as an expression of the interaction problem. Roughly, the interaction problem is this. Given that the mind is an immaterial, unextended substance and the body is a material, extended substance, how is it that they interact at all?
Now, one of the problems with this problem is that it isn't clear how much of a problem it really is. Why, for example, should this be seen as a problem for the Cartesian rather than as a research project? There is, in fact, good reason for the Cartesian not to be too worried about the interaction problem; and the reason is that interaction is always a difficult question. Take bodies, for example. We know that bodies interact with other bodies; but finding a non-question-begging explanation of this interaction is another thing entirely. We simply don't have, right off, a good handle on what the interaction between bodies really is. Finding out, and properly formulating what we've found out, requires an immense amount of work. If you don't believe me, ask your friendly neighborhood physicist to explain to you precisely, accurately, and completely what gravity is, and note their reaction.
But we do know that bodies interact (somehow) because we can sense them doing so. And Descartes notes that we know (5) in much the same way. So the interaction problem shows that the Cartesian hasn't answered all questions about mind and body; but he didn't claim to do so. Some of those questions are for further study. This isn't problematic for mind-body dualism.
It's noteworthy, however, that Elisabeth does not actually frame her objection in terms of mere interaction, but in terms of determination; and the two are not the same. To see this, we need to take a little detour through Cartesian physics. Suppose you hit a ball with a racquet; it hits the ground and bounces upward at an angle. What is the explanation of the motion of the ball as it is traveling upward? Descartes distinguishes between explaining the (mere) motion and explaining the determination of the motion. If you want to explain the fact that the ball is in motion at all, with the speed it has, your explanation will primarily appeal to the racquet. Gravity, the ground, and air resistance have something to contribute to the explanation, but the racquet is the primary contributor here. However, if you want to explain the way the ball is moving, your explanation will primarily appeal to the ground (although other factors will have some role to play), because that explains the direction, the fact that the ball follows path A rather than another path. The determination of motion can change without the fact of motion changing; so the two are not the same.
If we generalize this slightly to talk about causation rather than just motion, we can see that the interactionist is asking for an ultimate explanation for the body's motion. Elisabeth, however, is asking for an explanation for the determination of its motion. The two problems are not the same. Elisabeth elsewhere suggests very strongly that she considers herself to be, more or less, a Cartesian dualist; it's just that she has qualms about how the body is influenced by the mind in particular ways, and so is willing to entertain possibilities a strict Cartesian wouldn't (e.g., that bodily extension is a secondary property of the mind). So for her there's no real worry about interaction; and if there were, Descartes's response that we know the interaction occurs due to sensation would be an adequate answer. But Descartes's response isn't an adequate answer to the determination problem.
Consider an action like writing my name. A Cartesian will hold that something like the following happens. The mind interacts with the animal spirits in the brain. The animal spirits travel down the nerves and activate the muscles, which write my name. Now here's the kicker: if the nerves are capable of carrying the information for writing my name, the body is capable of carrying information for intelligent action. If the body is capable of carrying information for intelligent action, however, it seems that the separate mind is superfluous (at least for the purposes of physical action). Is the Cartesian mind needed for an explanation of the determination of the body's motion? It doesn't seem so.
Elisabeth doesn't go quite this far, although she clearly recognizes the intelligent nerves problem. This is largely because her major concerns are always ethical: she's worried about what an inability to solve the determination problem does to ethics and to the possibility of busy people like her to engage in intellectual contemplation despite physical distractions. And the problem runs both ways; it's very important to ethics to have some idea of how mind determines body and body determines mind. She's also not looking for a problem for Cartesian dualism; she's just found one and is asking Descartes for advice on how this problem could be solved. (Descartes, like most people after him, seems to misinterpret her as proposing an interaction problem.) Nonetheless, she recognizes the problem, and it is a serious one -- certainly more serious than the interaction problem. Arguably, it's a question any dualism will have to face.
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