the conversion of poetry into the rigorously analytic
faith as the appropriate response to friendship
the unfortunate tendency to conflate consent and common resolution
The greater part of endurance is taking responsibility.
Orders establishes a pentiential forum; dignity within orders establishes judicial fora.
a quasi-virtue-ethics of national character
Itis easier to remember justifications for very stable beliefs than constantly shifting ones; and easier to remember them for single isolated shifts than multiple or interacting shifts of belief.
motives of esperability
analogues to interpretations of 'This is my body' in interpretations of 'The Word was made flesh'
Teh music of liturgy represents both prayer and preaching.
the good society as a refuge for virtue
categories of magisterial statement
(1) of divinely revealed truth
(2) of truths closely associated with divinely revealed truth
(3) of what reasonably clarifies revealed truth
(4) of prudential caution or exhortation
(5) of prudential suggestion
--- (1) : demonstration proper :: (2) : demonstration by fitness :: (3) : probability :: (4) & (5) : plausibility
Receiving gifts, we have duties, which establish rights; thus, receiving gifts from God, the duties arising toward God ground rights.
soft integration practices of the papacy; ad limina visits, national churches, Pontifical Colleges, papal visits
Part of the point of the primacy of Peter is to make fruitful discussion possible. (Cp. Chrysostom on the Council of Jerusalem.) This fruitful discussion is necessary for the unity of the Church.
language dispersion and trade flow in liturgical influence
Evangelization is the primary expression of the Holy Spirit in the Church. He does much in doing this: pouring out prophecy, creating priests, teaching wisdom, raising theologians, and bringing together the entire council of the Church.
truth expressed rigorously & properly
truth expressed figuratively
truth expressed under common expressions
truth expressed in terms of appearances
the danger of confusing studied impartiality with intrinsic impartiality
necessary vs. non-necessary parts
Debunking arguments all presuppose some normative principles; otherwise they are toothless for guiding reasoning.
the function of tentative preliminary guesses/concessions in reasoning
the eduction of rational principles from narratives
Not all victories are worthwhile and not all pleasures are worthwhile, but we do seek victories and pleasures.
Hb 1:3 // Wis 7:26 (both use apaugasma)
the oddity of 'Almost everyone believes X but there is no reason at all to think it is true'
Reasonable people taken generally are a good source of information on what it is reasonable to believe given the available evidence.
Analytic appeal to intuitions is always either (1) an appeal to special expertise or (2) an appeal to common sense.
PSR as a postulate of inductive reasoning (Coffey)
spontaneous suspicion vs cumulative suspicion
"It is in the nature of the defensive to be less quick to act than the offensive." Ludwig von Pastor
"Only charity gives a correct view of men and things." Elisabeth Leseur
to share one's doings with God
the pseudo-iconographies of the state
Whenever an analytic philosopher says 'intuition', substitute 'suspicion' and see how it goes.
All experiences are infused with analogies; without analogies there would not be much to interpretation.
the link between suspecting and plausibility (this seems especially clear in the case of fiction, where what is plausible seems closely tied to what one can suspect and what one can only suspect)
The problem with getting to other minds by inference to the best explanation is characterizing the explananda without assuming other minds.
consensus gentium argument for the external world, assuming other minds
(1) moral unanimity of the human race (2) despite radical differences in custom &c. (3) that is resilient over time in the face of changes (4) thus indicating that it is natural to reason (5) and thus rational and reasonable in itself.
causation and the notion of what one thing owes to another
There is one God not only because there is one nature and not only because there is one Principle, although both of these are true, but because what comes from the Principle does so in such a way as to be one with the Principle and each other without muddling of their order.
Nyaya syllogism as a reasonableness inference
Religious conscience is a particularly public and organized form of conscience.
the noncommensurability of evidences
patron saints and receiving the righteous in the name of the righteous
suggestive vs confirmatory evidence
Newman's notes of development as notes of good interpretation
(1) Good interpretation maintains the genre (kind) of the text.
(2) Good interpretation shares abstract and general principles with the text.
(3) Good interpretation unifies and integrates what is in the text.
(4) Good interpretation is logically linked to the evidences of the text.
(5) Good interpretation is anticipated by prior good interpretation.
(6) Good interpretation builds on prior interpretations, illuminating them.
(7) Good interpretation endures on its own merits.
unity of doctrinal type, unity of principles, unity of idea, logical unity, chronological unity
Wars are not won by certainties.
faith: anticipation of knowing the divine
hope: anticipation of having the divine
charity; anticipation of being one with the divine
"The very nature of a true philosophy relatively to other systems is to be polemical, eclectice, unitive..." Newman
Quies animae est delectatio.
naturalism in phil. sci // liberalism in political philosophy
The freedom of religion worth having is that which facilitates and encourages the virtue of religion.
The kind of freedom that encourages vice destroys itself in the end.
kallipolis : patience and gentleness :: democratia : tolerance
principles of the liturgical commonwealth
(1) to uphold the sacraments and what pertains to them
(2) to be witness of Christ even unto death
(3) to do unto other Catholics as one would have them do unto oneself
(4) to maintain and follow authoritative laws, customs, and usages of the Church
(5) to give thanks in thought, word, and deed for God's grace
(6) to strive for unity in the Church
(7) to forgive offenses to oneself
(8) to act mercifully in all penalty, whether that by conscience, by public opinion, or by law
(9) to uphold and respect the dignity of all
(10) to give the better part to others, especially those in need
(11) to be prudent and equitable in judgment
(12) to respect the common destination of goods
(13) to protect both the virtuous and the vulnerable
(14) to respect legitimate authority, both civil and ecclesial
orders of extrapolation; extrapolations in extrapolations (weird hypothetical scenarios in analytic philosophy often have this problem: they are extrapolating how we would extrapolate)
Genetic debunking requires genetic definition.
review in inquiry // examination of conscience
lines of reasoning vs arguments
e.g., suppose three arguments
A, B; therefore C
A,B; therefore probably C
A, B; therefore C is a reasonable possibility
All can be considered to be along the same line, despite being diff arguments
Note the important difference between refuting a single argument and refuting all arguments along those lines.
miracles of saints as symbolic acts in the liturgical commonwealth
It would be more correct to say that the saints receive miracles than that they do them, although they do indeed do them as instruments.
moral design arguments for systems of miracles
'death of the author' as a denial of instrumental causality
Everything a pope does in his office, besides simply being a bishop performing liturgical functions, is accomplished through the instrumentality of others, and is affected by their manner of cooperation or resistance.
the Holy Spirit as the standing power of miracles in the Church
the solidary function of the papacy: to unite the bishops
the subsidiary function of the papacy: to support the bishops
The catholicity of papal jurisdiction is found in the unlimited character of the pope's solidary and subsidiary functions.
the psalmody of the Chruch militant as exemplate whose exemplar is the Church triumphant
the role of 'famous men' in traditions (Sirach)
All norms are moral when the stakes are high enough.
debunking based on (1) lack of key good feature; (2) riskiness; or (3) mere luck (accident)
For each there are three possible responses: (1) rejection of ground; (2) compatibilist acceptance of ground (i.e. rejection of the idea that the ground of the debunking requires the debunking); (3) qualification (i.e. rejection of the idea that the ground debunks under all circumstances).
It is impossible to alienate one's responsibility for common good.
Self-interest develops through and with interest for others.
the problem of the external world as partly a problem of classification
A society in which people have little quiet leisure is a society in which people are certainly being manipulated.
'Intuitions' cannot be presumed to be invariant even across equivalences. (Cf. Moon Duchin)
Oftentimes, analytic arguments based on intuitions turn out to be a cost/benefit guesstimation -- how costly is this supposition/ how much work would it require?
the study of possibilities
(1) by study of actualities
(2) by analogy
(3) by causal inference
(4) by extrapolation
Rites inspire society; music inspires hearts.
Trees are scenery when they are seen
but instruments when they are heard;
and fresh though lives are, vivid, green,
the tree-ish music fresher still
inspires more than singing bird,
and most on evenings chill.
The cultivation of calm clarifies.
Note Saadia Gaon's interpretation of the Song of Moses as a summation of the history of Israel and his argument that understanding it so suggests the doctrine of resurrection.
resurrection as the dew of light (Is 26:19)
Customary law is established (a) by induction (b) by customary heuristics (c) by analogy (d) by extrapolation from prior principles of practical reason combined with a historical story (e) by causal analysis of stable institutions and practices.
Lk 2:52 // Sir 45:1
completeness of what is complete in itself
(1) that outside of which there can be none of its parts
(2) that which admits of no greater degree in ability
(3) that which has attained its end
completeness of what is completed
(1) as making complete
(2) as having a completeness
(3) as representing completely
the primary ideas: being and nonbeing, act and potency, same and different, whole and part
PSR aas a derivative of the principle of causation (the PSR involves reference to intellect)
causation : being :: sufficient reason : truth
Note Kant's distinction between logical and transcendental PSR (Every proposition has a reason vs Everything has its reason) -- he takes the LPSR to be an analytic truth and the TPSR to be unprovable.
predicate quantity as predicate modality
the human race as a kind of relic (of itself in original righteousness), the redemption and exaltation of which is symbolized by the relics of saints
inquisitive possibility
If A then C
'Things are such that if A be true in reference to this universe of discourse / sphere of things, C is also true in reference to it.' (Coffey
If we have different kinds of 'intuitions', this complicates how we would go about being consistent with them, just as with sensory modalities.
affinities of fictional characters
fictional characterization as classification
Saturday, April 01, 2017
Lent XXVIII
Bring to the Lord glory and honour: bring to the Lord glory to his name: adore ye the Lord in his holy court. (Psalm 28:2 Vulg)
[St. Robert Bellarmine, A Commentary on the Book of Psalms, O'Sullivan, tr. Loreto Publications (Fitzwilliam, NH: 2011) p. 58.]
The Prophet tells us what sort of sacrifice we should offer to God, namely, "Glory and honor;" that is, in your words and your works glorify the Lord; and not only in your words and works, but even in the carriage of your person, which should be so reverential as to make it appear to all that you acknowledge him as your supreme Master, and that you adore him as such. "Bring to the Lord glory to his name."
Bring glory to the Lord, that is, to his name, by celebrating the name, fame, and knowledge of the Lord. "Adore ye the Lord in his holy court." The holy court may mean either the vestibule of the Jewish tabernacle, to which all could resort, while the priests alone were permitted to enter the tabernacle; or the Catholic Church, which is like the porch or vestibule of the heavenly tabernacle. All, good or bad, are promiscuously permitted to enter the Church, but they alone will enter the heavenly tabernacle who can say to Christ, "Thous hast made us a kingdom and priests to our God."
[St. Robert Bellarmine, A Commentary on the Book of Psalms, O'Sullivan, tr. Loreto Publications (Fitzwilliam, NH: 2011) p. 58.]
Friday, March 31, 2017
Government Ethics and Product Endorsement II
In a recent interview, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin was asked about movie recommendations.
Simply as a product endorsement, this would arguably not be an issue, since the explicit point of the relevant law is that executive branch employees cannot use their position or authority to endorse the product, or do so while in the completion of their official duties, not that they can't endorse products (which would be an unenforceable mess), and Mnuchin makes clear enough as part of the joke that he is not endorsing it as the Treasury Secretary, even if it weren't obvious enough from the immediate context in the interview. Given that other parts of the interview touch on more official considerations, one could perhaps argue for a problem here, but it would have to be argued. But Mnuchin is one of the producers of the movie (hence his comment about not being allowed to promote anything that he is involved in) and he had signed an ethics agreement in which he was not, while in the process of divesting from the relevant company, to participate substantially in things with a direct effect on the financial interests of the company, and thus the product endorsement raises the question of whether he had violated the agreement by recommending the movie in a public interview. One can certainly argue that recommending a movie is not a substantial participation in a matter with direct, predictable effect on the financial interests in question, but it does raise legitimate questions.
Senator Ron Wyden raised the question, and apparently sent a letter to USOGE asking for an investigation. (I have not been able to find any copy of the letter.) Given that Wyden was rather vehement in his opposition to Mnuchin's nomination, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this was mostly politically motivated -- Senators usually do not spend their time raking over the precise contents of interviews by Cabinet secretaries -- but that does not mean that there is no legitimate question here. And it should perhaps be noted that if, as the news reports give the impression, he only addressed the letter to USOGE and not also to White House Counsel, this was a very limited request -- as I have noted before, the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, despite the name, is not a general ethics watchdog, but an advisory and training office whose most serious possible action is usually to recommend to other agencies that disciplinary proceedings be started (although it can initiate proceedings itself for ongoing violations). In any case, OGE seems to have begun its inquiry, because Secretary Mnuchin wrote a letter to OGE saying that he should not have added the last sentence, that he would be meeting with the Designated Agency Ethics Official, and that he takes seriously the relevant ethical norms.
And Director Schaub seems to have written Wyden that the OGE "intends to give Secretary Mnuchin the opportunity to make good on the pledge." (Again, I cannot find any copy of this letter, either. Given how poor government ethics reporting generally is, this means everything has to be qualified more than it should have to be.) If that's what Schaub said, he is giving a perhaps misleading impression of OGE's actual role in something like this; it's not as if OGE can ethically refuse a plan for future ethical compliance, it's a one-shot rather than ongoing violation so OGE can't initiate any disciplinary proceedings itself, and to recommend that the President formally discipline Mnuchin over it when there is already an offer of compliance on the table would be extraordinarily incompetent -- compliance, not disciplinary action, is the whole point of government ethics law, and disciplining people who are cooperating conveys the message that there's no good reason to cooperate.
Assuming there are no weird twists anywhere, it's pretty much a textbook example of how this is supposed to work.
"I'm not allowed to promote anything that I'm involved in. So I just want to have the legal disclosure, you've asked me the question, and I am not promoting any product," Mnuchin said. "But you should send all your kids to 'Lego Batman.'"
Simply as a product endorsement, this would arguably not be an issue, since the explicit point of the relevant law is that executive branch employees cannot use their position or authority to endorse the product, or do so while in the completion of their official duties, not that they can't endorse products (which would be an unenforceable mess), and Mnuchin makes clear enough as part of the joke that he is not endorsing it as the Treasury Secretary, even if it weren't obvious enough from the immediate context in the interview. Given that other parts of the interview touch on more official considerations, one could perhaps argue for a problem here, but it would have to be argued. But Mnuchin is one of the producers of the movie (hence his comment about not being allowed to promote anything that he is involved in) and he had signed an ethics agreement in which he was not, while in the process of divesting from the relevant company, to participate substantially in things with a direct effect on the financial interests of the company, and thus the product endorsement raises the question of whether he had violated the agreement by recommending the movie in a public interview. One can certainly argue that recommending a movie is not a substantial participation in a matter with direct, predictable effect on the financial interests in question, but it does raise legitimate questions.
Senator Ron Wyden raised the question, and apparently sent a letter to USOGE asking for an investigation. (I have not been able to find any copy of the letter.) Given that Wyden was rather vehement in his opposition to Mnuchin's nomination, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this was mostly politically motivated -- Senators usually do not spend their time raking over the precise contents of interviews by Cabinet secretaries -- but that does not mean that there is no legitimate question here. And it should perhaps be noted that if, as the news reports give the impression, he only addressed the letter to USOGE and not also to White House Counsel, this was a very limited request -- as I have noted before, the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, despite the name, is not a general ethics watchdog, but an advisory and training office whose most serious possible action is usually to recommend to other agencies that disciplinary proceedings be started (although it can initiate proceedings itself for ongoing violations). In any case, OGE seems to have begun its inquiry, because Secretary Mnuchin wrote a letter to OGE saying that he should not have added the last sentence, that he would be meeting with the Designated Agency Ethics Official, and that he takes seriously the relevant ethical norms.
And Director Schaub seems to have written Wyden that the OGE "intends to give Secretary Mnuchin the opportunity to make good on the pledge." (Again, I cannot find any copy of this letter, either. Given how poor government ethics reporting generally is, this means everything has to be qualified more than it should have to be.) If that's what Schaub said, he is giving a perhaps misleading impression of OGE's actual role in something like this; it's not as if OGE can ethically refuse a plan for future ethical compliance, it's a one-shot rather than ongoing violation so OGE can't initiate any disciplinary proceedings itself, and to recommend that the President formally discipline Mnuchin over it when there is already an offer of compliance on the table would be extraordinarily incompetent -- compliance, not disciplinary action, is the whole point of government ethics law, and disciplining people who are cooperating conveys the message that there's no good reason to cooperate.
Assuming there are no weird twists anywhere, it's pretty much a textbook example of how this is supposed to work.
Of Just Actions the Companion Kind
Orphic Hymn to Law
tr. by Thomas Taylor
The holy king of Gods and men I call,
Celestial Law, the righteous seal of all;
The seal which stamps whate'er the earth contains,
Nature's firm basis, and the liquid plains:
Stable, and starry, of harmonious frame,
Preserving laws eternally the same:
Thy all-composing pow'r in heaven appears,
Connects its frame, and props the starry spheres;
And shakes weak Envy with tremendous sound,
Toss'd by thy arm in giddy whirls around.
'Tis thine, the life of mortals to defend,
And crown existence with a blessed end;
For thy command and alone, of all that lives
Order and rule to ev'ry dwelling gives:
Ever observant of the upright mind,
And of just actions the companion kind;
Foe to the lawless, with avenging ire,
Their steps involving in destruction dire.
Come, bless, abundant pow'r, whom all revere,
By all desir'd, with favr'ing mind draw near;
Give me thro' life, on thee to fix my fight,
And ne'er forsake the equal paths of right.
Thomas Taylor was the most notable British Neoplatonist of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; this is from his translation of the Hymns of Orpheus. To say that Taylor was philhellenic is an understatement -- he and his wife only spoke to each other in classical Greek, and he translated a vast number of Greek works. William Axon wrote a short article in 1890 summarizing his life, Thomas Taylor, the Platonist.
Lent XXVII
For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting, and shouldest ordain priests in every city, as I also appointed thee. (Titus 1:5)
[John Chrysostom, Homilies on Titus, Homily 2.]
The whole life of men in ancient times was one of action and contention; ours on the contrary is a life of indolence. They knew that they were brought into the world for this purpose, that they might labor according to the will of Him who brought them into it; but we, as if we had been placed here but to eat and drink, and lead a life of pleasure, we pay no regard to spiritual things. I speak not only of the Apostles, but of those that followed them. You see them accordingly traversing all places, and pursuing this as their only business, living altogether as in a foreign land, as those who had no city upon earth.
[John Chrysostom, Homilies on Titus, Homily 2.]
Thursday, March 30, 2017
Donut Thing
I saw this at Yard Sale of the Mind. Even the dystopian future is not idiot-proof.
DUST, which did this, has a number of other short videos (some original, some licensed) exploring different science fiction tropes from quirky angles. I liked "Future Boyfriend" as well.
Lent XXVI
This precept I commend to thee, O son Timothy; according to the prophecies going before on thee, that thou war in them a good warfare, having faith and a good conscience, which some rejecting have made shipwreck concerning the faith. (I Timothy 1:18)
[Thomas Aquinas, Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, Baer, tr. St. Augustine's Press (South Bend, IN: 2007), p. 20.]
Warfare is twofold: one is spiritual, and the other is carnal. II Cor 10:4: For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty to God unto the pulling down of fortifications, destroying counsels, etc. In a good warfare two things are required on the part of the soldier: that he do nothing contrary to military discipline and that he not faint in idleness.... Likewise, on the part of the warfare two things are required: that it fight off those contrary to the republic and that it subject those who need to be subject. Thus also spiritual warfare is ordered to destroying everyone who extols himself and to subjecting every intelligence unto obedience to Christ, as it is said in II Cor. 10....
He says, therefore, that thou war in them, etc., as if to say: You can fight a good war first through the good faith which you have...And through a good conscience, since a man easily departs from waht harms him; hence, remorse of conscience is as a certain stimulus which stings a man with a bad conscience, and so he quickly falls away from sin through a good conscience and right faith.
[Thomas Aquinas, Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, Baer, tr. St. Augustine's Press (South Bend, IN: 2007), p. 20.]
Wednesday, March 29, 2017
Two Poem Drafts
Neoplatonism
I saw the beauty of your face,
an emblem born of higher grace;
I heard the beauty of your song.
For harmony my heart did long.
Your eyes in vision ravish me
as signs of truth's eternity;
I am undone by glancing stars
and rise through them to splendors far.
All things of sense must shadows be
of things more real, of hopes more free,
and those who gaze with seeing eyes
know higher truths and thoughts more wise.
The eye of vice, so dark and proud,
is covered over by a cloud;
who would the good and splendid know
must good and splendid surely grow.
All beauty wakes the heart's desire
and flames it ardent; seering fire
then rises higher, above the earth,
to purest light and greatest worth.
Psalm 81, Vulgate
God rises up against the great assembly;
he judges the mighty:
"Will you always judge unjustly,
acting in favor of the wicked?
Give justice to the poor and abandoned,
do justice for the lowly and needy,
rescue those destitute of all,
save those in need from wicked hands."
They do not understand;
nothing do they see;
they stumble through the darkness,
the ground no longer steady.
"This I have proclaimed:
You are mighty,
representing the Highest,
but you shall die as men die;
you shall fall as princes fall."
Rise Lord, judge the world;
to you shall come all peoples.
I saw the beauty of your face,
an emblem born of higher grace;
I heard the beauty of your song.
For harmony my heart did long.
Your eyes in vision ravish me
as signs of truth's eternity;
I am undone by glancing stars
and rise through them to splendors far.
All things of sense must shadows be
of things more real, of hopes more free,
and those who gaze with seeing eyes
know higher truths and thoughts more wise.
The eye of vice, so dark and proud,
is covered over by a cloud;
who would the good and splendid know
must good and splendid surely grow.
All beauty wakes the heart's desire
and flames it ardent; seering fire
then rises higher, above the earth,
to purest light and greatest worth.
Psalm 81, Vulgate
God rises up against the great assembly;
he judges the mighty:
"Will you always judge unjustly,
acting in favor of the wicked?
Give justice to the poor and abandoned,
do justice for the lowly and needy,
rescue those destitute of all,
save those in need from wicked hands."
They do not understand;
nothing do they see;
they stumble through the darkness,
the ground no longer steady.
"This I have proclaimed:
You are mighty,
representing the Highest,
but you shall die as men die;
you shall fall as princes fall."
Rise Lord, judge the world;
to you shall come all peoples.
Justice and Goodness
...I think it necessary to observe that it is a very common thing for men to confound justice with goodness, and to assail the former with accusations which from their very nature could have no force whatever except as urged against the latter. How prone are people to claim rights which have no existence, or to complain of wrong where there has been no wrong at all! How extravagant are the pretensions of selflove! In its prejudiced eyes, it is a crime for you, not merely to do a hurtful thing, but also not to be lavish with what is your own. Let only your accustomed liberalities be diminished never so little—nay, let them only not be increased up to the measure of your client's greedy expectations, and lo! you will, in too many cases, have the cry of injustice raised against you; and this fancied injustice will be made the occasion of a thousand complaints, so that a very trifling accident will suffice to change into an object of execration and hatred a benefactor towards whom no true gratitude had ever been felt.
Antonio Rosmini, Theodicy, sect. 204.
Lent XXV
Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you. Cleanse your hands, ye sinners: and purify your hearts, ye double minded. (James 4:8)
[Bede, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles, Hurst, tr. Cistercian Publications (Kalamazoo, MI: 1985) p. 51.]
Draw near to the Lord by following his footsteps through humility, and he will draw near to you by freeing you from your difficulties through his mercy. For not everyone is far from God by distances, but by dispositions. For though both he who is inclined to virtues and he who falls away in the filth of vices dwell in one place on the earth, the one is far from God, the other has God near.
[Bede, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles, Hurst, tr. Cistercian Publications (Kalamazoo, MI: 1985) p. 51.]
Tuesday, March 28, 2017
Thomas Aquinas on the Capital Vices
ST 1.84.4, my translation. This is still a bit rough. For comparison, you can find the Latin here and the Dominican Fathers translation here.
*****
It seems that it should not be said that there are seven capital vices, which are vainglory, envy, wrath, sorrow, avarice, gluttony, and lust.
(1) For sins are opposed to virtues, but there are four principal virtues, as was said above. Therefore also principal or capital vices are not other than four.
(2) Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sins, as was said above. But the passions of the soul are four. Two of these are not mentioned among the aforesaid sins, namely, hope and fear. And there are enumerated various vices to which pertain delight and sorrow, since delight pertains to gluttony and lust, and sorrow to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are enumerated inappropriately.
(3) Further, wrath is not a principal passion. Therefore it ought not to be placed among the principal vices.
(4) Further, just as cupidity, or avarice, is the root of sin, so pride is the beginning of sin, as was said above. But avarice is placed as one of the seven capital vices, so pride should be enumerated among the capital vices.
(5) Further, some sins are committed which can be caused by none of these, as when someone sins out of ignorance; or when someone commits a sin from a good intention, as when someone steels in order to give alms. Therefore the capital vices are not completely enumerated.
But on the contrary there is the authority of Gregory, who enumerates them so in XXXI Moralium.
I reply that it must be said that, as was said, the capital vices are those from which others rise, particularly according to the notion of final cause. But in two ways may this kind of origination take place. [1] In one way, according to the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have the greatest inclination for one end, so that he often proceeds to other sins. But this mode of origination cannot fall under art, for particular human dispositions are infinite. [2] In another way, according to the natural tendency of the ends, one to another; and it is in this way that often one vice often gives rise to another; wherefore this mode of origination can fall under art.
In this way, then, those vices are said to be capital whose ends have certain primary reasons for moving desire, and it is according to these distinctive reasons that the capital vices are distinguished. But something moves desire in two ways. [1] In one way, directly and through itelf, and thus good moves desire to seek it and evil, for the same reason to flee it. [2] In another way, indirectly and as it were through another, as when someone seeks some evil due to some adjoined good, someone seeks evil due to some adjoined evil.
But human good is threefold. [1] For in the first place, there is a sort of good of the soul, which has the notion of desirability solely from being apprehended, namely the excellence of praise and honor, and this good is sought in a disordered way by vainglory. [2] Another is good of the body, and to this pertains either to the conservation of the individual, as with food and drink, and this good is pursued in a disordered way by gluttony, or to conservation of the species, such as sex, and to this lust is ordered. [3] Third is exterior good, such as riches, and to this is ordered avarice. And these four vices inordinately flee the contrary evils.
Or otherwise, good chiefly moves desire from the fact that it participates some property of happiness, which all naturally desire. [1] This conceptually (de cuius ratione) involves some kind of completion, for happiness is complete good, to which pertains excellence or clarity, which pride or vainglory desires. [2] Second, it conceptually involves sufficiency, which avarice desires in riches that promise this. [3] Third, it implies delight, without which happiness cannot be, as is said in Ethics I and X, and this is desired by gluttony and lust.
But that someone flees good due to some conjoined evil happens in two ways. [1] For this is either with regard to one's own good, and this is sloth, which is to sorrow at spiritual good due to the adjoined bodily labor, or [2] with regard to another person's good, and this, if it is without insurrection, pertains to envy, which is to sorrow at another's good, insofar as it impedes one's own excellence, or it is with a sort of insurrection in pursuit of vindication, and this is wrath. And to these same vices pertains the search for opposite evils.
Therefore:
(1) To the first it must be said that the same notion of origination is not found in virtues and vices, for virtues are caused by the ordering of desire to reason, or to immutable good, which is God; but vice is raised up from desire for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be opposed to the principal virtues.
(2) To the second it must be said that fear and hope are irascible passions. But all irascible passions are raised up from concupiscible passions, and these are all ordered in some way to delight and sorrow. Thus delight and sorrow are principally counted in the capital sins, in being the most principal passions, as was had above.
(3) To the third it must be said that wrath, despite not being a principal passion, is allowed because conceptually it involves movement of desire, in that to fight another's good suggests the notion of noble good, that is, of the right of vindication; thus it is distinguished from other capital vices.
(4) To the fourth it must be said that pride is said to be the beginning of all sin according to the notion an end, as was said. And according to this same notion it is accorded pre-eminence over the capital vices (principalitas vitiorum capitalium). And thus pride, as it were a universal vice (quasi universale vitium) is not counted among but is rather placed as the queen of all the vices (regina omnium vitiorum), as Gregory says. But avarice is said to be the root according to another notion, as was said above.
(5) To the fifth it must be said that these vices are said to be capital because from them others are frequently raised. Wherefore nothing prevents some sins from arising from other causes. Nonetheless we can say that all sins coming from ignorance can be traced back to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of someone who declines to acquire spiritual goods as a result of labor; for the ignorance that can be a cause of sin comes from negligence, as was said above. And that someone may commit some sin from a good intention is seen to pertain to ignorance, inasmuch as he is ignorant of the fact that evil should not be done so that good may come.
*****
It seems that it should not be said that there are seven capital vices, which are vainglory, envy, wrath, sorrow, avarice, gluttony, and lust.
(1) For sins are opposed to virtues, but there are four principal virtues, as was said above. Therefore also principal or capital vices are not other than four.
(2) Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sins, as was said above. But the passions of the soul are four. Two of these are not mentioned among the aforesaid sins, namely, hope and fear. And there are enumerated various vices to which pertain delight and sorrow, since delight pertains to gluttony and lust, and sorrow to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are enumerated inappropriately.
(3) Further, wrath is not a principal passion. Therefore it ought not to be placed among the principal vices.
(4) Further, just as cupidity, or avarice, is the root of sin, so pride is the beginning of sin, as was said above. But avarice is placed as one of the seven capital vices, so pride should be enumerated among the capital vices.
(5) Further, some sins are committed which can be caused by none of these, as when someone sins out of ignorance; or when someone commits a sin from a good intention, as when someone steels in order to give alms. Therefore the capital vices are not completely enumerated.
But on the contrary there is the authority of Gregory, who enumerates them so in XXXI Moralium.
I reply that it must be said that, as was said, the capital vices are those from which others rise, particularly according to the notion of final cause. But in two ways may this kind of origination take place. [1] In one way, according to the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have the greatest inclination for one end, so that he often proceeds to other sins. But this mode of origination cannot fall under art, for particular human dispositions are infinite. [2] In another way, according to the natural tendency of the ends, one to another; and it is in this way that often one vice often gives rise to another; wherefore this mode of origination can fall under art.
In this way, then, those vices are said to be capital whose ends have certain primary reasons for moving desire, and it is according to these distinctive reasons that the capital vices are distinguished. But something moves desire in two ways. [1] In one way, directly and through itelf, and thus good moves desire to seek it and evil, for the same reason to flee it. [2] In another way, indirectly and as it were through another, as when someone seeks some evil due to some adjoined good, someone seeks evil due to some adjoined evil.
But human good is threefold. [1] For in the first place, there is a sort of good of the soul, which has the notion of desirability solely from being apprehended, namely the excellence of praise and honor, and this good is sought in a disordered way by vainglory. [2] Another is good of the body, and to this pertains either to the conservation of the individual, as with food and drink, and this good is pursued in a disordered way by gluttony, or to conservation of the species, such as sex, and to this lust is ordered. [3] Third is exterior good, such as riches, and to this is ordered avarice. And these four vices inordinately flee the contrary evils.
Or otherwise, good chiefly moves desire from the fact that it participates some property of happiness, which all naturally desire. [1] This conceptually (de cuius ratione) involves some kind of completion, for happiness is complete good, to which pertains excellence or clarity, which pride or vainglory desires. [2] Second, it conceptually involves sufficiency, which avarice desires in riches that promise this. [3] Third, it implies delight, without which happiness cannot be, as is said in Ethics I and X, and this is desired by gluttony and lust.
But that someone flees good due to some conjoined evil happens in two ways. [1] For this is either with regard to one's own good, and this is sloth, which is to sorrow at spiritual good due to the adjoined bodily labor, or [2] with regard to another person's good, and this, if it is without insurrection, pertains to envy, which is to sorrow at another's good, insofar as it impedes one's own excellence, or it is with a sort of insurrection in pursuit of vindication, and this is wrath. And to these same vices pertains the search for opposite evils.
Therefore:
(1) To the first it must be said that the same notion of origination is not found in virtues and vices, for virtues are caused by the ordering of desire to reason, or to immutable good, which is God; but vice is raised up from desire for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be opposed to the principal virtues.
(2) To the second it must be said that fear and hope are irascible passions. But all irascible passions are raised up from concupiscible passions, and these are all ordered in some way to delight and sorrow. Thus delight and sorrow are principally counted in the capital sins, in being the most principal passions, as was had above.
(3) To the third it must be said that wrath, despite not being a principal passion, is allowed because conceptually it involves movement of desire, in that to fight another's good suggests the notion of noble good, that is, of the right of vindication; thus it is distinguished from other capital vices.
(4) To the fourth it must be said that pride is said to be the beginning of all sin according to the notion an end, as was said. And according to this same notion it is accorded pre-eminence over the capital vices (principalitas vitiorum capitalium). And thus pride, as it were a universal vice (quasi universale vitium) is not counted among but is rather placed as the queen of all the vices (regina omnium vitiorum), as Gregory says. But avarice is said to be the root according to another notion, as was said above.
(5) To the fifth it must be said that these vices are said to be capital because from them others are frequently raised. Wherefore nothing prevents some sins from arising from other causes. Nonetheless we can say that all sins coming from ignorance can be traced back to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of someone who declines to acquire spiritual goods as a result of labor; for the ignorance that can be a cause of sin comes from negligence, as was said above. And that someone may commit some sin from a good intention is seen to pertain to ignorance, inasmuch as he is ignorant of the fact that evil should not be done so that good may come.
Lent XXIV
Thou believest that there is one God. Thou dost well: the devils also believe and tremble. But wilt thou know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead? (James 2:19-20)
[Bede the Venerable, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles, Hurst, tr., Cistercian Publications (Kalamazoo, MI: 1985) p. 29.]
Many, even the wicked, are able to believe that the things he speaks are true; they believe that they are true and do not wish to make them their own because they are too lazy to do anything about them. Even the demons were able to believe, however, that he is God. But they alone know how to believe in God who love God, who are Christians not only in name but also in action and [way of] life, because without love faith is empty; with love it is the faith of a Christian, without love the faith of a demon.
[Bede the Venerable, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles, Hurst, tr., Cistercian Publications (Kalamazoo, MI: 1985) p. 29.]
Monday, March 27, 2017
Evening Note for Monday, March 27
Thought for the Evening: David Braine on the Nature of Knowledge
The Catholic Herald recently had an article on the philosopher David Braine, who died last month, so it has started me thinking about some of his work. One of his more important articles is "The Nature of Knowledge" [Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 72 (1971 - 1972), pp. 41-63]. In it he argues against Cartesian and empiricist accounts of knowledge, and justification-based accounts in general regardless of the precise mode of justification that is allowed as legitimate, and in favor of a broadly Aristotelian account.
The key idea of the paper, at least on its critical side, is that skepticism about our ability to know is closely connected to this notion of justification; if you look at how accounts of knowledge interact with various skepticisms, you find that justification is regularly the weak point. In particular, Braine's diagnosis is that skepticisms very often take advantage of the assumption that if a justification is conditional, it is inadequate for knowledge. In his example, if Smith knows (as we would usually say) that his house, which he last saw a fortnight ago, has five rooms, obviously this depends on things like nobody secretly expanding his house while he was gone. This is very weakly conditional -- Smith's knowledge depends on something not occurring, and, indeed, something not occurring that usually doesn't occur. But this suffices for the skeptical strategy. Because the knowledge of the five rooms depends on there having been no such occurrences, the skeptic will say, it is no better than knowledge of those nonoccurrences; so to have an adequate justification for the five rooms, one must also have justification for the nonoccurrences, and so on and so forth, so that by a generalization we conclude that anything with conditional justification is inadequately justified and therefore not a case of knowledge. And, Braine notes, philosophers typically go along with this -- essentially concede the whole point and look for unconditional justifications. This has the problem of (1) putting the theory of knowledge farther and farther away from any day-to-day account of knowledge and (2) more and more implausible accounts of specific kinds of knowledge. Braine takes these as signs of misstep; a concession is being made, right at the beginning, that should not be made.
Suppose that you are trying to determine whether you are justified in a particular judgment that X is true. What do you look at? Exactly the same evidence that you look at if you are trying to determine whether X is true, and exactly the same evidence that you look at if you are trying to determine whether you know that X is true. There is no fundamental difference of evidence here. Talk of justification, where it does not simply become a synonym of knowledge, is actually just parasitic on our first-order determination of whether things are true. You don't have to look first to see whether you are justified in judging that X is true; you already are looking at everything you need to look at in trying to figure out whether X is true. Likewise, you do not need to start with epistemology in order to figure out what you know, or rely on a special kind of knowledge-inference; you start with the things themselves. By the time you start doing epistemology, you are already knowing particular things in a crude, rough, case-by-case, unsystematic way, and epistemology is the study of those things, not the precondition for them.
It is precisely this that looks broadly Aristotelian -- Aristotle held that serious inquiry generally starts with endoxa, which are, loosely speaking, the common, stable, reasoned judgments arising out of experiencing many times the way things appear to be. Braine follows this line of thought to propose an alternative account of knowledge (I am pulling together Braine's explanations into one definition):
(A) For X to know P is for X to be in a relational state that is an acquired disposition, involving rational thought or inference, that is satisfactory (for a being of X's kind) with regard to P for intellectual reasons.
This definition gives a genus for knowledge -- intellectually satisfactory relational states -- and distinguishes it at least from obvious cases of non-knowledge in the genus. It avoids circularity. It avoids the problems noted above with regard to justification. And, more importantly, it gives a more fundamental way of evaluating whether and what we know than accounts of justification do. As Braine says (p. 57), "In any exercise of human faculties or capacities, it is always some goal or satisfactory end-position which provides the standard by reference to which we (a) assess defects in the exercise of the faculties concerned, and (b) define what it is for this exercise to be free of defect in this or that respect." To determine whether you are justified, you have to know what errors you could make; to determine what errors you could make, you have to know what you are doing; to know what you are doing, you need to know the goal. To know whether the arrow was well-shot, and how well-shot it was, you need to know what the target was. What's more, this goal-focused account allows something that gets lost in discussions of justification. Because we can compare actual seeing to the satisfactory end-position of seeing, we can recognize that sight is not a matter of an on/off switch: someone with poor eyes can see, just not well; thus we can determine that for some things their sight might count as not seriously different from blindness, and yet also recognize that it may be good enough for some kinds of seeing. You don't have to look for a minimum threshold of seeing in order to determine what successful seeing is; and you don't have to look for a threshold of justification in order to determine what knowledge is.
This brings us back full circle, in a sense: there is no need for unconditional justifications; all the talk of justification was in fact covering over the sheer richness of how knowledge is grounded. In order to look at knowledge in a field, we need to recognize this richness, by looking at the kinds of ways people are relating to the world and the kinds of ways that can provide an appropriate completion to the intellectual impulse. We do not have to make any assumptions as to what these things will look like beforehand; indeed, we should not.
Various Links of Note
* Babbage's Difference Engine in LEGO.
* A number of psychologists note that the evidence that there are distinct 'learning styles' is very poor.
* Sean Davis, Fourteen Things Everyone Should Understand about Guns
* Terry Eagleton, Revolutionizing Ourselves, on Wittgenstein and politics
* Caitlin Green, A very long way from home: early Byzantine finds at the far ends of the world
Currently Reading
Dante, Purgatorio
Christ Our Pascha -- Catechism of the Ukrainian Catholic Church
Theodore the Studite, Writings on Iconoclasm
Donald Ainslie, Hume's True Scepticism
C. S. Lewis and E. M. W. Tillyard, The Personal Heresy: A Controversy
Michael Flynn, Eifelheim
The Catholic Herald recently had an article on the philosopher David Braine, who died last month, so it has started me thinking about some of his work. One of his more important articles is "The Nature of Knowledge" [Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 72 (1971 - 1972), pp. 41-63]. In it he argues against Cartesian and empiricist accounts of knowledge, and justification-based accounts in general regardless of the precise mode of justification that is allowed as legitimate, and in favor of a broadly Aristotelian account.
The key idea of the paper, at least on its critical side, is that skepticism about our ability to know is closely connected to this notion of justification; if you look at how accounts of knowledge interact with various skepticisms, you find that justification is regularly the weak point. In particular, Braine's diagnosis is that skepticisms very often take advantage of the assumption that if a justification is conditional, it is inadequate for knowledge. In his example, if Smith knows (as we would usually say) that his house, which he last saw a fortnight ago, has five rooms, obviously this depends on things like nobody secretly expanding his house while he was gone. This is very weakly conditional -- Smith's knowledge depends on something not occurring, and, indeed, something not occurring that usually doesn't occur. But this suffices for the skeptical strategy. Because the knowledge of the five rooms depends on there having been no such occurrences, the skeptic will say, it is no better than knowledge of those nonoccurrences; so to have an adequate justification for the five rooms, one must also have justification for the nonoccurrences, and so on and so forth, so that by a generalization we conclude that anything with conditional justification is inadequately justified and therefore not a case of knowledge. And, Braine notes, philosophers typically go along with this -- essentially concede the whole point and look for unconditional justifications. This has the problem of (1) putting the theory of knowledge farther and farther away from any day-to-day account of knowledge and (2) more and more implausible accounts of specific kinds of knowledge. Braine takes these as signs of misstep; a concession is being made, right at the beginning, that should not be made.
Suppose that you are trying to determine whether you are justified in a particular judgment that X is true. What do you look at? Exactly the same evidence that you look at if you are trying to determine whether X is true, and exactly the same evidence that you look at if you are trying to determine whether you know that X is true. There is no fundamental difference of evidence here. Talk of justification, where it does not simply become a synonym of knowledge, is actually just parasitic on our first-order determination of whether things are true. You don't have to look first to see whether you are justified in judging that X is true; you already are looking at everything you need to look at in trying to figure out whether X is true. Likewise, you do not need to start with epistemology in order to figure out what you know, or rely on a special kind of knowledge-inference; you start with the things themselves. By the time you start doing epistemology, you are already knowing particular things in a crude, rough, case-by-case, unsystematic way, and epistemology is the study of those things, not the precondition for them.
It is precisely this that looks broadly Aristotelian -- Aristotle held that serious inquiry generally starts with endoxa, which are, loosely speaking, the common, stable, reasoned judgments arising out of experiencing many times the way things appear to be. Braine follows this line of thought to propose an alternative account of knowledge (I am pulling together Braine's explanations into one definition):
(A) For X to know P is for X to be in a relational state that is an acquired disposition, involving rational thought or inference, that is satisfactory (for a being of X's kind) with regard to P for intellectual reasons.
This definition gives a genus for knowledge -- intellectually satisfactory relational states -- and distinguishes it at least from obvious cases of non-knowledge in the genus. It avoids circularity. It avoids the problems noted above with regard to justification. And, more importantly, it gives a more fundamental way of evaluating whether and what we know than accounts of justification do. As Braine says (p. 57), "In any exercise of human faculties or capacities, it is always some goal or satisfactory end-position which provides the standard by reference to which we (a) assess defects in the exercise of the faculties concerned, and (b) define what it is for this exercise to be free of defect in this or that respect." To determine whether you are justified, you have to know what errors you could make; to determine what errors you could make, you have to know what you are doing; to know what you are doing, you need to know the goal. To know whether the arrow was well-shot, and how well-shot it was, you need to know what the target was. What's more, this goal-focused account allows something that gets lost in discussions of justification. Because we can compare actual seeing to the satisfactory end-position of seeing, we can recognize that sight is not a matter of an on/off switch: someone with poor eyes can see, just not well; thus we can determine that for some things their sight might count as not seriously different from blindness, and yet also recognize that it may be good enough for some kinds of seeing. You don't have to look for a minimum threshold of seeing in order to determine what successful seeing is; and you don't have to look for a threshold of justification in order to determine what knowledge is.
This brings us back full circle, in a sense: there is no need for unconditional justifications; all the talk of justification was in fact covering over the sheer richness of how knowledge is grounded. In order to look at knowledge in a field, we need to recognize this richness, by looking at the kinds of ways people are relating to the world and the kinds of ways that can provide an appropriate completion to the intellectual impulse. We do not have to make any assumptions as to what these things will look like beforehand; indeed, we should not.
Various Links of Note
* Babbage's Difference Engine in LEGO.
* A number of psychologists note that the evidence that there are distinct 'learning styles' is very poor.
* Sean Davis, Fourteen Things Everyone Should Understand about Guns
* Terry Eagleton, Revolutionizing Ourselves, on Wittgenstein and politics
* Caitlin Green, A very long way from home: early Byzantine finds at the far ends of the world
Currently Reading
Dante, Purgatorio
Christ Our Pascha -- Catechism of the Ukrainian Catholic Church
Theodore the Studite, Writings on Iconoclasm
Donald Ainslie, Hume's True Scepticism
C. S. Lewis and E. M. W. Tillyard, The Personal Heresy: A Controversy
Michael Flynn, Eifelheim
Job 12-14
And Job said:
It's remarkable how you are the only intelligent people,
and how wisdom will die with you.
I have a mind just as much as you do!
Who does not know the things you claim to know?
Someone like myself, whose friends mock him,
will appeal to God and receive a hearing,
because the innocence of the law-abiding is being laughed at.
The clever who prosper may treat it lightly,
but its time will come.
Thieves have many mansions,
boldly flaunting them before God,
and he has let them have it all.
The beasts could teach you this,
the birds of the air let you know it;
the earth is acquainted with it,
the fish will tell you about it.
Who could possibly not know
that the Lord acts in this way?
All life and every human breath is in his hand.
The ear can hear this.
The tongue can taste it.
It is the traditional understanding;
it is the insight that comes from experience.
He is strong and wise;
he has discernment and understanding.
What he pulls down, none can rebuild.
What he locks up, none can draw out.
If he holds back rain, everything dries up.
If he sends it down, the earth overflows.
He is strong, he is wise.
He knows the deceiver and the deceived;
he brings advisers to a fool's end
and judges to bewilderment;
he trades a king's fine belt for a chain,
leads the priests away without vestments,
overthrows the nobility,
confounds the words of the eloquent,
strips away the teaching of the elders.
He pours down ignominy on princes;
he raises up the downtrodden.
He shows forth things deep and obscure,
bringing light to deathly realms.
He makes nations flourish and perish,
and restores them again after ruin.
He muddles the hearts of rulers,
sending them on misleading paths to failure;
they stumble in darkness, without a glimmer,
staggering like men who are drunk.
I lack neither eye nor ear nor brain;
what you know, I know;
I am not less intelligent than you.
I will address the Almighty;
I will take my case to God;
but first I will show you all liars,
sophists of incompetent thoughts.
Would that you had the sense to be silent;
then someone might think you wise.
Listen to my rebuttal; hear what I have to say.
Does God need your folly?
Does he need you to bend the truth for him?
Are you his representative and his advocate?
Do you think that he does not see it all,
or that you can deceive him about any of it?
He will rebuke you,
because you took it on yourself to represent him.
when he acts, he will overturn you,
and you will learn to fear him.
Your memory will be just ashes,
your stubbornness fragile clay.
Shut your mouth while I speak my mind!
Why am I tearing my heart out,
holding my life in my hands?
I will await for his answer,
though he should kill me.
I will defend my ways to him,
and it is me he will spare,
because it is hypocrites he does not tolerate.
Hear me speak and learn what you do not understand.
If I come to judgment, I will be vindicated.
Where is my accuser? Let him come.
Why should I just lie down and take this?
There are only two things I ask,
so that I may face you openly:
Withdraw the force of your hand,
and stop raining your terrors on me.
Demand, and I will answer you,
or I will demand, and you answer me.
What are my crimes and faults?
Let me know my guilt and failing.
Why hide, why treat me like an enemy?
You come like a gale against a leaf;
you harry a bit of straw.
You file bitter charges against me,
and attack me for sins long in the past.
You have locked me in stocks,
you have hunted me down,
you have tracked my footsteps,
until I am just a rotting corpse,
a moth-eaten garment.
Men born of women are frail.
Their lives are misery-ridden,
brief like the flower that fades,
that flees like a shadow, never staying.
are they really worth your scrutiny
or your charges against them?
Who can make the blemished pure,
if not you who alone are pure.
Men's days are brief.
You alone know the count of their months.
You have set some bound they will not pass.
Will you not give him a little peace
until the toil of his work is done?
Trees have something to look forward to;
when stripped, they grow back green,
they sprout new branches,
and if their roots are withered,
the scent of water rejuvenates them,
and leaves sprout just like a first planting;
but when a man is dead, stripped and withered,
where is there anything left?
It is as if the seas were emptied,
as if the rivers were all dry.
The man in that sleep does not rise;
he will not wake while the sky endures.
Who can give me protection in death,
who can hide me until your wrath is done,
who can set a date for restoration?
Who will make the dead live again?
Then I could endure my tour of duty.
You could demand, and I would answer,
if I received the relief of your hand.
You have traced out my steps; erase my sins.
You have hoarded all my offenses; heal my wrongs.
Rock by rock, a mountain at last will crumble,
stones are worn down by water,
floods wash away the ground in the end.
In the same way you break a man,
allowing him strength for a little while
until you take it all away forever.
You drain him pale, and he disappears.
What his progeny do, he will never know;
he just has the pain and the sorrow.
It's remarkable how you are the only intelligent people,
and how wisdom will die with you.
I have a mind just as much as you do!
Who does not know the things you claim to know?
Someone like myself, whose friends mock him,
will appeal to God and receive a hearing,
because the innocence of the law-abiding is being laughed at.
The clever who prosper may treat it lightly,
but its time will come.
Thieves have many mansions,
boldly flaunting them before God,
and he has let them have it all.
The beasts could teach you this,
the birds of the air let you know it;
the earth is acquainted with it,
the fish will tell you about it.
Who could possibly not know
that the Lord acts in this way?
All life and every human breath is in his hand.
The ear can hear this.
The tongue can taste it.
It is the traditional understanding;
it is the insight that comes from experience.
He is strong and wise;
he has discernment and understanding.
What he pulls down, none can rebuild.
What he locks up, none can draw out.
If he holds back rain, everything dries up.
If he sends it down, the earth overflows.
He is strong, he is wise.
He knows the deceiver and the deceived;
he brings advisers to a fool's end
and judges to bewilderment;
he trades a king's fine belt for a chain,
leads the priests away without vestments,
overthrows the nobility,
confounds the words of the eloquent,
strips away the teaching of the elders.
He pours down ignominy on princes;
he raises up the downtrodden.
He shows forth things deep and obscure,
bringing light to deathly realms.
He makes nations flourish and perish,
and restores them again after ruin.
He muddles the hearts of rulers,
sending them on misleading paths to failure;
they stumble in darkness, without a glimmer,
staggering like men who are drunk.
I lack neither eye nor ear nor brain;
what you know, I know;
I am not less intelligent than you.
I will address the Almighty;
I will take my case to God;
but first I will show you all liars,
sophists of incompetent thoughts.
Would that you had the sense to be silent;
then someone might think you wise.
Listen to my rebuttal; hear what I have to say.
Does God need your folly?
Does he need you to bend the truth for him?
Are you his representative and his advocate?
Do you think that he does not see it all,
or that you can deceive him about any of it?
He will rebuke you,
because you took it on yourself to represent him.
when he acts, he will overturn you,
and you will learn to fear him.
Your memory will be just ashes,
your stubbornness fragile clay.
Shut your mouth while I speak my mind!
Why am I tearing my heart out,
holding my life in my hands?
I will await for his answer,
though he should kill me.
I will defend my ways to him,
and it is me he will spare,
because it is hypocrites he does not tolerate.
Hear me speak and learn what you do not understand.
If I come to judgment, I will be vindicated.
Where is my accuser? Let him come.
Why should I just lie down and take this?
There are only two things I ask,
so that I may face you openly:
Withdraw the force of your hand,
and stop raining your terrors on me.
Demand, and I will answer you,
or I will demand, and you answer me.
What are my crimes and faults?
Let me know my guilt and failing.
Why hide, why treat me like an enemy?
You come like a gale against a leaf;
you harry a bit of straw.
You file bitter charges against me,
and attack me for sins long in the past.
You have locked me in stocks,
you have hunted me down,
you have tracked my footsteps,
until I am just a rotting corpse,
a moth-eaten garment.
Men born of women are frail.
Their lives are misery-ridden,
brief like the flower that fades,
that flees like a shadow, never staying.
are they really worth your scrutiny
or your charges against them?
Who can make the blemished pure,
if not you who alone are pure.
Men's days are brief.
You alone know the count of their months.
You have set some bound they will not pass.
Will you not give him a little peace
until the toil of his work is done?
Trees have something to look forward to;
when stripped, they grow back green,
they sprout new branches,
and if their roots are withered,
the scent of water rejuvenates them,
and leaves sprout just like a first planting;
but when a man is dead, stripped and withered,
where is there anything left?
It is as if the seas were emptied,
as if the rivers were all dry.
The man in that sleep does not rise;
he will not wake while the sky endures.
Who can give me protection in death,
who can hide me until your wrath is done,
who can set a date for restoration?
Who will make the dead live again?
Then I could endure my tour of duty.
You could demand, and I would answer,
if I received the relief of your hand.
You have traced out my steps; erase my sins.
You have hoarded all my offenses; heal my wrongs.
Rock by rock, a mountain at last will crumble,
stones are worn down by water,
floods wash away the ground in the end.
In the same way you break a man,
allowing him strength for a little while
until you take it all away forever.
You drain him pale, and he disappears.
What his progeny do, he will never know;
he just has the pain and the sorrow.
Lent XXIII
For we, O Lord, are diminished more than any nation, and are brought low in all the earth this day for our sins. Neither is there at this time prince, or leader, or prophet, or holocaust, or sacrifice, or oblation, or incense, or place of firstfruits before thee, that we may find thy mercy: nevertheless in a contrite heart and humble spirit let us be accepted. (Daniel 3:37-39)
[St. Jerome, Commentary on Daniel, pp. 509-510.]
These verses are to be used whenever the churches suffer want (because of the sins of the people) of holy men, and of magistrates who are most learned in the law of God, and also whenever in times of persecution no sacrifice or oblation is offered up. Some authorities relate this passage to the heavenly Jerusalem, on the ground that the souls have been plunged to the earthly plane and find themselves in a place of tears and utter distress, and bewail the sins of by-gone years and the other things included in the prophetic discourse. But the Church of God has not accepted this view.
[St. Jerome, Commentary on Daniel, pp. 509-510.]
Sunday, March 26, 2017
Fortnightly Book, March 26
Non nobis, Domine, non nobis, sed nomini tuo da gloriam.
The next fortnightly book is Dante's Purgatorio, the second part of the Divine Comedy. By the internal chronology of the Comedy, Dante's journey had begun, depending on which interpretation you prefer, on March 24 or April 7, and lasts a week. The year for the journey is 1300; March 25, of course, would have been the Annunciation, and also the start of the Florentine year, while April 8, 1300 would have been Good Friday. While there are evidences that suggest the former, the poem's explicit statements seem usually to require the latter, and it makes somewhat more sense theologically. If we take that chronology, all of Good Friday is spent in Hell, and then it takes all of Holy Saturday at the very end of the Inferno to ascend from the bottomless pit to come out and see the stars on the other side of the earth; they arrive at the Island of Purgatory at 6 AM on Easter Sunday, April 10. Dante will find himself the gates to the Mountain of Purgatory at 8 AM on Easter Monday. The ascent up the mountain is laborious, and Dante will finally be at the Earthly Paradise atop the mountain at noon on Wednesday, April 13. (If one assumes the March date, the arrival will be Wednesday, March 30.)
Souls arrive at Purgatory singing In exitu Israel de Aegypto, which is Psalm 113 in the Vulgate (the quoted verse above is the best known verse from the Psalm) and that makes it Psalms 114 & 115 in most modern Bibles. It is precisely the first verse of this psalm that Dante uses in the Letter to Cangrande to explain the fourfold sense of Scripture, which he claims the Comedy imitates:
If we look at it from the letter alone it means to us the exit of the Children of Israel from Egypt at the time of Moses; if from allegory, it means for us our redemption done by Christ; if from the moral sense, it means to us the conversion of the soul from the struggle and misery of sin to the status of grace; if from the anagogical, it means the leave taking of the blessed soul from the slavery of this corruption to the freedom of eternal glory.
The translation I will be using will be Henry Francis Cary's, because it's the most convenient one I happen to have. It's a fairly solid blank verse translation, more concerned with accuracy than with style. It was highly praised by Coleridge, and received good reviews from the Italian poet, Ugo Foscolo, who discovered it while spending eleven years in London.
Dorothy L. Sayers, The Man Born to Be King
Introduction
Opening Passage: From "Kings in Judea":
Summary: The Man Born to be King consists of twelve plays, initially presented about a month apart:
(1) "Kings in Judea": King Caspar of Chaldea, King Melchior of Pamphylia, and King Balthazar of Ethiopia come to King Herod the Great to congratulate him on this newborn heir, whose birth they have seen in the stars, the scion of the House of Judea who shall rule in Rome as priest and king. The paranoid Herod, whose position is as a client-king of Rome who replaced the priest-king dynasty of the Hasmoneans, sends them off quickly but, taking their prophecy seriously, takes thought for how he will deal with this threat.
(2) "The King's Herald": A man named John is preaching repentance in the wilderness and baptizing in the River Jordan, along with a number of his disciples, including Judas Iscariot, Simon and Andrew the sons of Jonah, and John and James the sons of Zebedee. John baptizes his cousin, who makes an impression on several of John's disciples; He tells them to seek Him out when John no longer has need of them.
(3) "A Certain Nobleman": Mary is helping at the wedding of a close friend and her son, Jesus, arrives with several of his friends, Philip, Nathanael, Andrew, Simon, James, and John, thus increasing the number of guests beyond what had originally been planned. They run out of wine, but Jesus turns water into wine. Later, one of the guests at the wedding, named Benjamin, learns that his son has been dying; he sends for Jesus, who has been causing a scandal by driving the moneychangers out of the Temple with a whip. Jesus heals the son with a word.
(4) "The Heirs to the Kingdom": Jesus picks up two new disciples, Matthew and Judas Iscariot, as his healing ministry begins to worry the priests. The High Priest Caiaphas, a political schemer whose position is due to Rome's influence, begins to develop a plan to play the Jesus movement and the Roman government against each other; a Zealot named Baruch happens to know a man in Jesus' retinue, because they had discussed nationalist issues before. The man will see through any crude attempt at corruption, but he may nonetheless serve their purposes; his name is Judas.
(5) "The Bread of Heaven": Jesus sends his disciples out with the power to heal and cast out demons; Philip is exhausted from having done so, and Judas, who has only been preaching, is jealous. They stay at the house of Baruch, and Judas and Baruch discuss the possibility that Jesus is the Messiah who will save Israel from oppression. But to do so against the might of Rome requires a popular uprising -- which Baruch can provide. Baruch raises a worry: so many purported saviors and prophets turn out to be corrupt; Jesus seems incorruptible, but what if he is not? Judas refuses to have anything to do with Baruch's plans, but Baruch's suggestion eats at him. Jesus' miracle of feeding the crowd increases his popularity, but his claims that he is the bread of life and people must devour him turn many off; Simon receives the name of Peter.
(6) "The Feast of Tabernacles": The Feast of Tabernacles approaches and Jesus declines to go up to Jerusalem with his family. Claudia, the wife of the Roman governor, hears about a remarkable Jewish prophet from her Syro-Phoenician handmaiden. Jesus takes Simon Peter, James, and John to the top of a mountain and shows them his splendor. A Zealot named Barabbas is captured by the Romans, and Caiaphas sends guards to arrest Jesus when he finally comes to Jerusalem and begins preaching in the Temple; the guards, however, refuse. Caiaphas, not trusting Baruch, makes direct contact with Judas, who assures the Jewish leaders that Jesus' kingdom is not political but spiritual. When Caiaphas suggests that even noble men may become corrupted, Judas insists that Jesus will not, and Caiaphas sees how he can use him: "People with ideas are always jealous of their leaders" (p. 176).
(7) "The Light and the Life": Jesus is staying at the house of his friends, Mary, Martha, and Lazarus when the disciples come to tell him that there is trouble brewing over a blind man who had been healed by Jesus -- the local elders are excommunicating him from the synagogue. Jesus increases the tensions by claiming that God is His Father and He and His Father are one. Matthew, who knows money despite having given it up, has reason to believe that Judas is using his role as treasurer to embezzle from their common purse, but has no proof. Judas is getting frustrated with his inability to get straight answers from Jesus. Jesus and his disciples learn that Lazarus has died; Jesus returns and raises him from the dead. Caiaphas has to maneuver Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, who are Jesus sympathizers, into not interfering with his plans.
(8) "Royal Progress": Baruch sends a message to Jesus warning him that the priests and Pharisees are scheming to turn him over to Rome, and asks for a sign of Jesus' intentions: Baruch has prepared a war horse and an ass's colt for Jesus' entry into Jerusalem, and if Jesus rides into Jerusalem on the war horse, he will have all of Baruch's men in support of him. Jesus sends back saying that Baruch will have his sign, and Judas learns of it in a garbled form suggesting that Jesus will take Baruch up on his offer. Jesus enters Jerusalem on the ass's colt and crowds hail him as king. The Jewish leaders hire hecklers to try to trap Jesus, but he is too witty for them. Judas comes to Caiaphas in anger at Jesus' hypocrisy and the fact that the less intelligent disciples are more in Jesus' confidence than Judas is. We learn that Judas has been using the disciples' funds to spy on Baruch; Caiaphas promises to pay him thirty pieces of silver for his help.
(9) "The King's Supper": Jesus and his disciples celebrate the Passover feast. In private discussion, Judas realizes that Jesus suspects him, and he goes to Caiaphas urging speed. At supper, Jesus says many baffling things, but the disciples are still exultant after the triumphal entry into Jerusalem. Jesus is arrested in the Garden of Gethsemane.
(10) "The Princes of this World": Jesus becomes part of a complicated political game between Caiaphas and the Roman governor Pilate. Jesus is examined by Annas, the High Priest Emeritus who was removed by Rome and replaced by Caiaphas. Peter denies Jesus. Judas learns from Baruch that Jesus refused Baruch's offer and that Caiaphas has been manipulating him. Jesus is tried by the Sanhedrim, and Caiaphas manipulates the situation to guarantee a conviction despite the fact that the hurried nature of the situation makes it difficult to get the witnesses required by Law. Judas confronts Caiaphas, who pays him and dismisses him; Judas refuses the money and flees in shame. The Jewish leaders bring Jesus to Pilate to get ratification of the death penalty for him; Pilate sends Jesus to Herod on the jurisdictional technicality that he is actually a Galilean from Nazareth; Herod, discovering that Jesus was actually born in Bethlehem, sends him back. Pilate tries to save Jesus by using the custom of releasing a prisoner for the Feast, but the crowd, which has gathered to support Barabbas, forces his hand, especially when Caiaphas claims that if Pilate does not comply it will be regarded as a refusal to uphold the authority of Caesar against a man claiming to be king. Pilate washes his hands of the matter and in petty retaliation for being outmaneuvered commands that Jesus' cross be labeled, "The King of the Jews".
(11) "King of Sorrows": Jesus is led out to be crucified between two thieves. Caiaphas insists to Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea that his way is the only way to save the Jewish people from the heavy hand of the Empire. Claudia has a dream in which a great voice cries, "Great Pan is dead", and in which Pilate is remembered forever for the shame of having crucified a god. The Centurion Proclus and Balthazar of Ethiopia, whose paths had crossed before in the court of King Herod the Great, meet once more beneath the foot of the cross. Caiaphas has guards set on Jesus' tomb.
(12) "The King Comes to His Own": The disciples are scattered in fear and sorrow, but the women must still tend to the body. They discover that the body is gone and meet Angels. Peter and John confirm that the body is gone, and Mary Magdalen meets Jesus. Joseph of Arimathea is accused in the Sanhedrim of having aided the disciples in stealing Jesus' body; Nicodemus has a public breakdown over the events. Caiaphas realizes that he must arrest Jesus' disciples in order to prevent them from spreading claims that Jesus has risen from the dead. Cleophas and Mary Cleophas come to the disciples with a story of having met Jesus on the road to Emmaus. As Claudia and Pilate leave the city, Claudia hears gossip that people are claiming Jesus rose from the dead. Jesus proves to Thomas that he is real, and Thomas replies: "You are my Lord and my God" (p. 340). Jesus and Peter speak and Peter is forgiven, and Jesus ascends into heaven.
There are many specific choices that have to be made in a cycle like this, and there are many things that can be done in different ways, but the choices Sayers makes contributes to an excellent story. Two things in particular are outstanding. The first is her portrayal of the political scheming of Caiaphas, which I think partly comes out in the summary above. He has to outmaneuver the Zealots, and he has to outmaneuver Rome. He has to outwit Pilate, who has every reason to be noncooperative, and he has to outmaneuver his opponents in the Sanhedrim, some of whom sympathize with Jesus and some of whom, while not sympathizing with Jesus, would be more than happy to see Caiaphas fall on his face, and what is more, he has to do so on a point of Law in a room full of rabbis on the spur of the moment. And all of his maneuvering is successful, but it all comes to nothing in the end.
The second is the portrayal of Judas Iscariot, the only disciple who actually understands the truth that Jesus' kingdom cannot be political, and who is destroyed by not recognizing the limits of his understanding. He is an intellectual idealist, as Sayers says at one point, and, like so many intellectuals and academics who spend their lives in a world of highminded ideas, has difficulty distinguishing between his ideal of something and the way it really ought to be, and ends up devoting everything to the former rather than the latter. She also does very well at portraying his frustration that his intelligence is not getting him special consideration, and his devastation at the discovery that he was all the time just a pawn in the games of far more practically competent schemers, and not the brilliant strategist he had convinced himself he was. It is an extraordinary depiction of the corruption and self-destruction of an intellectual.
Favorite Passage: This passage, shortly after the Triumphal Entry and just before the Passover supper, captures perfectly the complete cluelessness of the disciples about what is about to smash into them broadside:
Recommendation: Sayers does excellent work in fulfilling her goal of telling that story; Highly Recommended.
****
Dorothy L. Sayers, The Man Born to be King. Gollancz (London: 1969).
Opening Passage: From "Kings in Judea":
THE EVANGELIST: The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God...Now, when Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judea in the days of Herod the King, behold there came wise men from the east to Jerusalem....
(the rattle of dice and the sound of a lute)
EPHRAIM: Four, six, two....Oh, stop strumming, you idle monkey!...Your throw, Captain.
PROCLUS (throwing dice): Five, three, six.
EPHRAIM: You win, Proclus....What was all that noise in the street last night? Right under the palace windows--disgraceful!
PROCLUS: A bunch of fools who'd got hold of some rumour or other. (p. 48)
Summary: The Man Born to be King consists of twelve plays, initially presented about a month apart:
(1) "Kings in Judea": King Caspar of Chaldea, King Melchior of Pamphylia, and King Balthazar of Ethiopia come to King Herod the Great to congratulate him on this newborn heir, whose birth they have seen in the stars, the scion of the House of Judea who shall rule in Rome as priest and king. The paranoid Herod, whose position is as a client-king of Rome who replaced the priest-king dynasty of the Hasmoneans, sends them off quickly but, taking their prophecy seriously, takes thought for how he will deal with this threat.
(2) "The King's Herald": A man named John is preaching repentance in the wilderness and baptizing in the River Jordan, along with a number of his disciples, including Judas Iscariot, Simon and Andrew the sons of Jonah, and John and James the sons of Zebedee. John baptizes his cousin, who makes an impression on several of John's disciples; He tells them to seek Him out when John no longer has need of them.
(3) "A Certain Nobleman": Mary is helping at the wedding of a close friend and her son, Jesus, arrives with several of his friends, Philip, Nathanael, Andrew, Simon, James, and John, thus increasing the number of guests beyond what had originally been planned. They run out of wine, but Jesus turns water into wine. Later, one of the guests at the wedding, named Benjamin, learns that his son has been dying; he sends for Jesus, who has been causing a scandal by driving the moneychangers out of the Temple with a whip. Jesus heals the son with a word.
(4) "The Heirs to the Kingdom": Jesus picks up two new disciples, Matthew and Judas Iscariot, as his healing ministry begins to worry the priests. The High Priest Caiaphas, a political schemer whose position is due to Rome's influence, begins to develop a plan to play the Jesus movement and the Roman government against each other; a Zealot named Baruch happens to know a man in Jesus' retinue, because they had discussed nationalist issues before. The man will see through any crude attempt at corruption, but he may nonetheless serve their purposes; his name is Judas.
(5) "The Bread of Heaven": Jesus sends his disciples out with the power to heal and cast out demons; Philip is exhausted from having done so, and Judas, who has only been preaching, is jealous. They stay at the house of Baruch, and Judas and Baruch discuss the possibility that Jesus is the Messiah who will save Israel from oppression. But to do so against the might of Rome requires a popular uprising -- which Baruch can provide. Baruch raises a worry: so many purported saviors and prophets turn out to be corrupt; Jesus seems incorruptible, but what if he is not? Judas refuses to have anything to do with Baruch's plans, but Baruch's suggestion eats at him. Jesus' miracle of feeding the crowd increases his popularity, but his claims that he is the bread of life and people must devour him turn many off; Simon receives the name of Peter.
(6) "The Feast of Tabernacles": The Feast of Tabernacles approaches and Jesus declines to go up to Jerusalem with his family. Claudia, the wife of the Roman governor, hears about a remarkable Jewish prophet from her Syro-Phoenician handmaiden. Jesus takes Simon Peter, James, and John to the top of a mountain and shows them his splendor. A Zealot named Barabbas is captured by the Romans, and Caiaphas sends guards to arrest Jesus when he finally comes to Jerusalem and begins preaching in the Temple; the guards, however, refuse. Caiaphas, not trusting Baruch, makes direct contact with Judas, who assures the Jewish leaders that Jesus' kingdom is not political but spiritual. When Caiaphas suggests that even noble men may become corrupted, Judas insists that Jesus will not, and Caiaphas sees how he can use him: "People with ideas are always jealous of their leaders" (p. 176).
(7) "The Light and the Life": Jesus is staying at the house of his friends, Mary, Martha, and Lazarus when the disciples come to tell him that there is trouble brewing over a blind man who had been healed by Jesus -- the local elders are excommunicating him from the synagogue. Jesus increases the tensions by claiming that God is His Father and He and His Father are one. Matthew, who knows money despite having given it up, has reason to believe that Judas is using his role as treasurer to embezzle from their common purse, but has no proof. Judas is getting frustrated with his inability to get straight answers from Jesus. Jesus and his disciples learn that Lazarus has died; Jesus returns and raises him from the dead. Caiaphas has to maneuver Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, who are Jesus sympathizers, into not interfering with his plans.
(8) "Royal Progress": Baruch sends a message to Jesus warning him that the priests and Pharisees are scheming to turn him over to Rome, and asks for a sign of Jesus' intentions: Baruch has prepared a war horse and an ass's colt for Jesus' entry into Jerusalem, and if Jesus rides into Jerusalem on the war horse, he will have all of Baruch's men in support of him. Jesus sends back saying that Baruch will have his sign, and Judas learns of it in a garbled form suggesting that Jesus will take Baruch up on his offer. Jesus enters Jerusalem on the ass's colt and crowds hail him as king. The Jewish leaders hire hecklers to try to trap Jesus, but he is too witty for them. Judas comes to Caiaphas in anger at Jesus' hypocrisy and the fact that the less intelligent disciples are more in Jesus' confidence than Judas is. We learn that Judas has been using the disciples' funds to spy on Baruch; Caiaphas promises to pay him thirty pieces of silver for his help.
(9) "The King's Supper": Jesus and his disciples celebrate the Passover feast. In private discussion, Judas realizes that Jesus suspects him, and he goes to Caiaphas urging speed. At supper, Jesus says many baffling things, but the disciples are still exultant after the triumphal entry into Jerusalem. Jesus is arrested in the Garden of Gethsemane.
(10) "The Princes of this World": Jesus becomes part of a complicated political game between Caiaphas and the Roman governor Pilate. Jesus is examined by Annas, the High Priest Emeritus who was removed by Rome and replaced by Caiaphas. Peter denies Jesus. Judas learns from Baruch that Jesus refused Baruch's offer and that Caiaphas has been manipulating him. Jesus is tried by the Sanhedrim, and Caiaphas manipulates the situation to guarantee a conviction despite the fact that the hurried nature of the situation makes it difficult to get the witnesses required by Law. Judas confronts Caiaphas, who pays him and dismisses him; Judas refuses the money and flees in shame. The Jewish leaders bring Jesus to Pilate to get ratification of the death penalty for him; Pilate sends Jesus to Herod on the jurisdictional technicality that he is actually a Galilean from Nazareth; Herod, discovering that Jesus was actually born in Bethlehem, sends him back. Pilate tries to save Jesus by using the custom of releasing a prisoner for the Feast, but the crowd, which has gathered to support Barabbas, forces his hand, especially when Caiaphas claims that if Pilate does not comply it will be regarded as a refusal to uphold the authority of Caesar against a man claiming to be king. Pilate washes his hands of the matter and in petty retaliation for being outmaneuvered commands that Jesus' cross be labeled, "The King of the Jews".
(11) "King of Sorrows": Jesus is led out to be crucified between two thieves. Caiaphas insists to Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea that his way is the only way to save the Jewish people from the heavy hand of the Empire. Claudia has a dream in which a great voice cries, "Great Pan is dead", and in which Pilate is remembered forever for the shame of having crucified a god. The Centurion Proclus and Balthazar of Ethiopia, whose paths had crossed before in the court of King Herod the Great, meet once more beneath the foot of the cross. Caiaphas has guards set on Jesus' tomb.
(12) "The King Comes to His Own": The disciples are scattered in fear and sorrow, but the women must still tend to the body. They discover that the body is gone and meet Angels. Peter and John confirm that the body is gone, and Mary Magdalen meets Jesus. Joseph of Arimathea is accused in the Sanhedrim of having aided the disciples in stealing Jesus' body; Nicodemus has a public breakdown over the events. Caiaphas realizes that he must arrest Jesus' disciples in order to prevent them from spreading claims that Jesus has risen from the dead. Cleophas and Mary Cleophas come to the disciples with a story of having met Jesus on the road to Emmaus. As Claudia and Pilate leave the city, Claudia hears gossip that people are claiming Jesus rose from the dead. Jesus proves to Thomas that he is real, and Thomas replies: "You are my Lord and my God" (p. 340). Jesus and Peter speak and Peter is forgiven, and Jesus ascends into heaven.
There are many specific choices that have to be made in a cycle like this, and there are many things that can be done in different ways, but the choices Sayers makes contributes to an excellent story. Two things in particular are outstanding. The first is her portrayal of the political scheming of Caiaphas, which I think partly comes out in the summary above. He has to outmaneuver the Zealots, and he has to outmaneuver Rome. He has to outwit Pilate, who has every reason to be noncooperative, and he has to outmaneuver his opponents in the Sanhedrim, some of whom sympathize with Jesus and some of whom, while not sympathizing with Jesus, would be more than happy to see Caiaphas fall on his face, and what is more, he has to do so on a point of Law in a room full of rabbis on the spur of the moment. And all of his maneuvering is successful, but it all comes to nothing in the end.
The second is the portrayal of Judas Iscariot, the only disciple who actually understands the truth that Jesus' kingdom cannot be political, and who is destroyed by not recognizing the limits of his understanding. He is an intellectual idealist, as Sayers says at one point, and, like so many intellectuals and academics who spend their lives in a world of highminded ideas, has difficulty distinguishing between his ideal of something and the way it really ought to be, and ends up devoting everything to the former rather than the latter. She also does very well at portraying his frustration that his intelligence is not getting him special consideration, and his devastation at the discovery that he was all the time just a pawn in the games of far more practically competent schemers, and not the brilliant strategist he had convinced himself he was. It is an extraordinary depiction of the corruption and self-destruction of an intellectual.
Favorite Passage: This passage, shortly after the Triumphal Entry and just before the Passover supper, captures perfectly the complete cluelessness of the disciples about what is about to smash into them broadside:
JESUS: The Kingdom is very near.
MATTHEW: And 'ere we sit, a-tasting of it, in a manner of speaking, beforehand. There sits the Master, like it might be in his royal palace, with his counsellors about him--John one side and Judas the other--between the 'eart and brains of the undertaking, as you might say.
JUDAS (unpleasantly): I am glad to learn what is John's official capacity.
ANDREW: My brother had a position given him too. Hadn't you? And a title.
PETER: That'll do, Andrew.
JAMES: Keeper of the Keys, wasn't it?
ANDREW: There you are! Judge of the Supreme Court.
JUDAS: It sounds more like the Head Gaoler.
ANDERW: Judas, that's rude....No, Peter was to be the foundation-stone of the Church.
NATHANAEL: High Priest then.
JAMES (slightly shocked): Oh, but he's not of a priestly house. Now our father Zebedee--
PHILIP: Of course, James, of course. All right--John shall be High Priest and Judas the Lord Treasurer.
MATTHEW: Don't I get anything? I've been a government official. A bad job, and a dashed bad government--still, experience counts for something.
THOMAS: Are all the appointments going to you people at the head of the table?
JUDE: That's right, Thomas. How about you and me and Simon here?
(pp. 244-245)
Recommendation: Sayers does excellent work in fulfilling her goal of telling that story; Highly Recommended.
****
Dorothy L. Sayers, The Man Born to be King. Gollancz (London: 1969).
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