Dashed Off XXX

 This is the beginning of the notebook begun at the end of July 2024.

We recognize God from being moved by Him, being created by Him, resting upon Him, being uplifted by Him, and being guided by Him. Many ordinary people will spontaneously say such things. But these are the Five Ways, loosely expressed in experiential terms.

the flavor story of a meal
the hospitality story of a meal
the prestige story of a meal

Treating everything as a matter of exchange for one's own benefit is the root of all evil.

'his name' / 'her name' etc. as quasi-demonstrative (cf.: His name is Bob. This is Bob. He is Bob.)

prudence: the world as a field of need for plan and decision (the agible)
justice: as a field of the due (jural goods)
fortitude: as a field of challenge and achievement
temperance: as a field of need for balance of good

Familial society and civil society need mediation. (Rosmini)

regulation of the modality of rights
(1) to protect rights from suppression
(2) to settle disputes (by agreement, custom, and reason)
(3) to modify minimally the exercise of rights to avoid harm (by agreement, custom, and reason)
(4) to form frameworks by which people may exercise their rights in mutually beneficial cooperations

"The effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves. Invariably what inspires wonder casts a spell on us and is always superior to what is merely convincing and pleasing." Longinus

Sex must be done in a way consistent with friendship and justice to all who are potentially affected by it.

'white horse is not horse' and ignoratio elenchi

The New Natural Law principle, "Do not choose to destroy, damage, or impede any instantiation of a basic human good" (Finnis), is defective in formulation in two ways:
(1) it is common good instantiations, and not individual good instantiations, that are relevant to moral ought;
(2) choices are often comparative and thus the principle has to be formulated as to deal with choices between instantiations of basic human activity (which is nto the same as choices between basic human goods).

the family as community of grace and prayer

humanizing goods

"For the role of prudence is to ensure that one's natural understanding of the basic human goods *is brought all the way down to action and a whole lifetime of actions*." Finnis

that something continues to exist as a presupposition of scientific inquiry, and the ultimate foundation of conservation laws

ideals to strive for (must be practicable) vs. ideals for assessment of progress (organize ideals to strive for into judgments of value)

modality of rights: "everything that can be done with or about a rigth without diminishing the good contained in it" (Rosmini)

Not all aspects of our union with Christ are experienced.

the already-knowledge account of immediate inferences
-- it is easy to see how Simplification is justified (knowing the conjunction is already knowing the conjuncts), but Addition seems to fail (knowing p is not already knowing that q is a logical possibility) (cp. Williamson)

Nothing we clearly imagine is impossible, but only to the extent we clearly imagine it.

The good and bad of reasoning gets you farther than it might seem, because many other kinds of good and bad are specific applications to particular domains, while others are extensions or analogues.

the role of scientist as witness to phenomena in science communication

obstinacy as misplaced loyalty

passive vs active participation in the human moral community

Humanity is both received and expressed.

In choosing, we partition the circumstances in which we find ourselves, dividing accidental circumstances from specifying circumstances, and indeed making the particular division betwene them by the choosing itself.

Human belief is not very systematic.

justice as order, justice as right, justice as participation in the divine

wisdom, sanctity, adventure, harmony

the juridical city, i.e., civilized life qua juridical

Act in a way always consistent with the friendships of civilized life.

law, right, and liturgy

sacrifice, purity, and wisdom as the three aspects of imitation of Christ at which human beings have special potential to excel, in part because they create special challenges for us

three ways of considering what is right: component of honorable life, requirement of non-injury, one's own/due
-- these perhaps can be considered positive, negative, union of two, or else formal, material, total

the right as the mediating factor in just relation and action between persons

Headlines are not descriptions of what the article says; headlines are editorial comments by which the editors express why they think it is important.

Justice creates derivative rights as part of its respect for rights.

incongruity immediately resolved: surprise
incongruity of uncertain character: puzzlement/bafflement
unresolved and definite incongruity: humor
-- but this is idealized; as Beattie and Gerard note, other sentiments can interfere, either overriding or redirecting the first impulse

humorous laughter -> uneasy laughter -> bitter laughter

The city that is the heart of civilization is the relatively self-sufficient city, i.e., not the urban area alone but all that makes the city possible and sustainable.

Everything is germinal philosophy.

One thing that makes Norse mythology splendid is the well-roundedness of the major gods -- they are complex, and we can both identify with them and find them alien, sometimes at the same time.

three aspects of a functional state: representation, preservation of rights, orderly action encouraging order

Many things are believed because they are beloved.

rite : moral person :: habitus : natural person

political philosophy as katabasis and anabasis

"There is no point in abstaining from vice unless you embrace moral excellence, because when it comes to noble pursuits, the beginning is not as praiseworthy as the end." Jerome

"Any right whatsoever, held by a person, causes inequality in others because it causes duy in them." Rosmini

Distributive justice is based on the inequality created by rights. (Rosmini)

the jural equality between state and citizen

common good -> community -> community as moral system -> suum of community

injustice qua intention of inequality in interaction (taking advantage) vs. injustice qua intention toward unjust thing (violating rights)

prudence, fortitude, and temperance with respect to another as included in complete justice

academic life as scaffold-building

Many modern discussions of love make more sense if you substitute 'need for love' or 'desire for love' in place of 'love'.

One sign of an adequate ethics is that it can serve as the framework for excellent stories with rich characterization.

We all owe to the human community as a moral person to act in a way appropriate to its survival and betterment.

A (subjective) right is possession of title to a jural good given a general obligation regarding it.

It is against the nature of governance to impede people from acting according to their officia, except in emergencies. (cf. SCG 71.4)

Habitude X

 To the third one proceeds thus. It seems that habitude can be generated through one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But through one demonstration is caused the knowledge [scientiam] that is the habitude of one conclusion. Therefore habitudes is able to be caused from one act.

Further, just as one habitude happens to increase through multiplication, so an act happens to increase through intension. But acts being multiplied, habitude is generated. Therefore if one act is intensified a lot, it could be a generative cause of habitude.

Further, health and illness are sorts of habitude. But from one act a man happens to be healed or sickened. Therefore one act is able to cause habitude.

But contrariwise is what the Philosopher says in Ethic. I, that neither one swallow nor one day makes a spring, so certainly neither one day nor a short time makes beatitude or happiness. But beatitude is working according to a habitude of complete virtue, as is said in Ethic. I. Therefore the habitude, and for the same reason any other habitude, is not caused through one act.

I reply that it must be said that, just as has already been said, habitude is generated through act inasmuch as passive power is moved from some active principle. But in order for any quality to be caused in the passive, it is needful that the active wholly overcome the passive. Thus we see that because fire cannot at once overcome its combustible, it does not at once inflame it, but bit by bit casts down contrary dispositions so that, wholly overcoming it, it may impress its similitude on it. But it is manifest that the active principle that is reason, is not able wholly to overcome the appetitive power in one act because the appetitive power has itself in many ways and to many things; but through reason is judged, in one act, that something is sought [appetendum] according to determinate reasons and circumstances. Thus from this the appetitive power is not wholly overcome, so as to be brought mostly to the same thing, by the way of nature, as pertains to the habitude of virtue. And therefore the habitude of virtue is not able to through one act, but through many. 

But in the apprehensive powers it must be considered that the passive is twofold, one of which is the possible intellect itself, but another intellect which Aristotle calls passive, which is particular reason, that is, the cogitative impulse along with the memorative and the imaginative. Therefore with respect to the first passive, there is able to be some active that by one act wholly overcomes the power of its passive, as one proposition known through itself [per se nota] convinces the intellect to assent firmly to a conclusion, which indeed a probable proposition does not do. Thus it is needful for opinionative habitude to be caused from many acts of reason, even on the part of the possible intellect, but habitude of knowledge [habitum scientiae] is possibly caused from one act of reason as regards teh possible intellect. But as regards inferior apprehensive impulses, it is necessary to reiterate the same act many times so that something may be impressed firmly on the memory. Thus the Philosophers in the book on memory and recollection says meditation confirms memory. 

But bodily habitude is possibly caused from one act, if the active is of great force, as sometimes strong medicine at once induces health.

And from this is obvious the response to the objections.

[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.51.3, my translation. The Dominican Fathers translation is here, the Latin is here.]

Thus we get a basic account of habituation, and also the first reason why it was necessary to determine that habitudes are qualities. Qualities admit of contraries, and thus when you induce a qualitative disposition in anything, you have to do so against any contrary disposition it might happen to have. Thus, where such contrary dispositions exist, you have to act enough to overcome the contrariety, whatever it may be, and depending on the situation, it may take many actions to do so. In the case of the intellect affecting appetitive powers, there need to be many actions, as also there will need to be many actions for the internal senses, and, depending on the situation, possibly the body.  

But in purely intellectual matters that are certain, it is possible, as when understanding a proof at once gives you knowledge, for the habitude to arise from a single action. In other cases, as in probable matters, it takes many actions. (St. Thomas elsewhere characterizes opinion as arising from when we have reasons on both sides, but greater on one side, so this is again a case of action overcoming contrary disposition.)

A Poem Re-Draft

 A Bit of Thanksgiving 

 I thank you, Lord, for fruitful fields,
for wide and healthful skies,
and for the hopes that we can have
that are not marred by lies.
And thank you, God, for mysteries
still left for us to solve
upon this awesome floating ball
that rotates and revolves. 

 Thank you, Lord, for infant smiles
and children bright at play;
thank you for the silly souls
who goad us every day.
(We appreciate those most, O Lord,
those crosses that we bear,
and we thank you that we're not yet bald
from pulling out our hair.) 

 I thank you, Lord, for mercy!
It saves us from the brink;
and thank you, Lord, for righteous wrath --
we need more of it, I think.
But thank you for all gentle souls
who always tempers keep;
protect them, Lord, from the rest of us,
lest we kill them in their sleep. 

 I thank you, Lord, for cheerful sun
that rises every dawn,
and that my students learn to hide
the sound and sight of yawn;
that education is a joy
that overflows with awe,
and, on those crazy grading days,
that there are murder laws. 

 I thank you that we live here free
in houses without bars,
that there are things that we can own,
that no one owns the stars,
that joy and virtue freely flow
without a market price
while we have markets fully full
of grain and fruit and spice. 

 I thank you, Lord, for politics,
for presidents and such,
that they work so hard to get their way,
that they never get it much;
yea, for the limits you have placed
on corruption, fraud, and spite,
that we need only deal with them
a dozen times each night. 

 I thank you for the not-quite-hinged,
the high-strung drama queen,
who overreacts ten times a day
(and twenty more if seen),
and for the fact we have the right,
however the world may go,
to stand our ground, though he may wail,
and simply tell him, 'No.' 

 For those who make such trouble, Lord,
I thank you, too, for them;
they force us to be on our toes
and keep us fit and slim.
I thank you for our heartache-pains,
for things that go awry,
and thank you for each helping hand,
however small and shy. 

 Thank you, Lord, for critics harsh
who attack with whip and flail;
and because of harsh reviewers, Lord,
I thank you too for hell.
And thank you, Lord, for stupid folk,
that we can clearly see
in blatant view the foolish things
from which none of us are free. 

 And thank you for those shocking times
when we pedants who lecture all
on every foolish folly
into those follies fall,
for it teaches us the wisdom
of gentleness's restraint
lest we in turn be painted
with the brush by which we paint. 

 Thank you for your graces,
the good of little things,
which even in harsh and hurtful times
can make us laugh and sing.
And thank you for all wonders
that stimulate the mind --
no matter the occasion,
new truths our minds may find. 

 But I thank you most for absurdities --
they overflow every bank,
so that if I thank you for each one,
I'll never cease to thank!
And thank you for sweet irony;
it gives the wit to see
that all the things we moan about
may be thanksgiving's seed. 

 But most of all, I thank you, Lord,
that long before we die,
we can see ourselves with wry regard,
and laugh until we cry.

Eucharisteite

 We call you, brothers, to caution the disorderly, soothe the dispirited, hold on to the weak, be undauntable toward all. See that no one gives bad for bad to anyone, but always pursue the good both toward each other and toward all. Always rejoice. Unceasingly pray. In everything be grateful because of the inclination of God toward you in Jesus Christ. Do not suppress the Spirit. Do not despise prophecies, but all things test; hold tight the good. Keep away from every form of wickedness.

[1 Thessalonians 5:14-22, my very rough translation. Lots of interesting words here. Oligopsychia is usually pusillanimity or petty-mindedness, but the verb suggests that it is here indicating a weakness rather than a vice. 'Dispirited' is my guess, but I think it's probably reasonably close to what is intended. Antechesthe, here translated as 'hold on to', literally means to adhere or stick to something, and can be translated as 'care for', as well. Makrothymia is often translated as 'patience', but it's an active patience -- greatness of thymos, or great-spiritedness, the thymos being the part of you that rises to challenges. So for makrothymeite I've tried to capture some of that, with be undauntable. Chairete means 'rejoice'; but it's also related to the common Greek salutation. (Gabriel's Ave or Hail is in Greek Chaire.) 'Be grateful' is eucharisteite, which can also be translated as 'give thanks'.]

Habitude IX

 To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that no habitude is able to be caused by act. For a habitude is a sort of quality, as was said above. But every quality is caused in some subject inasmuch as it is receptive of something. Therefore since what acts does not receive something, but rather sends forth from itself, it seems that there is not able to be a habitude generated from act in an agent.

Further, that in which some quality is caused, is moved to that quality, as is obvious in a cooled or heated thing, but what produces the act causing the quality, moves, as is obvious with cooling and heating. Therefore if habitude were caused in something by its own act, it would follow that mover and moved, agent and patient, would be the same, which is impossible, as is said in Physic. VII.

Further, an effect is not able to be nobler than its cause. But habitude is nobler than act preceding habitude, which is obvious from this, that it renders act nobler. Therefore habitude is not able to be cause by an act preceding the habitude.

But contrariwise, the Philosopher in Ethic. II teaches that habitudes of virtues and vices are caused by acts.

I reply that it must be said that in an agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act, as in fire there is only the active principle of heating. And in such an agent there is not able to be any habitude cause by its own act, and thus it is that natural things are not able to be accustoming or unaccustoming [consuescere vel dissuescere], as is said in Ethic. II. But some agent is found in which there is the active and passive principle of its act, as is obvious in human acts. For the acts of appetitive virtue proceed from the appetitive impulse [vi appetitiva] according as it is moved by the apprehensive impulse [vi apprehensiva] representing the object, and beyond this, the intellectual impulse [vis intellectiva], according as it reasons about conclusions has as its active principle a proposition known through itself [per se notam]. Thus from such acts habitudes are able to be caused in the agent, not indeed with respect to the first active principle, but with regard to the principle of the act that moves the moved. For everything that is endured and moved from another is disposed through the act of an agent; thus from multiplied acts there is generated a sort of quality in passive and moved power, which is called habitude; just as the habitudes of the moral virtues are caused in appetitive powers, inasmuch as they are moved by reason, and the habitudes of kinds of knowledge [scientiarum] are caused in the intellect, inasmuch as they are moved by first propositions.

Therefore to the first it must be said that the agent, inasmuch as it is agent, does not receivng something. But inasmuch as it acts as moved by another, it receives something from the mover, and so habitude is caused.

To the second it must be said that the same, according as it is same, is not able to be mover and moved. But nothing prevents the same being moved by itself according to diverse things, as is proved in Physic. VIII.

To the third it must be said that the act proceeding habitude, inasmuch as it proceeds from active principle, proceeds from a nobler principle than the generated habitude, just as reason itself is a nobler principle than the habitudes of moral virtues generated in appetitive impulse [vi appetitiva] by customary acts; and understanding of principles is a nobler principle than knowledge of conclusions [scientia conclusionum].

[Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-1.51.2, my translation; the Latin is here, the Dominican Fathers translation is here.]

This, of course, gives us habitudes that are not natural in the sense that the previous article considered. It's easy to overlook, but this article is also an indirect discussion of free will and rational learning, which involve acts that cause habitudes.

The Wheel-Breaker

 Today is the feast of Queen Saint Catherine of Alexandria, Great Martyr, the patron saint of philosophers.

Raphael, Saint Catherine of Alexandria

Links of Note

 * Gregory B. Sadler, Saint Catherine of Alexandria, Patroness of Christian Philosophers: Inspiration for Contemporary Christian Philosophy

* Daniel D. De Haan, Delectatio, gaudium, fruitio: Three kinds of pleasure for three kinds of knowledge in Thomas Aquinas (PDF)

* Virginia Weaver, Gender essentialism is inevitable -- and necessary for feminism, at "Overlong Memories"

* R. A. Nicolás-Francisco, On the Polish “Via Modalization” Approach to Paraconsistency (PDF)

* Ashley Frawley, Are We Not Catholics, Too?, at "Compact"

* Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Easy Social Ontology (PDF)

* Dirk Schlimm and David Waszek, John Venn's pluralism regarding logical forms (PDF)

* Tim Powers has a substack on writing fantasy. Orson Scott Card occasionally comments.

*Tim Juvshik, Why Be Realists About Artifact Kinds? (PDF)

* Bañezian Thomist, Domingo Báñez on the Logical Problem of the Trinity