Friday, March 13, 2026

Dashed Off IX

This is the beginning of the notebook started in November 2024.


 Most explanations involve making assumptions that are justified only in terms of an assessment of what is required for an adequate explanation.

explanandum -> explanant profile -> evidence for explanatory factors -> profile-filling abductions

science fiction and the magical reification of measurements

All human desert presupposes elements of good fortune.

In the long run, taxes seem eventually to undermine democratic governance.

The actual laws of physics must be such that actual physics is possible.

Music as a fine art is concerned with the suggestion of rhythm, rather than metronomic rhythm, with the suggestion of notes, rather than exact notes.

No one can understand political equality before they understand political dignity.

scientific progress as an example of rational tradition

In the virtue of prudence we are provident both for ourselves and for others.

"A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge." MacIntyre

Naturalism cannot make specific predictions in the absence of specific natural evidences.

When people say that a field, sociology, say, is about 'is' and not 'ought', what they in fact mean is that the oughts of sociology are second-order.

common law as diffused practical jurisprudence

Critical Legal Studies is fundamentally an exploration of legal systems as interactions of practices, objects (reifications), and values (tilts), albeit one that has not always had honest intentions.

mathematical functions as abstractions of terms, sets as abstractions of formulas (Lorenzen)
"Since sets are abstracted from formulas, and formulas are built up by means of logical particles, corresponding operations arise for sets."

You should always be wary fo anything that gives you a satisfying feeling of righteousness; the feeling and the thing come apart easily and even when not, the feeling is often associated with release from what would ordinarily be restrictive -- which may be one's actual moral obligation as to means. This is why it is often associated both with hypocrisy and with immoderation.

prevention, prepared countermeasure, prepared mitigation

the Binding of Isaac as a picture of consecration

Divine reason is autonomous by nature; human reason is autonomous only by participation.

Intersubjective testing of religious experience requires something like a church; it also requires having already determined the conditions of validity of religious experience.

Series, unlike sets, are always something more than just their members. (Note that Edwards in his Eskimo example explicitly depends on a series being the same as a group.)

As the abstract principles governing the behavior of the universe do not share the directionalities of the universe, the directionalities must derive from the moving cause.

Clifford's argument against belief without evidence would, if it worked, also work as an argument against fiction, pageantry, advertisement; the love of fiction increases the risk of being affected in one's belief by them, fictions adoring things unevidenced with tinsel splendor, forming them into cloud-castles, making us half-believe through pleasant plausibilities.

causality > responsibility > complicity > culpability

the dipping method of philosophy -- taking a passage by chance and reflecting on it and the association it brings

Talk of social construction often confuses cases where we construct through social interaction with cases where we are constructed by way of social interaction.

Direct accessibility is a causal notion.

We always in practice take intelligible abstract objects to be part of the common environment shared with others.

learning by co-laboring

When people talk about agreement in the sciences, they generally talk about families of things that are in fact interpreted in very different ways; when people talk about disagreement in philosophy, they usually are talking about very particularly and distinctly conceived positions that include particular interpretations.

stage persons and play persons (e.g., in role-playing games or video games)

To say that God created the world for His glory is to say that He created it for the union of intelligent creatures to Himself.

light as 'the form of first acting body, by which lower bodies act'

sequential causation
(1) simultaneous causation; A causes B in particular respect x
(2) identity through time of B in respect x
(3) simultaneous causation: B in respect x causes C in respect y
-- thus C in respect y preserves a dependence on A despite temporally measurable gap
-- waves seem particularly suitable for an explaantion of roughly this sort

Kant's claim about the sovereign in the MM can only properly apply to God; all human sovereigns have rights because they have duties, and there are conditions under which they can be forced to do the latter, and no human legislation is the highest legislation except secundum quid.

It is pointless to criticize, rather than simpy correct, the scientific inaccuracies of the past, because no one who does so is in fact free of scientific inaccuracy, and certainly not free of inaccuracies not yet discovered by the sciences.

extension, intension, limitation (partition from negative complement)

Kant's categories as the logical ways judgments about reality can be related to temporal measurements

"A purely passive being knows not, and cannot know, either itself or any other thing." Cousin
"Kant has fallen into a grave error, in thinking that the questions raised in the antinomies necessarily require teh same method of solution, viz. reasoning." 
"What are the characteristics of a moral law? Necessity and universality. But are not these the characteristics of all the principles which Kant has recognized in the metaphysics, of the principle of contradiction, for example?"

'What begins to exist has a cause' as a condition for applying mathematics to the physical world

An advocate who did not have different arguments for different judges, but only repeated the same thing regardless of court and context, would be incompetent; and pretending that having many reasons for a conclusion makes it less certain, is a sign of stupidity.

the transcendental conditions of consensus gentium and consensus sapientorum

We calibrate individual reason in light of the reason of others.

All of the principles of speculative reason are relevant to practical and moral action, always contextually and sometimes with respect to the practical action as such.

"A merely logical philosophy may die of inanition, and a sensational philosophy of paralysis; but the nature of the diseased that killed it matters little to the corpse." Edward Caird

Kant's Humean 'awakening' was only possible because Kant was already tending in that direction, and Hume broke some final restraints.

the co-worldedness of individual substances

Besides space and time, the forms of sense would have to include something like forcefulness/robustness/realness, where this is understood as structuring how we sense things with respect to other things.

"Substance, causality, and reciprocity are only imperfect expressions of that conception of unity in difference, which, in a higher form, appears as the idea of final cause, and which ultimately reveals itself as the idea of self-consciousness. In determining inorganic objects, we may not find it necessary to use any but the first order of categories; when we come to the organic world we require, as Kant himself maintains, the second order: and when we react the spiritual world, we can accomplish our purpose of making it intelligible with nothing less than the third." E. Caird
(This seems very strong and defensible *as a reasponse to Kant*; Caird is right that Kant's own principles and approach sometimes suggest something like this.)

Organisms can only be understood in terms of systems of possibilities formed by causal processes and constraints of actually existing things.

Regulation of changing things requires either enduring barrier to deviation or recurring correction of deviations or both.

Our conception of what happens is a conception of something 'being happened'.

Human beings require friendship to solidify their pursuit of virtue.

In roleplaying games, optimizing practices arise from running very specific parties through very generic stories. (This is precisely how D&D structures itself, giving lots of framework for character building and much less assistance to storybuilding, which is largely limited by the DM's ingenuity in using very constraining character mechanics.)

The only way to interpret other human beings is to interpret them as having a generic aptitude to truth, and we cannot inquire without taking ourselves to have it.

the opinion-clashing method of philosophizing

liberalism as rpg politics: 'the most interesting play possibilities to the greatest number of participants for the longest period of time possible' (Gygax)

Some things, like the laws of nature, or the decline of civilization, or the Last Things, belong to frameworks much larger than themselves, and are related to our moral judgments as background context, not as falling under the scope of their authority.

Natural religion diversifies by custom and vow.

vow -> covenant -> grace
(note that each transfigures the previous rather than merely replacing it) (note also that each is a natural candidate for final cause of the previous)

'Encounter' is itself more primitive than vow; it is something that sometimes leads people to vow. Treating it as paradigmatic to the regime of grace is a grotesque error. 'Encounter' is useless unless it is transfigured into the covenant of friendship. Christianity is not an experience but something both more fundamental and higher than any human experience can be.

The argument from moral evil is ultimately a tendentious asking of the question, "Why is it necessary to be carefully and deliberately moral?"

We don't only just have secondary beliefs about secondary worlds (in Tolkien's sense), but also secondary beliefs about the primary world.

We are saved by faith but also inspired by it.

the contingency of philosophers relative to the faith (Gilson)

"In our own lifetime, in the names of how many doctrines, since abandoned by their very authors, have we been summoned to abandon the teaching of the Church?" Gilson
"What is common to Athens and Jerusalem is the human being."
"That a nation experiences the need to promote the development of the arts and sciences does not keep art and science from essentially belonging to an order that transcends that of the nation."
"There is Christendom where there is Christian civilization, and there is Christian civilization where there is Christian thought."

Christendom as a sign and partial healing of the broken commonwealth of humanity

The Socratic approach to philosophy is not a dogmatic commitment to ignorance, and yet this seems ost on some people.

Thursday, March 12, 2026

Two Loves

 There are two loves from which proceed all wishes, as different in quality as they are different in their sources. For the reasonable soul, which cannot exist without love, is the lover either of God or the world. In the love of God there is no excess, but in the love of the world all is hurtful. And therefore we must cling inseparably to eternal treasures, but things temporal we must use like passers-by, that as we are sojourners hastening to return to our own land, all the good things of this world which meet us may be as aids on the way, not snares to detain us....But as the world attracts us with its appearance, and abundance and variety, it is not easy to turn away from it unless in the beauty of things visible the Creator rather than the creature is loved; for, when He says, "you shall love the Lord your God from all your heart, and from all your mind, and from all your strength," He wishes us in noticing to loosen ourselves from the bonds of this love.

[St. Leo I, Sermon 90.]

Wednesday, March 11, 2026

On Just War and Iran

 Cardinal McElroy has an interview on the Iran conflict and just war theory in his archdiocesan newsletter; it's quite reasonable and clear, and since I am very harsh with bishops who unnecessarily muddy doctrinal waters, it's only fair that I note when they are doing the opposite. There are a few quibbles I could make (like most people, for instance McElroy treats 'right intention' much too narrowly, taking 'intention' in the colloquial English sense rather than the original scholastic sense), but in the context of an interview, and with respect to the purpose of the interview, I don't think it necessary to stand on them. It also gives a nice occasion for thinking about just war theory in a real-world context.

McElroy sees the current conflict as violating the principles of just war in at least three particular respects:

(E1) Just cause: McElroy argues that just cause was not met because we were not responding to "an existing or imminent and objectively verifiable attack by Iran", and preventative war is not just.

(E2) Right intention: We lack "clear intention", as shown in the sheer variety of proposed goals, explanations, and reaons that the Trump administration has offered.

(E3) Expectation of good: It's unclear that the war's benefits will outweigh its harms.

Thus, His Eminence concludes, the war is not morally legitimate.

It's interesting to compare this to Ed Feser's recent discussion of how just war principles apply to the Iran conflict. [ADDED LATER: Ed has a new article developing his argument at "Public Discourse".] He also argues that the current conflict violates the principles of just war on (if I understand how his argument is structured) at least two points:

(F1) Just cause: Feser goes through some of the goals that have been proposed -- eliminating imminent threats, destroying Iran's nuclear capability, possible future threats, liberation of the Iranian people, and argues that none of these are plausible. Like Cardinal McElroy, he notes that preventative war is not just.

(F2) Lawful authority: Warmaking authority in the United States ultimately rests with Congress. While Congress has given the President certain war powers and emergency powers, they require Congressional oversight, which the Trump administration has not done much to obtain -- indeed, has apparently deliberately not bothered to obtain.

It's possible to read him as also suggesting (F3) Reasonable possibility of success as a third, depending on which goal discussed in (F1) we take to be dominant.

Fundamentally, just action of any kind is rightful authority rightly disposed to righteous ends, and genuine just war criteria are always applications of this to the specialized work of warring; as I've noted before, you can always derive them from general practical considerations about the things done in war. We have to be wary, however, of a common ambiguity in talking about justice, namely, that it has both a moral sense and a legal or juridical sense, related to each other but distinct. And we see this ambiguity all the time in just war theory; St. Thomas Aquinas's account of just war is specifically an account of how a prince's warring can be an act of the virtue of justice (the moral sense), but later scholastics often are considering war juridically in terms of whether the overall conduct of war is in accordance with natural law and jus gentium. Both are important, but it is possible to have a just war in the juridical sense in which some of the people involved are participating with unjust intentions or goals, and, equally, it is possible to have a war that is juridically unjust but in which some of the people involved are being just in their participation. Indeed, given human failings, every just war (juridical) that has ever been has had some unjust warring (moral) in it. Distinguishing these is usually not a problem if we are considering common soldiers, but it can get very tricky when we are looking at the level of generals or the commander-in-chief, who, in addition to being individual participants are also principal agents organizing the juridical situation.

One weakness in both McElroy's and Ed's arguments is the assumption that hostilities with Iran have recently begun. I don't think this is an accurate assessment of the situation. The United States has been in a state of cold-and-hot hostilities with Iran since 1979, and while military confrontation has not always been direct, when it has not been so, it has been going on by proxy fights, deliberate subversion, economic and diplomatic sanction, assassination attempts, bombing campaigns, and the like. This is not a recent conflict; this is an already existing cold war becoming a hot war. That it has been until now a mostly slow-motion conflict does not make it any less a conflict. What is more, Iran is not an innocent actor in any of this; it has consistently positioned itself as an enemy of the United States and its allies, and attempts to persuade it to take a more moderate posture have repeatedly failed. There is also a reason why our Arabic allies have been remarkably sanguine and nonobstructive despite the fact that the American campaign has resulted in a large number of missiles being shot at them and their civilians; there are very few countries in the region for which Iran has not funded and armed coup attempts, and there are very few whom Iran has not threatened militarily and economically in an attempt to get its way on any number of things. In this sense, the question of whether and under what conditions Iran can be attacked is much like the question of whether and under what conditions the Barbary States could be attacked.

It's worth recognizing that this does not change the framework -- that's one reason I pointed out that it derives from general practical principles, namely, it covers everything -- but I think it does complicate the just cause arguments given by both McElroy and Feser. In fact, I am highly skeptical of both if they are intended juridically. Just cause is the most important component determining whether war is just or not, mostly because it is the reference point for understanding how to apply all the other criteria, but it is (alas) not usually a difficult one to meet, and it is actually quite easy to meet it in the context of Iran. Ed looks at various goals that have been proposed, and is right that they cannot of themselves justify a standalone war; but they are each entirely reasonable goals to have for particular operations in an already ongoing state of hostilities. This, of course, is a distinct question from whether President Trump, or any other officials or commanders involved are themselves operating with a just cause in their own actions in this war. 

To be sure, I would blame no one for going along with the idea that the campaign is morally illegitimate for just cause reasons, since if Cardinal McElroy and Dr. Feser agree on a point of moral theology and philosophy, then it is at least reasonably safe and Catholic. Nonetheless, I don't think those particular arguments work on rational grounds.

I also don't think Cardinal McElroy's argument on expectation of good, at least as it stands, works; Ed rightly notes that the mere fact that something could turn out well is not enough to make it just, but it's also true, for much the same reason, that the mere fact that something could go very wrong is not enough to make it unjust. That is, unless we are moral rigorists, which I can hardly imagine Cardinal McElroy intends. War is uncertain, unpredictable, and cannot be done according to a strict plan; and people who forecast wars are virtually always wrong. Further, the idea that we should not act in a way that would create greater harm than the harm we are addressing is concerned specifically with grave evils and disorders directly associated with the use of arms and its natural aftermath. Broader ripples and unpleasant consequences are not the concern here. (The argument also has an inconvenient result for His Eminence's position in that it implies the United States also cannot justly withdraw from the conflict until we can do so in a way that would guarantee that the withdrawal would not gravely harm our allies in the region. This is probably close to true, but it is not, I think, what the Cardinal is intending to suggest.)

I remember Ed having some sympathy with the idea that the Iraq War met just war criteria, when I was skeptical of that. It's interesting here that Ed regards the current Iran campaign as manifestly unjust whereas I am at least much more sympathetic to the general possibility of its being just. Nonetheless, I think, McElroy is quite right that, in terms of what has actually been done there are serious concerns with right intention, and particularly with clear intent or purpose, which is only one part of right intention, but nonetheless one that is sometimes quite important (E2). And Ed's argument on lawful authority (F2) is, I think, likewise a matter of serious concern in this particular case.

Tuesday, March 10, 2026

Moment of Ripeness

 The beauty of things is in this moment of their ripeness that God waits for. If anyone were to taste the leaves or flowers of a cherry tree, he would make a wrong evaluation of it. If anyone were to judge the cool shade of trees in winter weather and by their appearance in this season, he would make a rather blind evaluation of them. Yet we likewise pass judgment on God's government and its purposes.

[Johann Georg Hamann, The Complete London Writings, Kleinig, tr., Lexham Academic (Bellingham: 2025), pp. 219-220. This is a comment on Ecclesiastes 3:11.]

Sunday, March 08, 2026

Fortnightly Book, March 8

 After World War II, Louis L'Amour began writing for Western pulp magazines; most of this was originally under pseudonyms like 'Jim Mayo' and 'Tex Burns'. In 1951, however, he began publishing under his own name, and his career was to change forever when in 1952, he wrote a short story, "The Gift of Cochise", which was published in Colliers. In it, a woman named Angie Lowe faces down the Apache warrior, Cochise, with some help from a man named Ches Lane. The story caught the eye of the film producer, Robert Fellows, who had just teamed up with John Wayne and was looking for stories that would work well for Wayne on film. They bought the film rights from L'Amour and hired Wayne's friend and vertean screenwriter, James Edward Grant, to rework it into a screenplay. Ches Lane became Hondo Lane. 

So far, an ordinary story of publication. However, when he sold the film rights, L'Amour cleverly retained the novelization rights to the film. He wrote a novel based on Grant's heavy reworking of the story, with the same title, Hondo. The novel Hondo was published in 1953 on the same day the film came out, and, Wayne and Fellows understanding how publicity worked, did so with a blurb from John Wayne himself on the cover. The movie was a success, which made the novelization a bestseller, which contributed further to the success of the movie. L'Amour, of course, was able to leverage this beginning to become the twentieth century's greatest novelist in the Western genre. 

The fortnightly book, then, will be Hondo, Louis L'Amour's novelization of James Edward Grant's screenplay inspired by Louis L'Amour's short story. I have a copy of "The Gift of Cochise" somewhere, so I will read it as well.

Even Though We Do Not Know It

 You have extended me, made space for me or made me greater than I am, given me more courage, patience, hope and comfort by the cross than what the natural man is able to receive. How mysterious is God in his love! Even though we do not know it, the cross serves to give our high status, our greatness, and our strength.

[Johann Georg Hamann, The Complete London Writings, Kleinig, tr., Lexham Academic (Bellingham: 2025), p. 194. This is a comment on Psalm 4:1.]